McDowell's force was recalled to the capital city.

"Our

condition is one of considerable danger," wrote Stanton, "as we are stripped to supply the Army of the Potomac and now have the enemy here." McDowell had promptly sent off Shields with his division, who now retraced the steps he had taken but a few days before; the rest of the force for the Shenandoah valley followed after. McDowell himself went to see the President for counsel and then took command in person. May 26 it was known that Banks had effected his crossing of the Potomac at Williamsport, that the Federal capital was secure, and that Harper's Ferry still remained in our possession, and its garrison with the reinforcements on the way ought to be able to resist any probable attack. Hearing of the movements of Shields and Frémont, Jackson began on May 30 a rapid retreat. The President had a distinct plan for his capture or destruction which was to be accomplished by the converging movements of the several forces upon Strasburg, surrounding him and cutting off his retreat to the south. In the direction of this campaign Lincoln issued instructions in person or by telegraph to the different commanders, and from the White House and War Department continued daily to despatch orders. The plan was too complicated to succeed, being such an one as Lee himself would hardly have undertaken at so great a

1 May 25, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 241.

2 Stanton and Meigs were again alarmed for the safety of Washington, May 29, on information received from Banks. The information should not have been credited. Their fear was groundless and was not shared by the President. O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 532 et seq.; part iii. p. 275.

3 Ibid., pp. 243, 248, 251.

4 Jackson's report, ibid., part i. p. 707.

5 Shields as well as McDowell had been called to Washington,

History of the Civil War in America, Comte de Paris, Am. ed., vol. ii. p. 47. General Sherman wrote his brother: "Banks's repulse was certain. Three converging armies whose point was in possession of the enemy was worse generalship than they tried to force on me in Kentucky of diverging lines with a superior enemy between. Our people must respect the wellestablished principles of the art of war, else successful fighting will produce no results."- Sherman Letters, p. 155.

distance from the field of operations. Moreover, in Banks and Frémont Lincoln had imperfect instruments for military designs; it was too much to expect that they would be efficient in a piece of intricate strategy.

The President urged Banks to follow the Confederates as they retreated, but he and his soldiers were demoralized. The commander of the Harper's Ferry garrison received like instructions; but while Jackson was retreating, some of his men, fearing an attack from the dreaded Confederate general, ran away. Both of these forces should have been at Jackson's heels harassing him, but they did practically nothing. It was five o'clock on the afternoon of May 24, while at Franklin, that Frémont received the order to march southward to Harrisonburg. For what he considered abundant reasons in the matter of unobstructed roads and available supplies, he went northward instead, and failed to communicate with the War Department for two days, when the President learning of his whereabout sent him this sharp despatch: "I see you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?" Receiving his excuses without a word of censure in rejoinder, Lincoln urged him forward. Although complaining of stormy weather, heavy roads, and many stragglers, and deeming it imperative to give his army one day's rest, Frémont promised to be at Strasburg with his 17,000 men Saturday, May 31, at five o'clock in the afternoon. The President had directed McDowell to be at Front Royal within supporting distance of Frémont at the same time. McDowell pushed forward Shields's division with celerity, and had it at the appointed place a day in advance; the rest of his 20,000 troops came up in time to be of assistance. But Frémont failed. Jackson made a swift march in spite of storm and mud. "Through the blessing of an ever-kind Providence," he wrote, "I passed Strasburg before the Federal armies under Generals Shields

1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 290 et ante, also pp. 296, 303; part i. p. 531 et seq.

and Frémont effected the contemplated junction in my rear." 1 Frémont and Shields pursued the Confederate general. There were two more battles in which he was victorious; indeed, after he had eluded the two armies May 31 and June 1, his safety was practically assured. June 8 the President ordered that the pursuit be stopped.2 Stonewall Jackson's campaign of one month was distinguished by rapid marches, energetic and successful fighting. With an effective force of 17,000 he had won a number of battles, taken rich spoil and many prisoners, alarmed Washington, and prevented 40,000 men from joining the Union army before Richmond.3

A careful study of this campaign leaves one doubting the wisdom of sending the detachment from McDowell to the Shenandoah valley. It must be borne in mind that Lincoln then knew almost exactly the size of Jackson's army.1 McDowell called the President's order "a crushing blow," obeyed it with "a heavy heart," and argued against it with a force it is difficult with the facts now before us to countervail: indeed we may easily believe that if he had commanded all the troops except McClellan's he would have managed affairs better than did the President. Although he made the mistake at first of underestimating Jackson's force, it is certain that with the special duty assigned him of protecting the Federal capital he would have run no risk on that score. A suspension of his forward movement, the sending of part of his force directly to Washington, whence it could easily be brought back, would have made that city absolutely secure, and kept his army well in hand for offensive opera

1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 277 et seq., part i. p. 645 et seq., also p. 711; Dabney.

2 O. R., vol. xii. part i. p. 653, part iii. p. 354. McDowell spoke of Frémont's "vigorous pursuit," ibid., p. 325.

3 On this campaign the Life of Stonewall Jackson by Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson (vol. i.) may be read with interest; see Ropes's Civil War, part ii. p. 115 et seq.

O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 32; vol. xii. part iii. p. 243.

5 Ibid., p. 220.

6 This error lasted only two days. Ibid., pp. 221, 243.

1

tions, should Jackson cease his advance. The dispiriting effect of this campaign's failure and the disorganization consequent on this derangement of McDowell's plans were apparent as late as June 27, so that a large part of his army was neutralized at a time of active operations about Richmond. Jackson's design went no further than to threaten an invasion into Maryland with a menace to the Federal capital; he sent word to Richmond that if the authorities would increase his force to 40,000 he would march on Washington, but it was not practicable to furnish such a reinforcement.2

It is true that Richmond was easily ours if McDowell with 30,000 or 40,000 men had joined McClellan, and the joint army had been handled with the energy which the situation demanded; but since McClellan did not skilfully dispose in battle his hundred thousand, it is difficult to believe that he would have managed the larger undertaking better. Moreover his feeling towards McDowell was unfriendly. Their respective orders were difficult to harmonize, and efficient and generous co-operation on McClellan's part was hardly to be looked for. But McDowell thirsted to retrieve his defeat at Bull Run, and had he arrived near the scene of action on the Chickahominy a little before May 31, it is possible that under the command of McClellan or independently he would have struck a decisive blow.

McClellan seemed to be aware that while Jackson was making havoc in the Shenandoah valley he should embrace the opportunity to strike at Johnston. "The time is very near when I shall attack Richmond;" "We are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle,' were his telegrams on successive days to the President.*

1 McDowell's Testimony, C. W., part i. p. 266.

2 Life of Jackson by his wife, p. 263; Dabney, p. 386; J. Davis to Jackson, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 905.

3 O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 27, 28, 30, part iii. pp. 176, 184; Webb's The Peninsula, p. 87.

4 May 25, 26, O. R., vol. xi. part i. pp. 32,

33.

McClellan had an army of 100,000; Johnston had 63,000.1 Yet it is doubtful whether McClellan would have taken the initiative. He never reached his "ideal completeness of preparation," and he fell short of understanding the opposing commander, even as he failed to arrive at a correct estimate of the enemy's force. "Richmond papers," he telegraphed, May 27, "urge Johnston to attack, now he has us away from gunboats. I think he is too able for that." 3 On the same day in a letter to his wife he told of his arrangements for "the approaching battle. The only fear," he continued, "is that Joe's heart may fail him."5 Four days later Johnston did attack, and with a measure of success, owing to McClellan's faulty disposition of his force. At the time of this battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines (which took place May 31), McClellan, who had advanced from Williamsburg on the east side of the Chickahominy, had only two of his five corps on the Richmond side of the river. It is true that a division of his army was necessary, for a part of it must be left on the north side of the river, both to cover the railroad that ran to White House, his base of supplies, and furthermore to insure a safe and effective junction with McDowell, which, as we have seen, was expected as late as May 24. But McClellan's distribution of his strength was wrong; for, inasmuch as Johnston could in little more than half a day concentrate

1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 204. For Johnston's force I have followed the computation of G. W. Smith, Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 219, but Johnston in his article in that book estimates his own force at 73,928 (p. 209). Robert M. Hughes in his biography of Johnston, p. 148, seems to accept this figure. See an interesting computation of General F. W. Palfrey in Papers of the Military Historical Society of Mass., vol. i. p. 170, where he arrives at the figure of 71,000, but he places McClellan's army at 100,000 to 110,000. All the authorities of weight, however, agree that the Federals outnumbered the Confederates at the time of the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines, in about the proportion of 3 to 2.

2 General F. W. Palfrey, Papers of the Mil. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. i. p. 168.

3 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 193.

Joseph Johnston.

5 McClellan's Own Story, p. 397.