concealed by a violent storm of wind and rain, he successfully withdrew his army to the north side of the river. Lee was not aware of the magnitude of his victory. Expecting that the Federals would renew the attack, he did not follow up his advantage. Pollard writes that the Southern public anticipated that their shattered foe, who was cut off from escape by the river in his rear, would be annihilated.1 The feeling in regard to Lee might have found expression in the words of Barcas, a Carthaginian, after the battle of Cannæ: "You know, Hannibal, how to gain a victory, but not how to use it." Burnside's loss in killed, wounded, and missing was heavy, but it was as nothing compared with the loss in the army's morale. Officers and soldiers, feeling that they had been put to a useless sacrifice, had lost confidence in their commander. At a review of the Second Corps he was received with such coldness that Sumner asked Couch2 to call upon the men for cheers. Couch and the division commanders rode along the lines and waved their caps or swords, but did not elicit a single encouraging response. Some soldiers even gave vent to derisive cries. Had McClellan appeared before them to take command once more, the air would have rung with joyful shouts. The Democrats and some of the Republicans clamored for his restoration to the head of the army, but Lincoln could not of course entertain seriously the proposal. Burnside remained its general, and the President sent to its officers and soldiers the best measure possible of congratulation. But the demoralization of the army was complete. Officers resigned and great numbers of men deserted. 1 The Second Year of the War, p. 195. The weight of military authority is against the soundness of such an anticipation. Longstreet, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 83; Allan, p. 513; Dabney, p. 628. 2 Now commander of the Second Corps. 3 Walker, Second Army Corps, p. 198. 4 Welles, Diary, Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 267; W. P. Cutler's Diary, entry Dec. 18; Boston Courier, Dec. 23; N. Y. Herald, Jan. 10, 1863; see, also, Wright's speech in the House, Jan. 30, 1863, Globe Appendix, p. 76. Although Burnside was weighed down with distress, the magnanimous nature of the man would not let go unchallenged the report gaining currency that he had been forced to the attack by orders of the President. The President, the Secretary of War, the General-in-Chief gave me no orders; the whole management was left in my hands; I am entirely responsible for the failure, he wrote in his first account of the battle. This was exactly true, but the laying bare of the whole correspondence has been necessary to convince many that this despatch in which he assumed the whole blame was not dictated to him from Washington. Lincoln was much depressed at the disaster, the responsibility of which he must share with his general, since he had placed him in command. In the early part of December, Halleck had conceived that the paramount anxiety of the President for a victory was the necessity of counteracting the sentiment in Great Britain which favored joining France in an intervention in our contest.2 It was, indeed, true that the fear of foreign complications contributed to the solicitude born of the consciousness that he was losing rapidly his hold on the people of the North, which he then knew, as we all now know, was the requisite of success. "I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since," he said, September 22, the day on which he submitted his proclamation of emancipation to his cabinet. Since then he had suffered defcat at the ballot-box and in the field; and the defeat in battle was aggravated in the popular estimation by his mistaken change of commanders, on which no more severe comment could be made than Burnside's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War which was speedily given to the public. 1 Dec. 17, O. R., vol. xxi. p. 67. 2 Ibid., vol. xx. part ii. p. 123. 3 Warden's Chase, p. 482. 8 4 Burnside's testimony (as to the nature of it, see p. 189) was taken Dec. 19, and published in the N. Y. Tribune Dec. 24. See Boston Courier, Dec. 25. The hopes of the Confederacy were high. The correspondent of the London Times wrote from Lee's headquarters: December 13 will be "a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic."1 Some such thought occurred to the people of the North when they came to know the story of the battle of Fredericksburg. Grief, as great as any told in epic, in drama, or in novel, wrung their hearts at the useless sacrifice of so many noble souls. Gloom followed. "This is a day of darkness and peril to the country. . . . Under McClellan nothing was accomplished; now Burnside fails on the first trial;" an elastic and stout-hearted people has been brought to the brink of despondency; the North has lost heart and hope; we do not absolutely despair of the Republic: 3 such are the reflections of public opinion we meet with in the chronicles of the time. The feeling of those in the inner councils of the nation was undoubtedly expressed by Meigs. "Every day's consumption of your army," he wrote Burnside, "is an immense destruction of the natural and monetary resources of the country. The country begins to feel the effect of this exhaustion, and I begin to apprehend a catastrophe. . . . I begin to doubt the possibility of maintaining the contest beyond this winter unless the popular heart is encouraged by victory on the Rappahannock. . . . As day after day has gone, my heart has sunk, and I see greater peril to our nationality in the present condition of affairs than I have seen at any time during the struggle." 4 1 Issue of Jan. 13, 1863. 2 W. P. Cutler, M. C. from Ohio, in his diary entry of Dec. 16, Biographical Sketch, p. 296. 3 N. Y. World, Dec. 24; N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 26; Boston Courier, Dec. 29. Joseph Medill, editor of the Chicago Tribune, while penning or dictating hopeful leaders in his journal, thus wrote privately to Colfax: "Our people all have the blues.' The feeling of utter hopelessness is stronger than at any time since the war began. The terrible bloody defeat of our brave army at Fredericksburg leaves us almost without hope."- Hollister's Colfax, p. 203. 4 Dec. 30, O. R., vol. xxi. p. 916. Burnside's energy took an almost frenzied turn. In spite of the disaffection in his army, which extended from the highest generals to the privates, he decided to cross the river a few miles below Fredericksburg and again attack the Confederates. He had already commenced operations when the President, to whom had been brought home vividly the feeling in the army towards its commander, sent him this despatch: "I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know." He suspended the orders for the advance and went immediately to Washington. The knowledge that we have of his conferences with the President, the Secretary of War, and the General-in-Chief show us Burnside perturbed, Stanton and Halleck lacking judgment and decision and unequal to the responsibility that should have been theirs, and Lincoln in a state of painful perplexity which seemed to reach, on New Year's Day, 1863, a culmination. Burnside told the President that Stanton and Halleck "had not the confidence of the officers and soldiers," nor, in his belief, of the country at large. He intimated strongly that they ought to be removed, while he himself "ought to retire to private life." The President, harassed by doubts, wrote to Halleck with pardonable irritation, saying, in effect, Do come to some decision in regard to General Burnside's plan of advance. "Your military skill is useless to me if you will not do this." This resulted in an offer of resignation of his place by the General-in-Chief and the withdrawal of the letter by the President "because considered harsh by General Halleck." 2 No determination was reached. Burnside returned to the army, where, in spite of the almost unanimous opposition of his general officers, he resolved upon another crossing of the river, and wrote the President to this effect, enclosing his resignation in case the movement were disapproved.3 Lincoln gave a qualified consent, adding an injunction different 1 O. R., vol. xxi. p. 900. 2 Ibid., p. 940 et seq. from that he had been accustomed to send McClellan: "Be cautious and do not understand that the government or country is driving you." He said further, "I do not yet see how I could profit by changing the command of the Army of the Potomac." Burnside prepared for an advance. Franklin said that success was impossible. Hooker, as free and emphatic in the criticism of his present commander as he had been of McClellan, declared that the projected movement was absurd, and the chances of failure nineteen to one. Officers and privates generally agreed with Franklin and Hooker. It was fortunate that the elements interfered in their favor. A severe storm occurred, and rain fell without ceasing. Burnside, tormented by lack of sleep, still persisted with desperate energy. The orders to march were given, but the deep mud made it impossible to move the artillery, the pontoons, the ammunition and supply wagons. The Confederates on the other side of the river bantered the Union pickets, asking if they should not come over and help build the bridges. The movement known in the annals of the army as the "mud campaign" was perforce abandoned, yet Burnside was still stubborn and his excitement did not abate. He prepared an order removing Hooker, Franklin, and many other officers of the army. He went to see the President, and asked for the approval of this order or the acceptance of his resignation as major-general. The President took time for reflection, and concluded to relieve Burnside and place Hooker in command of the Army of the Potomac.3 1 Jan. 8, 1863, O. R., vol. xxi. p. 954. 2 General Order No. 8, Jan. 23, ibid., p. 998. 3 The same order relieved Sumner at his own request; and also Franklin. It was one of the unfortunate results of Fredericksburg that Franklin, who had undoubted military talent, was lost to the service. The Committee on the Conduct of the War injured him in the public estimation by reporting that if he had attacked the enemy in sufficient force, "the plan of General Burnside would have been completely successful." - C. W., part i. p. 67. But see Palfrey, pp. 174-182. "The press has now killed McClellan, Buell, Fitz John Porter, Sumner, Franklin, and Burnside. Add my name and I am not ashamed of the association. If the press can govern the country, |