no intrenchments in his front, since he had occupied the ground only during the night and early morning preceding the battle.1 Franklin and General William F. Smith 2 relate that about five o'clock in the afternoon of December 12 Burnside visited the left of his army and had a conference with them and John F. Reynolds. Franklin, fortified by a previous discussion in which Smith and Reynolds had agreed with him, urged Burnside to let him attack the enemy's right with a column of at least 30,000 at daylight the next day; he further recommended that to make the necessary dispositions and to get the aid needed from Hooker, the orders should be issued as early as possible. Burnside neither approved nor disapproved Franklin's suggestion, but promised him his directions before midnight. Franklin passed the night in "sleepless anxiety," waiting for the order from his general, which came at about seven in the morning, and was interpreted by him to direct that he should make an armed reconnaissance with one division, while Burnside's real meaning was that he should attack the enemy with one division well supported. The order was indeed ambiguous, and especially so if taken in connection with the conversation of the evening before. Franklin sent Meade's division to the attack. It gained the crest of the hill, but not being strongly enough supported, although several other divisions had been sent into action, was driven back. It is thought that if the onset had been made with a large force Lee's right would have been turned.

On Burnside's right was lost forever his reputation as a general. He determined "to seize" Marye's Heights — a hill, at the bottom of which was a stone wall, "strengthened by a trench" and "heavily lined with the enemy's infantry," while the crest 66 was crowned with batteries." 5

1 Life of Jackson, p. 604.

Where

2 The commander of the Sixth Corps in Franklin's grand division.

3 The commander of the First Corps in Franklin's grand division. 4 Dec. 13.

p. 460.

See Ropes's discussion of this order, Civil War, part ii.

Humphrey's report.

there were not cannon in earthworks, there were rifle-pits filled with sharpshooters. Couch and Hancock had told Burnside that the heights were fortified and that it would be difficult to take them. This caused him irritation, but did not induce caution.1 The day before the battle Couch sent Francis A. Walker of his staff to the commander, to tell him that the enemy would make a stand upon the hills in the rear of the town, "that a deep trench or canal ran around Fredericksburg, which would prove a serious obstacle to the passage of troops debouching from the town to assault the works on the hills behind." Nervousness and obstinacy caused Burnside," the sweetest, kindest, most true-hearted of men, loving and lovable," to reply with asperity that "he himself had occupied Fredericksburg with the Ninth Corps the August before" he knew the ground and Couch was mistaken.2

The order to be ready came in the early morning; the word of attack was received before noon. The Union soldiers advanced over the plain between the town and the stone wall, ground which Longstreet's superintendent of artillery said, "we' cover so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it." The canal interfered with their deployment, and the fire was therefore the more destructive. But generals and soldiers had their orders, and forward they went. No higher courage could be shown. Intelligent as brave, they felt their effort hopeless, yet did their very best to carry the stone wall. Hancock led a charge of 5000, and lost two out of every five of his veterans, of whom 156 were commissioned officers, "able and tried commanders."5"Six times did the enemy," wrote Lee, "notwithstanding the havoc caused by our batteries, press on with great determination to within 100 yards of the foot of the hill, but here, encountering the deadly fire

1 Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 108.

2 Walker, Second Army Corps, pp. 137, 155.

3 Dec. 13.

4 Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 79.

5 Hancock's report.

"Oh, great

of our infantry, his columns were broken."1 God!" cried Couch, "see how our men, our poor fellows, are falling." "It is only murder now." 2 "Fighting Joe Hooker," who until that day had never seen fighting enough, felt that he could make no more impression upon the Cónfederate works than upon "the side of a mountain of rock." Putting spurs to his horse, he rode across the river and begged Burnside to desist from further attack. The commander was obstinate, and declared that the work of assault must go on.3 Humphreys, "the knight without reproach or fear," then led a bayonet charge of 4500 troops who had never been in battle before. "The stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and flanks of the column." In brief time over a thousand men were killed and wounded. "The column turned." The regiments retired slowly, and in good order, many of the soldiers "singing and hurrahing." 5

This ended the battle. The Confederate loss was 5377; the Union 12,653, of the flower of the army. The next day Burnside was wild with grief. "Oh, those men! those men over there!" he said, pointing across the river where lay the dead and wounded, "I am thinking of them all the time." 6 This anguish combined with his debility from loss of sleep to drive him to a desperate plan. He thought of putting himself at the head of his old corps, the Ninth, and leading them in person in an assault on the Confederates behind the stone wall. Sumner advised him against such an attack, as did Franklin and several corps and division commanders. He gave it up. On the night of December 15, his movement

1 Lee's report. I do not cite the concluding clause, as the statement is disputed by Federal writers.

2 Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 113; Second Army Corps, p. 175. C. W., part i. p. 668.

4 Walker's Hancock, p. 68.

Humphrey's report. When matters on his right were going so badly, Burnside sent this word: "Tell General Franklin that I wish him to make a vigorous attack with his whole force." This was not done. See the dis

cussion of this incident by Palfrey, p. 174.

& Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 138.