position on the Warrenton turnpike, mocked and taunted the troops leaving the field of Bull Run, jeered at the new route to Richmond, and made no secret of their glee at the downfall of McClellan's rival. In order to "avoid great disaster," it was Pope's advice that the army be drawn back to the intrenchments in front of Washington.2 Halleck in his disquietude had already telegraphed to Burnside at Falmouth, "Embark your troops as rapidly as possible for Alexandria." 3 McClellan did not "regard Washington as safe against the rebels. If I can quietly slip over there," he said in a letter to his wife, "I will send your silver off."4 September 1 he went to Washington at the request of Halleck, who placed him in command of the defences of the capital and its garrisons. Towards evening of this day the advance of the Confederates occasioned the combat of Chantilly, which had no important result except that the killing of Generals Philip Kearny and Isaac I. Stevens deepened the gloom on the Union side.5

September 2 was an anxious day in Washington. Early in the morning came a despatch from Pope which told a sad tale of the demoralization of the army and the excessive straggling from the regiments of the Potomac army. "Unless something can be done," he continued, "to restore tone to this army, it will melt away before you know it." The President knew the one remedy, and in spite of the bitter opposition and remonstrance he was certain to encounter, placed McClellan in command of all the troops for the defence of the capital.8 Halleck had already ordered Pope to bring his forces within or near the lines of the fortifications;

1 Gen. Chas. F. Walcott, Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass., vol. ii. p. 144.

2 Sept. 1.

8 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 774.

4 12.30 P. M., Aug. 31, Own Story, p. 352.

5 Cox's Reminiscences, MS.

6 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 797.

7 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 23.

8 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 807; McClellan's Own Story, p. 566.

there his authority passed to McClellan. In view of the "great danger to Washington," the general-in-chief asked Dix at Fort Monroe to send as rapidly as possible to the capital as large a part of the remainder of Keyes's corps as could be spared, and urged Burnside to hasten forward his troops.1 A number of gun-boats were ordered up the river, and anchored at different points in proximity to the city, and a war steamer was brought to the Navy Yard.2 All the clerks and employés of the civil departments, and all employés in the public buildings were called to arms for the defence of the capital. The sale of spirituous liquors at retail within the District of Columbia was prohibited. Excitement and alarm held undisputed sway.5

McClellan, elated at being called to the rescue, went forward to meet his soldiers. Encountering Cox, he said, “Well, General, I am in command again." Warm congratulations ensued. The two rode on until they met the advancing column of the army, Pope and McDowell at its head. When it became known that McClellan had been placed in command, cheers upon cheers from the head to the rear of the column were given, "with wild delight."6 Inspired by the confidence of his men, he wrought with zeal. His talent for organization had full play, and in a few days he had his army ready for an active campaign. Lincoln's comment ran, "McClellan is working like a beaver. He seems to be aroused to doing something by the sort of snubbing he got last week." 7

At the cabinet meeting of September 2 the opposition to McClellan broke forth, with Chase and Stanton so earnest

1 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. pp. 798, 799.

2 Wash. Eve. Star, Sept. 2, 3.

3 O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 807.

4 Nat. Int., Sept. 2.

5 Wash. corr., Sept. 2, N. Y. Herald; Wash. Ere. Star, Sept. 3.

Cox

6 Cox's Reminiscences, MS.; McClellan's Own Story, pp. 547, 567. gives a graphic account of McClellan's apparently studied manner of responding to the cheers of his soldiers that "seemed to carry a little of personal good fellowship even to the humblest private soldier."

7 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 28.

that they fell to invective. Chase maintained that as a military commander he had been a failure, that his neglect to urge forward reinforcements to Pope proved him unworthy of trust, and "that giving command to him was equivalent to giving Washington to the rebels." "This, and more, I said," sets down Chase in his diary. All the members of the cabinet except Seward and Blair "expressed a general concurrence." Lincoln was distressed and perplexed; "he would gladly resign his place; "2 but he argued that under the existing circumstances, McClellan was the best man for the command an argument to which subsequent events gave force. Chase replied that Hooker, Sumner, or Burnside could do the work required better than McClellan.3

The President again offered the command of the army in the field to Burnside, who again declined it, saying: I do not think that there is any one who can do as much with that army as McClellan, if matters can be so arranged as to remove yours and the Secretary of War's objections to him.1 The intelligence came that Lee with his army was crossing the Potomac into Maryland. The Union troops must be sent in pursuit, and a commander for them must be designated. The President said to McClellan, "General, you will take command of the forces in the field."5 To Pope this word was sent: "The Armies of the Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, you will report for orders to the Secretary of War:"6 thus ended his service as a general of the Civil War.

1 Seward was out of the city.

2 Cf. Washington's regret that he had not resigned the office of President. Jefferson's Anas, cited by McMaster, vol. ii. p. 112.

3 Warden, p. 459 et seq. Sidney Howard Gay, managing editor of the N. Y. Tribune, wrote A. S. Hill, its Washington correspondent: "What is the meaning of this appointment of a man as commander of the armies whom Mr. Lincoln has said over and over again is incompetent? Will Stanton resign? Will he be put out if he don't?"— A. S. Hill papers, MS.

C. W., part i. p. 650.

5 Ibid., pp. 451, 453, 470. This was probably as early as Sept. 5. See O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 182; vol. xii. part iii. p. 812; Own Story, p. 567. 6 Sept. 5, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 813.

7 The sequences of Pope's Virginia campaign, other than those men

tioned in the text, were the loss to the active army of the services of McDowell and Fitz John Porter as well as Pope, all of whom in happier circumstances might have been useful to the country. All had military ability and patriotism. The feeling in the army against Pope and McDowell was bitter; to some extent this was reflected in public sentiment. Pope's orders despatched him to the Northwest to watch the Indian tribes. McDowell, from whom Fortune's wavering wheel ever turned backward, was relieved from command. - Warden's Chase, pp. 462, 463; O. R., vol. xix. part ii. p. 197. The radical Republicans and friends of Pope demanded a victim. This they had in Fitz John Porter. He was tried before a general court-martial, which assembled Nov. 27, 1862, and was sentenced "to be cashiered and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States." The sentence was approved by the President. The most damaging evidence against Porter was his despatches to Burnside, who, carelessly but with goodness of heart, transmitted them to Halleck for the President's eyes. (See Burnside's testimony before the court-martial.) Porter, feeling that he had been wronged, appealed frequently for a review of his case. President Hayes in 1878 ordered a Board of Army Officers to examine the record of the court-martial and any new evidence. — O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 512. This board, at whose head was General Schofield, exonerated Porter. President Hayes submitted the matter to Congress, which took no action. President Arthur, May 4, 1882, by proclamation remitted so much of the sentence as had not been fully executed. — Ibid., p. 535. July 1, 1886, President Cleveland approved an act for the relief of Fitz John Porter. Aug. 5 he was commissioned as colonel of infantry in the U. S. Army to rank from May 14, 1861, but without back pay. Century War Book, vol. ii. p. 692; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 12. The record of the proceedings of the court-martial and the Board of Army Officers is printed in Sen. Docs., No. 47, 1st Sess., 46th Cong. In an article "An Undeserved Stigma" (N. A. Rev., Dec. 1882) General Grant espoused warmly Porter's cause, the more remarkable as when President he had decided against Porter. Excellent reviews of the case by Ropes and Col. Thos. L. Livermore may be found in vol. ii. of the Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. of Mass. See, also, Der Feldzug in Nord-Virginia in Aug., 1862, von Major F. Mangold, pp. 334, 335; contrariwise the Second Battle of Bull Run, J. D. Cox.

Although Pope testified strongly against Porter at the court-martial, he considered McClellan responsible for his lack of success. -O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 808. Oct. 20 he wrote Halleck, "The greatest criminal is McClellan." - Ibid., p. 821.

Two passages from Halleck's letter to Pope of Sept. 5 are worth citing: "The troops at present are under McClellan's orders, and it is evident that you cannot serve under him willingly. . . . The differences and ill-feeling among the generals are very embarrassing to the administration, and unless checked will ruin the country." — Ibid., p. 812.

CHAPTER XVIII

LET us take a look at Lee, as Longstreet has drawn his picture. Instead of the well-formed, dignified soldier, mounted at the head of his troops, and exhibiting in every movement the alertness and vigor of rich manhood, we have now before us the closet student, poring over his maps and papers, with an application so intense as sometimes to cause his thoughts to run no longer straight. Often on these occasions he would send for Longstreet and say that his ideas were working in a circle and that he needed help to find a tangent. He was now at Chantilly, in the midst of one of these perplexities. He had no intention of attacking the enemy in his fortifications about Washington, for he could not invest them and could not properly supply his army. He must either fall back to a more convenient base or invade Maryland. In that State, so allied in sympathy with his own, he even hoped for a rising in his favor, but at all events deemed it likely that he could "annoy and harass the enemy." He would strike alarm to Washington and Baltimore, and would enter Pennsylvania. Perhaps in the chances of war he might win a decisive battle and conquer a peace. His soldiers were ragged, and many of them were destitute of shoes. The army lacked "much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation." "Still," Lee wrote, "we cannot afford to be idle; we shall encounter without fear the troops of McClellan and Pope, both of which we have beaten and both of which are much weakened and demoralized." He decided to cross the Potomac. Nothing occasioned him uneasiness but "supplies of ammunition and subsistence." With this project in contemplation, he talked with Longstreet.