deemed a blow to his self-respect: he would have resigned his commission. Here, though, must be taken into account the problem of the working man, how in that event was he to get a living for himself, his wife, and child. He had already written his friend William H. Aspinwall, a man of large business connections in New York City, that if he lost the command of the Army of the Potomac he should give up the service; anticipating this contingency, he adds, “Be kind enough to cast your eyes about you to see whether there is anything I can do in New York to earn a respectable support for my family."2 This was July 19. Three weeks later his feeling is thus expressed: "Their [the government's] game is to force me to resign; mine will be to force them to place me on leave of absence." The natural and comprehensible desire to continue receiving the pay of a MajorGeneral was one reason, if not the main reason, why he did not resent by a signal act the humiliation of supersedure and the overruling of his plan.

Meanwhile a reconnaissance made towards Richmond at the suggestion of Halleck, had resulted in a skirmish in which Hooker drove the Confederates from Malvern Hill. It is from this place that McClellan dates his telegraphic report of it to Halleck, adding: "This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and only 143 miles distant, and I feel confident that with reinforcements I could march this army there in five days." "I have no reinforcements to send you," was Halleck's prompt reply.5 General Sumner had supported MeClellan by sending at the same time a telegram to Washington with the words, “I am convinced that if we had a reinforcement of 20,000 men we

1 "I am tired of serving fools. God help my country! He alone can save it. It is grating to have to serve under the orders of a man whom I know by experience to be my inferior." - Own Story, p. 453, also p. 455.

2 Ibid., p. 451.

8 Ibid., p. 464.

4 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 76.

Aug. 5 and 6, ibid.,

p. 78.

could walk straight into Richmond."1 McClellan's private correspondence and Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War indicate that he entertained the project of a forward movement with the purpose of fighting Lee. This plan was recommended by Hooker, who was so confident of success that he told his commander he would willingly take the advance.2 But McClellan was not made of the stuff which ventures disobedience of orders where final ruin or lasting glory is the issue of the move, and the thought was not translated into action. So loath, however, was he to leave his present position, so impelled by a union of military judgment, patriotism, and selfinterest, that, after receiving Halleck's despatches which informed him that the enemy was fighting Pope and that the most urgent necessity existed for getting additional troops in front of Washington, he went to Fort Monroe and across Chesapeake Bay, travelling sixteen hours in order to have a conversation with his general-in-chief by wire, to learn fully about Pope's movements, and probably to urge with earnestness and force what he had already advised in two despatches of August 12: that he could help Pope with greater certainty and more surely relieve Washington from all danger by a movement on Richmond than by embarking his troops for Aquia Creek. He proposed to make an advance within forty-eight hours, fight a detachment of the enemy between him and the Confederate capital, and if he defeated and captured this estimated force of 18,000, he saw "but little difficulty in pushing rapidly forward into Richmond." He would need no reinforcements unless he were successful, but would then require them to maintain his communications. At 1.40 in the morning of August 14 Halleck said to him over the wires, "There is no change of plans; you will send up your troops as rapidly as possible," and then worn out by fatigue and anxiety left the telegraph office for his bed, to the

1 O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 356.

Letter of Sunday, Aug. 10, Own Story, p. 465; C. W., part i. p. 579.

great disappointment and annoyance of McClellan, who had waited at the other end of the telegraph in hope of a frank interchange of views.1

All this while the removal of the sick by steamers and transports was going on, but not with sufficient promptness to satisfy Halleck. From the commencement he had urged rapid progress. Expecting impossibilities, tortured with the anxiety and responsibility of his office and with the fear that Pope, who was at Culpeper Court House, and Burnside, who was at Falmouth, were in danger of being crushed, whereupon the enemy would move forward to the Potomac, his telegrams assumed, in McClellan's opinion, an "unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone." "There must be no further delay in your movements," he said. "That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained." 2

It is possible but not entirely clear from the correspondence and reports that there was a slight delay at the inception of the movement, caused by McClellan's desire to know what would be done with the army; for this knowledge, he maintained, would enable him to send off the sick to the greatest advantage. But after August 4, the day on which he received the order to withdraw his troops to Aquia Creek, his operations were marked by promptness, order, and zeal. In his despatches he reiterated that there had been no unnecessary delay. From the 8th to the 12th the artillery and cavalry ordered to Burnside were embarked. August 14, the day on which he had hoped to make a final appeal to Halleck for permission to take the offensive, two of his corps began their march towards Yorktown. On the 16th the last of the sick were sent off by water,3 and by August 19 all of the corps

1 O. R., vol. xi. part i. p. 86 et seq.; part iii. pp. 372, 379; McClellan's Own Story, p. 467; conversation between Hooker and Chase, Sept. 25, Warden's Chase, p. 488.

2 Aug. 10, O. R. vol. xi. part i. p. 86.

3 Ibid., pp. 76-90, also part iii. pp. 378, 379. Halleck was not convinced that up to this time the movement had been made with proper celerity. He wrote Stanton, Aug. 30: "The order was not obeyed with the prompt

had reached their different points of embarkation. Porter's sailed from Newport News the 19th and 20th, Heintzelman's from Yorktown the 21st, Franklin's from Fort Monroe the 23d. Sumner had to wait for transports, but on August 27 reached Aquia Creek, which had also been the destination of the others. Meanwhile McClellan had given Keyes directions to garrison Yorktown temporarily; he himself reported for orders at Aquia August 24, and three days later in response to a request from Halleck reached Alexandria.1

66

Our attention is now claimed by Pope's campaign in Virginia, which is from the beginning a story of cross purposes and of energy counteracted by unskilful management and the lack of hearty co-operation. Burnside having refused the command of the Army of the Potomac, in the belief that no one in the service was as well fitted for it as its actual general, and Chase, Stanton, and Pope having failed to induce the President to supersede McClellan with any one else, Halleck finally decided the matter by saying that " McClellan would do very well under orders from himself."2 Pope, however, was still troubled "with grave forebodings of the result," and expressed to the President, the Secretary of War, and to Halleck his "desire to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia and to be returned to the Western country." 3 At first the plan seems to have been that Halleck should take command in the field of the combined armies of McClellan and Pope when their concentration had been effected, but this was abandoned, owing doubtless to his

ness I expected and the national safety, in my opinion, required.” — O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 739.

1 Ibid., vol. xi. part i. p. 90 et seq. Referring to McClellan's movement after Aug. 14, Halleck wrote Stanton that "it was rapidly carried out.". Ibid., vol. xii. part iii. p. 739; see, also, pp. 578, 580, 590, 599, 605 et seq., noting especially McClellan's confidential letter to Burnside.

2 Schuckers's Chase, p. 448.

3 Pope's report of Jan. 27, 1863, O. R., vol. xii. part ii. p. 22.

4 Report of Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, Sen. Doc., 1st Sess. 46th Cong. No. 37, part iii. p. 1697.

unwillingness to assume so great a responsibility. Afterwards Halleck writing to McClellan at Harrison's Landing informed him that when the armies were joined, he should be given the command of all the troops, Pope and Burnside coming immediately under his control. Although the language of this letter is plain, McClellan doubted the sincerity of it.2 Burnside, the common loyal friend of all, went to the Chickahominy to assure him that the purpose thus announced would certainly be executed, but three days later McClellan wrote: "My dear Burn. . . . Yesterday and to-day I have received intelligence from confidential sources leading me to think it probable that Halleck either will not or cannot carry out his intentions in regard to my position as expressed to you." He may have obtained an inkling of a later scheme that some other general than himself or Halleck was to have the supreme command in the field.5

4

Pope was not allowed to return to the West. By July 29 he had pretty well concentrated his army, which consisted of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Sigel," and numbered 43,000. Having threatened Gordonsville, an important railroad centre, he forced Lee to send Jackson from Richmond to oppose his advance, and on the 29th left Washington to take command of the operations in the field. From the nature of the case, public sentiment demanded that the rival of McClellan should assume at once a vigorous offensive, and Pope had given proof by his address to his army that to find the Confederates and defeat them was his own purpose and desire. Varro had taken the place of Fabius, and had

1 Aug. 7, O. R., vol. xi. part iii. p. 360.

2 Own Story, p. 466.

3 Aug. 17, ibid., p. 468; see, also, O. R., vol. xii. part iii. p. 590.

4 Aug. 20, ibid., p. 605.

5 Sen. Doc., 1st Sess. 46th Cong. No. 37, part iii. p. 1697. It is possible that this was the time when the command was offered to Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who declined it. See Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. p. 24.

6 Frémont had declined to serve under his junior in rank, and at his request had been relieved from command.