1. 1913, and Etheridge became the purchaser at the sale.

The defendant in error holds under J. R. Campbell, who purchased the title of Hollingsworth Bros. on May 2, 1912. He also introduced in evidence a release from George J. Bryan, to whom it was claimed the Hollingsworth notes were transferred by the Dallas Land & Loan Company before it made the general assignment for the benefit of creditors, and offered testimony which the Court of Civil Appeals held sufficient to show such transfer. The transfer, however, was not filed for record, and Etheridge had no notice thereof at the time he purchased the notes and lien.

We are of opinion, under the facts stated, that Etheridge was an innocent purchaser of the Hollingsworth notes and lien, and as such entitled to protection. In so far as the record disclosed, the loan company was the owner of the notes, and as such held the superior title to the lots, at the time it made the general assignment for the benefit of creditors. The record title to the notes and lien passed by the assignment to the assignee. It is true the title which the assignee takes under a general assignment is no better than that which the assignor has, and as a general rule only such title will pass to a purchaser under the assignee, whether immediate or remote. But where a purchaser upon the faith of the record pays value, without notice of a secret equity with which the property was affected at the time of the assignment, he acquires such title as the records disclose the assignor owned. Cantrell v. Dyer, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 551, 25 S. W. 1,098.

It is immaterial that the notes were not listed in the inventory. Under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, all the property of the debtor, except that exempt from forced sale, passes to the assignee, whether included in the inventory or not; and parties dealing with the property, who are not in possession of facts sufficient to put them upon inquiry, have a right to rely upon the record as to its true ownership. The transfer of vendor's lien notes is within our registration statutes. It was within the power of Bryan to have taken a written assignment of the notes and to have placed same of record, thus apprising subsequent purchasers of his rights. Having failed to do this, and Etheridge having acquired through the record owner thereof, without notice of Bryan's claim, he is entitled to protection as an innocent purchaser.

the notes

The fact that the notes were past due is immaterial. The purchaser of a past-due note is charged with notice of any defense which the

maker has, but is not charged with notice of the secret equities of third persons. Gee v. Parks, 193 S. W. 767. It follows, therefore, that the title acquired by Etheridge to the lots under the sale foreclosing the lien is superior to that claimed by the defendant in error. Morgan v. Wheeler, 87 Tex. 179, 27 S. W. 54; Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 17 S. W. 909; Cantrell v. Dyer, supra; Loan Association v. Brackett, 91 Tex. 44, 40 S. W. 719.

We are of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and that of the trial court should be reversed, and judgment here rendered for plaintiffs in error.

PHILLIPS, C. J. The judgment recommended by the Commission of Appeals is adopted, and will be entered as the judgment of the Supreme Court.

NOTE.-Transfer of Overdue Paper Cutting Off Secret Equities.-In Gymnasium Co. v. Rockford Nat. Bank, 179 Ill. 599, 54 N. E. 297, 46 L. R. A. 753, 70 Am. St. R. 135, it was said: "The inquiry then must be: Is the fact that the paper is past due when transferred sufficient, of itself, to charge the taker with notice of the latent equities of third parties? Our statute fixes the rights of the maker in such cases upon clear principles of justice, without materially affecting the negotiability of commercial instruments; but to extend the same protection to whoever may have acquired some collateral interest in the paper would be to charge him with knowledge of a fact not within his power of ascertainment and practically destroy the negotiability of overdue instruments." Thus reasoning, it was held in that case that the pledgee of overdue negotiable paper found in the hands of assignee thereof, as received from assignor, was not protected.

In Kelly v. Staed, 136 Mo. 430, 37 S. W. 1,100. 58 Am. St. Rep. 648, that such paper "is only subject in the hands of the indorsee to such equities and defenses as are connected with the note itself, and not such as grow out of transactions disconnected with the note." There is quite an elaborate discussion of Missouri authorities in this case. And in Loewen v. Forsee, 137 Mo. 29, 38 S. W. 712, 59 Am. St. Rep. 489, it was observed, relative to the facts there appearing, that: "Had the note taken by Mrs. Forsee in satisfaction of the indebtedness of her husband to her, and without notice of the existence of the agreement between her husband and Hicks by which the latter's deed of trust was to have preference over that of her husband, the note would not be subject in her hands to any equitable defenses existing between the original parties thereto." In Moffett v. Parker, 71 Minn. 139, 73 N. W. 851, 70 Am. St. Rep. 319, it is said: "It is the settled law of this state that a mortgage has none of the privileges of negotiable paper, but is a mere chose in action; hence an assignee thereof takes it subject to any defense that exists between the original parties, unless they are equitably by their acts, or otherwise, debarred from asserting it as against the assignee. But it does not follow from this proposition that the plaintiffs have any equity superior to the bank to have the mortgage canceled, for it is equally well settled,

at least in this state, that the assignee of a mere chose in action or of past-due negotiable paper takes it subject to the equities of the original parties thereto, but not as to any equities of third parties of which he has no notice." Italics are those of the author of this note.

It would seem that there is an exception to this doctrine found in an Indiana decision by its Appellate Court, wherein it is said that: "It is a most salutory rule, and one which the courts should strictly enforce, that anyone who purchases a note not governed by the law merchant should at once notify the maker of the change of ownership, if he desires to be protected against defenses afterwards acquired by the maker; and the maker of the note is thus placed upon his guard and warned not to extend credit to the payee, upon the supposition that the same will be a credit upon his contract when the time for settlement arrives." Cox, Receiver, v. Bank of Westfield, 18 Ind. App. 248, 47 N. E. 841. But would not this necessarily be an equity not arising out of the transaction between original parties, whether the note were acquired before due or after due?

It seems to me that the rule supported by the instant case is the just one and one to which the taker of a past-due obligation trusts to transferrer to reveal the then condition of things by the giving of such information as may be verified by such taker. In other words, the purchaser does not buy something that may have little or no value whatever, because of some equity accruing to one not directly there from arising. C.

ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL

INTEREST.

THE END OF THE STORM

Lawyers are always appreciative of effective figures of speech. One which struck us as being very effective, and in which the analogies are as logical as they are encouraging, appeared in a recent editorial in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. We quote:

"A great storm does not come to an end instantly. After the thunders cease, and even after the winds are stilled, the waves continue to beat the shores furiously. It is so with the great conflicts among men. The thunders of colossal war stopped on November 11, 1918, but the surge of the forces it had created could not be checked by an armistice. The year just closed has been a trying one for mankind. The normal processes of civilization had been violently disturbed. New currents had set in, creating dangerous whirlpools. The blackness of night had lifted, but heavy clouds remained. The winds still blew in uncertain and conflicting directions. Equilibrium was lost and action and reaction battled for its restoration. But every storm must have its end; every tempest must subside. Equilibrium is the normal state of nature, and whenever and however it is disturbed, the balancing forces surely rally for its

re-establishment and inevitably the calm suc

ceeds.

"Slowly, gradually, but with absolute certainty, the equilibrium of mankind is being restored. It is not easy to realize this when we look abroad upon the world today, for unrest is still manifest, and we are yet bewil dered by the conditions and the problems that we face. But if we look back a year we can see that progress has been made toward subsidence of the waves. Conditions are still confused and complicated, but chaos no longer reigns. The elements and the powers of order are becoming again dominant. Definite form is beginning to emerge. Great problems are approaching solution. Anarchy is consuming itself. Physical necessities are compelling the return of stability, the increase of labor, and the dissipation of hallucinations. Work, the panacea of all ills, is applying its balm to the wounds of war. The griefs and hates are being softened by the soothing hands of time. Slowly, haltingly, with difficulty but surely, humanity is finding the solid ground of Ararat."

BOOK REVIEW.

HUEBNER'S HISTORY OF PRIVATE GERMAN LAW.

The close of the titanic struggle with German militarism will no doubt revive interest in the studies of continental jurisprudence. With the ratification of the Peace Treaty, including some form of international control of world affairs, England and America will become more and more vitally interested in the principles of jurisprudence recognized on the Continent, and a comparative study of the laws of those countries of Europe whose jurisprudence is based on the Civil Law cannot fail to give the common law student a wider conception of the universality of legal concepts and free him from the narrow confines and provincial horizon which has hitherto hedged him about.

Wonderful as has been the growth of the common law, it is a mistake to assume that it is exclusively Anglo-Saxon. The common law Owes much to contributions received from Danes and Normans, who introduced the pure Germanic and Gothic Roman conceptions of legal principles. A study of legal concepts from the historical point of view, therefore, as well as of their development in communities whose manner of life and whose social and business ideals have much in common with our own, cannot help but prove profitable and interesting.

For these reasons and others that will occur to the student of comparative jurisprudence, the lawyers of the country, we are sure, are quite ready to express their sense of obligation to the Committee of the Association of Ameri

can Law Schools, who have at considerable expense and labor translated and published the various treatises in the series known as the Continental Legal History Series, of which the volume now under review is a recent addition. The present work-"The History of Germanic Private Law"-is by Professor Rudolf Heubner, of the University of Gissen. It is a history of the private law of Germanic countries and principalities, whose principles of law are traced back to their sources in the anarchic individualism of the Germanic tribes of the medieval period. Local liberty was, and is today, except as modified by a strong nationalism, the strongest feature of Teutonic life.

The author traces the struggle, more fierce in Germany than elsewhere, from individualism to particularism and then to nationalism, due to social changes. He also shows how the Roman law was received into Germany and how it conquered because of the extreme individualism of Germanic customs which had no curia regis as in England to mold it into shape, correct its defects, and apply it to changed conditions of society. The so-called Reception of Roman Law into Germany was rather an unconscious absorption of its principles by the less civilized tribes of the Teutonic invaders, although not without much opposition. The German law is therefore not Teutonic, nor Roman, but the product of a reconstruction of the tribal customs in recognition of, as well as in opposition to, the principles of Roman law. The Germanic law has reaped the benefit of the strength and popularity of the old tribal common law and customs corrected and improved by contact with the more enlightened concepts of Roman law.

The author's treatment of the idea of seizin in Germanic Law is interesting. It did not, in view of the Roman influence, develop into a mere possessory right with a system of "possessory actions" as in England, but into a system of ownership in which the abstract right of possession was not regarded as pre-eminent. There was no development of possessory remedies, but the purpose of the law in practical usage was to determine the title very similar to the suit to quiet title which the English law had to borrow from the Roman through the chancellor. The peculiar features of an action in ejectment had no counterpart in Germanic law.

It is, of course, impossible to give any complete idea of the results of researches such as Huebner's in the present treatise, but enough has been said, we believe, to show that there are many interesting analogies in the development of German law, brought out and made clear by

Huebner's thorough investigation, which cannot but be of great value to students of the common law.

The work is translated by Prof. Francis L. Philbrock of the University of California and a very valuable introduction is contributed by Paul Vinogradoff, Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in Oxford University.

Printed in one volume of 785 pages, bound in cloth and published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston.

CORRESPONDENCE.

RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE IN INDUSTRY.

Editor Central Law Jaurnal:

I write to commend your editorials on the correlative rights of employers, workers and the people in industry.

It is highly appropriate that the Central Law Journal, that power for law and order, sane and right thinking, which reaches the largest clientele of bright minds and progressive intellects, should undertake a sane and seasonable discussion of the evils of the present hour, their cause or origin and their remedy; appropriate, because one of the roots of these evils is sunken deeply into the soil of the legal fraternity. Lawyers, as a class, are learned, patriotic and upright-the leaders of thought and progress for the amelioration of the conditions which oppress a struggling humanity; but there are, unfortunately, men who will prostitute their ability and their learning and a noble profession to serve any cause, however viciousanarchy and arson, Bolshevism and breweries, and other like evils and heinous offenses against humanity and the laws of the land-provided only it "has the price."

It is greatly to be hoped that the effect of the efforts of the Central Law Journal will be to raise the standard of "outlook" of all members of the profession touching these matters, and enforce a realization of the fact that there are some things an attorney cannot afford to do, some cases which an attorney cannot afford to take, even for a "fat fee."

An Emma Goldman and others of her ilk are deliberate law-breakers, who live and labor in our too hospitable midst for but one purpose, and that is to tear down and destroy our insti

tutions and bring on anarchy and ruin. The Fosters and Lewises, who wantonly and without just cause call strikes of the laborers in labor unions for the purpose of forcing up wages and the shortening of the hours of labor, are common enemies, alike, of honest labor and of humanity-declare war on the government and the public at large. An adequate punishAn adequate punishment must be provided for this kind of warfare, the same as for warfare with firearms, and it is up to the legal profession to devise it. The less than 3 per cent of the population, led by nonlaboring fire-eaters, must not be permitted to enthrall and oppress the remaining 97 per cent of the people, in defiance of law and order-if Our institutions are to survive. It is claimed on the part of these marplots that there is a constitutional right to strike. This is a mere figment of the imagination; "chimney-corner law" made current by ignorance. There is no such right, and, if our institutions are to survive and the liberty of the people be preserved, there never can be. A strike is fundamentally wrong. It is in truth nothing but a conspiracy to injure the employer and his business and, more particularly, the public at large. Is there any reason in the nature of things that such an injurious "right" should be secured to less than 3 per cent of the people, when it is denied to the other 97 per cent? At common law, and formerly in every state in the Union, such a conspiracy was a felony and punishable as such. It is still a felony in all its essential elements, and the protecting aegis thrown around such criminal acts by misguided legislators should be speedily removed and the former wholesome provisions restored.

Whatever real grievances laboring men may have can and should be remedied in a peaceful and legal manner, and not by declaring war upon, and inflicting hardship and loss upon, innocent persons in no way involved in or responsible for, or able to correct, the supposed grievance the general public.

Pasadena, Cal.

HARRY M. HANSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

"Cases on the Law of Evidence. Selected From Decisions of English and American Courts." By Edward W. Hinton, Professor of Law in the University of Chicago. American Casebook Series. William R. Vance, general editor. St. Paul. West Publishing Co., 1919. Review will follow.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

Lawyer-And now that I have saved you from that bootlegging charge, what do you consider my services worth?

Negro Client-I ain't got no money, boss, but I'll give you two gallons of whisky.-Stanford Chaparral,

"Watched a lady lawyer in court the other day." "Did she know any law?" "I dunno. But every motion she made was graceful."-Louisville Courier-Journal.

"She seems to be always sifting evidence." "That's because she's straining to find grounds for a divorce."-Buffalo News.

The detective sat in a corner of the station house exclaiming, "He's a thief, a scoundrel, a blackleg"

"Less noise there," said the sergeant. "What are you doing?"

"Why, I'm running down a criminal."-Bos ton Transcript.

There rushed into the police station a youngster very much out of breath, who gasped out to Chief Holmes:

"You're wanted-down-town-in our street -an'-bring an' ambulance!"

"What's the trouble?" demanded the chief. "And why bring an ambulance?"

"Because," the kiddie explained, when he had recovered his breath, "mother's found the lady that pinched the doormat."

"You shouldn't say this young couple 'com. mitted' matrimony."

"Why not?"

"It isn't good taste. You talk as if they had done something wrong."

"They have. When a young man who isn't earning over $25 a week marries a girl who can't boil water and thinks that when she charges a hat to father it never has to be paid for, in my opinion they have committed matrimony."-Birmingham Age-Herald.

In a certain St. Louis office argument about the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations has been long and lively, and sometimes the stenographers find it difficult to keep their minds on their work. One day an eastern firm was surprised to receive a letter saying:

"Gentlemen: We regret that you have not sent us promptly our League of Nations. Unless you can make shipment by the tenth you may cancel our order."

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of Important Opinions of the State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.

Alabama..
Arkansas

California.

Colorado

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

Indiana.

Iowa.....

Kansas..

Kentucky.
Massachusetts

Minnesota

Missouri.

New Hampshire

New Jersey.

New York.

North Carolina.

North Dakota
Oklahoma.

Oregon..

South Carolina
Texas

U. S. C. C. App.

United States D. C. Virginia..

1.

.6, 7, 10, 11, 28, 40, 49, 64

.78

.31, 47, 68, 84 .19, 56, 81 .54 .14, 69 ..5, 67

.9, 18, 25, 39, 45, 60, 62, 74 .1, 4, 22, 23, 35, 44, 57, 72, 83 .3, 21, 48, 52, 85 .13, 17, 53

63

.51, 86 .26, 29, 37 .20 .24, 30, 34, 61 .8, 46, 50, 70, 75, 77, 80 16, 27, 41, 42, 71 65 ..15, 38, 55 .43, 59, 73, 79

.76 .82 .2, 58 ..66

.12, 32, 33, 36

Adverse Possession Encroachment. Long-continued encroachment of abutting owner on highway, such as the maintenance of fences for 20 years, will not prevent removal of such fences by the proper authorities on theory of acquiscence.-Webster County V. Wasem

Plaster Co., Ia., 174 N. W. 583.

2. Assignments-Notice by Mail.-Notice of an assignment deposited in the mail by an assignee does not become effective as againt the holder of the fund assigned or the debtor until it is actually communicated to him.-In re Leterman, Becher & Co., U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 543. 3. Attachments-Consolidation of Actions.It is no defense to an action on an attachment bond that the original action in which the bond was given was consolidated and tried with other actions.-Gregory v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Kan., 185 Pac. 35.

4. Bills and Notes-Holder in Due Course.Where maker and payee of note at the time it was signed also signed an agreement that no payment should be made on the note unless the payee first performed certain things, the maker of the note, in an action by one to whom the payee had transferred it, could set up as a defense the fact that the payee had not performed the things he agreed to at the time the note was executed, where the transferee was not a holder in due course.-Lutton v. Baker, Ia., 174 N. W. 599.

5.

Carriers of Goods-Draft on Consignee.Bank which purchases bill of lading and makes draft on consignee is not liable on any implied warranty of goods nor subject to attachment of proceeds of draft where consignor is insolvent. -Terre Haute Nat. Bank V. Horne-Andrews Commission Co., Ga., 101 S. E. 6.

6. Carriers of Passengers-Relation of Passenger. It is not necessary that the fare be paid to establish the relation of carrier and passenger, and where one boards a train with the implied invitation or consent of the company's agent or conductor to take passage and with the intention of paying, the relationship is established.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Harper, Ala., 83 So. 142. .

7.- -Safety Devices.-Carriers, being under the highest duty to provide and maintain suitable and safe equipments and appliances, must keep pace with the science and art of their business; and, while not bound to adopt every new device unless it contributes to safety, they must adopt those improved modes known to conduce to safety, and cannot escape liability for injuries to a passenger where they have not adopted safety devices generally in use by other carriers.-Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Robertson, Ala., 83 So. 102.

Conspiracy-Co-Conspirator. One who connects himself with an existing conspiracy and joins in carrying out the common purpose and design will be deemed a party to every act which had before been done by the others, and a party to every act which may afterwards be done by any of the others in furtherance of such design.-Roberts v. State, Ind., 124 N. E. 750. 10. Contracts-Waiver.-Contracts, the cution of which are induced by fraudulent acts or omissions to the injury of the party defrauded, are voidable, not absolutely void, and infirmity so intervening may be waived or surrendered by the party defrauded.-Barbour v. Poncelor, Ala., 83 So. 130.

The extent of franchise rights of corporations to acquire, hold, or dispose of property cannot be collaterally inquired into in a suit in ejectment between third parties.-Daniel v. Wade, Ala., 83 So. 99.

12. Diversion of Assets.-A stockholder may maintain suit for wrongful diversion of assets of corporation, where he alleges and proves that a request or demand has been made upon the board of directors or other body managing the corporation to institute proceedings and they have refused, or upon allegation and proof that it is reasonably certain a demand for corporate action would have been useless.-Liggett v. Roanoke Water Co., Va., 101 S. E. 55.

13. Officers and Directors.-The relations of officers and directors of a corporation in respect to private business transactions with the corporation are more closely scrutinized than those of mere stockholders, and directors are bound to