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wise. The request made of the Secretary of the time appointed for action upon a of the Treasury was not that he should petition for the settlement of the final acname a competent person with whom the count of an executor and for the final disSecretary of the Interior might contract for tribution of the decedent's estate is so unreasonable as to a nonresident claimant as the performance of the desired services, but to be wanting in due process of law is too was that he should "authorize," that is, clearly unsubstantial and devoid of merit designate, "a competent person" to do such to furnish a basis for a direct appeal to work. The reply to such request, dated the Federal Supreme Court from a decree March 14, 1901, we think makes evident the of a circuit court. fact that it was not expected that the person who was to be supplied from the regular force of the Treasury Department, because it could be done without detriment to the public service, would be additionally com

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Dec.

Dig. § 385.*]

[No. 120.]

17, 1909.

pensated. Indeed, any inference that such Argued March 19, 22, 1909. Decided May thought was entertained by the Secretary of the Treasury is rebutted by the circum

stance that, in his letter, he directed the at

tention of the Secretary of the Interior to the fact that an expense of about $500 would be necessary for the employment of draftsmen and others who could not be sup plied by the Treasury Department, and that this sum would be regarded as sufficient for "the expense incident to a general inspection of the work during the period of installation." The direction given to Mr. Woodwell to confer with the chief clerk of the Department of the Interior "relative to the installation of a electric light, heating, and power plant in the old Postoffice Department building" was addressed to him in his capacity of "inspector of electric light plants" in the Treasury Department. Presumptively, the aid which Mr. Woodwell rendered by direction of the Secretary of the Treasury to the Department of the Interior was done by him in and by virtue of the order and direction of his superior officer, and was not, therefore, a distinct employment. Certainly it cannot be said that Mr. Woodwell, whatever may have been the value of his services, was called upon to render a service specially required by an existing law, and for the performance of which the remuneration was fixed by law. These conclusions clearly bring the case within the prohibitions against payment contained in §1765, Rev. Stat. As there is no contention in argument respecting the claim for expenses ($110), which it is assumed has been paid, we eliminate it from considera

tion.

Affirmed.

(214 U. S. 71)

GEORGE G. GOODRICH, Appt.,

V.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the

United States for the Northern Dis

trict of California to review a decree dis-
missing a bill to set aside the probate of a
in which the final account of the executor
will and to reopen the probate proceedings
has been passed and the estate finally dis-
tributed. Dismissed for want of juris-
diction.

See same case below, 145 Fed. 844.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. John G. Johnson, Tyson S.
Dines, L. Sidney Carrère, and Henry Ar-
den for appellant.

Messrs. J. W. Dorsey, Henry E. Davis, and Henry Ach for appellees.

*Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

Upon demurrers, the court below dismissed the bill filed by Goodrich, the appellant, for want of equitable jurisdiction to grant the relief which was prayed. 145 Fed. 844. To review that decree this appeal direct to this court is prosecuted. Jurisdiction to review is challenged. That question, therefore, at the outset requires at

tention.

To clarify the issue for decision, instead of reciting the allegations of the bill in the order in which they are therein stated, we shall briefly recapitulate the facts alleged in their chronological order, in so far

as essential to be borne in mind for the purpose of the question of our jurisdiction.

In February, 1886, Thomas H. Williams, a resident of California, died in San Francisco, leaving as his lawful heirs four sons, viz., Sherrod, Thomas H., Jr., Percy, and Bryant, and one daughter, Mary, who was the wife of Frank S. Johnson. The wife of the deceased and the mother of his children had died before him. Williams left an estate of large value, composed principally of real property. Shortly after his death, on April 2, 1886, in the court having proA claim that ten days' statutory notice bate jurisdiction in San Francisco, a last will

JOHN W. FERRIS et al.

COURTS (385*)

CIRCUIT COURT

FEDERAL QUESTION
BATE PROCEEDINGS.

DIRECT APPEAL FROM
FRIVOLOUSNESS OF

NOTICE IN PRO

For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

*76

born in 1889, but died the year following; and Percy died on October 3, 1890, leaving his widow surviving. Bryant Williams, another son, died in May, 1893, unmarried and without issue. In that year also Mrs. Goodrich, the daughter, died in the city of New York, without issue from her marriage with Goodrich, leaving her husband surviving.

and codicil thereto of Williams were duly, in the city of New York. The son Percy admitted to probate. Leaving out of view was married in August, 1888; a child was certain bequests of personal property and small legacies in money, the estate was principally disposed of as follows: The title of the property was vested in the executor and trustee named in the will, George E. Williams, a brother of the deceased, for the purpose of making the distribution which the will provided. To one of the sons, Sherrod, nothing was given. It was provided that the sum of $50,000 should be absolutely vested in the son Percy, that $200,000 should "be set aside absolutely" for the benefit of the daughter, Mary, wife of Johnson, and that $100,000 should be set aside for the benefit of each of the sons, Thomas H., Jr., Percy, and Bryant. The will, however, provided that the gifts to the children above stated, other than the gift of $50,000, which was to vest absolutely in Percy, were only intended for the use and benefit of the children to whom they were given during their respective lives, with the remainder in fee to the lineal descendants, or, if none such, to the surviving brothers or sister, as the case might be. The residuum of the estate was directed to be set aside in equal shares After the death of Mrs. Goodrich, her for the benefit of the daughter and two of husband went from New York to California the sons (Thomas H., Jr., and Percy) dur- for the purpose of the interment of the reing their respective lives, with the remain-mains of his wife, and, while being there a der in fee, as heretofore recited. The will short time, undoubtedly met the executor. contained the following clause:

In the nearly eight years which supervened between the death of the father and the death of Mary, the daughter, the latter undoubtedly received from the executor of the estate of the father, by way of revenue or allowance, the provision made for her benefit by the will of the father. By the various deaths it came to pass that, at the end of 1893, those entitled to the estate of Williams by the terms of the will, either for life or in remainder, were the surviving son, Thomas H. Williams, Jr., and the infant son of Mary, the daughter, represented by his father, Frank S. Johnson, who had, in 1889, in the proper probate court, been duly appointed the guardian of the estate of such minor.

Goodrich returned to New York, where he continued to reside. In 1896, three years after the return of Goodrich to New York, in the court having jurisdiction over the estate and person of the minor, the guardian

"Item 4. When the term of three years after my death, shall have elapsed, unless the executor, herein named, shall for good cause extend it for two years, or in case there be another executor, three of my chil-Johnson applied for authority to agree with dren, or representatives, shall by writing, the executor of the estate of Williams on a extend it for two years, distribution of my final distribution of the estate. In makestate, shall be made, as herein directed." ing this application no reference was made *Until the setting aside or distribution to the fact of the marriage of Goodrich with thus directed, the executor was authorized the mother of the minor after her divorce. to advance monthly to the daughter the sum Conforming to the requirements of the of $250, and to each of the three sons, $100. California Code of Procedure, after hearing, The executor was authorized to carry on the guardian was authorized to make the the business in which the testator was en- agreement for final distribution. Simulgaged at the time of his death, and ex-taneously or thereabouts the executor also tensive powers were conferred in regard to the sale and reinvestment of the property to be set aside for the benefit of the children, etc. George E. Williams qualified as executor, and entered upon the performance of his duties.

In 1888 one of the sons, Sherrod, died unmarried and without issue. In the same year Frank S. Johnson, the husband of Mary, the daughter, obtained a decree of divorce against his wife, by which he was awarded the custody of an infant son, Frank Hansford Johnson, the issue of the marriage. In December of the following year, Mary, the divorced wife, married George G. Goodrich, and thereafter lived with him

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filed in the proper probate court a petition asking the authority of the court to pass his accounts and make a final distribution of the estate. Express notice was given to Williams, the surviving son, and to Johnson, the guardian of the minor, and, in accordance with the provisions of the California Code, a publication, by a posting of notice for a period of ten days, was ordered and duly made. On January 5, 1897, after hearing, and in view of the consent of the parties, the accounts were finally passed and a full distribution of the estate was made between the parties in interest; that is, 40 per cent of the estate was transferred to the minor, Frank Hansford Johnson,

*78

through his guardian, 26% per cent to, fraud, but to have been absolutely wanting Thomas H. Williams, Jr., the son, in fee, and 33% per cent was vested in Williams as trustee for the benefit during life of Thomas H. Williams, Jr.

Nearly three years after the entry of the decree of final distribution, in December, 1899, Williams, the trustee, died, and, by proceedings in the superior court of the city | and county of San Francisco, John W. Ferris was appointed trustee.

in due process of law, because of the absence of express notice to the complainant, and because the provisions of the statutes of California providing for notice by ten days' posting were void, because*insufficient as to a resident of the city of New York, and, in consequence, repugnant to the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Without stating the various grounds upon which the defendants demurred, it suffices to say that the bill, having been submitted to the court on the demurrers, was, by it, dismissed, as we have said, because the court was without jurisdiction in equity to set aside the probate of the will and to reopen, upon the

ceeding had conformably to the local law.
It is manifest from the foregoing state-
ment that the only possible ground upon
which the assertion that we have jurisdic-
tion by direct appeal to review the action of
the trial court can rest is the contention
made below, that, as to the complainant, the
notice of the hearing in the probate court
upon the petition for the settlement of the
account of the executor and for the final
distribution of the estate of Williams did
not amount to due process of law. Farrell
v. O'Brien (O'Callaghan v. O'Brien) 199
U. S. 89, 100, 50 L. ed. 101, 107, 25 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 727, and cases cited. It is equal-
ly certain, as held in the cited case, that
the mere fact that a constitutional ques-
tion is alleged does not suffice to give us
jurisdiction to review by direct appeal if
such question is unsubstantial, and so de-
void of merit as to be clearly frivolous.

More than eighteen years after the death of Williams and the probate of his will, about eleven years from the date of the death of the daughter, Mary, the wife of Goodrich, and more than seven years after the passing of the final account of the ex-grounds alleged in the bill, the probate proecutor, and the final distribution of the estate by the probate court, viz., on May 19, 1904, the bill which is here in question was filed. Ferris, trustee, Williams, the surviving son of the deceased, and Johnson, as guardian, and his minor son, were made defendants. The facts above recited in various forms of statement were alleged, and, in substance, it was charged that the will and codicil of Williams, the deceased, were void because the absolute power of alienation of the property of the deceased, contrary to the laws of California against perpetuities, was, by the terms of the will, suspended for a period of three years, and not for a period measured by the continuance of lives in being, and therefore, as to all property included in the trust which Williams, the deceased, attempted to create by his will, he had died intestate, and all his property, by reason thereof, vested at his death in his heirs at law. It was averred that complainant, as heir of his deceased wife, was entitled to a stated share of her estate. It was charged that all the proceedings had in the probate court were fraudulent and subject to be avoided; that, in those proceedings, the fact of the remarriage of the daughter, Mary, and the survivorship of her husband, Goodrich, the complainant, had been sedulously concealed for the purpose of misleading the court; that when Goodrich was in California, after the death of his wife, he was notified, as the result of an inquiry made of the executor, that the death of his wife terminated her interest in the estate of her father; that the proceedings in the probate court concerning the final accounting and distribution were fraudulently had for the purpose of depriving the complainant of his interest in the estate, and it was expressly charged that, in those proceedings, the existence of the complainant and his interest in the estate were concealed. The whole proceedings, it was also averred, were not only subject to be avoided because of

The grounds for the contention that a constitutional question exists are thus stated in the brief of counsel for appellant:

"4. Sections 1633 and 1634 of the Civil Code of California, upon which jurisdiction of the court to make the consent decree of distribution is based, are in contravention of § 1, article 6, of the Constitution of the United States.

"The notice of final settlement and distribution, posted for ten days in the city and county of San Francisco, did not constitute due process of law as to appellant, who was and is a citizen and resident of the state of New York."

The sections of the California Code above referred to are thus set forth in the bill:

"Sec. 1633. When any account is rendered for settlement, the clerk of the court must appoint a day for the settlement thereof,* and thereupon give notice thereof by causing notices to be posted in at least three public places in the county, setting forth the name of the estate, the executor or administrator, and the day appointed for the settlement of the account. If, upon the

08.

final hearing at the time of settlement, the court, or a judge thereof, should deem the notice insufficient from any cause, he may order such further notice to be given as may seem to him proper.

of the various steps in the administration of an estate in the custody of one of its courts, we hold that the claim that ten days' statutory notice of the time appointed for the settlement of the final account of the executor, and for action upon the petition for final distribution of the Williams estate, was so unreasonable as to be wanting in due process of law, was clearly unsubstantial and devoid of merit, and furnished no support for the contention that rights under the Constitution of the United States had been violated. As held in Bell

"Sec. 1634. If the account mentioned in the preceding section be for a final settle ment, and a petition for the final distribution of the estate be filed with said account, the notice of settlement must state those facts, which notice must be given by posting or publication. . . On the settlement of said account, distribution and partition of the estate to all entitled there-ingham Bay & B. C. R. Co. v. New Whatto may be immediately had, without further notice or proceedings."

While various decisions of this court and of the courts of two states are cited in the brief of counsel for appellant under each of the foregoing propositions, none of them are apposite, and indeed, although citing them, counsel have specifically commented upon but one; viz., Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 44 L. ed. 520, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410. That case, however, concerned the validity of original process by which the conceded property of a nonresident, situate within the jurisdiction of the state of Texas, was sought to be subjected to the control of its courts. The proposition which was presented for decision in that case was whether a statutory notice of five days, given to a resident of Virginia, requiring him to appear in Texas and defend a suit brought against him to foreclose a vendor's lien upon his land, constituted reasonable and adequate notice for the purpose. Manifestly, that case is not, in any particular, analogous to the one under consideration, which is a case involving the devolution and administration of the estate of a decedent,a subject peculiarly within state control. Broderick's Will (Kieley v. McGlynn) 21 Wall. 503, 519, 22 L. ed. 599, 605. It is elementary that probate proceeding by which jurisdiction of a probate court is asserted over the estate of a decedent for the purpose of administering the same is in the nature of a proceeding in rcm, and is therefore one as to which all the world is charged with notice. And that the law of California conforms to this general and elementary rule is beyond question. William Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 Pac.

323.

The distribution of the estate of Williams was but an incident of the pro ceeding prescribed by the laws of California in respect to the administration of an estate in the custody of one of its probate courts. Under such circumstances, therefore, and putting aside the question of whether or not the state of California did or did not possess arbitrary power in respect to the character and length of notice to be given

com, 172 U. S. 314, 318, 43 L. ed. 460, 461, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205, even although the power of a state legislature to prescribe length of notice is not absolute, yet it is certain "that only in a clear case will a notice authorized by the legislature be set aside as wholly ineffectual on account of the shortness of the time."

The jurisdiction to determine this appeal upon the merits being dependent upon the existence of a constitutional question in the record, and the mere averment that such a question was raised below not being sufficient where the alleged Federal question is so wanting in merit as to cause it to be frivolous or without any support whatever in reason, it follows that the appeal must be and it is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Mr. Justice McKenna took no part in the decision of this case.

(214 U. S. 47) J. M. CEBALLOS & COMPANY, Appts.,

V.

UNITED STATES.

COURTS (§ 389*)-UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT APPEAL FROM COURT OF CLAIMS
-REVIEW OF FACTS.

1. The refusal of the court of claims to

make an allowance for the transportation from the Philippine Islands to Spain, under a contract with the United States, of certain Spanish prisoners of war, certified by an American consul to have been landed in a Spanish port, will not be disturbed on appeal where the method prescribed by the contract for determining the initial fact that such persons had been taken on board in the Philippine Islands had not been pursued, and the evidence did not establish to the satisfaction of that court that such persons were entitled to transportation under the contract.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 389.*]

UNITED STATES (§ 70*)—GoVERNMENT CON-
TRACT-CONSTRUCTION.

2. The manifest spirit of the contract end the prior conduct of the parties de

For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

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UNITED STATES (§ 70*)
CONTRACT
PERSONS."

3. All noncombatants except the wives and children of military and civil officers were embraced in the words "other per sons" in a contract with the United States for the transportation to Spain at the cabin rate of Spanish military and civil officers in the Philippine Islands, and at the steerage rate of such other persons as might be designated by the Secretary of War.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see United States, Dec. Dig. $ 70.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 5089-5091.]

[No. 108.]

forces at Santiago, made a contract with the United States for the repatriation from Cuba to Spain of the prisoners of war resulting from that surrender. That contract was performed, and it is conceded that all obligations of the United States under the same were discharged. It is admitted, however, that, at the trial below, the Cuban contract, as it is termed, was offered and the mode of execution thereof was estab

lished by competent evidence, upon the assumption that such facts were proper to be taken into view in the elucidation of the particular contracts which are here involved. No finding was made by the lower court on the subject, although one was requested. After the filing of the record in this court a motion was made, praying that the lower court be directed to find whether or not the Cuban contract had been made, as stated, and whether or not the wives and children of Spanish officers transported thereunder were also transported under the contract, and, if they were, the rate paid for such transportation. The motion was resisted, and action thereon was postponed until the hearing on the merits. In the discussion at bar it was conceded by the gov

Argued March 10, 1909. Decided May 17, ernment that the Cuban contract had been

A

1909.

PPEAL from the Court of Claims to review a judgment refusing to allow certain items claimed under a contract with the United States for the repatriation of certain persons from the Philip pine Islands to Spain. Reversed.

See same case below, 42 Ct. Cl. 318.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. William V. Rowe, John J.
Hemphill, and Sullivan & Cromwell for
appellants.

Assistant Attorney General John Q. Thompson and Mr. Franklin W. Collins for appellee.

*Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

Speaking in a general sense, this case involves determining how much, if anything, is due by the United States to J. M. Ceballos & Company, the appellants, for services rendered in pursuance of oral and written contracts for the repatriation of certain persons from the Philippine Islands to Spain. Before coming to the case as made by the record it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary consideration which may throw light upon one of the questions arising for decision.

offered in evidence below, that the contract was correctly printed in one of the briefs, and that it had been performed in a particular manner. It was, however, insisted that the Philippine contracts here involved were unambiguous, and therefore the Cuban contract was irrelevant. It was conceded, if it was deemed that there was such ambiguity in the Philippine contracts as to require construction, and that*the construction might be elucidated by the Cuban contract and the mode of its performance, that contract and the admission as to the manner in which it had been performed might be treated as part of the record for the purposes of the case before us, without the necessity of directing findings on the subject. As we are clearly of opinion that the contracts which are here involved require construction, and that the previous contract between the parties as to the movement of the prisoners of war from Cuba to Spain, and the construction which obtained in the execution thereof, may serve within proper limitations to throw light upon the construction of the contracts here involved, we treat the Cuban contract and its mode of performance as embraced in the record, and review the case in the light thereof.

In the month of July, 1898, and from that time until the commencement of this litiCeballos & Company-who here assert gation, the members of the appellant firm their rights as arising from contracts made, were the American operators and agents of as we have said, concerning transportation the Compañía Transatlántica, a steamship of persons from the Philippine Islands to line engaged in the transportation of freight Spain-after the surrender of the Spanish and passengers between the ports of Spain *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

*50

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