PAROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW WARRANTY.

LOWER V. HICKMAN.

Supreme Court of Arkansas, Nov. 12, 1906. Where a sale of a sawmill was evidenced by a complete written instrument, parol evidence was inadmissible to prove an oral warranty of the capacity of the mill.

A memorandum contained a list of items preliminary to a contract for the sale of a sawmill and appliances, and at the bottom of a statement that the capacity of the mill was 20,000 feet of lumber a day. The contract, when executed, contained everything in the memorandum except the capacity of the mill, and much more. Held, that it would be presumed that the parties did not intend to include in the contract any warranty of the capacity of the mill, and that it was, therefore, incompetent to show that the words on the memorandum imported such warranty.

HILL, C. J.: An examination of the rejected evidence, the memorandum alleged to have been signed by Hickman and the final contract signed by Lower and Gann, will show that two questions have arisen: (1) Was it competent to prove an oral warranty of the capacity of the sawmill? (2) Was it competent to prove that the words "sawmill cap. 20,000" on the memorandum meant a warranty that the sawmill had a capacity to cut 20,000 feet of lumber per day?

1. A warranty is so clearly a part of a sale that, where the sale is evidenced by a written instrument, it is incompetent to ingraft upon it a warran'y proved by parol. The character of the written instrument is not important, so long as it purports to be a complete transaction of itself, and not a mere incomplete memorandum or receipt for money, or part of a transaction, where there are other parts of it other than warranties. It may be a complete contract, signed by both parties and comprehensive and exhaustive in de-. tail, and contain many mutual agreements, terms, and stipulations, or it may be a simple bill of sale, or sale note evidencing the sale. The principle is the same in any of th se transactions, and oral evidence of a warranty is almost universally excluded when a complete written instrument evidences the sale. It is not important that the instrument be signed by both parties; for acceptance of the other may be equally binding, and the principle here invoked is as often applied to unilateral as to bilateral instruments. For the statement of the principles involved, and the many applications thereof, see 4 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2434, and review in notes; 1 Elliott on Ev., §.580; Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Co., 141 U. S. 510, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46, 35 L. Ed. 837; Hanger v. Evins, 38 Ark. 339; Hooper v. Chism, 13 Ark. 496; Reed v. Wood, 9 Vt. 285; Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. Law, 331, 43 Am. Rep. 380; Diebold Safe & Lock Co. v. Huston, 55 Kan. 104, 39 Pac. Rep. 1035, 28 L. R. A. 53; Am. Mfg. Co. Klarquist, 47 Minn. 344, 50 N. W. Rep. 243; Miller v. Municipal E. L. &. P. Co., 133 Mo. 205,

V.

34 S. W. Rep. 585; McCray Ref., etc., Co. v. Woods, 99 Mich. 269, 58 N. W. Rep. 329, 41 Am. St. Rep. 599; Mast v. Pearce, 58 Iowa, 579, 8 N. W. Rep. 632, 12 N. W. Rep. 597, 43 Am. Rep. 125; Grand Ave. Hotel v. Wharton, 79 Fed. Rep. 45, 24 C. C. A. 441; Buckstaff v. Russell, 79 Fed. Rep. 611, 25 C. C. A. 129; Galpin v. Atwater, 29 Conn. 93. The application of these principles to the facts at bar cannot be better stated than in a similar case by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: "Whether the written contract fully expressed the terms of the agreemeut was a question for the court, and since it was in this instance complete and perfect on its face, without ambiguity and embracing the whole subject-matter, it obviously could not be determined to be less comprehensive than it was." And this conclusion is unaffected by the fact that it did not allude to the capacity of the particular machine. To hold that mere silence opened the door to parol evidence in that regard would be to beg the whole question. Seitz v. Brewers' Ref. Co., 141 U. S. 510, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46. 35 L. Ed. 837. The evidence attempting to prove by parol a warranty was properly rejected.

2. According to the evidence of Lower and Gann, Hickman made them a verbl proposition and put into writing a statement of what constituted the mill output, and at the bottom of this list of property is added "Sawmill cap. 20,000." This meant, according to their testimony, that the sawmill had a capacity to cut 20.000 feet of lumber per day. The contract signed by Lower and Gann shows it is a complete contract between the parties, embracing the subject-matter of their negotiations, except the capacity of the mill. The property listed in the memorandum is described with minuteness and detail, and not in general terms, as in the memorandum. The contract contains everything in the memorandum except the capacity, and much more. It stipulates terms and times of payment, the security for payment, a reservation of title, the rights of possession before and after default, and that in case of default in full payment the partial payments shall be considered rent. If the capacity of the mill had been omitted from the final contract by accident, mistake, or fraud, on proper proof, equity would grant relief. Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177, 55 Am. Rep. 545; Goerke v. Rodgers, 75 Ark. 72, 86 S. W. Rep. 837; Mast v. Pearce, 58 Iowa, 579, 8 N. W. Rep. 632, 12 N. W. Rep. 597, 43 Am. Rep. 125; 4 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2413, 3416. Antecedent propositions, correspondence, prior writings, as well as oral statements and representations, are deemed to be merged into the written contract, which covers the subject-matter of such antecedent negotiation when it is free of ambiguity and complete. Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177, 55 Am. Rep. 545; Richardson v. Comstock, 21 Ark. 69; McClurg v. Whitney, 82 Mo. App. 625; 17 Cyc. pp. 596, 598. There is nothing here to impeach the integrity of the final draft of the contract, and, as it em

braced everything in the prior negotiations and memorandum except the capacity of the sawmill, it must be presumed that the parties did not intend to ingraft into the contract any warranty of the capacity of the mill, and it cannot be ingrafted upon it by parol.

The case was properly tried on the issue raised as to false representations, and in strict conformity to the last enunciation of this court upon that subject. La. Molasses Co. v. Ft. Smith Wholesale Gro. Co., 73 Ark. 542, 84 S. W. Rep. 1047.

Affirmed.

NOTE. A Sale Evidenced by a Complete Written Instrument May Not be Changed by Parol Evidence in an Action at Law Where There is no Ambiguity, but Equity May Reform it.-The opinions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas reflect credit on the state. Going back to the Roman we find the opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court expressed: "Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas ibi nulla expostio contra verba ficoda est. In the absence of ambiguity no exposition shall be made which is opposed to the express words of the instrument." See Hughes on Procedure, Vol. 1, p. 319; Pyne v. Campbell, 6 El. & Bl. 370; Woolam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. Jun. 211; 2 Hughes' Proc. 751.

It is in the matter of procedure that lawyers so frequently fall down. It is reasonably certain that if anything were left out of a contract which was intended to have been put in it, a proceeding in equity to reform the instrument gives the broadest scope for the pieader. A party has an opportunity for a complete remedy, for if a court of equity having taken jurisdiction to reform a contract, finds the evidence sufficient for that purpose, it does not stop with the reformation, but proceeds to do complete justice by giving all the relief a suitor may show a right to, both in law and equity. Construction is the great thing to be attained; it lies above everything and the greatest lawyers and judges are those who are most apt in the matter of construction. A proceeding in equity affords the greatest opportunity for the use of rules of construction, because a common law proceeding deals with rigid rules of more universal application, so that the pleader is necessarily confined. The court has given a fine line of authorities to uphold its opinion, so that on the particular point decided we will offer but one citation relating most aptly to the question at issue in the principal case, which may be found in 23 Cent. L. J. 292. It is not a multitude of cases that impresses the really good judge, but the force and reason which may be found in the great cases, and the sooner the judges of our misi prius, courts, as well as those of last resort, proceed to act upon this principle the better will it be for the force and effect of the administration of our laws which, in fact, is government.

As to the question when instruments may be reformed, a very valuable note may be found on the subject in 3 L. R. A. 190, in note to Rosenbaum Bro. v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., which shows that "a writing not expressing the agreement as actually made, may be corrected without an allegation or proof of mutual mistake. Born v. Schrenkeisen, 110 N. Y. 55. A written contract which mistakes the terms of an oral agreement on which it is founded may be reformed. Hallam v. Corlett, 71 Iowa, 446. The same would be true of a written memoranda which was afterwards embodied in a written instrument which

misstated what was intended to be embodied therein, the intention to do so being shown. "Where the minds of the parties have failed to meet on the same matters, or else the agreement or transaction is different with respect to its subject-matter, or terms from which it was intended, equity will grant relief." Id. citing Childers v. Childers, 1 De G. & J. 482; Cooper v. Joel, 1 De G., F. & J. 240; Bentley v. Mackay, 4 De G., F. & J. 279; Henkle v. Royal Exchange Assur. Co., 1 Ves. Sr. 317; Townshend v. Staugroom, 6 Ves. Jr. 328; Holmes v. Clark, 10 Iowa, 423; Jackson v. Andrews, 59 N. Y. 244; Nevins v. Dunlap, 33 N. Y. 676; Story v. Conger, 36 N. Y. 673; Welles v. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525; Diman v. Providence, W. & B. R. Co., 5 R. I. 130, 135; Sawyer v. Hovey, 3 Aller, 331; Woodbury Savings Bank & Bldg. Assn. v. Charter Oak F. & M. Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 517;,Tesson v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 33; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., 344. In such a case the instrument may be corrected so that it shall truly represent the agreement or transaction actually made or determined upon, according to the real purpose and intention of the parties. Baker v. Paine, 1 Ves. Sr. 456; White v. White, L. R. 15 Eq. 247; Bloomer v. Spittle, L. R. 13 Eq. 427; Mackenzie v. Coulson, L. R. 8 Eq. 368: Fowler v. Fowler, 4 De G. & J. 250; Rider v. Powell, 28 N. Y. 310; De Pyster v. Hasbruck, 11 N. Y. 582, and cases cited further in note, 3 L. R. A. 190. Also note to Page v. Higgins, 5 L. R. A. 156.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN CASES OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST PERSONS

OF AFRICAN DESCENT.

On October 24, 1906, the Supreme Court of the United States filed an opinion in the case of Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, which can hardly fail to be of universal interest, especially in the southern sections of the country. In that case the court, in an opinion remarkable for its brevity, held, Harlan and Day, JJ., dissenting, that the federal courts have no jurisdiction under the 13th amendment or sections 1978, 1979, 5508, 5510, Revised Statutes, of a charge of conspiracy made and carried out in a state to prevent citizens of African descent, because of their race and color, from making or carrying out contracts and agreements to labor. That the federal courts had jurisdiction of actions of this class previous to the three post bellum amendments to the constitution can hardly be contended. With the exception of a very few restrictions such as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, etc., the entire control over the privileges and immunities of the citizens was vested exclusively in the state legislatures. Carfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct. 371, 381. The federal government is one of enumerated powers. 10th amendment to the constiution. The 13th and 14th are universally conceded to be restraints on state action and not intended to furnish redress for the invasion of individual rights. United States v. Harris (1906), U. S. 313. The state alone has sovereignty and jurisdiction to protect personal liberty against lawless violence on the part of individuals. Cooley's Const. Lim. 706. Unless, therefore, the 13th amendment gives the federal courts jurisdiction over crimes of the character charged in Hodges v. The United States, it would seem that, of necessity, the remedy must be sought through the state courts subject to supervision by writs of error in proper cases. The question then

resolves itself into a determination of the scope of the 13th amendment. The national govenment has power, whether expressly given or not, to secure and protect rights conferred or guaranteed by the constitution. United States v. Reeves, 92 U. S. 214. Every right created by, arising under, or dependent upon, the constitution of the United States may be protected and enforced by congress in such manner as congress may, in its discretion, deem best adapted to the objects sought. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 293. Can it be correctly said, however, that a conspiracy to prevent citizens of African descent, because of their race and color, from making or carrying out contracts and agreements to labor is the deprivation of a right created by, or dependent upon, the 13th amendment? Or in other words, does such a conspiracy in its effect virtually amount to slavery and involuntary servi tude? The solution of this question appears to be the point of dissension among the judges in this case.

Pomeroy in his work on Municipal Law, 660 p. 383, defines slavery as a status implying perpetual servitude to the master or owner upon whom it confers the complete control and dominion over the labor, acquisitions and person of the slave. Whether this definition is sufficiently comprehensive or not, we do not attempt to say. At any rate, it is sufficient for our purpose. While the inciting cause of the 13th amendment was the emancipation of the colored race, yet it was not an attempt to commit that race to the care of the nation. It reaches every race and equally forbids Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie trade when they amount to involuntary servitude. Slaughterhouse Case, 16 Wall. 36. It must be borne in mind, however, that congress did not assume under the authority given by the 13th amendment to adjust what may be called the social rights of men in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitute the essential distinction between freedom and slavery. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 22.

The rights of citizens to pursue and follow any of the ordinary vocations of life are not created by the constitution, but are among the inherent and inalienable rights of men. Butcher's Union v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 757; Civil Right Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 13. In the case of Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 203, 293, the court held that the right to work at a given occupation, or particular calling, free from injury cr interference by individual citizens was not a right guaranteed by the constitution. Where a state has been guilty of no violation of the 13th, 14th or 15th amendments no power is conferred on congress to punish private individuals who, acting without any authority from the state, and it may be defiance of law, invade the rights of the citizen protected by such amendments. Le Grand v. United States, 12 Fed. Rep. 577. Unless the state denies to persons of the colored race the equal protection of the laws, congress has no power to pass laws for the punishment of ordinary crimes and offenses against them. United States v. Cruikshank, 1 Wood, 308.

We fail to see therefore, how under circumstances such as these where the state has been guilty of no unjust discrimination against her colored citizens, but on the contrary is ready and willing to enforce the law and protect them in the exercise of their fundamental rights as citizens, the federal courts have any right to assume jurisdiction simply because the persons wronged happened to be of the African race. To hold otherwise would be in fact granting them privileges

OFTEN DECEPTIVE.

Editor of the Central Law Journal:

The following story is absolutely true, except the names used in designating the persons concerned, and is a good illustration of the saying, "appearances are often deceptive."

Many years ago, in a neighboring state, there lived two families in a neighborhood, whom we shall call Smith and Jones. The Jones family had a son about 21 years of age, who had for some reason or other, conceived a great disliking for Mr. Smith. The men had never gone further than to exchange angry words a couple of times. Finally Charlie Jones, the young man, left the country and was gone a couple of years. On his return he got off the train at "H," a town about 16 miles distant from his home, as that was the trading point for most of the people of his neighborhood. Soon after leaving the train he met his old enemy, Smith, on the street. To his surprise Smith seemed to have forgotten the old trouble and greeted him very cordially, inquiring where he had been, what he had been doing, how he was getting along, and finally told him he could ride out with him in his wagon if he did not find a wagon going nearer home. Charlie agreed to do so. During the afternoon Jones met and talked with several of the old neighbors, but as none of them were going any nearer to his home than Smith was, he waited and rode out with Smith. It was late in the evening when they left town, and as they had some sixteen miles to drive, it was after night when they reached the Smith farm. Smith invited Charlie to remain over night with him and told him that he could go on early in the morning. As it was Saturday night and he had not written his parents that he was coming, and it was still some two or three miles to his home, Jones finally agreed to stay over night. The team was cared for, the chores done, supper eaten and old neighbors and neigborhood gossip talked over until it was near midnight when the family retired. The next morning Smith arose and did his chores, while his wife prepared breakfast. When the meal was ready and Jones had not yet made his appearance, Smith went to the room to call his guest, but found the room empty. Just supposing that Charlie had gotten up and started early for his home, the family ate breakfast and began to get ready for Sunday school, at the school house in the district. Before they got started some neighbor boys, who had seen Charlie the day before in town, or had heard that he had come home, went to the Jones home to see him, and not finding him there, they came on over to Smith's, expecting to find him there yet. The surprise was great on both sides. Smith told his story straight enough, but what had become of Jones? They hunted all day, but not a trace of the missing man could be found. The excitement in the neighborhood was running high by night. People then recollected the old enmity between Jones and Smith, and at once a suspicion of foul play was aroused. People went to

the Smith farm and searched for evidence of the supposed murder. Smith protested his innocence and made no attempt to leave the neighborhood. No blood stains were found, nor any other evidences of any struggle. But people were not satisfied. Finally some wise one formulated the theory that the body had been burned and horrifying stories of how the body had been cut to pieces with a hatchet and burned in the cook stove at the Smith's home were afloat in the neighborhood; charred boues had been found in the ash heap, and the very wise were sure that they could positively identify them as human bones. Smith was arrested, charged with the murder and forced to stand trial for his life. His attorneys de layed the trial as long as possible, hoping some new evidence would come to light to prove the innocence of their client. When they could ro longer stay the case, they went to trial. The state had a strong case. The motive for the murder was shown in the old grudge. The last seen of the missing man, he was in Smith's company. It was hardly possible that a young man who had been away from home for two years would come within three miles of home and then leave without going home, unless he were murdered. True, his body had not been found, but could easily have been made with in any one of half a dozen ways. Smith protested his innocence but as he had no evidence to show what had become of his guest he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced accordingly. His attorneys at once moved for a new trial and by some means it was granted. They insisted that in the absence of the body, no proof had been presented to show that a murder had actually been committed. Smith was kept in jail six months longer. His expenses soon ate up his property and he and his family were left absolutely destitute. The time for the re-hearing was approaching. The sober thought of the people was gradually doing its work and it looked as though Smith would be cleared when one day Mrs. Jones received a letter from Charlie. He was well and in & neighboring state. He explained his action by saying that after he retired that night at Smith's he thought of the plan for "getting even" with his old enemy, and got up and crawled out at the window in the night. He walked several miles away and took a train at a station where he was not known. He said he knew the vigilants were active and he had hoped they would hang Smith before he got any chance for a trial, but now that his plan had miscarried and Smith was bankrupt and had spent a year and a half in jail, and he and his family subjected to insult by everybody, and as they would now have to leave the country, he thought it was not necessary for him to keep still any longer. The letter was given to the county attorney who took steps to learn of its truthfulness. He was soon satisfied. The case was quashed and Smith discharged. No attempt was ever made to punish Jones for what he had done.

The question has often been asked, but never yet answered, "Why did the vigilants not hang Smith as Jones supposed and hoped they would do?" Perhaps some sharp-eyed night-rider knew more than he dared tell lest he betray his organizaton, but that may have been the way in which people finally came to the conclusion that no murder had been committed even before Jones' letter came to the public.

of the law" has led even the courts to adopt loose methods in the trial of criminal causes, forgetting what a large number of people have never understood that what are known as common law "technicalities" are in reality based on great principles of law established not only in the experience of the ages but written in the blood of martyred public servants who wrenched them from unwilling tyrants at the risk of their own lives. That any court, for instance, would permit a conviction without the clearest possible proof of the corpus delicti is incredible. It behooves us to get a little closer to general principles and to overcome the unfounded public disregard of the "technicalities" of the law. EDITOR.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

GREGORY'S FORMS OF COMMON LAW DECLARATIONS. In the present time there is a tendency among some lawyers to be very lax in the construction of their pleadings, especially the petition, the very foundation of the cause of action and the most important constituent part of the mandatory record by which the entire cause of action is controlled both at the trial and on appeal, as well as on collateral attack. In justification of this tendency some lawyers point in defense to the decisions of certain courts detracting from the written pleadings their primal importance, courts which hold to what is termed as the "ambulatory rule," the theory of the case, insisting on giving to the bill of exceptions, the statutory record, greater im portance, and holding that the issues may be shaped or reshaped at the trial, depending upon the theory upon which the case may be tried independent of the pleadings. That this position is indeed the grossest error, we could prove and may undertake to prove at some more convenient occasion, but we refer to the matter now to show that what might seem to justify laxness in pleading is a misconception, and that attorneys building thereon may be rudely awakened by some enlightened appellate justice who will give to pleadings their proper importance. In some states the courts are indeed very firm in adhering to principles which call for accuracy in the pleadings and who do not hesitate to throw a case out of court upon insufficient statement of the cause of action. Such a mishap is costly and lawyers will certainly welcome, we believe, a form book, giving in full, accurate forms for stating the declaration in any particular cause of action that may arise. Such a work we find in a new book, published by the author, entitled Forms of Common Law Declarations for Use in State and Federal Courts, by George C. Gregory of the Richmond, Virginia, bar.

Objection might be made here that any lawyer who knows the law should know how to state bis cause of action. This objection is not well taken, as a glance at the reports of almost any of our state tribunals will show, since the best lawyers in the state often fall down on their pleadings. This arises very often from the fact that a lawyer with a large practice often waits until a few days before the last date for filing to the ensuing term, and then in his haste is not able to give to the statements of the causes of action which he files that degree of care which a less busily engaged practitioner gives to his first pleading. Objection might be further made that the local form book are more to be desired. This objection also is untenable, for the reason that local form

books, as far as our observation has gone, at least, deal, and rightly so, with such a vast multitude forms, that the delaration or petition is not given that prominence and detailed subdivision which is so necessary. Moreover, each state appellate court has not passed on every form of a declaration so that in making up a state form book, some of the forms are made up by the author from his own experience and have not the sanction of any court, while a national form book, as far as the declaration or first pleading is concerned, can easily present a form which has passed the scrutiny of one or two tribunals and one who relies upon it has, when such pleading is questioned in a higher court, the authorities which have sustained it right at his command.

Mr. Gregory's Common Law Declarations answers these two objections completely. To the busy prac. titioner they offer a complete form for almost every conceivable common law declaration. All the practitioner has to do is to change the characterization, the jurisdictions, the dates and the locations, and he has a petition that is iron-clad and will withstand the test of demurrer before trial, and a motion for judgment on the pleadings after trial and in argument before the supreme appellate tribunal. Especially in cases of attachment or injunction, where time is valuable such a form book is easily worth its actual weight in gold. This form book also gives to the practitioner forms absolutely tested and proven under fire. Under each form are given the authorities which sustain that particular form, at once giving the practitioner who uses it absolute confidence in his case. Moreover, Mr. Gregory has stated his forms in full with every possible detail, so that it is only necessary to omit that detail not included or necessary in the statement of any particular cause of action. Moreover, the subject matter of the various forms are subdivided with great particularity so as to suit almost any state of facts that would possibly arise. Thus take the subject of Warranty. Here we have four distinct declarations in full as follows: Declaration on a Guaranty; Declaration Upon Warranty of Chattel; Declaration on Deed Warranting Land; Declaration for Falsely Warranting Horse. Also under the subject heading of Account, we find three distinct declarations in full, to-wit: Declaration on Assigned Account; Declaration with Count of Account Stated; Declaration on Open Account. It is easy to conceive how it would be easy to change any one of these subdivisional forms to suit almost any statement of fact arising under these general headings. It is needless to state that the general subject of Common Carrier demands the largest variety of forms. Under this general heading there are fourteen general forms.

The work contains in all one hundred and nine common law declarations. It is prepared especially, according to the author's statement, for lawyers practicing in the common law states, but we believe that it will prove to be of great assistance to iawyers practicing in code states as well.

Printed in one volume of 226 pages and published by the author. Selling agents, Central Law Journal Co., St. Louis, Mo.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Act to Regulate Commerce (as amended) and acts supplementary thereto, indexed, digested and annotated, including the Carriers' Liability Act, Safety Appliance Acts, Act Requiring Reports of

Accidents, Arbitration Act, Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and others. By Charles S. Hamlin, Esq., Corporation Counsel, Boston Chamber of Commerce; Member of Council and of Committee on Law of the National Board of Trade, etc., Boston. Little, Brown & Co., 1907. Buckram. Price $3.50. Review will follow.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

The late Judge Pettingill, of the Maiden district court, concealed under an apparently stern exterior a kind heart, and nothing touched him so quickly as an unintentional witticism, especially if it were at the expense of the court.

One day a prisoner, arraigned before him for drunkenness and still under the influence of liquor, pleaded as hard as he could to be placed on probation.

"Why should I place you on probation?" said the judge, sternly. "Why, you're drunk now." "No, I'm not, your honor," said the poor prisoner, earnestly. "I'm as sober as a judge."

He was placed on probation.-Boston Herald.

1. ABDUCTION-Indictment.-An indictment charging the abduction of a child from the custody of its parents without their consent for the purposes of marriage is not insufficient as not showing to whom it was intended the child should be married.-State v. Sager, Minn., 108 N. W. Rep. 812.

2. ACKNOWLEDGMENT — Sufficiency. To entitle a party to a correction of a defective certificate of acknowledgment of a married woman, he must plead a state of facts showing his right to it, as parol evidence that the officer complied with the law is not admissible.-Kopke V. Votaw, Tex., 95 S. W. Rep. 15.

3. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Computation of Time.Where the successive adverse occupants hold in privity with each other, limitations may be computed by the last occupant from the date when the cause of action accrued against the first adverse possessor.-Nash v. Northwest Land Co., N. Dak., 108 N. W. Rep. 792.

4. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Statute of Limitation.-That a portion of the land in controversy was wholly inclosed by water barriers held not to deprive defendant's possession of its effect to confer title by adverse possession