Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

no authority to execute satisfactions of mortgages, under the rule that the creditor may give a business situs to his property in the chose in action elsewhere than his domicile. Bristol v. Washington Co., 177 U. S., 133.

Evading taxing laws of State.-While United States treasury notes are not as a rule taxable by the States, yet where a person who had moneys on a general deposit, drew out a day or two before the day of assessment, and took the amount in legal tender notes, and, which he re-deposited as a special deposit, this was held an evasion of the State tax laws, and he could not plead exemption of the same from taxation. Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S., 590.

The re-assessment of property grossly undervalued at the first assessment so as to impose upon it its just burden of taxation, does not violate the Constitution in depriving of property without due process of law. Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 176 U. S., 550. And the failure to provide for a rehearing before the governor, pursuant to Gen. Laws, 1893, c. 157, does not make the proceeding void for want of due process of law. Id., 485.

Re-assessment of taxes, where the first assessment failed for irregularity of notice, is not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because of short notice given to the owner. Bellingham Bay, etc., Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S., 320.

Taxes for highway improvements.-Where the legislature of a State, in exercise of its taxing power, directs

that the expense of laying out, grading or repairing a street be assessed upon the owners of lands benefited thereby, and determines the whole amount of the tax and what lands are benefited; and provides for notice to and hearing of the owner at each stage upon the question as to the proposition of the tax to be assessed upon his land, there is no taking of his property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S., 345; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S., 578.

In such matters of assessment, neither the corporate agency by which the work is done, the excessive price which the statute allows therefor, nor the relative importance which the work bears to the value of the land, nor that the assessments are unequal as regards the bene fits conferred, nor that personal judgments are rendered for the amounts assessed are matters in which the State authorities are controlled by the Federal Constitution. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S., 345; Stanley v. Supervisors, 121 U. S., 535, 550; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S., 691; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S., 701; United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S., 284; Laramie Co. v. Albany Co., 92 U. S., 307; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S., 578.

Provision for notice by publication or otherwise, to each owner of land to be assessed for a highway improvement and for hearing him at some stage of the proceedings, is due process of law. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S., 548.

Notices of tax proceedings, how far necessary.-The statute of a State providing for the assessment and collection of taxes, which gives notice of the proposed assessment to an owner of property to be affected by requiring him at a designated time and place to be present and give a statement of his property, with an estimate of its value, and gives opportunity to be heard and also resort to the courts to correct error or unfairness in assessment, does not deprive of property without due process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S., 321.

A notice, given by the statute, of the time and place at which the assessment of taxes is to be made is all that due process requires in the matter of notice of tax proceedings. Merchants', etc., Bank v. Penn., 167 U. S., 461.

"Due process of law" does not require personal notice of assessment of one's property for taxation; nor is equal protection denied by allowing to railroad companies only one hearing before a county board and an appeal to a State board. Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S., 421. Denial by a State court, after a fair trial, of damages for depreciation of railroad property, is not a taking without due process of law. Id.

ARTICLE XV.

THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

Section 1. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2. "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

Decisions under the Fifteenth Amendment summarized. The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage; but it exempts citizens from discrimination on account of their race, color or previous condition of servitude, and empowers Congress by appropriate legislation to enforce the right. On this article rests the power of Congress over the subject of voting at State elections; and such power can be exercised by providing a punishment only where the wrongful refusal to receive the vote of a qualified elector is, because of his race, color or previous condition of servitude. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S., 214.

The third and fourth sections of the Act of May 3d, 1870 (16 Stats. at L., 140), provided, in effect, (1) that whenever by or under the Constitution or laws of a State, etc., any act is or shall be required to be done by any citizen as a prerequisite to qualify or entitle him to vote, the offer of such citizen to perform the act required to be done "as aforesaid" shall, if it fail to be

carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission "aforesaid" of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such performance, or offer to perform, be deemed and held as a performance in law of such act; and the person so offering and failing as aforesaid, and being otherwise qualified, shall be entitled to vote in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had in fact performed such act, and penalties were imposed for the refusal to receive and count his vote, or allow him to qualify, or by force, bribery, threats, intimidation or other unlawful means, hindering, delaying, preventing or obstructing any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or from voting at any election.

These sections were held void, being penal and strictly construed because their penal provisions were not confined to unlawful discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The case arose upon an indictment against Reese for refusing as an inspector of a municipal election to receive the vote of a colored citizen. As the two sections were so broad in their terms as to cover wrongful acts outside of and beyond the constitutional jurisdiction of Congress to legislate upon the subject, it was held that Congress had not provided by appropriate legislation for the punishment of an inspector for refusing to receive and count a vote at such election. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S., 214.

« AnteriorContinuar »