which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings."

The District of Columbia is not a "State" within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution; and its citizens can not sue in the courts of the United States as citizens of any State. Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445.

Congress has authority to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the Constitution. Loughborough v. Lake, 5 Wheat., 317.

The power of Congress to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, is co-extensive with the territory of the United States. Id.

The power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases within the district includes the power to tax it. Id. Congress in the exercise of the right of taxation may direct that half the amount of compensation awarded to owners of lands taken for public highways shall be charged to the lands benefited by the highway. The act providing for a permanent highway system in the District of Columbia held valid. Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S., 324.

After the cession of this territory by Maryland and Virginia, Congress had the same power that both States had previously possessed to modify the compact between those States by which a free use of the river was se

cured to all the people residing in its borders. Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet., 91.

The counties of Washington and Alexandria (prior to the retrocession by Congress of the portion of the district lying in Virginia) constituting the district, and stood in the same relation to each other as counties in the same State, together constituting the district; and residents of one county, were not "beyond seas" with respect to each other. Bank of Alexandria v. Dyer, 14 Pet., 141.

The charter of the city of Washington did not authorize it to enforce the sale of lottery tickets in States whose laws prohibit such sales. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 264.

A police regulation by act of Congress relating exclusively to the internal trade of the States, can have no operation where as in the District of Columbia the legislative authority of Congress excludes territorially, all State legislation. United States v. Dewett, 9 Wall., 41.

Congress has power to confer on the city of Washington authority to assess upon lot owners along streets the expense of repairing the pavements. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall., 676.

The validity of the retrocession of the County of Alexandria to the State of Virginia, that State having been in possession of Virginia since 1847, can not now be questioned. Phillips v. Pryne, 92 U. S., 130.

When the United States acquires lands within the limits of a State by purchase with the consent of the legislature of the State for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, etc., the Constitution confers upon them exclusive jurisdiction of the tract so acquired; but when they acquire such lands in any other way than by purchase with consent of the State legislature, their exclusive jurisdiction is confined to the erections, buildings and land used for the purposes of the Federal government. A State may for such purpose cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over a tract of land; and may prescribe conditions to the cession, if not inconsistent with the effective use of the property, and may reserve the right to tax private property, railroad bridges, corporate franchises, etc. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525.

The right to use the streets for any other than ordinary uses must proceed from Congress; and a railroad company can not lay its tracks in or across the streets without permission of Congress. District of Columbia v. B. & P. R. R. Co., 114 U. S., 453.

The National Homes for Soldiers are under control of Congress, and State laws as to use of oleomargarine in hotels, eating houses, and the like do not apply to them. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S., 276.

THE COEFFICIENT OR INCIDENTAL POWERS OF CONGRESS.

The Congress shall have power,

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"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

Congress must possess the choice of means and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of the power granted by the Constitution. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358.

If the end be within the scope of Congressional power, all means appropriate and plainly adapted to that end, not prohibited by the letter or spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., 539.

The end being legitimate, Congress can judge of the necessity of the means. Id.

Instances of implied powers.-Congress may incorporate a bank. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316. May make United States treasury notes a legal tender in time of war or peace. Legal Tender Cases, 110 Wall., 421, overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall., 603 (see ante, p. 36). This is incident to the power to regulate the currency. 110 Wall., 438.

States may tax shares of stock of National banks, as this does not impair their usefulness as an instrumentality to carry out the powers of the government. Nat. Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall., 353.

The interstate commerce act is constitutional, power to pass it being implied from the power to regulate commerce among the States. Interstate Com. v. Brenson, 154 U. S., 472, 473; In re Debs, 158 U. S., 378.

The Congress may, as an incident to the power to carry on war, provide that the operation of the statute of limitations shall be suspended during the war. Stewart v. Kohn, 11 Wall., 507.

The Congress may make or authorize contracts with individuals or corporations for services to the government; may grant aids by money or land in preparation for and in the performance of such services; may exempt in its discretion, the agencies employed in such service from State taxation, which will prevent or impede the performance of them; yet in the absence of such exempting legislation, the exemption can not be applied to a corporation created by State law, exercising its franchise and holding its property therein, merely because of the employment in the service of the government. Thompson v. Pac. R. R. Co., 9 Wall., 579.

The exemption of agencies depends on the effect; whether the tax prevents or deprives the agency to serve the government or hinders the efficient exercise of the