INFERIOR COURTS. The Congress shall have power, * * "To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Congress has the power to establish circuit and district courts, and to confer on them equitable jurisdiction in cases coming within the reach of Federal jurisdiction. Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet., 632. This jurisdiction is to be exercised uniformly throughout the United States, and can not be limited in its extent, or controlled in its exercise by the laws of the several States. U. S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat., 108; Russell v. Southard, 12 How., 139; Neves v. Scott, 13 How., 268; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall., 558; Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S., 353, 362; Kirby v. Lake Shore, etc., Railroad, 120 U. S., 130, 138. Courts of the United States created under this power are all of limited jurisdiction but are not technically speaking inferior courts, whose judgments taken alone are to be disregarded. Their judgments and decrees are binding until reversed, and are not coram non judice, though no jurisdiction be shown in the record. McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat., 192. No court of the United States, except the Supreme Court, possesses any jurisdiction not given by the legis lative power. U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch., 32. Consent of parties can not confer it. Pacific R. R. v. Ketchum, 3 Dall. (U. S.), 289; Dewhurst v. Coulthard, 3 Dall. (U. S.), 409; "The Lucy," 8 Wall., 307; Peoples' Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U. S., 256. But the parties may admit the existence of facts which confer or show jurisdiction and the court may act judicially upon such decision. Id. Other cases affecting the jurisdiction of the inferior courts will be treated under the article conferring ju dicial power. PIRACY AND FELONIES ON HIGH SEAS. The Congress shall have power, * * * "To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." 1. Robbery committed on the high seas, although such robbery, if committed on land, would not by the laws of the United States be punishable with death, is piracy under 1 Stat. at L., 113. Congress can not make that piracy which is not piracy by the laws of nations. U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat., 610. It is considered within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. U. S. v. Pirates, 5 Wheat., 184. 2. Manslaughter is not punishable in the courts of the United States, when committed in a river within the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76. 3. The Federal courts have jurisdiction of murder or robbery on the high seas, though on board a vessel not belonging to a citizen of the United States, if she had no national character, but was held by pirates and not lawfully under any foreign flag. U. S. v. Holmes, 5 Wheat., 412. 4. The law of nations requires every national government to "use due diligence" to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another nation with which it is at peace, or to people thereof; and because of this, the obligation of one nation to punish those who, within its own jurisdiction, counterfeit the money of another nation has long been recognized. U. S. v. Arjona, 120 U. S., 479. Congress can constitutionally enact laws to punish the counterfeiting of the notes of a foreign bank or corporation. Id. 5. The act of Congress (3 Stat. at L., R. S., Sec. 5358), referring to the laws of nations for a definition of crime of piracy is a constitutional exercise of the power to define and punish that crime. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat., 153. 6. The term "high seas," as used in the Federal statute (R. S., §5346) for punishing assaults with a dangerous weapon or intent to commit felony, "upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or on any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State," applies to the unenclosed waters of the great lakes, which are connected by the Detroit river. U. S. v. Rodgers, 150 U. S., 249. THE WAR POWER. The Congress shall have power, "To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." The war power.-"Upon these powers no restrictions are imposed." "The power to declare war involves power to prosecute it by all the means and in any manner by which war may legitimately be prosecuted." It therefore involves the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at the will of the captor. This is and always has been an undoubted belligerent right. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall., 268. Congress is not deprived of these great powers when the necessity for their exercise is called out by domestic insurrection and internal civil war. Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall., 331. The exercise of the war power in time of civil war is so restricted that neither the President, nor Congress, nor the judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution, except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A citizen not connected with the military service and resi dent in a State where the courts are open and in the proper exercise of their jurisdiction, can not be tried, convicted and sentenced but by the courts of law. Such person can not be regarded as a prisoner of war. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2. British property found in the United States on land, at the commencement of hostilities with Great Britain, can not be condemned in an enemy's country, without a legislative act, authorizing its confiscation. Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, 110; "The Thomas Gibbons," 8 Cranch, 421. The United States in the enforcement of their constitutional rights against armed insurrection, have not only all the powers of a sovereign, but also of the most favored belligerent. As belligerents they may by capture enforce their authority, and as sovereign by pardon and restoration to all civil and political rights, can recall their revolted citizens to allegiance. Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S., 187. The government of the United States has power to permit commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war, and to provide conditions thereon as it sees fit. This power is incident to the power to declare and carry on war. It seems the President alone, as Commanderin-Chief, may exercise this power; but there is no doubt he may with the concurrent authority of Congress. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall., 73. Among some of the |