213 U.S.

Argument for Appellants.

merce. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167; Reagan v. Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362.

There are no excessive or cumulative penalties for second, third and succeeding convictions under the act of March 10, 1908. 12 Cycl. Law & Pro. 949; Brown v. Kentucky, 100 Kentucky, 127; S. C., 37 S. W. Rep. 496; Wilson v. Kentucky, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 685; Standard Oil Cases, 87 S. W. Rep. 1092, 1131; S. C., 29 Ky. Law Rep. 20; Cawein v. Kentucky, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1736; Parish v. N. C. & St. L. Ry., 49 Am. Rep. 655; S. C., 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 65; Ex Parte Snow, 120 U. S. 274.

The essential elements of "due process" are reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to be heard. Davison v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 102; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; Iowa Cent. R. R. v. Iowa, 204 U. S. 255; Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 535; Paulson v. Portland, 149 U. S. 41; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 393; L. & N. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 236.

The State may distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation without denying equal protection of the laws. Missouri Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 209; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 32; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Ky. Ry. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 322; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 606; Pac. Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339; Orient &c. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 562; New York &c. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 571.

That a different rate may be made for different roads constitutes neither arbitrary power nor unjust discrimination, so long as the rule by which the rates are fixed is uniform. Reagan v. Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362; Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 540, 547; S. C., 64 Fed. Rep. 165; Cov. Turnpike v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Railroad Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 664; Railroad Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 164; Stone v. Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307; Storrs v. Railroad Co., 29 Florida, 617; S. C., 11 So. Rep. 227; Ruggles v. Illinois,

Argument for Appellants.

213 U. S.

108 U. S. 526; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517; Commonwealth v. Cov. Bridge, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 836.

Classification proceeding on any difference which has a reasonable relation to the subject-matter sought to be accomplished is unobjectionable, though inequality results. Railroads have always formed a separate and distinct class. Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 214; Grundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680; Magoun v. Trust Co., 170 U. S. 282; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 560; Railroad Co. v. McKee, 127 U. S. 205; Railroad Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26; Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703.

The police power of the State relating to the regulation of the rates of common carriers cannot be bargained away. L. & N. R. R. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 505; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Douglas v. Commonwealth, 168 U. S. 488; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; L. & N. R. R. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; N. O. Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Slaughter House Cases, 111 U. S. 746; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 536; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; Stone v. Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307; Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387; Railroad Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57; Railroad Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556; Railroad Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88; Pearsall v. Railroad Co., 161 U. S. 648; Railroad Co. v. Transp. Co., 25 W. Va. 324.

For a charter provision to amount to an irrevocable contract fixing rates for all time, it must be clear, to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and must contain words exempting the corporation from future control. Merely to fix a maximum rate in the charter is not sufficient. Tiedeman on State and Federal Control, 952, 955; Russell on Police Powers, 127, 128; Cent. Transp. Co. v. Pullman, 139 U. S. 49; Minott v. Railroad Co., 18 Wall. 204; Bailey v. Magwire, 22 Wall. 215; Stone v. Wis

213 U.S.

Argument for Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.

consin, 94 U. S. 181; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 536; S. C., 91 Illinois, 262; Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541; Stone v. Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 347; Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174; Railroad Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 467; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Turnpike v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578; Commonweath v. Covington Bridge, 21 S. W. Rep. 1042; Railroad Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75; Winchester Turnpike Co. v. Croxton, 98 Kentucky, 739; Ragan v. Aiken, 9 Lea (Tenn.), 610; Water Co. v. Fergus, 178 Illinois, 571; Danville v. Water Co., 178 Illinois, 399; S. C., 53 N. E. Rep. 118; S. C., 180 Illinois, 235; S. C., 54 N. E. Rep. 224; Water Co. v. Freeport, 57 N. E. Rep. 862.

A reservation of the right to alter, amend or repeal, expressed either in a general law or in the charter prevents a provision from becoming an irrevocable contract. Tiedeman on State and Federal Control, 980; Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636.

Mr. Henry Lane Stone, for Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company:

The ruling of the court below sustaining its jurisdiction was correct. The allegations of the amended bill bring the case within the decision of this court in Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20.

The principle is well settled that where a Circuit Court of the United States once obtains jurisdiction of a cause, it may proceed to determine all questions involved therein, whether state or Federal. Osborne v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 822, 823; Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 340; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 252; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 264; Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 141; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 154; Omaha Horse Ry. Co. v. Cable Tram-Way Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 727, 729; People's Savings Bank v. Layman, 134 Fed. Rep. 635, 641; Michigan R. R. Tax Cases, 138 Fed. Rep. 223, 230.

The decree appealed from, therefore, should be affirmed, and

Argument for Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. 213 U.S.

it may be upheld and sustained upon any of the grounds relied on by appellee whether or not they arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

As the McChord Act undertakes to vest in the railroad commission, an administrative body, legislative, executive and judicial powers, it violates §§ 27, 28, 109 and 135 of the Kentucky constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. McChord, 103 Fed. Rep. 222; Roberts v. Hackney, 109 Kentucky, 265; Pratt v. Breckinridge, 114 Kentucky, 1; McChord v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 183 U. S. 495; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cin., N. O. & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 499.

Neither the said statute nor any other Kentucky statute provides for any judicial investigation or review on the reasonableness of any rate fixed by the commission for services of a carrier thereafter to be rendered, before the carrier is required to put them into force and effect. The making of such order conclusive as to the sufficiency of the rate fixed, deprives the carrier of its property without due process of law, and denies it the equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 458; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 154 U. S. 399; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. McChord, 103 Fed. Rep. 224; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 172; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 518; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 381; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 708; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 107; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 418; Violett v. Alexandria, 92 Virginia, 561, 569; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U. S. 132; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 409.

The McChord Act does not in its title or provisions authorize the commission to prescribe and establish schedules of maximum rates or tariffs, as is attempted by the order of July 20, 1906. The principal object of the act was to amend § 816, Kentucky statutes, which had been held by the Court of Appeals

213 U.S. Argument for Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.

to be unconstitutional and void, L. & N. R. R. Co. v. McChord, 99 Kentucky, 132, and there is no suggestion looking to the granting of power to the commission to make schedules of maximum rates. It is impossible to conceive that the legislature would require a road like the Louisville & Nashville with 1,300 miles of road and 700 stations to publish and put into force a rate schedule in ten days. The legislature is presumed to have had before it the acts of other States creating railroad commissions and defining their powers, and apt and clear language would have been employed, if it had been the intention. to clothe the commission with this important and far-reaching power. No railroad commission of any State has ever assumed such power except where expressly granted.

Powers of railroad commissions are limited, and the statutes granting such powers must be strictly construed. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Commissioners of Indiana, 38 Ind. App. 439; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 16 S. D. 517; S. C., 94 N. W. Rep. 407; Board of R. R. Commrs. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 17 Oregon, 65; S. C., 19 Pac. Rep. 702; Interstate Com. Comm. v. C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 38 Fed. Rep. 656; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. McChord, 103 Fed. Rep. 216.

The complaints on which the rate order was made were insufficient to give jurisdiction to or authorize said commission to make such order or to prescribe and establish maximum rates even if the act empowered the commission to establish and prescribe maximum rates on complaints of any character or under any circumstances.

The commission acted beyond its power in attempting to prohibit the railroad company from increasing or advancing any rate or rates it had or has in force and effect on any commodity or commodities belonging to either of the classes set out in the commodity clause in "Standard Tariff No. 1," notwithstanding the fact that such rates had not been found by said commission to be extortionate.

The said order shows on its face that the maximum rates