for the most part confining himself to theological, devotional and homiletical limits, achieved such literary distinction. He had not the weight of Hooker; nor the range, originality, or poetic passion of Milton; nor the quaintness, wit and reckless good nature of Fuller; nor the terse and thoughtful stateliness of Bacon; but he has a lucidity, an ease, force and precision of movement, a light, sensitive and sometimes humorous touch, accompanied by a wealth, a fitness, a splendor of imagery which give him preeminence among them all. Coleridge "used to reckon Shakespeare and Bacon, Milton and Taylor, four square, each against each." He spoke of Taylor's "great and lovely mind"; that "he was the most eloquent of divines; had I said of men, Cicero would forgive me and Demosthenes nod." Keble said of him "I confess I do not know any other author, except perhaps Hooker (whose subjects are so different that they will hardly bear comparison), worthy to be likened to him. Spenser comes nearest to his spirit. in all respects. Milton is like him in richness and depth, but in morality seems to me as far below him as pride is before humility."

The best known and most widely circulated of Taylor's writings are his "Holy Living" and "Holy Dying," and selected passages from his other devotional books, his life of Christ and his sermons. The mingled piety and music of these exquisite sentences still enthrall us and are good for the soul. But his "Liberty of Prophesying" is his most significant book, and the book which, because its appearance hit the right moment in one of the profoundest political, intellectual and moral struggles of the English race, gives him his greatest fame, though in point of his peculiar richness and beauty of style, it is inferior to much of his writing.

The distinguishing trait of this learned, frank and lofty treatise is its grounding of liberty of religious opinion in charity, and in this respect it is a transcript of the pious

spirit of its great author. He urges that no other weapons be used in behalf of the faith than those which are suitable to the Christian warfare, such as "preaching and disputation, charity and sweetness, holiness of life, assiduity of exhortation, the word of God and prayer. For these ways are most natural, most prudent, most peaceable and effectual. Only let not men be hasty in calling every misliked opinion by the name of heresy; and when they have resolved that they will call it so, let them use the erring person like a brother, nor convince him with a gibbet, or vex him out of his understandings and persuasions." He points out that "few men considered that so long as men had such variety of principles, such several constitutions, educations, tempers and distempers, hopes, interests and weaknesses, degrees of light and degrees of understanding, it was impossible all should be of one mind. And what is impossible to be done, is not necessary it should be done. And therefore although variety of opinion was impossible to be cured (and they who attempted it, did like him who claps his shoulder to the ground to stop an earthquake), yet the inconvenience arising from it might possibly be cured-not by uniting their beliefsthat was to be despaired of,-but by curing that which caused those mischiefs and accidental inconveniences of their disagreeing. For although these inconveniences which every man sees and feels, were consequent to this diversity of persuasions, yet it was but accidentally and by chance, inasmuch as we see that in many things, and they of great concernment, men allow to themselves and to each other a liberty of disagreement and no hurt neither. And certainly if diversity of opinions were of itself the cause of mischiefs, it would be so ever-that is, regularly and universally; but that we see it is not." "For," he continues, "if it be evinced that one heaven shall hold men of differing opinions-if the unity of faith be not destroyed by that men call differing religions, and if an unity of

Christian charity be the duty of all, even towards persons that are not persuaded of every proposition that we believe, then I would fain know to what purpose are all those stirs and great noises in Christendom, those names of faction, the several names of churches not distinguished by the divisions of kingdoms, which was the primitive rule and canon, but distinguished by names of sects and men? These are all become instruments of hatred, thence come schisms, and parting of communions, and then persecutions, and then wars and rebellions, and then the dissolutions of all friendships and societies. All these mischiefs proceed, not from this, that men are not of one mind (for that is neither necessary nor possible), but that every opinion is made an article of faith, every article is the ground of a quarrel, every quarrel makes a faction, every faction is zealous, and all zeal is for God, and whatever is for God cannot be too much. We by this time are come to that pass we think we love not God except we hate our brother, and we have not the virtue of religion unless we persecute all religions but our own.”

He assumes that there must be some basis for the exercise of toleration, that the Apostles' creed was originated and laid down by the Apostles themselves as such basis, and that it contains all that is necessary to be believed unto salvation, and no more. "The duty of faith is completed in believing the Apostles' creed." "Since it is necessary to rest somewhere, it is best to rest there where the Apostles rested." "Not that it is unlawful for any wise man to extend his creed to anything which follows from these articles, but no such is fit to be pressed on others as an article of faith"-least of all by force. "For it is a demonstration that nothing can be necessary to be believed under pain of damnation, but such propositions of which it is certain that God hath spoken and taught them to us, and of which it is certain that this is their sense and purpose."

With vast learning and acuteness he proves that persecution by the Church was unknown during its earlier history; that it is impossible to establish any rule of faith more definite than the Apostles' creed, either from the Bible, tradition, decrees of councils, the fathers, the Pope, or the opinions of the Universal Church. He vindicates the authority of reason. "No man may be trusted to judge for all others, unless this person were infallible and authorized to do so; which no man, or company of men is, yet every man may be trusted to judge for himself." He points out the folly, iniquity and uselessness of punishing by torture and death the holding of opinions which he has proved to be harmless and inevitable. "No Christian is to be put to death, dismembered, or otherwise directly persecuted for his opinion which does not teach impiety or blasphemy. If it plainly or apparently brings in a crime and himself does act it or encourage it, then the matter of fact is punishable according to its proportion or malignity." He distinguishes ecclesiastical from secular authority, and shows that the secular governor has no right to punish opinions, but only disturbance of the peace. "The ecclesiastical power which only is competent to take notice of such questions, is not of capacity to use the temporal sword, or corporal inflictions. The mere doctrines and opinions of men are things spiritual, and therefore not cognizable by a temporal authority; and the ecclesiastical authority which is to take cognizance, is itself so spiritual that it cannot inflict any punishment corporal."

He has a long section on the Anabaptists in which he argues with great subtilty on both sides of their position, and deals with them in great breadth and charity. "Their doctrine is wholly to be reproved and disavowed, but the men are to be treated with the usages of a Christian; strike them not as an enemy, but exhort them as brethren." "But for their other capital opinion that it is not lawful for princes to put malefactors to death, nor to take up

it is not to

For "

'that

defensive arms, nor to minister an oath, be disputed with such liberty as the former." prince or commonwealth that should be persuaded by them would be exposed to all the insolences of foreigners, and all mutinies of the teachers themselves, and the governors of the people could not do that duty they owe to their people of protecting them from the rapine and malice which will be in the world as long as the world is. And therefore they are to be restrained from preaching such doctrine, if they mean to preserve their government; and the necessity of the thing will justify the lawfulness of the thing. If they think it to themselves, that cannot be helped; so long it is innocent as much as concerns the public; but if they preach it, they may be accounted authors of all the consequent inconveniences and punished accordingly. No doctrine that destroys government is to be endured." Here Taylor goes beyond the problem of mere religious toleration and with wonderful grasp and prevision lays down a broad political principle as sound and as vitally applicable to Twentieth Century as to Seventeenth Century issues.

He has another long section in which he deals with equal breadth and charity with the Papists, concluding that so far as their doctrine is concerned "there is nothing in the foundation of their faith that can reasonably hinder them to be permitted; the foundation of faith stands secure for all their vain and unhandsome superstructures." "But if we consider their doctrines in relation to government and public societies of men, such doctrines

as these: the Pope may dispense with all oaths taken to God, or man; he may absolve subjects from their allegiance to their natural prince;

may be slain by their subjects;

heretical princes now these opinions

are a direct overthrow to all human society and mutual commerce, a destruction of government and of the laws. and duty and subordination which we owe to princes;