Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. 1851. Although the law upon this subject was perfectly well settled, losses by fire upon the ocean had been of such rare occurrence, that ship owners had not fully recognised their liabilities until these decisions. The history of that act during its passage is curious, suggestive, and instructive. 23 Congressional Globe, 713-718. When first introduced into the Senate, the last clause of the act was as follows: "The preceding sections shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal boat, nor to the owner or owners of any lighter or lighters employed in loading or unloading vessels, or in transporting goods or other property inland from place to place." Thus limiting the exception to canal boats and lighters engaged in inland commerce, or, in other words, extending the benefits of the law to all other vessels of every description within the jurisdiction of Congress. The bill had been carefully prepared by the Committee on Commerce, and was called up by Mr. Hamlin, Senator from Maine, one of that committee. He said: "It is a bill which I think is just in its provisions, and it places our commercial marine upon the same basis as that of England.” Its consideration was opposed by several distinguished Senators, and urged by others as a measure of great importance. Mr. Davis, of Massachusetts, said "that it is by a recent decision some two or three years since that the owners of ships have comprehended their liabilities," and urging the consideration of the measure as a system which had been for many years in operation in England, and said, "it is simply putting our merchant marine upon the same footing as that of Great Britain. We are carriers side by side with that nation in competition with them, and we cannot afford to give them any very great advantage over us without affecting our interest very seriously." Mr. Cass urged its consideration with great earnestness, for similar reasons; and when before the Senate upon its merits, Mr. Hamlin said: "It is true that the changes are most radical from the common law upon the subject, but they are rendered Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. necessary, first, from the fact that the English common-law system really never had any application in this country; and second, that the English Government has changed the law, which is a very strong and established reason why we should put our commercial marine upon an equal footing with hers. Why not give to those who navigate the ocean as many inducements to do so as England has done? Why not place them upon that great theatre where we are to have the great contest for the supremacy of the commerce of the world? This is what this bill seeks to do, and it asks no more." Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, opposed the bill, and said: "Great Britain has more interest in relieving itself from liabilities upon the ocean than any other." Mr. Underwood, of Kentucky, as representing the agricultural interests of the West, opposed the bill, and especially that portion of it exempting the owners of the vessel from liabilities for loss by fire; he said: "The argument is, that we cannot compete with our great rival upon the ocean, with Great Britain, and that we must pass the first section of this bill in order to come into competition with her;" and he thought the bill would be injurious to the agriculturists, who produced articles of commerce, but who were not their own carriers; that it would lessen the security without lessening the cost of freight. It was to obviate these objections coming from the interior that Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, moved to strike out the clause of the bill, and to insert the clause under consideration: "This act shall not apply to the owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter, or any vessel of any description whatsoever used in rivers or inland navigation." Mr. Hamlin, who had charge of the bill, said: "If those who represent the interior waters of the country desire such an amendment, I am perfectly willing that it should be made." Mr. Phelps, of Vermont, living upon the banks of Lake Champlain, opposed the amendment, and said: "If there is any portion of our navigation which is entitled to the benefit of this change in the common law of the country, it is our inland navigation. From my own experience in my own imme Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. diate neighborhood, of the navigation of the waters of the inland section of the country in which I reside, it is proved that this navigation is more subject to accidents, against which they cannot guard, than is the navigation of the sea. Under these circumstances I am opposed to the amendment, because I think that if the principle which is incorporated in the bill be adopted, it should be adopted in regard to all our navigation, internal as well as external." Mr. Pearce, who introduced the amendment, said: "The memorials which gave rise to this bill came from that class of our people who were interested in ocean navigation, and one of the strongest arguments in support of this bill is, that it would put the ocean navigation of this country upon an equal footing with the ocean navigation of England and other countries. No such argument applies to this case; it is very manifest that the passage of this bill, without this amendment, will operate very disadvantageously to the interests of inland navigation." Mr. Rantoul was willing to vote for the amendment, because it did not affect those sections directly interested in foreign navigation, and was willing that the other sections should make such arrangements as best suited their purpose. Mr. Seward opposed the amendment, because it introduced "one system for ships that were engaged in the State of New York, another system for the commerce on our lakes, on Lakes Erie, Ontario and Michigan; one system for the rivers and lakes, and another system for the ocean navigation." "The reasons which lead to the necessity for this bill are applicable to the inland navigation, and not to ocean navigation alone." Mr. Clayton, of Delaware, said: "I suppose the amendment will apply to lake navigation as well as inland navigation.” Mr. Walker, of Wisconsin, favored the amendment, for the reason "that the great producing interests of the country require it." Mr. Shields, of Illinois, said: "I also hope the amendment will be adopted. I do not think we have too many guaranties upon our Western waters for the safety of either passengers or freight." Looking, then, at the history of British legislation upon this Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. subject, and the greater liabilities that rested upon our ship owners, which had been so clearly brought to light by the decisions growing out of the loss of the Lexington, it seems very clear that the purpose of the act was in relation to ocean navigation, to place our vessels upon an equality with those of Great Britain, and enable them to compete successfully with British and other foreign shipping for the commerce of the seas. It seems equally clear, that the provisions of the clause in question were intended to be extended as well to commerce upon the lakes as on rivers. The British statutes exempting ships from liabilities were not in force in Canada and upon the great lakes, nor was there upon those lakes any real competition between British and American shipping. It already stood upon an equality in relation to legal liability, and, practically, American shipping had the entire monopoly of the commerce. Is there anything in this exception itself that requires a different construction? We think not. In the first place, the exception excludes from the operation of the act certain vessels, irrespective of the character of the navigation in which they are engaged, canal boats, barges, and lighters. These, from their very nature, cannot be used in ocean navigation, nor be exposed to its hazards. Then there is excluded from the operation of the act, "vessels of any description whatsoever used in rivers or inland navigation;" the phrase is sufficiently comprehensive to include everything that floats upon water, if used in the specified way. Webster's Dict., "Vessel." The phrase "used in rivers" is too unambiguous to require explanation or construction. The remaining question, and which is the question in this case, is, what construction is to be given to the phrase "inland navigation;" shall it be held to embrace navigation upon Lake Erie and our great lakes? That this is the obvious, natural, and popular meaning of the phrase, we think there can be no Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. doubt. This is admitted by Judge Conklin, who suggests, however, a different construction. Conklin Ad., 209. It is now clearly settled, that in the construction of statutes the courts will give to the language used its ordinary and obvious meaning, unless from the statute itself it is clearly apparent that some other meaning was intended. Sedgwick on Stat. Law, 243, 260, 310, 382. Tisdale v. Comb, 7 Ad. and E., 788. Lakes are from their very nature inland, and must be so, and the navigation upon them must therefore be inland navigation. 5 Am. Encyc., art. "Lake." 4 Nat. Cyc., art. "Canada." 5 Ed. Encyc., art. "Canada." Maunder's Scientific Treas., art. "Lake." Thus the Caspian, though sometimes called a sea, is strictly a lake, being a large collection of water in an inland place. 15 Ed. Encyc., art. "Physical Geo.," 608. 5 Amer. Cyc., art. "Lake." 7 Nat. Encyc., art. "Lake." The word "inland," as applied to navigation or bodies of water, is used as the correlative of ocean or tide water. Webster's Dict., "Inland." We refer to a few only of the many instances in which the terms "inland seas," "inland waters," and "inland navigation," have been used by jurists and by other writers in relation to, or so as necessarily to include, the great lakes. "Inland Seas," Woodbury, J., 5 How., 495. |