Rector, &c., of Christ Church, Phila. v. County of Phila. THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary act. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court, and also the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which was alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. It was argued by Mr. McCall and Mr. Reverdy Johnson for the plaintiffs in error, and submitted on a printed argument by Mr. King for the defendants. The first point of the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, viz: that a Legislature had power to exempt property permanently from taxation, was not contested by the other side; but the argument was, whether the reason given for exempting the property was a legal consideration of a contract or only a motive alleged for passing the laws. Upon this question many authorities were cited on both sides. Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. This cause comes before this court upon a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under the 25th section of the act of Congress of the 24th September, 1789. In the year 1833 the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act which recited "that Christ Church Hospital, in the city of Philadel phia, had for many years afforded an asylum to numerous poor and distressed widows, who would probably else have become a public charge; and it being represented that in consequence of the decay of the buildings of the hospital estate, and the increasing burden of taxes, its means are curtailed, and its usefulness limited," they enacted, "that the real property, including ground rents, now belonging and payable to Christ Church Hospital, in the city of Philadelphia, so long as the same shall continue to belong to the said hospital, shall be and remain free from taxes." In the year 1851 the same authority enacted "that all property, real and personal, belonging to any association or incor Rector, &c., of Christ Church, Phila. v. County of Phila. porated company which is now by law exempt from taxation, other than that which is in the actual use and occupation of such association or incorporated company, and from which an income or revenue is derived by the owners thereof, shall hereafter be subject to taxation in the same manner and for the same purposes as other property is now by law taxable, and so much of any law as is hereby altered and supplied be and the same is hereby repealed." It was decided in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that the exemption conferred upon these plaintiffs by the act of 1833 was partially repealed by the act of 1851, and that an assessment of a portion of their real property under the act of 1851 was not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, as tending to impair a legislative contract they alleged to be contained in the act of Assembly of 1833 aforesaid. The plaintiffs claim that the exemption conceded by the act of 1833 is perpetual, and that the act itself is in effect a contract. This concession of the Legislature was spontaneous, and no service or duty, or other remunerative condition, was imposed on the corporation. It belongs to the class of laws denominated privilegia favorabilia. It attached only to such real property as belonged to the corporation, and while it remained as its property; but it is not a necessary implication from these facts that the concession is perpetual, or was designed to continue during the corporate existence. Such an interpretation is not to be favored, as the power of taxation is necessary to the existence of the State, and must be exerted according to the varying conditions of the Commonwealth. The act of 1833 belongs to a class of statutes in which the narrowest meaning is to be taken which will fairly carry out the intent of the Legislature. All laws, all political institutions, are dispositions for the future, and their professed object is to afford a steady and permanent security to the interests of society. Bentham says, "that all laws may be said to be framed with a view to perpetuity; but perpetual is not synonymous to irrevocable; and the principle on which all laws ought to be, and the greater part of them have been established, is that of defeasible perpetuity-a perpetuity defeasi Wiggins et al. v. Gray et al. ble by an alteration of the circumstances and reasons on which the law is founded." The inducements that moved the Legislature to concede the favor contained in the act of 1833 are special, and were probably temporary in their operation. The usefulness of the corporation had been curtailed in consequence of the decay of their buildings and the burden of taxes. It may be supposed that in eighteen years the buildings would be renovated, and that the corporation would be able afterwards to sustain some share of the taxation of the State. The act of 1851 embodies the sense of the Legislature to this effect. It is in the nature of such a privilege as the act of 1833 confers, that it exists bene placitum, and may be revoked at the pleasure of the sovereign. Such was the conclusion of the courts in Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass., 442; Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew., 387; Alexander v. Willington, 2 Russ. and M., 35; 12 Harris, 232; Lindley's Jurisp., sec. 42. It is the opinion of the court that there is no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court, within the scope of the writ to that court, and its judgment is affirmed. WILLIAM WIGGINS, JAMES M. JONES, AND JOHN B. WELLER, COMPLAINANTS, v. JOHN B. GRAY AND KNOWLES TAYLOR. The Circuit Court certified that they had divided in opinion upon a question whether a party had a right to proceed summarily on motion to vacate a decree in that court. The question certified is merely one of practice, to be governed by the rules prescribed by this court, and the established principles and usages of a chancery court. And even if a summary proceeding on motion might have been a legitimate mode of proceeding, yet the court, in its discretion, had a right to refuse, and to order a plenary proceeding by bill and answer. The exercise of such a discretionary power by the court below cannot be revised in this court upon appeal or certificate of division, and this court therefore decline expressing any opinion on the question certified. THIS case came up on a certificate of a division of opinion Wiggins et al. v. Gray et al. between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of California. The question certified is stated in the opinion of the court. The case was argued by Mr. Bayard, upon a brief filed by himself and Mr. Collier, for the complainants, and by Mr. Walker and Mr. Cushing for the defendants. The question being merely one of practice, which is authoritatively settled by the judgment of this court, it is not thought necessary to give the authorities referred to. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. This case comes before the court upon a certificate of division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court for the district of California, sitting as a court of equity. In stating the facts upon which the question certified arose, the court gives a history of the case, and it appears that a bill was filed in a State court of California, and was afterwards removed to the District Court of the United States, by order of the court, pursuant to an agreement made by the counsel for the respective parties; that before it was transferred from the State court, one of the complainants and one of the defendants died; and the representatives of neither of them were afterwards made parties, either in the State court before the removal, or the District Court of the United States, after the case was transferred to that court. And in this condition of the case, and without these parties, a final decree was rendered in the last-mentioned court. These proceedings were transferred to the Circuit Court of the United States, under the act of Congress of April 30, 1856; and a bill was afterwards filed in that court to set aside and vacate the final decree which had been rendered as above mentioned; but in that proceeding the Circuit Court held that it had not jurisdiction, because the parties made defendants resided in New York, where the process of the court could not lawfully be served upon them. The dates of these several proceedings in the different courts, and the motions and agreements of counsel, are particularly Wiggins et al. v. Gray et al. set forth in the statement; but they are not material to the decision of this court, and need not, therefore, be repeated here. The Circuit Court further certify, that after all of these proceedings were had, and the bill filed against the citizens of New York dismissed, a motion was made "to vacate the final decree rendered, and to remand the case to the State court, in which it originated; and that the motion was predicated on the ground that the whole proceedings, from the time the case was transferred thence, including the decree, were null and void, and not merely voidable, and therefore might be set aside on motion." Upon this motion the judges divided in opinion, as they certify, upon the following question: "whether, under the circumstances detailed, this court (the Circuit Court) has authority to vacate summarily, on motion, the decree of the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California, and remand the case to the third judicial district of the State." It will be observed, that the grounds upon which the decree of the District Court is alleged to be void, or voidable, are not stated, nor the questions which arose in the State court, or the courts of the United States; nor does it appear what errors are supposed to have been committed, which it is proposed to bring for revision before the Circuit Court, and to correct by a summary proceeding on this motion. The only question certified by the Circuit Court is, whether, under the circumstances of the case as detailed in the statement, it could proceed summarily on motion to vacate and declare void the decree. The inquiry obviously relates altogether to the practice of the court as a court of equity. And this question often depends upon the sound judicial discretion. of the court, regulated by the rules prescribed by this court, and the general principles and established usages which govern proceedings in a court of chancery; and whether it will proceed in a summary manner on motion, or require plenary proceedings by bill and answer, must depend upon the partic |