the phrase would as certainly refer to the retributory slaughter by which the mutiny was quelled.1

It is a characteristic of the British race that its children rapidly forget the dangers which they happen to experience. The incidents of the Vellore rising, its causes and its consequences, might have usefully occupied the thoughts of statesmen for a lengthened period. But, if it had not led to a difference of opinion between the Governor of Madras 2 and the Commander-in-Chief, which ultimately involved the Governor's recall, it would probably have never troubled British statesmen at all. Yet surely it was no slight matter to ascertain that the subordination of a great army might depend on trivial regulations affecting the form of a hat, the shape of a beard, or the ornaments which routine might allow or refuse a soldier to wear. All, however, that statesmen condescended to recollect was, that the mutiny had been stamped out on the day of its birth; all that they thought it necessary to do was to punish, with the one hand, officers who, warned by the mutiny, distrusted their own troops, or high officers of state, who, unwarned by its lessons, were in favour of undue leniency. No measures of any moment were taken to prevent the outbreak of similar rebellions in future; and no serious consideration was accorded to the question whether the defence of India could safely be trusted to an army whose religious prejudices might at any moment be roused by the ill-considered orders of an inexperienced commander.

If it be the characteristic of the British race rapidly to forget the danger which is past, insensibility to peril is a source of strength to the nation. Empires are not founded by men who are always brooding over the risks which surround them, and the heart that dares and the arm that strikes are better allies in some circumstances than the brain which reflects and the hand that hesitates. Confidence in difficulty is frequently rewarded with immunity from danger; and so it proved in India. Native troops bore their part and did their duty in

1 Ann. Reg., 1806, Hist., 253; Thornton, vol. iv. p. 63; Marshman, vol. ii. p. 209; Kaye's Sepoy War, vol. i. pp. 218-232.

2 Lord W. Bentinck. Vide supra, p. 131.

the wars of Wellesley and in the wars of Hastings; and Indian statesmen thought it ungenerous to dwell on one unhappy circumstance in the history of an army which had so frequently rendered faithful and brilliant service.

The mutiny of the 47th Regiment in

And so, for another eighteen years, the Vellore Mutiny and its lessons were forgotten. In 1824, however, another rising again drew attention to the conditions on which the Indian army served. The Bengal army was enlisted for service in India. By the terms of its enlistment 1824. the authorities had the right to call on it to march at any moment on any service. But they were not entitled to order it to cross the sea. On the occasion of the first Burmese war, it was accordingly decided to march the regiments of Bengal round the Indian frontier instead of transporting them across the gulf which separates Burma from Calcutta. The march was attended with many difficulties, the transport animals were inadequate, and the sepoys incurred a fear that, as the transport had failed, they might, in defiance of the terms on which they served, be carried by sea. Instigated by these fears, the 47th Regiment refused to march. an officer was again at hand prepared to punish mutiny with stern measures. The guilty regiment, persisting in its refusal, was without warning mowed down by artillery, its leaders who survived were tried and hanged, and the regiment itself was struck out of the Army List.1

But

Thus for a third time in sixty years the sword on which the British relied had wounded the hand which held it, and for the third time mutiny had been punished with severe retribution. Another twenty years passed away before mutiny again appeared in the ranks of the Bengal army; and in the interval the lessons of 1806 and 1824 were almost wholly forgotten. During much of that period India enjoyed an exceptional and unparalleled peace; and peace, however pleasant it may be to the citizen, neither improves the prospects of the soldier nor promotes the discipline of an

1 Kaye's Sepoy War, vol. i. pp. 266-271; Holmes's Indian Mutiny, p. 55; Wilson, vol. iii. p. 100; Thornton, vol. v. p. 105; Marshman, vol. ii. p. 399.

army. Before the twenty years were over, however, the policy of Auckland and the ambition of Ellenborough brought the sepoy new service. The conquest of Scinde and the annexation of the Punjab threw new duties on the Bengal army and produced new dangers for British rule. The European troops which had previously been stationed in the Lower Provinces were moved towards the frontier, and Bengal itself was almost denuded of any garrison except that which a Native force supplied. The sepoys in Bengal could hardly avoid perceiving that the British were relying almost solely on their protection. The sepoys in the North-West were discontented. on finding that the conquests which brought their employers fresh territories gave them only increased duties and reduced allowances. For when a sepoy was engaged outside the Company's dominions custom and regulation gave him double allowances; but when the territory was once acquired and the new conquests were incorporated in the Company's possessions the double allowances immediately ceased.

It was this circumstance that produced the third serious mutiny in the Native army during the nineteenth century.

The mutiny of the 34th Regiment.

The 34th Regiment, warned for service in Scinde and halted at Ferozepore, refused to march unless double allowances were assured to it. Three other regiments moving towards the frontier followed its example. Two regiments of the Madras army, employed on special service, thinking that the Government did not keep faith with them, also ventured on mutiny; and the Government, hardly knowing where it could rely for help, did not venture on requiting these risings with prompt and adequate punishment. For the first time in Indian history stern retribution had not rapidly followed military crime; and, though punishment ultimately came and the name of the 34th was struck out of the Army List, the sepoy had been taught to know his own power, and had learned from experience that occasions might arise when the British Government would be unable to enforce subordination in its own army.1

1 Holme's Indian Mutiny, p. 58; Kaye's Sepoy War, vol. i. pp. 276-298.

But, whatever conclusions the sepoy may have drawn from these circumstances, they made little or no impression on his employers. Nothing was done either to improve the discipline or to remedy the grievances of the Native soldiers. The misconduct of a few regiments was not allowed to throw suspicion on an army, and the Company proceeded to fresh wars and fresh conquests without thought for the consequences. And, in one sense, they were justified by the event. In the assault on Sobraon, amidst the mismanagement of Chillianwalla, and in the crowning victory of Gujerat, the sepoy showed his old courage and rendered his old services. But the defeat of the Sikhs produced the same difficulties which had resulted from the conquest of Scinde. The sepoy failed to understand the reasoning which led his employer to requite his services with reduced allowances; he could not appreciate the principle of lowering his pay because he had won a noble victory. Hence, in July 1849, two regiments of the army of occupa- The mutiny tion at Rawul Pindee struck for higher pay. The at Rawul first news which greeted Napier on India was the tidings of the mutiny. But it so happened that the command at Rawul Pindee was held by a stout soldier, and that European troops were in the neighbourhood of the discontented regiments. Colin Campbell knew how to deal with the difficulty, and the mutineers returned to their duty and bided their time. But mutiny was not averted, it was merely postponed. In the following December two other regiments stood out for increased allowances, and mutiny for a second time was only averted by the tact and firmness of a commanding officer. On both these occasions the sepoys had only shown a passive insubordination. In the following month, however, the 66th Native Infantry rose at Govindghur. Fortunately for the British, a cavalry regiment at the same station stood firm and crushed the mutineers. The number of the guilty corps was struck out of the Army List and a regiment of Ghoorkas raised in their place.

his arrival in

Pindee.

1 Kaye's Sepoy War, vol. i. p. 312; Holmes's Indian Mutiny, p. 59.

2 Brigadier Hearsey. Kaye's Sepoy War, vol. i. p. 313, and Holmes's Indian Mutiny, p. 59.

Warning enough had now been given to the blindest Government, but other circumstances diverted attention from it. A Governor-General and a Commander-in-Chief publicly engaged in an exciting controversy, and the personal considerations which their altercation involved, effaced the graver question of mutiny which had been at the root of the misunderstanding. The controversy arose in this way. Hearsey, who was in command of the troops at Wuzeerabad, drew Napier's attention to a grievance under which he considered the men were lying. Up to 1844, whenever grain was exceptionally dear, the Government had granted to the sepoy a pecuniary compensation equivalent to the increased cost of the grain on which he lived. But other things besides grain formed a portion of the sepoy's food, and in distant countries occasionally commanded exceptional prices; accordingly in 1844 the Company consented to place these articles on the same footing as grain, and to allow the sepoy pecuniary compensation when they were dear.

of 1844.

In sanctioning this arrangement the Company intended to secure the sepoy his ration at a fixed and moderate price The Order of seven shillings a month. Experience, however, proved that a change involved great complications in the accounts, and that it did more for the sepoy than the Company had intended. For it occasionally occurred that, while one article of the sepoy's ration was exceptionally dear, other articles were unusually cheap; and it seemed, consequently, unnecessary to compensate the sepoy for the increased cost of some commodities without setting against it the diminished expense of the others. The Company, therefore, in 1845 took the opportunity, which the issue of some new and beneficial regulations afforded, to correct Its modi- the error; and the troops were then told that they fication. would be only entitled to compensation when the price of provisions forming their diet exceeded in the aggregate seven shillings a month. The new regulation, which

1 Correspondence relating to Resignation of Sir C. Napier, Parl. Papers, 1854, p. 61.