further official intercourse with the representative of Persia at the British Court." 1 Whether vigorous measures of this kind were wise or necessary is a matter of opinion. That they were attended Fresh with partial success is a matter of fact. arrangements with The Persian Government consented to an arrangement Persia. which received the approval of the British Ministry; it engaged not to send troops to Herat unless Herat were threatened by attack from some foreign country; and it undertook, when the invading army withdrew, to recall its own forces.2 The negotiation which was thus concluded had commenced in the latter half of 1851, it was protracted till the commencement of 1853, and for another year no overt difference existed between Persia and this country. Unhappily, however, while one cause of difficulty was in process of removal, another ground for dispute was gradually forming. Russia, quarrelling with France about the Holy Places, was brought into open collision with Turkey; and the Czar, confronted with the Western Alliance, turned to Persia for help. The Shah was dazzled by the proposals which the Czar made to him, and was only dissuaded from declaring war against Turkey by the attitude of his Prime Minister. Through the latter's influence Persia was induced to remain neutral. If England then had been well served, she would have done her utmost to support the power and to attend to the wishes of the minister. Instead of doing so, two successive envoys at the Persian Court took a step which was certain to be offensive to him. In 1854, Mr. Thomson, the British representative at Teheran, appointed as his first Persian secretary one Meerza Hashem Khan, a man who had been in Persian service, who had not been officially removed from it, and whose "family" had for a long time been at enmity with that of the minister.4 The minister flatly declined to receive Meerza Hashem, and Meerza 1 Papers respecting Persia, pp. 29, 30, 35. 2 Ibid., pp. 59, 64. His appointment to Shiraz. neither the chargé d'affaires in Persia nor the Foreign Office in London thought it desirable to force him to do so. Unluckily the chargé d'affaires still thought it necessary to provide for Meerza Hashem, and, as he was not allowed to appoint him Persian secretary, selected him for the post of British agent at Shiraz. A more foolish arrangement could not have been made. By a treaty of 1841 "it was expressly provided that England should have no commercial agent except at Teheran and Tabreez, and a Resident at Bushire."1 It was true that the British had for a long time been in the habit of employing an agent at Shiraz.2 But the mere fact that he was there, not in accordance with but in opposition to a treaty, ought to have induced the British chargé d'affaires to take exceptional care in selecting an unobjectionable person for the place; while Mr. Murray, who had now become British Minister in Persia, chose the man whom he knew to be offensive to the Persian Prime Minister. Some diplomatists, like some statesmen, delight in building walls for the purpose of knocking their heads against them. Only one result could follow from Murray's proceeding. The Persian minister declared that, if Meerza Hashem left the Embassy to take up his duties, he would be arrested. Murray retorted that, if Meerza Hashem were either seized or molested, the minister well knew the consequences which would ensue.3 Not venturing to carry out his threat, the minister laid hands on Meerza Hashem's wife, and Murray demanded her release, threatening even to haul down his flag if she were not restored to her husband.4 The minister, instead of complying with this demand, published and inserted in a despatch offensive insinuations of the relations between Murray and Murray's predecessor and Meerza Hashem's wife, and Murray at once struck his flag. Murray strikes his flag. He offered to re-hoist it if the lady were restored, 1 Hansard, vol. cxl. p. 1717. The speech of Mr. (now Sir A.) Layard, from which the quotation in the text is taken, is worth reading. 2 See Palmerston's statement in ibid., p. 1722. 3 Parl. Papers respecting Persia, pp. 80, 81. 4 Ibid., p. 83. and if the minister came to the Embassy, withdrew his despatch, and apologised for writing it.1 ... In insisting on this apology, Murray was undoubtedly right, but his previous conduct in demanding the liberation of Meerza Hashem's wife was as certainly wrong. “If there is one subject," said a good authority in the House of Commons. afterwards, "upon which Easterns are more jealous and sensitive than another, it is with regard to their women. . . . It was, therefore, the duty of our representative to avoid any discussion with the Persian Government relative to women.” 2 For a second time in the same autumn, Murray had raised an issue which could not do otherwise than result in a quarrel. Not unnaturally, the Persian Government decided, if quarrel were before it, to act in the way most distasteful to England. Britain and Russia were still locked in a deadly struggle, and the British Government would be sure to take alarm at a fresh advance on Herat. Persia accordingly issued a manifesto, declaring that Dost Mahommed was moving from Cabul on Candahar; that he was ultimately intending to march upon Herat; and that, as it was unwilling to tolerate such a movement, it was determined to send wellequipped troops to Herat to prevent the place falling into Dost Mahommed's hands.3 A Persian advance on Herat was The Persian manifesto. always attended with the same consequences. In July 1856 the Government of India was instructed to prepare a force at Bombay for the occupation of the island of Karrack and the city of Bushire. It was assumed that a pressure which had proved sufficient in 1838 would again induce the Shah of Persia to withdraw his army from before the gate of India. Indirectly, however, still stronger pressure was brought on the Persian Government. The ground on which it mainly relied crumbled beneath its feet. So long as the Crimean war continued, it assumed, rightly or wrongly, that England had no troops to spare for other expeditions; and that Persia 1 Papers respecting Persia, p. 85. 2 Mr. Layard. Hansard, vol. cxl. p. 1716. 4 Ibid., p. 154. mission to Constan might venture, therefore, to repay the British representative's indiscretion with insulting contumely. But, before the summer of 1856 had well begun, peace between Russia and England was assured, and Persia found herself alone in her quarrel. She had no hope of success in a single-handed combat, and she accordingly made a serious effort for the removal of the misunderstanding. A special ambassador was sent The Persian from Teheran to Paris, with instructions to stop at Constantinople on his way, and to endeavour to tinople. arrange terms with Stratford de Redcliffe.1 The terms which Stratford de Redcliffe was instructed to ask included the withdrawal of Persia from Herat and the dismissal of the Persian minister. On the first of these points Stratford de Redcliffe met with unexpected success. News of the capture of Herat by Persia arrived at Constantinople while the negotiation was in progress. But the Persian envoy nevertheless consented to the evacuation of the town. On the other point he was much more resolute. He had either no power or no will to consent to the dismissal of the Persian minister. Its failure. If the Persian envoy were unwilling to give way, the British Government was equally firm. It had already resolved on war; it had directed the Indian Government to prepare for war; and it had persuaded Outram, seeking health in England, to return to the East and assume command of the expedition. Yet the declaration of war involved a curious inconsistency. The Governor-General rested the case for the war on the expedition to Herat, and the Persian envoy had already offered full satisfaction on this point. The British Government, on the contrary, was breaking off the negotiations on its demand for the dismissal of the Persian minister, and the Governor-General was silent on this part of the question.4 On the war which thereupon ensued it is not necessary to say much. Karrack was occupied, Bushire was The Persian taken, the Persian army was defeated, and British war of 1856. troops proved their capacity and power to overthrow the 1 Papers respecting Persia, p. 173. 2 Ibid., p. 190. feeble empire of the Shah. But the war was not decided by Outram and the army. Its declaration was unpopular in England; a grave constitutional question arose on the conduct of the ministry in declaring and prosecuting a war without calling Parliament together; and the Government, finding its authority decreasing, was almost as anxious to conclude peace in the beginning of 1857 as it had seemed resolute for war at the end of 1856. An opportunity was still open to it to terminate hostilities. The Persian envoy, after his abortive negotiation with Stratford de Redcliffe, had travelled on to Paris, and was just as ready to make terms with the British ambassador at the Court of France as with the British ambassador at the Porte. The British Government consented to Its termina- accept an apology from the Persian minister, instead of insisting on his dismissal; and on these terms, on which peace might in all probability have been secured in the autumn, the war was concluded in the spring. tion. War is so great an evil, peace is so unmixed a blessing, that most men hesitate to criticise the terms on which the one is terminated and the other concluded. Yet it is difficult to find any instance in which the terms of peace more completely condemn the inception of hostilities. If nothing but the removal of the Persian Prime Minister could atone for Murray's outraged dignity in the autumn of 1856, why should minor terms have been exacted after armies had been moved, towns had been taken, and skirmishes had been fought and won? But the fact is that the insulting language which Shah and minister applied to the diplomatist was due to the diplomatist's own errors. In selecting for employment a Persian whom he knew to be offensive to the Persian Government, in insisting on his retention in a post 1 Hansard, vol. cxlvi. pp. 1578–1655. The ministers succeeded in resisting the attack made on them on this account, but "they were compelled to assent to an Act which made it unlawful to apply the revenues of India in support of any military operation beyond the frontiers of India, unless with the consent of both Houses of Parliament.' Duke of Argyll, India under Lord Canning, P. 72. The provision to which the Duke refers will be found in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, sec. 55. |