characteristics of successful empire. Like other rulers, too, vested with autocracy, he showed little consideration for the feelings of subordinates who either failed to understand his policy or differed from his judgment. And so, though no Governor-General ever left behind him more ardent admirers, hardly any Governor-General made fewer friends. It would be both an injustice to Dalhousie himself and to the great Company he represented if the student of Indian history concentrated all his attention on the salient features of his policy, and omitted to notice other and more beneficial consequences associated with his administration. No previous Governor-General had ever conferred such material and varied benefits on the country which he was called on to rule. It was under Dalhousie that railways in India were first projected, first sanctioned, and first constructed; it was under Dalhousie that uniform postal rates both throughout India and between India and Britain were first adopted; it was under Dalhousie that the first telegraph lines were laid, and the first telegraphic communication instituted; it was under Dalhousie that canals for the double purpose of navigation and irrigation were pushed forward with an energy which the world had never previously seen. Nor was it in work of this character alone that Dalhousie's administration stands preeminent. It was under his rule that vernacular schools were first instituted in India,2 and it was under his rule, though not by his action, that the civil service of India was first thrown open to public competition. Such achievements as these are the true monuments of British rule in India, and ought to be set against the many actions of British governors which it ་་ 1 The Ganges Canal, the greatest of these works, extended over 525 miles in length, measuring in its greatest depth ten feet, and in its extreme breadth 170 feet. Its length is fivefold greater than that of the main lines of Lombardy united, and more than twice the length of the aggregate irrigation lines of Lombardy and Egypt together, the only countries in the world whose works of irrigation rise above importance." The Baree Doab Canal, begun under the same Administration, had a length of 465 miles. Dalhousie's Minute, pp. 28. 27, 2 The first impulse in this direction was given by Mr. Thomason. Ibid., is neither possible nor desirable to defend. If Britain has frequently waged war without cause and annexed provinces without justification, she has at least been the instrument of accomplishing material and moral progress; and the Englishman who relates these things, and who scruples not to condemn what he cannot excuse, may point to the material blessings which Britain has given to her great dependency, and say of them and of his country— He is succeeded by Canning. "These are imperial works, and worthy thee.” In the place of Dalhousie the choice of the Government at home fell upon Lord Canning, the younger and only surviving son of the great statesman whose political career occupied so large a space in the first two volumes of this history. The new Governor-General had filled with credit subordinate office in the Peel Administration; he was acting as Postmaster-General under Aberdeen when he was selected to succeed Dalhousie. The choice was unexceptionable. Without his father's genius, without his predecessor's vigour, he had character, position, and ability, and was quite competent to navigate the vessel of state on a sea which was free from storm. And India, when Canning landed on its shores in 1856, seemed at last secure from war. The power of the British was both paramount and unquestioned; even the little cloud was not visible on the horizon; and Canning had more grounds than any of his predecessors for imagining that peace during his rule would be undisturbed. In 1856, moreover, the British themselves had other matters than the affairs of India to occupy their attention. The changing fortunes of the Russian war absorbed the thoughts of the nation. The possibility of obtaining peace, and the terms on which it was procurable, were the chief subjects of discussion both in senate and in drawing-room; the people, engrossed with Russian policy, had no leisure to examine the wrongs of an Eastern Nawab; and beyond a vague idea, for which they could have given no substantial reason, that Dalhousie had proved a great governor, and an instinctive faith that the annexation of Oudh was right because it was sanctioned by British statesmen and carried out by British administrators, they paid little or no attention to the affairs. of India. Persia. Herat. It happened, moreover, that any little leisure which British statesmen had for Indian matters was devoted to the consideration of affairs on the North-Western frontier. The Crimean war had resulted in the usual consequences. Russia, finding herself involved in war with Britain, had naturally moved in the direction which was likely to cause the British trouble and annoyance. Her statesmen could hardly mistake their path. The Persians had never forgiven England for abandoning them in 1828, and for thwarting them in 1838. In ordinary circumstances, indeed, they would have hardly ventured to provoke the opposition of the British nation. But, though they yielded a nominal deference to British counsels, they secretly resented the restraint which the British Embassy at Teheran placed upon them. For Persian policy was radically opposed to British policy. The British had been educated into the belief that Herat was the key of India; they were alarmed at the possibility of Persia becoming at any moment the creature of Russia; and they concluded, therefore, that Herat should never be allowed to pass into Persian hands; and that "the key of India" should be entrusted to other keeping. Probably the day will arrive when Englishmen will recognise that this policy is both inconsistent and unwise. The true key of India is held in London; and, if the gates of India are to be defended, they must be held on the British frontier, by British treasure, by British bayonets, and by British courage. But, if Britain has fallen so low that she must rest her defence on other races, she should at least place her chief outposts in strong keeping. Yet so plain a policy was not accepted by British statesmen. They would not place Herat in the hands of a powerful nation for fear that the watch-dog might be bribed and pass over to the enemy. And so Herat was left in weak hands, a prey to the first Power who had courage to attack it; and the two nations, who might have held it with British aid against the armed strength of Russia, were alternately bullied and coerced into hostility. Persia was driven from Herat by Auckland and Pottinger; and the most competent ruler in Central Asia-Dost Mahommed-was converted into an enemy. Yar Mahom If the British were determined that Herat should never pass into Persian hands, the Persians in their turn never ceased to covet the famous city. And, though their army retreated from its battlements in 1838, their agents succeeded in practically effecting their policy. The ablest man in Herat, who had stood at Pottinger's side and seconded his efforts, was med Khan. Yar Mahommed Khan, its ruler's minister. Some time after the siege, Yar Mahommed succeeded in grasping the power which Kamram nominally held. A bold, able, and unscrupulous chief, he retained his position till his death in 1851, leaning on Persia for support, and on some occasions lending the Persians valuable aid. Through Yar Mahommed's policy, Herat practically became a Persian city. Yar Mahommed coined money in the Shah of Persia's name, and considered himself a servant of the Shah, and Governor of Herat on the part of his Majesty."1 In 1851 Yar Mahommed died; his son Syed succeeded to his rule. Devoid, however, of his father's ability, Syed was evidently unable to maintain the independence of his territory. Disorder soon prevailed, and neighbouring potentates were naturally tempted to look with covetous eyes on the envied city. Persian troops, under the command of a Persian prince, were manoeuvring in the neighbourhood, and, under the pretext of suppressing risings in the Shah's dominions, were hovering in dangerous proximity to Herat. The British envoy at the Persian Court, Colonel Sheil, impregnated with the views which had been adopted by his employers, asked for an explanation of this movement from the Persian Court, and succeeded in obtaining from the Persian Prime Minister a 1 This is the Persian account. See the curious Persian State Paper in Correspondence respecting relations with Persia, in Parl. Papers, 1857, p. 116, distinct assurance that the Persian Government had not "the slightest intention of sending troops to Herat.” 1 This assurance, however, was accompanied with a very natural stipulation. Persia would leave Herat alone if other Powers would exercise similar forbearance. But if either Dost Mahommed, the Ameer of Cabul, or Kohendil Khan, his brother and representative at Candahar, should approach the city, it might be necessary for Persia to interfere and prevent the annexation of Herat either to Candahar or to Cabul. And, before two months were over, the contingency which the Prime Minister foresaw actually occurred. Kohendil Khan marched a force on Herat.2 Syed Mahommed, surrounded by disorder at home, and threatened with invasion from abroad, applied to Persia for protection; and the occupation Persians, with the double object of assisting an ally and of checking disorder in territories contiguous to their own, temporarily occupied the city." 3 4 The Persian of Herat. Critics may approve or disapprove the policy which Persia thus pursued. But no fair person can doubt that the Court of Teheran acted on this occasion exactly as a British Governor-General would have acted. The President of the Board of Control had the good sense to see that, however much he might have preferred the independence of Herat, the ruler of Herat was accepting the presence of Persia as a lesser evil than the presence of the Afghans. But the Foreign Office, unfortunately, was unprepared to abandon so easily its old traditions. Though the Indian Government could not see 'any possible danger" to India in the occurrence, though there was "no apprehension of any hostile movement on the part of Russia," it could not shake off its old forebodings. The British Minister at Teheran was consequently instructed to make it clear that the occupation was "extremely displeasing British interto England; "5 and, on news arriving that Herat course with had been formally declared an appendage to the pended. Persian monarchy, the British Foreign Minister declined to hold 2 Ibid., p. 7. 1 Papers respecting Persia, p. 5. Persia sus 5 Ibid., p. 23. 4 Ibid., p. 24. |