by Outram. men in India declared that the abuses which Sleeman had detected were the offspring of his imagination, and that the Government of Oudh was no worse than the Government of any other Native State. This doubt could be definitely resolved if an officer of tact, ability, and impartiality were sent to Lucknow, and ordered to report on the state of the province. Dalhousie was usually fortunate in his appointments, He choose as Sleeman's successor James Outram. Pro- Sleeman bably if all India had been searched, only one other succeeded man equally fit for the post could have been found. In his long service Outram had displayed an independence of character which was, on the whole, more creditable to himself than satisfactory to his employers; his treatment of the Bheels had shown, years before, that he had remarkable capacity for gaining the confidence of Native races; his defence of the Ameers of Scinde had won for him a reputation as the chivalrous, or, as some people thought, quixotic supporter of Native rulers. Brave, true, wise, and good, his chief adversary had named him the Bayard of India; his friends had adopted the title as peculiarly suited to him. Outram, appointed at the close of 1854, was instructed to inquire into the state of the country; to ascertain whether its affairs continued in the condition which Sleeman had described; to report whether the improvements which Hardinge had peremptorily demanded had been effected; and whether the duty imposed on the Government of India by the treaty of 1801 would justify its "honestly indulging the reluctance" it had hitherto felt to take over the administration of the country.1 Outram's To these questions Outram, in the course of a few months, returned a definite answer. The internal condition of Oudh was, in his judgment, most deplorable. It was due to "the culpable apathy and gross misrule of the sovereign and his Durbar." The improvements which Hardinge had peremptorily demanded had not in any report on Oudh. 1 Papers relating to Oudh, presented to Parliament in 1856, p. 5. I shall in future refer to this volume by its popular title, the Oudh Blue Book. degree been effected; and Outram had therefore no hesitation in declaring that the duty imposed on the British Government by the treaty of 1801 compelled it “to have recourse to those extreme measures which alone can be of any real efficacy in remedying the evils from which the state of Oudh has suffered so long." Such a report would have come with crushing effect from any officer of rank. It came with double force from Outram, because his recommendation was opposed to his well-known predilections. As he himself said: "In pronouncing an opinion so injurious to the reigning family of Oudh, I have performed a very painful duty, for I have ever advocated the maintenance of the few remaining Native States in India, so long as they retain any principle of vitality, and we can uphold them consistently with our duty as the paramount Power in India, and in accordance with our treaty pledges. It is therefore peculiarly distressing to me to find that, in continuing to uphold the sovereign power of this effete and incapable dynasty, we do so at the cost of 5,000,000 of people, on whose behalf we are bound to secure—what the Oudh Government is solemnly pledged to maintain-such a system of government as shall be conducive to their prosperity, and calculated to secure to them their lives and property.1 The manner of interference. Outram's report could not be suffered to remain a dead letter. The time for interference had plainly come; the manner of interfering was the only question worth considering. Should the Government of India act under the treaty of 1801, or under the treaty of 1837, or, brushing away all treaties, assert its right to interfere as the paramount Power? Dishonest conduct, in the long run, is frequently followed by embarrassment; and the dishonest conduct of the Government of India respecting the treaty of 1837 now produced this consequence. There was no doubt that the treaty of 1837 had been disallowed by the East India Company, and there was equally no doubt that its disallowance had never been communicated to the Court 1 Oudh Blue Book, p. 46. of Lucknow. The King of Oudh and his ministers were of opinion, and could not but be of opinion, that the treaty was in full force.1 If, indeed, the Court of Oudh ever read Parliamentary Papers, it had been given in 1853 new reason for supposing that the treaty was in operation. In that year a return had been presented to Parliament containing the treaties. and engagements between the East India Company and the Native Powers in Asia; and, by an unpardonable blunder, the treaty of 1837 had been included in the return. The Government of India had drawn attention at the time to the error, and the Court of Directors had not had the moral courage to acknowledge it.2 Both by what it had done and by what it had left undone, the Court of Directors had given the King of Oudh reason to rely on the treaty of 1837, and this circumstance gave him a moral right to claim that the treatment accorded to him should not be more harsh than that which the treaty of 1837 had indicated. Nor was there anything in the terms of the treaty of 1801 opposed to this view. So far as Oudh was concerned, the interference which had been contemplated by Wellesley was even smaller than that which had been contemplated by Auckland. For the treaty of 1801 had distinctly declared that the improved administration which the sovereign of Oudh pledged himself to introduce should be carried out under British advice by his own officers. This condition, however, all the best authorities agreed made the treaty of 1801 practically useless. "All who have written upon this subject," 3 were "unanimous in the opinion that the management of the province of Oudh and the reform of its administration could not be undertaken with any hope of success by the Government of India, unless through the agency of British officers. But the treaty of 1801 peremptorily and insurmountably bars the employment of such officers in carrying into effect any system of administration of Oudh." 1 See Captain Hayes' Report in Oudh Blue Book, p. 81. 2 Papers relating to the King of Oudh, Sess. 1858, No. 125, pp. 68, 70. 3 From Lord Dalhousie's Minute in Oudh Blue Book, p. 182. The claims Nor should it be forgotten that the King of Oudh had peculiar claims on the British Power. Whatever charges could be brought against him for the maladministration of his own territory, no charge could be preferred forbearance. against him for his conduct to the British Government. "The rulers of Oudh," wrote Dalhousie,1 "however unfaithful they may have been to the trust confided to them, however gross may have been their neglect, however grievous their misgovernment of the people committed to their charge, have yet ever been faithful and true in their adherence to the British Power. No wavering friendship has ever been laid to their charge. They have long acknowledged our power; have submitted without a murmur to our supremacy; and have aided us, as best they could, in the hour of our utmost need." "The grand errors of the Oudh kings," added Low, in quoting and endorsing the paragraph, "have been their sad mismanagement of their own interior affairs, and their culpable neglect of our advice in regard to those interior concerns. In regard to their exterior relations with us, their conduct has been remarkably irreproachable." 2 opinion. The treaty of 1801 was, however, useless; the treaty of 1837 had been disallowed; and no provision existed for effectually carrying out the threat which Bentinck had made. and which Hardinge had repeated. It was necessary either to sweep away or to ignore the stipulations of 1801 before Dalhousie's any interference could be attempted with advantage. Dalhousie himself thought that the time had come for telling the Court of Lucknow that the treaty of 1801 was annulled because its provisions had not been faithfully observed by Oudh; that the termination of the treaty would be followed by the recall of the Resident and the withdrawal of the troops; and that this measure, which would endanger the stability of the throne, would be carried out unless the king consented to sign a new treaty vesting the whole civil and military administration of the province in the hands of the East India Company.3 1 Oudh Blue Book, p. 184. 2 Ibid., p. 226. 3 Ibid., p. 188. If this advice had been followed, the King of Oudh would undoubtedly have been compelled to choose between submission and revolution. "It was by our troops that the Native Government was maintained. Experience had proved that it could not stand without them."1 But the advice was not followed. The Governor-General of India is surrounded at Calcutta by a Council whose members criticise his proposals and suggest alterations of their own on important subjects. Their minutes are forwarded with the Governor-General's own memorandum to the Home authorities. In 1855 the GovernorGeneral was surrounded by four men of very unequal capacity-Dorin, Grant, Low, and Peacock. Low's long service as Resident at Lucknow enabled him to speak with weight on the affairs of Oudh; Peacock, an English barrister, ought to have been able to speak decisively on the legal aspects of the question; Dorin, who ranked first among the Council, was probably the weakest man upon it. Energy and ability had given to the remaining colleague an authority which none of the other councillors exercised.2 His Council. All of these four men agreed with Dalhousie in thinking that the maladministration of Oudh required the interference of the Government. But none of them concurred in the course which Dalhousie had recommended. Dorin was in favour of asserting the rights of the Government of India as paramount Power, of requiring the king to abdicate the sovereign power he had abused, and of incorporating his territory in the British dominions.3 Grant recommended a similar proceeding, though he could not bring himself to think that the king should be degraded from his rank, his title, and his honours. Low, like Dalhousie, was in favour 1 Duke of Argyll, India under Lord Dalhousie, p. 19. The Duke says, "The veriest formalist must admit our right to do what Lord Dalhousie recommended -which was simply to withdraw our troops, declaring the treaty of 1801 to be at an end." Yet is this clear? Oudh in 1801 had surrendered half its territory, nominally as the price of these very troops. Had we the right to retain the territory and withdraw the troops ? 2 The characters of these men are sketched from an unfavourable standpoint in the Red Pamphlet, p. 13. 3 Oudh Blue Book, p. 192. VOL. VI. 4 Ibid., p. 213. R |