demanded-1st, that the Governor of Rangoon should express in writing his deep regret for the manner in which British officers had been treated; 2nd, that the indemnity should at once be paid; 3rd, that the Governor should consent to receive an accredited agent of the British Government with due honour. If these concessions were made, he undertook to send an officer of rank to adjust the final settlement of the difference, and on its adjustment to restore the Burmese ship and to raise the blockade. If, on the contrary, these concessions were refused, he declared that the British Government would exact for itself reparation for the wrong which it had suffered.1 In writing this letter, the Government of India avoided some of the mistakes which had previously been In particular, it did not repeat the error of wounding the susceptibilities of an Oriental by asking him to receive an officer of inferior rank. But it ignored the circumstance that the conduct of Lambert in seizing a Burmese ship had altered the whole conditions of the quarrel. Up to that point the sole grievance had been a British grievance, and the demand for reparation had been exclusively a British demand. Lambert by his action had thrown away this advantage. He had, in his turn, given the Burmese a grievance; and the Governor. of Rangoon thenceforward insisted, and from a Burmese standpoint rightly insisted, that the Burmese ship should be surrendered at the same time as the indemnity was paid. This circumstance was, however, of less importance as the difference was already getting wider. The despatch in which the Govern

1 Papers relating to Burma, p. 52.

2 Ibid., p. 63. It may be thought that I have been influenced in the text by the arguments in Cobden's very able paper, How wars are got up in India. I subjoin, therefore, the opinions of Derby, the Prime Minister, and Herries, the President of the Board of Control. The former said in the House of Lords: " Commodore Lambert, unfortunately, as I think, took upon himself, without previous instructions, to seize a vessel of the King of Ava." Hansard, vol. cxx. p. 656. The latter wrote to Dalhousie: "With more discretion on the side of the naval negotiators, and a strict compliance with your instructions, the affair might perhaps have been terminated without having recourse to the strong measures which you are now forced to adopt." Memoir of Herrics, vol. ii. p. 250. Derby and Herries in these two passages practically endorse the chief part of Cobden's contention.

ment of India made its last demand was forwarded through Lambert; and Lambert, in order to deliver it, carried

Renewed

the Fox up the river. To do so he had necessarily combat. to repass the stockade which he had already encountered; and its garrison, untaught by previous experience, re-opened fire on the vessel. In this conflict the Fox was again successful, and the stockade silenced. But in the course of the contest a sailor on board the Fox was mortally wounded. The prospects of peace were not increased by successive encounters unfortunately attended with blood shedding.

Up to the date of this occurrence Dalhousie had acted with laudable moderation. In his original instructions to Lambert, as well as in his demand of the 26th of January, he had studiously avoided requiring more than the Burmese had originally conceded. If common care had been taken

in the first instance by Lambert to respect the susceptibilities of an uncivilised people; if Lambert, in opposition to his orders, had not committed an act of war by seizing a Burmese vessel, and by blockading the Burmese coasts; if even he had taken the precaution to notify his reasons for passing up the river in the Fox, there is every reason for believing that war might have been avoided. But the responsibility for the later proceedings does not rest with Lambert, but with Dalhousie. He had hitherto wisely separated the Governor of Rangoon from the Burmese Government; the only chance of peace lay in maintaining this distinction. Instead of preserving it, and of waiting for an apology from Ava, he decided on at once exacting reparation by arms. Orders were issued for the immediate preparation of a considerable expedition. It was calculated The expedithat the troops selected for the service could be tion to ready by the 20th of March. Only one loophole was left for the Court of Ava. If, on the arrival of the force at Rangoon, the required apology were offered, it was to be accepted. But, in addition to the original compensation of £1000, a further sum of £100,000 was to be exacted from the Burmese. If these demands were at once conceded,

Burma.

or difficulty arose in obtaining so large a sum of money, Rangoon and Martaban were to be placed temporarily in British hands as security for the payment; but, if either the demand were refused, or the Burmese declined to yield two of their most important towns, war was at once to begin.1

The second Burmese war.

Such were the circumstances in which the second Burmese war commenced. Whatever judgment may be formed as to its policy, no two opinions can be expressed upon its conduct. When Dalhousie struck, he always struck hard. By the end of March the expedition which he had prepared was ready for action. General Godwin,2 its commander, attempted to ascertain whether the Burmese Government had made the requisite concessions; but the vessel which he despatched with a flag of truce for the purpose was fired on by the Burmese, and Godwin had no alternative but to commence the war. Martaban was taken by the British on the 5th of April; Rangoon itself fell a week afterwards. After these successes a short respite was afforded in order that the Burmese Government might have the opportunity of making terms. But the Burmese Government did not, perhaps dared not, concede the reparation which the British demanded. In consequence the war was continued till Pegu, and the whole province of which it is the capital, were conquered. Even then, the Court of Ava refused to yield; and the British, instead of continuing the war, decided on annexing the conquered territory to the British dominions.3 Few nations ever resented a conquest more bitterly than the Burmese. The King of Ava lost his throne; and his successor, for years, declined to acknowledge that the province of Pegu was no longer a part of the Burmese Empire. At last, ten years after the Burmese war, he consented to conclude a treaty 1 Parl. Papers relating to Burma, p. 67, cf. p. 74.

Its termination.

2 There is a very pleasant and just tribute to General Godwin's merits in Sir E. Arnold's Dalhousie, vol. ii. p. 100.

3 Further Papers relating to Burma, p. 160; Arnold's Dalhousie, vol. ii. p. 96.

with the British, and to recognise the loss which it was useless. for him any longer to deny.

There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. There is a tide in the affairs of India which bears on the strongest men to a policy of annexation. Since the days of Wellesley no stronger man than Dalhousie had been sent to govern the Indian Empire. Since the days of Cornwallis no Governor-General had been more anxious to refrain from increasing the Company's dominions. Yet events had proved too strong for Dalhousie, as they had proved too strong for all his predecessors. The mutiny of the Sikh army had forced him to commence the war which had been terminated by the annexation of the Punjab. The lawlessness of the Burmese and the errors of Lambert had carried him into the hostilities which had terminated with the conquest of Pegu; and, in the four years which had passed since he set foot in India, Dalhousie had done more than almost any of his predecessors to extend the sway of British rule and to enlarge the responsibilities of British rulers.1

Yet, great as were the additions which he had already made to the British possessions in India, when men talk of the annexations of Dalhousie they do not usually refer to the consequences of the second Sikh war or to the conquest of Pegu, but to the annexation of Oudh. The formal addition of that great province to the possessions of the Company is rightly regarded as the most important circumstance in Dalhousie's administration, and the verdict on the character of his rule will probably ultimately depend on the opinion which may be formed on this part of his policy.

Oudh,

There are few circumstances in the history of the British in India on which a greater conflict of thought exists, or on which

1 I have omitted from this review all allusion to Dalhousie's annexations of Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi, since it seemed more desirable to concentrate light on great events than dissipate it among smaller matters. For these annexations, see Arnold's Dalhousie, vol. ii. p. 107 seq.; Duke of Argyll's India under Lord Dalhousie, p. 23 seq.; and Lord Dalhousie's Review of his Administration, Papers of House of Lords, 1856, No. 161, p. 8.

VOL. VI.

Q

The state of Oudh.

it is more difficult to form a correct judgment, than on this question. No impartial Englishman would indeed care to defend the treatment of Oudh in the eighteenth century; he must be a brave writer who undertakes the defence of Wellesley's treatment of Oudh in the nineteenth century. Most persons cognisant of Indian history would admit that the maladministration of the province, which forms the only real justification of its annexation, was intensified by the extortionate demands of successive Governors-General. But for these acts Dalhousie was not responsible. He had only personally to deal with the facts before him, and it is on these facts that his policy was based, and on these alone that his conduct should be criticised.

The salient features of Wellesley's policy towards Oudh have already been related.1 The attitude of Zemaun Shah induced him to increase the British force stationed in Oudh ; and the unpunctual payment of the subsidy for its support afforded him an excuse for appropriating one-half the province in order that its revenues might be applied to the payment of the troops. This harsh and unjust policy undoubtedly weakened the position of the Nawab. Yet for many years relations of close friendship existed between Lucknow and Calcutta. The reigning Nawab was a man of ability, acquainted with society, trained to business, and able, by prudence and economy, to reduce expenditure, to preserve order,2 and to amass considerable treasure; and, though complaints of maladministration arose, those readers who are acquainted with the "Life of Metcalfe," with the "Diaries" of Moira, and the "Memoirs of Heber," will possibly doubt whether the government of Oudh was worse than that of any other independent Indian principality.4

1 Ante, p. 79.

2 All these compliments are paid to him by Sleeman. Tour in Oudh, vol. ii. p. 190. The passage seems to have been strangely overlooked by the Duke of Argyll in his Review of India under Lord Dalhousie, p. 12.

3 £14,000,000. Sleeman's Tour in Oudh, vol. i. p. 309.

4 Heber, who visited Oudh in 1824-5, wrote: "I was pleased, however, and surprised, after all which I had heard of Oudh, to find the country so completely under the plough; since, were the oppression so great as is sometimes stated,