found it necessary to move troops and the slightest resistance were made, the whole property of Nusseer Khan was to be forfeited to the British Government.1

Napier's proposals to Ellen

Bar

Steeped like an Oriental in intrigue, Nusseer Khan was practically allowed by this decision the bare alternative of peaceably surrendering a portion of his territory or of being forcibly deprived of the whole of his possessions. If, however, the Governor-General had hard measure in store for the Ameer, Napier had hardly passed a month in Scinde before he was suggesting still harder terms. borough. barous princes without feeling for their subjects were, he thought, unfit for government. If the British were to evacuate Scinde, they would sooner or later inevitably return. If, then, it were possible to do so honestly, it would be wiser and better to coerce the Ameers at once. A. fair pretext for such a policy could easily be found. Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, especially, was treasonably corresponding with Shere Sing of Lahore in defiance of the treaty of 1838. His treachery and the intrigues of Nusseer Khan afforded ample excuse for a fresh policy of aggression, and, in Napier's judgment, the seizure of Bukkur and Sukkur, of Kurrachee and Shikarpore, was both expedient and justifiable.2

3

The advice fell on willing ears. Ellenborough at once directed Napier to lay before the Ameers fresh draft treaties. Roostum Khan was to suffer for his alleged intrigues with Shere Sing, Nusseer Khan for a letter which he was said to have addressed to Beebuck Boogtee. The Ameers were to cede all the territories which the British required either for themselves or for the reward of their ally the Khan of Bhawulpore. They were to renounce one of the chief attributes of sovereignty-the right of coinage. They were to supply British steamers with ample fuel at a price to be agreed upon, or to allow the British to fell it for themselves on either side of the Indus.

In return for these concessions,

1 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 361.

2 Ibid., pp. 363-369.

3 Chief of the Boogtee hill-tribes. Calcutta Review, vol, vi. p. 583.

they were to be relieved from paying tribute to the British Government.1

These hard terms seemed to Ellenborough justifiable because of the treacherous correspondence into which Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan had entered. It is remarkable, however, that before drawing up the treaties the Governor-General did not take the trouble to ascertain whether the alleged offences had really been committed. All he thought it

necessary to do was to tell Napier to satisfy himself of the truth of the charges before actually proceeding to exact the penalty. To this day it is still doubtful whether the alleged correspondence was authentic or not. Nusseer Khan denied its authenticity.3 Napier thought that Roostum Khan had been a mere puppet in the hands of his minister. Satisfied, however, that Roostum was technically responsible for the acts of his agent, and that Nusseer was, at any rate, indirectly guilty, at the end of November 1842 Napier presented the new treaties.5

The well-worn adage, "Si vis pacem, para bellum," has passed with Englishmen into a truism. Ignorant of Latin, the Ameers had probably never heard of it, but they understood its lessons as well as Napier. They professed to wish for peace; but, as demand after demand was sent to them, they collected their forces and prepared for war. Whatever lessons, however, the saying may convey collect their to strong nations, it is full of danger to weak ones. Napier regarded the Ameers' preparations as overt acts of hostility, and prepared to set his own forces in motion. Before war actually commenced an opportunity arose for fresh negotia

The Ameers

forces.

1 Ellenborough's decision and the draft-treaties will be found set out at length in Correspondence relating to Scinde, pp. 436-444. The territorial cessions exacted represented a revenue of above £110,000 a year; those suggested by Outram rather more than £30,000 a year; the tribute to be remitted in either case, £35,000. Calcutta Review, vol. vi. pp. 578, 587. 2 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 440.

3 Ibid., p. 474; and cf. Napier's account of his examination of the matter in ibid., pp. 454, 455, and Outram's Conquest of Scinde, a Commentary, vol. i. p. 74 seq. 4 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 454.

5 Ibid., p. 462.

VOL. VI.

tions. Roostum Khan, charged with fresh infractions of the treaty, pleaded his inability to obey Napier's instructions, and offered to escape to his camp. Napier thought that the presence of the Khan would embarrass his operations, and persuaded him to repair to Ali Moorad, Roostum's brother, who might induce him to resign the chieftainship. The friendship of Ali Moorad was purchased by the promise that British influence should be used to secure him the throne. Roostum's family naturally resented an act which deprived them of their influence and authority, and fled to Emaum Ghur, a strong fortress in the desert, whither they assumed that even British troops would be unable to follow them. Though war had not been declared-though, on the contrary, negotiations were in active progress-Napier determined to seize the opportunity of proving that the desert afforded no protection to the Ameers, and that, wherever the men of Scinde could go, the British could follow. Assuming then that Roostum's family were mere rebels against the chief in whose favour Roostum had been persuaded to abdicate, and that it was the special mission of the British to uphold Ali Moorad, he resolved on marching with a small force on Emaum Ghur. Roostum, a "poor old fool" of eighty-to use the description which Napier thought proper to apply to him-fled at once from Ali Moorad's protection and joined the other Ameers. His flight gave Napier an additional excuse for precipitate action. He moved through the desert to Emaum Ghur, and, as the garrison abandoned it on his approach, blew up the fortress. From Emaum Ghur he despatched Outram to the Ameers, to negotiate the details of the treaty.1

The march on Emaum Ghur.

As a military feat the march through the desert upon Emaum Ghur may or may not excite admiration; as an act of policy it deserves reproof. The march, however, displayed Napier's vigour, and consequently strengthened Outram's hands in the negotiation of the treaty. "Why is it," asked the Ameers in the conference with him, "that you make new

1 Correspondence relating to Scinde, pp. 477-485; Outram's Commentary, vol. i. pp. 112, 218, 253; Life of Outram, vol. i. p. 304.

demands? Four years ago the British solemnly promised never to covet any portion of our territory. Why A new Outran: urged treaty preThe Ameers the Ameers.

'sented to

should more be required of us now?" that the treaties had been broken. denied that they had broken any of them. Outram declared that the particular breaches complained of had been submitted to them by Napier's orders. The Ameers replied that they had never been even allowed to see the treasonable letters which it was alleged that they had written, and they solemnly denied that they were written by them or by their authority. Outram had no authority to discuss these matters; he had simply to present an alternative to the Ameers. Sign the treaty, or submit to Napier's advance. Then the Ameers predicted exactly what occurred. "If the army advances our Beloochees will not be restrained, and we shall be blamed for If the army advances they will plunder

the

consequences.

the whole country.

"The only way to stop this result," replied Outram, "is to sign the treaty, and so stop Napier's advance." 1

2

Agency.

Reluctantly the Ameers gave way, and on the 12th of February 1843 signed the treaty. Their troops, however, regarded the arrangement with little favour. Outram was mobbed on his return to the Agency, and one of his followers was struck by a stone. Three days afterwards the The attack Agency was attacked, and Outram and his retinue on the with difficulty effected their escape to a steamer moored in the Indus, which fortunately commanded the approaches to the building. This attack gave Napier a new pretext for hostilities. He advanced against the Beloochees, whose army was drawn up at Meeanee in an exceptionally strong position. Their front was protected by the dry bed of the Fulaillee. Their flanks rested on woods, which Napier judged it impossible to penetrate. This position, held by 28,000 brave men, Napier had the courage to attack with 1 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 502, and Outram's Commentary, vol. ii. p. 344.

2 Correspondence relating to Scinde, pp. 505, 509; cf. Life of Outram, vol. i. p. 316-323.

The battle

2800. He succeeded; and his victory has made Meeanee one of the brightest names in Anglo-Indian of Meeanee. warfare. The Beloochees lost guns, ammunition, treasure, and 5000 men. Six of the Ameers surrendered on the field; and the victorious general marched from the battlefield into Hyderabad, whose towers had looked down on the field of action.1

The annexa

Scinde.

Meeanee virtually decided the fate of Scinde. Ellenborough concluded that the position of the Ameers was entirely changed by the battle. "They had only held their power by the sword -by the sword they had lost it."2 They were consequently removed as prisoners to Bombay, their territory was annexed to British India, and its government was entrusted to the officer by whose victory it had been won. Scinde, tion of under Napier's administration, became an integral and flourishing part of British India, and its people prospered from the removal of rulers who had been cruel, avaricious, and weak. Some people have even excused Ellenborough's treatment of Scinde by pointing to the results which his conquest secured. If such excuses, however, be available, it is difficult to see where war can ever end. If it be justifiable to attack a Government because it is bad, for the sake of liberating a people that is ill-governed, other and sterner work remains undone, and other Ellenboroughs and other Napiers may wage aggressive wars through a weary and bloody eternity.

In Britain, in 1843, the news of the conquest excited indignant feelings. Ellenborough's conduct towards Afghanistan had been The feeling already severely criticised. His readiness to abandon in England. the country, and to leave the prisoners to their fate, had been blamed; his proclamations and his pageants had been laughed at; and Parliament had only reluctantly consented to include the Governor-General's name in the vote of thanks accorded to the men who had restored the credit of British arms in India. While the public in and out of

1 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 512.

2 Ellenborough's despatch, reprinted in Thornton, vol. vi. p. 452, note.