borough, while President of the Board of Control, with his head full of ambitious ideas, and longing to see the British flag float in triumph on the waters of the Indus to the source of all its tributary streams, opened negotiations with the Ameers for the navigation of that river. They were reluctantly persuaded to grant a free passage along the river and roads of Scinde to the merchants and traders of Hindostan, but they expressly stipulated that no military stores should be brought by river or road, and that no armed vessels should come by the river.

No necessity for the infraction of the treaty of 1828 existed in 1839. The direct road from India to Cabul passed through the territory of Runjeet Singh and the Khyber Pass; and the road from Loodiana, where Shah Sooja was residing, through Scinde to Cabul, was three times as long and more than three times as difficult as that by Peshawur. High military authorities were of opinion that the shorter and more direct road should be preferred.2 The Governor-General, however, thought otherwise. A crisis, in his opinion, had occurred in "which it was essentially requisite for the security

Auckland's treatment of Scinde,

of British India that the real friends of that Power should unequivocally manifest their attachment to its interests;" and in a passage, which was hardly more than a parenthesis of a despatch, the British Resident in Scinde was instructed to inform the Ameers that during the con tinuance of the war the stipulations of the treaty would "neces sarily be suspended."

A much more serious demand than the passage of the Indus was simultaneously pressed on the Ameers. In the tripartite treaty, Shah Sooja had agreed to relinquish all claim to the tribute of Scinde and its arrears in consideration of such a sum as the British Government might consider fair, and he had undertaken, out of the sum which he so received, to pay

1 Ellenborough's Diary, vol. ii. p. 144. The treaty which, in consequence, was concluded in 1828 with the Ameers of Hyderabad is printed in Correspondence relating to Scinde, pp. 2, 3.

2 Napier's Conquest of Scinde, p. 59.

3 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 10.

fifteen lacs of rupees to Runjeet Singh. The Resident in Scinde was instructed to tell the Ameers that the amount which they would be required to pay would be not less than twenty lacs, and that, if the Ameers refused to pay this sum, Shikarpore and the adjacent territory would be seized as a base for the ensuing campaign. The Ameers met the claim by producing two releases, signed and sealed by Shah Sooja himself, bestowing Scinde and Shikarpore upon them without tribute of any kind. These releases afforded, therefore, a strong presumption that Shah Sooja had no claim on the revenues of Scinde, that he had consequently nothing to surrender as an equivalent for a fixed payment, and that the provision in the tripartite treaty was based on a misapprehension. But these documents caused no difficulty to Auckland and his counsellors. Formal releases, signed and sealed by Shah Sooja, were treated as "ex parte statements," and referred to Macnaghten, who by this time had become envoy to the Shah.1

It is not surprising that Native princes thus treated should have turned for help to other quarters. The King of Persia was, in their judgment, "exalted high as the planet Saturn," and Noor Mohammed, the chief Ameer of Hyderabad, accordingly flung himself into the arms of Persia.2 The Resident in Scinde reported the circumstance to the Governor-General, and Auckland at once determined that duplicity had deprived Noor Mohammed of all confidence and friendly consideration. The Resident was authorised in consequence to tell the Ameers that "the share in the government which has been held by the guilty party shall be transferred to the more faithful members of the family," and that it might be necessary to accompany this stipulation with a condition that a British subsidiary force should be maintained in Scinde.3

British writers and British readers, naturally disposed to assume that British statesmen abstain from the practices which 1 Correspondence relating to Scinde, pp. 31, 53, 61; Thornton, vol. vi. p. 404; Life of Outram, vol. i. p. 156. Durand calls this "an iniquitous demand." History of Afghan War, p. 76. 3 Ibid., 16, 17.

2 Correspondence relating to Scinde, pp. 12, 13.

their ancestors denounced in France of the First Empire, and which they themselves denounce in Russia to-day, will do well to reflect on this melancholy story. Nor should they forget that Scinde in 1838 was an independent country, only recently brought into commercial relations with British India; that its frontier was remote from British territory; that British statesmen had expressly promised that no arms, and no armed vessels, should pass through its roads or its waters; and that its Ameers were at least as much entitled to seek the alliance of the Persians as the British themselves were justified in agreeing to the tripartite treaty. Might has been too frequently accepted as a synonym for right in the history of the world. But in the annals of wrongdoing there are few grosser instances of the confusion of right with might than in the dreary history of the Afghan war and of the treatment of Scinde. Even writers who condone Wellesley's conduct towards Oudh have no apology to offer for Auckland's conduct towards the Ameers.

The occu pation of Scinde.

But the unrighteous history was not yet completed. On the 5th of October the British Resident was told that "in the present crisis of affairs no opposition to the arrangements in progress can be tolerated."1 On the 29th of October it was added that, whether the present Ameers were suffered to retain power or not, the Governor-General had determined that it was just and necessary to establish a British subsidiary force in Lower Scinde.2 At the end of November, Keane and the Bombay troops landed at Kurrachee: and in January 1839 the Ameers were informed that Scinde formed an integral portion of Hindostan; that the supremacy of Hindostan had devolved upon Britain; that Britain could allow the intermeddling of no other Power; that the Ameers must consequently bind their interests irrevocably with those of Britain, and that if they neglected to do so they would deeply regret their neglect. Truths, perhaps ; but truths which had rarely been addressed to an independent Power, and which no independent Power could have done else than resented.

1 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 27. 2 Ibid., p. 60. 3 Ibid., p. 120.

1

The conduct

Ameers.

Under such pressure the conduct of the Ameers could hardly have been straightforward. Britain was tearing up the treaties which she had made with them, she was infringing the neutrality of their country, she was enforcing of the the claim which Shah Sooja had surrendered years before. Ignorant probably of the respective strength of Persia and Britain, they had in the first instance turned to Persia for help, and Persia had failed them. They thenceforward attempted a policy of delay. With Orientals delay was almost certain to be accompanied with duplicity. The Ameers consented to allow the British a passage through their territories, but they threw every obstacle in the way of their collecting transport and supplies for the army. They even offered to pay the claim which the British had raised in Shah Sooja's favour; but the negotiations moved slowly; and in the meanwhile Keane, imperfectly supplied, was still detained on the Lower Indus. Cotton, however, by this time advancing from Ferozepore, had arrived at Roree, where it was intended that he should cross the Indus. The bridge for his passage would not, so the engineeers told him, be ready for some days; and he determined to fill up the interval by leading his army on Hyderabad, the richest city in the province, and thus creating a diversion in Keane's favour.2 The troops heard with eagerness that they were to be led against a town which was reputed to contain £8,000,000 of treasure. But the movement answered its purpose. The Ameers, who had been collecting a rabble which they called an army, unconditionally gave way. They allowed the troops the required passage; they paid a sum of money towards Shah Sooja's expenses; they even consented to accept and to maintain a subsidiary force. Like the

1 Havelock's Afghan War, vol. i. p. 114.

2 Correspondence relating to Scinde, p. 127.

3 Ibid., p. 130; Havelock's Afghan War, vol. i. pp. 151, 158; Durand's Afghan War, pp. 95-116. In the text I have treated Scinde as a whole, and have omitted the distinction between the conduct of Meer Roostum, the friendly Ameer of Khyrpore, and that of the unfriendly Ameers of Lower Scinde. The reader will find a good account of this in Havelock's Afghan War. vol. i. pp. 111-141.

king in the parable, they counted the cost.

For all practical purposes Scinde ceased to be an independent Power.

The submission of Scinde removed some of the difficulties of the expedition. The troops advanced through Beloochistan The advance on Quetta, where Keane, in the spring of 1839, of the army. took command of the force. The town of Quetta lies at the northern entrance of the Bolan Pass. It overlooks, and perhaps commands, the road which, running through the mountains to Candahar, leads either to Cabul on the northeast or to Herat on the north-west. At the end of the first week in April the army left Quetta; towards the end of that month Candahar was occupied ; and there, on the 8th of May, Shah Sooja was formally enthroned.1

Hitherto the army had encountered no military opposition. It had suffered from heat and drought, its baggage-animals had died by tens of thousands, and the troops themselves, faint from want of food and parched with thirst,2 had frequently been forced to do the work of beasts of burden. At Candahar the men enjoyed some weeks of welcome rest. As the summer advanced the march was resumed, and the army was led along the road which leads to Cabul. This road is blocked ninety miles from Cabul by the fortress of Ghuznee. An impression prevailed in Calcutta, Ghuznee. which had been accepted by military men, that Ghuznee was only an Oriental fortress commanded by surrounding hills, which would fall an easy prey to an English

The fall of

army. The troops were startled, therefore, to find themselves before a rampart which rose sixty or seventy feet above the plain, which was surrounded by a deep ditch full of water, which was flanked by numerous towers, and which, it was ascertained, was held by one of Dost Mahommed's sons. No battering-train of strength adequate for an attack on such a fortification had been attached to the original expedition. The mortality among camels and cattle had forced the army to leave at Candahar the few heavy guns which