Turkey was on the eve of destruction by Russia, and actually induced him to send to the Admiral in command in the Mediterranean, and urge him to bring his fleet to Vourla. Fortunately, the Admiral at Malta and the British Ministry in London were free from the influences which temporarily shook Rose's judgment. The Admiral declined to move without orders from London. The Cabinet commended his decision, and disapproved the course taken by Rose. But Napoleon saw in Menschikoff's action and Rose's fears a fresh excuse for embroiling France. Though acquainted with the views of the British Ministry, he at once ordered his own fleet to Salamis. The chances of peace were not improved by a movement which was gradually bringing French and Russian armaments within striking distance of one another.1

The

The temporary excitement caused by Fuad's dismissal, however, wore off, and the Russian Ambassador was able to address himself to the objects of his mission. One of these had been accomplished before he set foot in Constantinople. Porte had accepted the ultimatum of Austria, and Omar Pacha had withdrawn from Montenegro. Ostensibly nothing remained to determine, except the question of the Holy Places. From the language which Menschikoff held at the Porte, from the assurances which Nesselrode conveyed to Seymour at St. Petersburg, and which Brunnow repeated to Clarendon in London, the British Ministry had a right to infer that no other issue of importance was reserved for settlement. Almost immediately, however, after Menschikoff's arrival, rumours were circulated at Constantinople that he was the bearer of a larger demand which he was insisting should be kept secret from the British authorities; and on Stratford's arrival he found that the demand was for a formal treaty acknowledging the right of Russia to protect the Greek Church and its members in Turkey. By Stratford's advice the Porte insisted on separating the two questions; and with Stratford's assistance all the

3

4

1 Eastern Papers, Part i. pp. 85, 91, 93, 95.

3 Ibid., pp. 107, 109.

2 Ibid., p. 203.

4 Ibid., p. 126.

disputes affecting the Holy Places were settled before the end of April.1 But, on the day succeeding that on which the original dispute was settled, Menschikoff laid an ultimatum before the Porte, requiring it within five

Menschikoff's

ultimatum. days to accept a treaty guaranteeing the Greco

Russian religion against all molestation for the future. The Sultan's minister and the British Ambassador, who was rapidly becoming the Sultan's supreme minister, considered that such a treaty, if it were signed, would place the Greek subjects. under the direct protection of the Czar of Russia. By Stratford's advice the Porte consequently decided on the courteous but firm rejection of the ultimatum; and Menschikoff, with his whole suite, withdrew from Constantinople.

He leaves Constantinople.

4

From a Russian point of view, Russia was only claiming, in the case of members of the Greek Church, the same kind of protection which France had always exercised in the case of Roman Catholics, and Britain in the case of Protestants, in Turkey. From a British point of view, there was a radical difference between these cases, since the Roman Catholics and Protestants in Turkey were only numbered by thousands, while the Eastern Church reckoned its members by millions. Russia, indeed, might urge that this very circumstance made interference more necessary, since the privileges of the many were of more importance than those of the few; but England could reply that the same circumstance made interference more dangerous, since it was one thing to place a small minority, and another thing to place a majority, of a sovereign's subjects under the protection of a foreign Power.

1 Eastern Papers, Part i., p. 160.

2 The orthodox Greek religion, its clergy and its possessions, shall enjoy, without any prejudice, under the protection of his Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which are assured to them ab antiquo, and, upon a principle of perfect equity, shall participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects. Ibid., p. 166, and cf. p. 168. Menschikoff first asked for a treaty; he offered subsequently to be satisfied with a sened, and he finally offered to be contented with a note. Ibid., p. 243.

3 Ibid., p. 176 seq.

4 Russian Diplomatic Study, p. 188.

Reasonable men will agree in admitting that there was truth and force in both of these contrary contentions, but they will not agree in attaching the same amount of import- The conduct ance to them. Some will probably think that the of the Ministry. demands of Russia were natural and legitimate; others, that they were natural but dangerous; others again, that they were natural but inadmissible. Much could easily be advanced for all these views. Each of them could probably have found capable exponents in the Aberdeen Cabinet. But there is no evidence that the Cabinet ever set itself seriously to consider which of these views was right till it had been irrevocably committed by its ambassador to his own policy. No doubt, if it had addressed itself to this consideration, it might have resolved on the line of action which Stratford pursued. In this case it would, at least, have guided the ship of State into the unsettled waters into which she was being carried. But it did nothing of the kind. It left it to its ambassador to shape its policy; it committed the honour of its country to his hands. It is not true to say, as was said at the time, that it glided or drifted into war. The ship was steered into the whirlpool; but the hand which held the tiller was the hand of Stratford, and not the hand of Aberdeen,

The fleet

Dardanelles.

Momentous issues at once followed Menschikoff's departure. The Czar, impelled to war by a temper which had grown irritable with age, and hardly dissuaded from it by the sober counsels of his Chancellor, Nesselrode,1 re- sent to the solved on the occupation of the Principalities. The British Ministry thereupon ordered the Mediterranean fleet to the Dardanelles, and placed its further movements at the disposition of Stratford.2 It thus admitted that a quarrel which

1 I have studiously endeavoured in these pages to refrain from a single word which could give pain to any reasonable Russian, and so increase the unfortunate estrangement between two great nations whom I would fain see allied. And I think it right, therefore, to point out that the passage in the text is founded, not on Mr. Kinglake's eloquent invective, but on the Russian Diplomatic Study. "This half-measure was the result of a compromise between the calm moderation of Count Nesselrode and the extreme irritation of the Emperor Nicholas," vol. i. p. 190.

2 Eastern Papers, Part i. p. 210.

hitherto had been regarded as involving Russia and France alone, and in which Britain had no concern, had been converted into a dispute between Russia and England. By a movement which was hardly perceptible, and which was not generally understood, the mere onlooker had become a principal in the dispute.

Unfortunately, moreover, there were no restraining influences to check the decision of the ministry. England has rarely been engaged in a war into which her people did not enter with alacrity; and in 1853 the English were more than usually disposed to war, and to war with Russia. On the one hand, a whole generation had grown up ignorant of what a European war meant. On the other hand, the memory of disaster in Afghanistan was still green; and Russia was regarded as the Power which had forced the Afghan policy on Auckland. In addition, those who sympathised with the Liberal movement of 1848 saw in Russia the chief champion of autocracy; while men of Conservative opinions were annoyed at the new ideas of foreign policy which Cobden and a few other men were proclaiming. Thus both Liberals and Conservatives were ready to fight, and to fight with Russia; and the ministry, which should have steered the ship of State into calmer waters, entrusted its control to their representative at the Porte.

Yet, at that supreme moment, there was one man who desired peace with all his soul. Peace was the sum and substance of Aberdeen's policy. No Englishman then alive had done so much for peace. But the exertions which he had made in that sacred cause in the past had now actually become inducements for war. Nicholas could not believe that war was possible while Aberdeen, the minister with whom he had conversed in 1844, presided over the British Ministry. He failed to observe the change which had occurred. The policy of England no longer depended on the Cabinet in London; it was practically moulded by Stratford at the Porte.1

1 Nothing has brought out more clearly the confidence which Nicholas reposed in Aberdeen's policy than the Diplomatic Study; see e.g., vol. i. pp. 292, 300.

The new phase into which the quarrel had entered had been followed by new circumstances. England had become a principal in the dispute, and in consequence had been drawn into closer union with France. But the action of Russia in occupying the Principalities was attended with even more important results. The Danube is to Austria what the Bosphorus is to Russia; and Austria saw accordingly, with undisguised alarm, her powerful neighbour approaching a river which is both the artery and the outlet of her dominions. Prussia in 1853 usually followed the lead of Austria; and thus, while Menschikoff's ultimatum and Stratford's action made Britain a party to the dispute, the occupation of the Principalities brought Austria and Prussia into the quarrel.

This circumstance was not unfavourable to the cause of peace. Every addition made to the party of resistance naturally increased the desire of moderate men in Russia to avoid the

risks of war. Austria and Prussia, moreover, had little inclination to engage in hostilities with a Power which had much in common with themselves. France, on her part, or the autocrat who represented France, had gained by the quarrel all that he could ever hope to obtain. The man at whose conduct France had first laughed and then trembled had posed before Europe as the ally of England, and had acquired the status of which he felt in need from the alliance. In England itself the strange craving for war in the multitude was tempered by the moderation of her Prime Minister. It seemed certain that Aberdeen would do all that an honourable man could honourably do for the sake of avoiding war.

Thus, though the combatants were nearing the arena, though the Russian army under Gortschakoff1 was occupying the Principalities, though the French and English fleets were casting

1 It is one of the curious facts connected with the Crimean War that Gortschakoff, the commander of the Russian army, was a warm admirer of England. In what Lord Malmesbury calls a "racy military speech" in London in 1852 he said, after a panegyric on Wellington, "Vive cette armée qui a combattu avec lui! Vive cette belle marine qui a nettoyé son chemin et aidé ses efforts! Mais, avant tout, vive la vieille et glorieuse Angleterre!" Malmesbury's Memoirs of an ex-Minister, p. 282.

VOL. VI.

B