gage is sufficient, as against creditors and bona fide future incumbrancers and purchasers, the courts have manifested a laudable disposition not to exclude any security, which was relied upon in good faith, at the time the advances were made and subsequently. Hence mortgages to secure blank indorsements by the mortgagee have been held valid, as against creditors whose securities accrued after the date of such indorsements, but before any payment upon them, or even before the bills are put in circulation. Burdett vs. Clay, 8 B. Mon. 287. And it will be equally valid if given to secure future indorsements. Kramer vs. The Bank, 15 Ohio 253; or even to secure one for signing the bond of an executor, as surety. Hawkins vs. May, 12 Alabama R. 673. And a mortgage to secure the mortgagee "what I may owe him on book," was not only held valid, to secure any existing indebtedness, but it appearing that no such indebtedness existed, at the date of the mortgage, to which it could have been intended to apply, it was held that it should be construed to apply to any future indebtedness on book. McDaniels vs. Colvin, 16 Verm. R. 300. So also a mortgage to secure all debts due and all suretyships of the mortgagor for the mortgagee was held a valid security for all existing liabilities. Vanneter vs. Vanneter, 3 Gratt. 148. And in a late case in Vermont it was decided that a mortgage to secure the mortgagee all the notes and agreements I now owe or have with him," was a valid security to cover all payments made as surety upon any indorsements made by the mortgagee on behalf of the mortgagor, after the date of the mortgage, and before knowledge of any intervening incumbrance, such indorsements. being made in pursuance of a contract in the form of a promissory note for $1000, expressed upon its face to be collateral to and as "security for any demand or liability he then had or might thereafter have against or on account" of the mortgagor, such collateral note existing at the date of the mortgage. Seymour vs. Darrow, 31 Vt. R. 122. . And the leading case, in this country, upon the subject, Shirras vs. Craig, 7 Cranch 34, was a mortgage expressed to be for the security of thirty thousand pounds sterling, when the real object of the deed was to secure "different sums, due at the time from particular mortgagees, advances afterwards to be made, and liabilities to be incurred to an uncertain amount." But the security was nevertheless held valid, as against future incumbrancers and creditors, even as to future advances made before notice of any intervening equity. 9. We have not been able to perceive any valid objection to this relaxation from the former cases, which will not equally go to destroy all registered mortgages wherever the securities are changed. And it cannot be denied that such an indulgence as that last named does open a wide door for the practice of fraud. Very few persons would hesitate to treat a mortgage, as probably paid, upon being shown all the securities described in the condition, and especially where they were overdue at the time. The idea of substituting a new security, for one already overdue, would not commonly occur to business men, unless in the case of banks, or moneyed institutions, with whom such practice is more usual, than to suffer the overdue paper to remain unpaid. 10. But notwithstanding this liability to fraud and imposition, and the notoriety of the fact, that some cases of considerable severity do, from time to time, occur in this way, the law is nevertheless settled, beyond all question, or cavil, that no change of the securities will release the title of the mortgagee, so long as the original indebtedness, or any portion of it, remains uncancelled, unless there is clear and satisfactory evidence, that the substituted securities were intended to supersede the mortgage security. Tripp vs. Vincent, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 614. And where the personal obligation of the debtor is relinquished, or avoided, the mortgage is nevertheless held as a binding security for the debt. Id.; Buswell vs. Davis, 10 N. H. 424. The same was held also where the bond secured by the mortgage was avoided for a fraudulent alteration. Gillett vs. Powell, Spear's Ch. R. 142. But this last decision may be regarded as questionable perhaps. And where the creditor gives his debtor a general release from the debt, or from all debts and liabilities, this will be prima facie a release of the mortgage. Armitage vs. Wickliffe, 12 B. Mon. 488. 11. But no presumptive payment will be allowed to operate unless it is apparent this was the intention of the parties. As where one promissory note is given for another. Watkins vs. Hill, 8 Pick. 522; Bank vs. Rose, 1 Strob. Eq. 257; Demshee vs. Parmlee, 19 Vt. R. 172; McDonald vs. McDonald, 16 Vt. R. 630; Bolles vs. Chauncey, 8 Conn. R. 389; Pomroy vs. Rice, 16 Pick. R. 22. 12. The same rule has been repeatedly applied to banking paper, where it is the custom to renew from time to time. Enston vs. Friday, 2 Rich. R. 427; Handy vs. Commercial Bank, 10 B. Mon. 98; Smith vs. Prince, 14 Conn. R. 472. The change and substitution of the parties by others will not affect the mortgage security. N. H. Bank vs. Willard, 10 N. H. R. 210; Pond vs. Clark, 14 Conn. R. 334. And the last case overruled the case of Peters vs. Goodrich, 3 Conn. R. 146, which held, in accordance with the principle of Griswold vs. Pettibone, supra, and the earlier cases, that as the registry must show the true state of the debt secured by the mortgage, it could not be changed by renewal or otherwise, without releasing the mortgage security. 13. And where a general security of $1500 was given to secure the mortgagee for indorsing the note of the mortgagor for that sum at the bank, and the note was renewed at the bank from time to time, being one time reduced as low as $600, and was finally protested for $720, upon the mortgagor becoming insolvent, it was held to be a portion of the original debt secured by the mortgage. And where the mortgagee gave the mortgagor his check to take up the note secured by the mortgage to save it being protested, it was held no extinguishment of the security. Rogers vs. The Traders' Insurance Company, 6 Paige R. 583. 14. In some late cases this allowance of substituted securities has been carried so far as seemingly to disregard the proper distinction between the creation of a new debt and the renewal of an existing one. In the case of Hubbard vs. Converse, 34 Vt. R., it was held that where the mortgagor gave security by way of mortgage to the amount of $25,000, expressed in a bill of exchange or draft for that sum, whereupon he was allowed to draw from time to time upon the bank for sums not exceeding $25,000 in the aggregate; and in taking up that draft was in every instance required to pay money before any subsequent draft would be honored; it was held that the mortgage security continued to maintain its priority notwithstanding a subsequent mortgage, of which the mortgagees had due notice long before the date of the drafts in existence at the time of the failure of the mortgagor. And in Rowan vs. Sharp's Rifle Company, 29 Conn. R. 282, it is decided that where the legal title of land was conveyed to the plaintiffs as security for the performance of a certain contract undertaken by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, viz. the manufacturing of twenty thousand rifles, on condition of having an advance of $40,000; and the possession being in the mortgagor and he having made erections and put machinery upon it to the value of more than $100,000 and given a subsequent mortgage for the security of the debts incurred by the purchase of some of this machinery, which had been duly registered; and the mortgagee having advanced $75,000 beyond the $10,000 stipulated to be advanced, and the mortgagee having received actual notice of the junior mortgage at some period after the date of the registry, it was held the first mortgagee was not affected by the registry of the subsequent mortgage, but that after actual notice of such subsequent mortgage, he was not justified in making further advances upon the faith of his security, except so far as was requisite to complete, or to enable the mortgagor to complete the contract. These illustrations might be carried much further, but enough has been shown to exhibit the extreme limit to which it has been carried. 15. We feel justified in saying that the fair result of the American cases upon this subject, which are quite numerous, many of which will be found digested 1 Hilliard on Mort. 449 et seq., is, that where no actual release of the mortgage securities was intended, as between the parties, and no actual payment of the same has been made by the money of the debtor, although there may have been an actual payment by the money of some other party, without any express agreement to subrogate such party to the rights of the mortgagee, the mortgage will still be held as a valid security. Kinley vs. Hill, 4 Watts & Serg. 426. This last case is where the mortgage debt had been paid with funds of which the debtor was the cestui que trust, and it was held to have satisfied the security. 1 Hilliard on Mort. 460, and cases cited. 16. There is no doubt some difficulty in reducing all the facts in the different cases reported upon this point to the same principle. In some cases the same fact has been regarded as evidence of an intention to release the mortgage security, and in others not. In Fowler vs. Bush, 21 Pick. R. 230, where the mortgagee demanded payment of the first instalment upon the mortgage to enable him to sell the mortgage, and the mortgagor gave a negotiable promissory note for the amount payable in four months to enable the creditor to raise the money by having the note discounted at the bank, and the first instalment was accordingly indorsed as satisfied, it was held that this clearly evidenced an intention to treat the substituted note as payment of the mortgage note, the mortgage having been assigned, and the suit brought by the assignee, the debtor having in the mean time become insolvent, and the note for the first instalment having been paid by the indorsee, who now claimed the right to a lien upon the mortgage security for his indemnity. The case is put by SHAW, Ch. J., expressly upon the ground of the intention of the parties at the time the note was given; distinguishing it from other cases, of a similar character, where no such intention was manifested, viz. Davis vs. Maynard, 9 Mass. R. 242; Crane vs. March, 4 Pick. R. 131; Watkins vs. Hill, 8 Pick. R. 522; Pomrey vs. Rice, 16 Pick. R. 22. And in Bonham vs. Galloway, 13 Illinois R. 68, it seems to have been considered that a mortgage to secure one for indorsing the note of the mortgagee, conditioned to be void if the mortgagor should satisfy his note, by renewal or otherwise, which he did by renewing. his note with other indorsers, to whom the mortgagee assigned the mortgage, could not be held as a subsisting security for such purpose. This case seems to have turned upon the import of the condition. And where the mortgagee takes the note of the assignee of the mortgage for the amount due upon the note of the mortgagor |