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their treasury, their patronage, their contracts, the appointment of their writers and cadets; by which, in the course of things, all the officers and servants in India were in their immediate appointment.

He then came to state what was to be the nature of the government abroad: "Their authority should have the powers of large discretion, accompanied with the restraint of responsibility." They should be bound to obey the orders of the board at home, but at the same time they should have a sufficient quantity of power for all the purposes of emergency, and all the occasions which the immense distance might give rise to. He went into a long detail to shew how much the influence created by the last bill exceeded the influence of this. Here the government abroad could at best but select from among the appointments of the company they could not make original appointments of their own. In addition to this, there was in the crown, and consequently in the two Houses by an address to the crown, the power of recal.

It was to be enquired by whom the members of the councils abroad were to be appointed. The company had cheerfully yielded this point also to the crown. He however had his doubts on this subject, and therefore in his bill the matter should be left for the wisdom of the House to decide; but "the appointment of the commander-in-chief he thought should be clearly in the crown," for the duties which he had to fulfil were so essentially connected with the great operations of the state, that there could be no doubt on his appointment.

The next consideration was the number of the councils abroad. His idea was," that their number should be four, the governorgeneral to have the casting vote." But this also he would leave to the House. The number of the council at Bengal he did not mean to reduce; for in this he followed the example of the right honourable gentleman, in not making the system a personal question.

The late bill thought fit to vest all the power in the government here, and none or little in the government abroad. His idea was otherwise. He thought there should be a power in

the government abroad, large and broad, but guarded with responsibility.

He proposed that there should be "a revision of all the establishments in India, to see where retrenchments might be made with safety-to see what were necessary, what were useful, and what, on account of their inutility, inconvenience, corruption, or abuse, ought to be extinguished." This he recommended, for he believed that many of the abuses in India arose from the establishments being overloaded.

Another reform struck him as essential, and which indeed was only an enforcement of an old rule. This was, "that all appointments in India should take place by gradation and succession." Influence would by this means be very much diminished; and indeed, without entering much into the nature and amount of the power, he imagined the government might be framed to possess all that was necessary to its purposes, without having so much as to create influence. He would speak only therefore of the great lines of power, without entering into the little detail.

His last proposition, he said, was, "that there should be erected a new tribunal for the trial of offences in India." He explained the necessity of such an institution, and said, it would be for the wisdom of the House to determine its nature and authority. His idea was, that it should consist of a number of the principal persons in Westminster-hall in the first place; that civilians should also be joined; and also a number of peers, and a number of the members of the House of Commons. A tribunal thus constituted might, in his idea, embrace the great object. The culprit might have the power of challenging; and, before this tribunal, evidence might be admitted which the courts of law could not receive. They should be directed to question, to arraign; they should determine the nature of offences; and in offences he would reckon the disobedience of orders, the acceptance of presents, oppressions of the natives, monopolies, rapacity, and all the train of offences which had tainted the national character in India. They should enquire into the personal fortunes of the delinquents; they should have the power of confiscation, and

every thing but capital power. In regard to the Zemindars, though he admired the spirit of the right honourable gentleman's intention towards them, yet he could not imitate it on account of its impracticability. General indiscriminate restitution was as bad as indiscriminate confiscation. He proposed, therefore, "That an enquiry should be instituted into the confiscations, for the purpose of restoring such as had been irregularly and unjustly seized; and that they should be secured against violence in future."

He had taken notice of many more points, he said, than were included in his motion; but he had thrown them out for the consideration of the House, as a subsequent bill must be brought in for regulations, or what he believed would be effectual, the bill of the right honourable gentleman now in the House might be modified to his purpose. He again gave a comparison betwec his bill and that which had been thrown out; and, he declared, that the establishment of a moderate and effectual system of government for India, was the great and immediate object of his mind. He did not wish to gratify young ambition by the place to which he was called; he was not attached to his eminence. I am not, said Mr. Pitt, governed at this moment by motives of personal interest, or of personal fame. I have introduced this plan as the deliberate conviction of my mind, made up on the most serious consideration of the most intelligent men. Accept the ideas if they are worth your notice; strengthen them with your wisdom; mature them with your experience; or, in their room, establish a more adequate system, and I am happy.

However unpleasant to me a majority of this House, and insinuations against me, must be, I shall incur the danger of them all on this great point- establish a good, rational, and safe system, and dispose of me as you will. I have the consciousness of a good intention, and therefore, without having the serious fear, that personal consideration will be imputed to me, I conclude with moving, "That leave be given to bring in a bill for the better regulation of our Indian concerns."

The motion was seconded by Mr. Dundas, and, after some discussion, agreed to; and the bill was ordered to be read a first time on the Friday following.

January 23. 1784.

On a motion for the second reading of Mr. Pitt's East-India Bill, and after Mr. Fox, Mr. Erskine, and other members had expressed their objections to the measure,

Mr. PITT rose, and spoke to the following effect :

Notwithstanding the vast variety of auxiliary matter with which the right honourable gentleman over the way has thought proper, according to his ordinary manner, to aid and to embellish his speech; notwithstanding also his learned friend †, in a speech equally diffuse, has followed his right honourable leader through a most faithful repetition of the same arguments; yet I cannot help thinking that I meet the question fairly, when I say that all the objections made to the present East-India bill, reduce themselves to these two:

In the first place it is said to want vigour and effect;

In the second place to want permanency.

Now, Sir, with regard to the first of these objections, that it is a plan of patronage, and not a plan of vigour, effect, and of power; that it gives to the crown a new and enormous extent of influence, while it furnishes no new means of controul; to this I must reply: Is it possible that gentlemen who argue thus can have read the bill? Sir, I defy any man to contradict me when I say, that while there is every possible guard against patronage, the crown's vigorous, effectual, and authoritative command over the politics of Indostan, is clearly the main object of every line of the bill. It was the acknowledged fault of the regulating act of 1773, that it left only a dormant power among His Majesty's ministers to negative and regulate political orders sent out to India. This power, I allow, was not usefully, nay, not at all, exercised; responsibility lay not then with the crown; but, Sir, does it follow, when an express board is appointed, and devoted to the object of EastIndia politics, charged with the whole responsibility, furnished

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with every means of information, as well as every power that can possibly be necessary to the dominion of the East-does it follow, I say, Sir, that by means of such a board, there will be no active, no efficient control? How does the right honourable gentleman torture the imagination, and strive to mislead the common sense of the House, in order to persuade them into this absurdity: He introduces a most curious dialogue between the government-board and the directors; the directors appoint a servant, whom (according to his train of argument) the board object to, and say, "No, you shall not appoint this man your servant, for if you do, we will punish you, by insisting on such and such a measure." "Whom shall we appoint then?" say the directors. "Why we choose you should appoint such an one," says the board, "and then you shall order what political measures you please." The right honourable gentleman, therefore, in order to prove that the new board will have the patronage, while the directors will keep the control, argues exactly thus: The board, he says, will barter their control for patronage; ergo, the board will have all the patronage, and none of the control. But, Sir, will the directors agree to such a bargain? Will they give up all their right of naming their own servants, for the pleasure of dictating political measures? Is it possible to conceive such a perversion of common sense? I say, therefore, away with such arguments as these. If any honourable gentleman can fairly devise the means whereby the patronage of the crown can be still farther restrained, and its authority in India at the same time supported, I am not only willing, but I am extremely eager to listen to any such propositions; but the committee, I conceive, will be the place for observations of this sort. What I contend, and insist at present, is only this, that to give the crown the power of guiding the politics of India, with as little means of corrupt influence as possible, is the true plan for India, and is the true spirit of this bill.

Next, Sir, with respect to the permanency of this system. And here I am forced to confess, that I, for my part, can never expect any duration, any consistency, any degree of permanency in the government either of India or any other of our dependencies,

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