guide them in the consideration, and they would examine how far his propositions were calculated to answer the object.

In the first place then, the political concerns of this country in India, that is, the civil and military government of India — the political establishments-the political system- the collection of the revenues — and, to give it one short and general definition, the imperial dominion of our territories in the East, ought to be placed under other control than that of the company of merchants in Leadenhall-street; but the change ought to be made with as little violence as possible; it ought to be made by the conviction of the company, and not by violence. In this the proprietary agreed with him. The first business then, was to take care, that this should be made an effectual control, and it was his clear idea, that this control could not with safety or propriety be placed in any other hands than those of the genuine and legitimate executive power of the constitution.

His next principle was, that the commerce of the company should be left, as much as possible, to their own superintendance. This was an idea which must strike every thinking man; for commerce ought always to be left to the merchant, unshackled, unembarrassed by interferences which might impede its current, and diminish its security. In this, however, there was a consideration to be attended to. The commerce of the East-India company was of a mixed nature. It was involved with revenue, and it would be requisite that a provision should be made for distinguishing between what was merely commercial and what was mixed, that under the colour of commercial acts or commercial regulation the politics of India should not be affected.

His next principle was to prevent capricious effects on the constitution of Britain from the government of India. In providing for this principle, very great delicacy was to be used in the nature, quality, and extent of the powers to be given to the governments in India. The servants in India must obey the controlling power at home; but still, in regard to the distance from the controlling power, care must be taken to arm them with such discretionary authority as should leave energy and vigour for all the purposes of

good and substantial government, sufficient to secure the happiness of the natives, as well as to protect the commerce and the possessions, but at the same time, so limited as to restrain inordinate ambition to crush oppressive rapacity-to extinguish the jobbing of adventure-and to establish true and equitable dominion. He understood well that it was more easy to exhibit principles than adopt provisions; and he only exhibited these principles to serve as land-marks to the House in the examination of his provisions, for he should succeed or fail in his plan in so far as he reached or came short of these ideas.

The first point, then, in the plan, was to ascertain the degree of control which should be established over the company, and the hands in which that control should be placed. The degree of control should amount to the government of the civil and military concerns, and of the revenue, and this was a species of control not new; for we had already seen a control over the company established in the hands of government. But the former interference of ministers had not been beneficial, because it had not been active or vigilant. On this account was it, that the right honourable gentleman in his bill, had placed it in new hands? Was it on this account that he had vested the control in the hands of a set of men, whose character was a monster and a novelty in the constitution? What security had parliament that this new and unheard-of board would have been more active and vigilant than a constitutional and executive one? Surely none but the character, the integrity, the intelligence, and the alacrity of the individuals who composed it. If men could be found by the executive government of the country equally endowed, he asked if the security to the public was not the same?

But he must again take notice here of the imputation, which, he imagined, would be thrown on his plan for its moderation in this respect. It would be called a half-measure, because it left with the company many of their rights, their property, their patronage, their respect: but he saw no aspersion in the term of a half-measure, if his plan was to be so termed in opposition to the

enjoyed. This grasped at no more than what was essential to the object, and he with confidence trusted to the impartiality of the House of Commons, that they would approve of a measure calculated to effect all the purposes required, by means less violent than those of the late plan; and he had this confidence, notwithstanding the impression of the times, which he confessed to be new and extraordinary. His plan aimed at beneficial control. He meant not to rob nor to steal the rights of the company.

He knew that the merits of his plan must be comparative; and that the House would give the preference to that, which, in the comparison, was proved to be the best in the two great points of sufficiency and vigilance of control. The public required security. What was the security which they had in the projected board of commissioners? Was it the greatness of their character, or the circumstance of their being appointed by the House on the nomination of the minister? If this was all, might not others be found as great in character, and found constitutionally by the executive power? And would it be a less recommendation of such men that they were not a new and independent institution, unknown to the constitution and uncontrollable by the crown? The persons, that had the control, should be persons capable of giving time and attention to the objects of the trust-they should have leisure for activity and exertion, that it should be no longer subject to the imputation of a sleepy and ineffectual control, but deserve the character of an active and efficacious one. But this could not be done, perhaps, without the creation of new officers; for, in the present state of administration, the ministers through whom the crown should speak, that is, the two secretaries of state, were so occupied as not to be able to give the business all the time and attention which would be necessary. To provide for this, there should be joined to the minister other assistance to expedite the affairs, that they might not be delayed or neglected, at the same time that the crown's control was signified through a minister.

His proposal therefore was, "that a board should be instituted to be appointed by His Majesty, consisting of one of the

principal secretaries of state, the chancellor of the exchequer for the time being, and a certain number of the privy concil." The number of the board would be left blank for the consideration of the House. The privy counsellors were not to be as in the constitution of the privy council itself, to attend precariously; but such as His Majesty appointed were to give regular attendance at this board, and devote their time and study to its objects. But it might be asked, were there to be salaries given to the mem bers of this new board, and was it to be productive of additional burthens to the people? He knew that in the last bill, though there was no salary mentioned, it was the general rumour, if not the general intention, that they should have a remuneration. It was his idea, however, that in the present establishment, any expense might be avoided. There were in this country a number of persons, who, from their rank, were members of the privy council, and who at the same time were possessed of great and distinguished offices, with large emoluments and little labour. There was no doubt but a number of such persons might be found to accept of this important duty without any additional reward. It was what they owed to the country, from which they derived splendid incomes for no service; and he was sure that if it fell to his lot—which was a question to be decided-he would think it his indispensable duty, and would give up his time and attention most cordially to the object.

A board thus constituted, it might be imagined, would have the qualities of activity and vigour. It would be derived constitutionally from the executive power. It would create no new office of emolument. It would load the subject with no new bur then. It would be as efficacious as the board of seven commissioners. That board undoubtedly was composed of men of great integrity and fair honour; but he might be allowed to add, some of them not possessing much knowledge of, or interest in, the subject of their control. But this new board would be at least equally intelligent and as efficacious. It would be as good, only with this difference, that the rights of no company would be violated

or uncontrollable; - only with this difference, that they would not possess the whole of the patronage, to the great danger of British liberty. The dispatches of the company must be submitted to this board, and be made subject to their control, their opinion to be given in a reasonable and competent time, and the dispatches countersigned by the board, by which a complete responsibility was vested in them. This was no ambiguous system-it was clear, public, and administrative.

In the next place, though he had no wish to interfere with,' much less to control, the commerce of the company, yet as the commercial acts might be connected with the political, because they might have an aspect leaning both to the one and to the other, he also proposed, "That all the commercial dispatches of the company should also be submitted to the board, whose control should be signified in a reasonable and competent time; but the court of directors, if they agreed not with the opinion of the board on the decision of the question, whether it had a political or merely a commercial tendency, might appeal to the king in his council, whose decision should be final." This he hoped would not be considered as a security nominal and frivolous, when it was remembered that this was to be a public appeal and public trial. He was sincere in his ideas on the subject of the security; and being so, he regarded neither the sneers nor the smiles of gentlemen: this appeal he considered as a guard to the company, and chiefly because it was liable to be discussed in both houses of parliament.

This board possessed not the patronage of the company. They had the power of a negative, indeed, but they could not alter the names that were sent them by the company; they could not make use of this power in the way of patronage, for it was his idea that this should be a board of political control, and not as the former was, a board of political influence. He stated what the constitution of that board was, and what the constitution of this was to be. That board was to seize on the rights, patronage, commerce, and property of the company. This left to the company the uncontrolled possession of their commerce,