coming to any decision on the question, and that he might be charged with having stirred notions dangerous to the state; but such questions, he begged it to be remembered, he had not stirred. When questions concerning the rights of the people, the rights of the parliament, and the interests of the nation, were started, it was necessary, if the House had a right on the subject, to exercise that right; it was their duty; it was a matter that could by no means be lightly given up. If it was their duty, in the present calamitous state of the nation, to grant power, they ought to know how they granted such power. They must decide, either in the manner of a choice, or as acting judicially, to recognise a claim of right; and if they recognised such claim, it would be an acknowledgment that they had no power to deliberate on the subject. If they did not come to some decision, they would confound their own proceedings, and it would be highly dangerous to posterity, in point of precedent. They were not, therefore, to consult their own convenience. He remarked, that, originally, the claim of right had been asserted by the right honourable gentleman, in strong and lofty terms, but that the tone had been since somewhat lowered. He declared, he could see no possibility of the committee proceeding a single step farther, without knowing on what kind of ground they proceeded; and, therefore, it became indispensably necessary to have the question of right decided. The danger of the question originated in its having been stirred, not in its being decided; the danger of the stirring would be done away by the decision, but leaving it undecided, and equivocal, would be highly dangerous. The decision of both Houses could be attended with no dissension, but, if the right of parliament was not confirmed, the measures of both Houses would be imputed, he feared, rather to motives of persorral interest and convenience, than to a due regard for the interest of the country. The measures which he meant to propose were dictated by no other motive than an anxious desire, in conformity to his duty, to provide for the safety of the King, the rights of parliament, and the interests of the people.

Mr. Pitt, previous to the conclusion of his speech, adverted to what he described as the opinion stated by a noble lord * in another place, in contradiction to his assertion, that the Prince of Wales had no more right to assume the regency, than any other individual subject. He said, that he understood, that in arguing that matter, some very extraordinary modes of reasoning had heen resorted to. Among other conceived proofs that the rights of the Prince of Wales were different from those of other subjects, it had been contended, that the Prince of Wales was, in an old record, quoted by Lord Coke, pronounced one and the same with the King. The fact certainly was so; but to draw from such a circumstance an argument, that the Prince had a right to exercise the sovereign authority, under the present circumstances of His Majesty's unfortunate incapacity, was an inference so monstrous, that he should think he deserved censure for sporting with the gravity of the House, if he suffered himself to treat it with the least gravity whatsoever. In truth, a very different conclusion might be drawn from the whole of that record, the metaphorical language of which was not to be taken in a literal sense, in that or any other point of so much importance. Another position, laid down at the same time, and in the same place, was, that the Prince of Wales, as heir apparent, and being of full age, could assume the exercise of the sovereign authority, if His Majesty's infirmity had occurred when parliament was not sitting: but that doctrine had been so expressly contradicted in that House, by the right honourable gentleman opposite to him, when the subject was last agitated, that it was needless for him to say a syllable more relative to its nature. A third argument urged in support of the Prince's right, was, that a Prince of Wales, when he came to the crown, could sue out an execution, as king, in a cause in which he had obtained a judgment as Prince of Wales. But what was there decidedly conclusive in this posi. tion? The reason why the Prince of Wales had this advantage over other subjects was obvious. If the son of a peer, who had maintained a suit in the courts in Westminster-hall, and obtained

* Lord Rawdon.

a judgment, succeeded to his father's honours before he had sued out an execution, he could not sue out an execution, without previously identifying himself, and satisfying the court that he was the same person who had prosecuted the suit, and obtained the judgment. And why was not the Prince of Wales obliged to do the same? For this plain reason, the courts of Westminster-hall are holden in the name of the King, and therefore, in his own courts, it must be a matter of notoriety that, on the demise of the crown, the Prince of Wales had succeeded to it, and become King: but were these arguments multipled 'ten times over, what did they prove? Merely that the Prince had rights, of some sort or other, peculiar to himself; but did they prove, that he had a right to exercise the sovereign authority, on his father's incapacity, without the consent and declared approbation of the two remaining branches of the legislature? No more than a proof, that a man having an estate in Middlesex, was a proof that he had another in Cornwall, and a third in Yorkshire. In fact all these arguments put together, regarded and considered with a reference to the point in dispute, whether the Prince of Wales, as heir apparent, had a right to exercise the sovereign authority, during the incapacity of His Majesty, were so irrelevant, so foreign to the question, and so perfectly absurd, that they were not to be relied on as law, even if they came from the mouth of a judge.

With respect to the strong and lofty assertion that had been at first made of the right of the Prince of Wales, as heir apparent, to assume the exercise of the sovereignty, it was sufficient to observe, that this doctrine was retracted. Upon this occasion, he should beg leave to recall the word and say, not retracted, but disavowed. This reminded him of the precedent in the reign of Henry the Sixth, during which the Duke of Gloucester quarrelled with the Bishop of Winchester, which disagreement rose so high, and was carried so far, that, at length, the duke brought a criminal charge against the bishop, accusing him of having, in a former reign, advised the Prince of Wales, afterwards Henry the Fifth, to assume the sovereign authority in the life-time of

his father, Henry the Fourth. Though this charge, if proved, would have been high treason, the bishop desired that it might be referred to the judges, and that its validity might be determined by the strictest investigation. The quarrel, however, was compromised, on grounds of personal convenience, and the charge never came to a legal decision.

Mr. Pitt having endeavoured, by many arguments, to establish the right of the two Houses of parliament to provide the means of supplying the defect in the case of the King's incapacity to exercise the sovereign authority, expressed his hopes that he should impress the House with a conviction, that if they had a right, they had also a duty; — a duty, which neither their allegiance nor their affection to their sovereign would allow them to dispense with. It was their duty, at this time, not only unequivocally to declare their right, so that it might remain ascertained, beyond the possibility of all question hereafter, and become secured to posterity, but to proceed, without delay, to excrcise their right, and provide the means of supplying the defect of the personal exercise of the royal authority, arising from His Majesty's indisposition. Upon no account did it appcar probable, that their decision could either occasion a dissension between the two Houses of parliament, or produce mischievous consequences of any kind whatsoever. On the contrary, if the right were not declared, as well as decided, it would appear that the two Houses had made a compromise, unbecoming themselves, and had acted upon personal motives, rather than a due regard to the true interests of their country. Mr. Pitt then read his resolutions as follow:

I. "That it is the opinion of this committee, That His Majesty is prevented, by his present indisposition, from coming to his parliament, and from attending to public business, and that the personal exercise of the royal authority is thereby, for the present, interrupted.

II. That it is the opinion of this committee, That it is the right and duty of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons of Great Britain, now assembled, and lawfully, fully, and freely

representing all the estates of the people of this realm, to provide the means of supplying the defect of the personal exercise. of the royal authority, arising from His Majesty's said indisposition, in such manner as the exigency of the case may appear to require.

Resolved, "That for this purpose, and for maintaining entire the constitutional authority of the King, it is necessary, that the said Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons of Great Britain, should determine on the means whereby the royal assent may be given in parliament, to such bill as may be passed by the two Houses of parliament, respecting the exercise of the powers and authorities of the crown, in the name, and on the behalf, of the King, during the continuance of His Majesty's present indisposition."

The first resolution was carried unanimously. Upon the second a long debate ensued, Lord North moving, as an amendment, " That the chairman leave the chair, report progress, and ask leave to sit again." After Mr. Fox had spoken, Mr. PITT rose to reply.

*

He observed, it was not without some astonishment that he discovered, that the right honourable gentleman had thought proper, particularly in the latter part of his speech, to digress from the question of right, which was then before the House, in order to enter upon the question of expediency, and that not so much for the purpose even of discussing that expediency as to take an opportunity of introducing an attack of a personal nature on him. The House would recollect, whether the manner in which he (Mr. Pitt) had opened the debate, either provoked or justified this animosity. This attack, which the right honourable gentleman had just now made, he declared to be unfounded, arrogant, and presumptuous. The right honourable gentleman had charged him, as acting from a mischievous spirit of ambition, unable to bear the idea of parting with power, which he had so long retained; but not expecting the favour of the Prince, which he was conscious he had not deserved, and there

* Mr. Fox.