ment; that they were not content with such provision, but, that they looked forward to the time when the heir apparent should attain full age, granting him a reversionary patent, the same precisely with the regent's, to take place when he should come of age. Thus, though they provided for allowing him at that period more considerable powers than they had suffered him before to possess, they had still not granted him the full powers of sovereignty, but had made such limitations, as proved their most positive denial of any right existing. That instance, though a single one, and where the heir apparent was not of full age, was sufficient to shew the sense of parliament in those days, as much as if the heir apparent had been of full age.

If no precedent contrary to those which he had stated to the committee could be advanced, he should presume, that the committee would, of course, admit that no right existed with an heir apparent, or an heir presumptive, to assume the functions of royalty on the temporary incapacity of the sovereign; nor any rights but those delegated by the two remaining branches of the legislature. He scrupled not therefore to declare, that no positive law, nor the least analogy from any law, could be adduced to support the doctrine of right. A record had, indeed, been quoted elsewhere [the House of Lords] to prove that the King and the heir apparent were one and the same person, and that it followed of course, that, on the incapacity of the King, the heir apparent had a legal and clear right immediately to exercise the same powers that the King had possessed: but, a different opinion was entertained of that record by persons of great éminence and authority in the law, and by their opinion a far different conclusion was drawn from the same record, the metaphorical expression of which was not to be taken literally. Another opinion which had been started, was, that if parliament had not been sitting, in such a case the Prince would have a right to assume the royal authority and summon parliament. But this position he should expressly contradict; because, those who were, like him, standing up for the rights of parliament, and, through parliament, for the rights of the people, were peculiarly fortunate

in one particular; they were as fortunate as most of those, who had truth and justice on their side, generally were, because little was left for them to do, except to controvert and overcome their antagonists by stating to them, and comparing their own arguments and assertions, made at different times, and as the occasion suited.

It had been pretty strenuously contended elsewhere by a learned magistrate*, who had chosen to force his own construction on their silence, that our ancestors, if they had entertained any doubt of the right of an heir apparent, would, in their wis dom, have provided for so possible a case as the present; and yet instead of leaving the interpretation of this point to that learned lord's wisdom, it must be concluded by the committee, that they would have provided for it in plain, distinct, clear, and express words, and would not have left it liable to be differently understood. The wisdom of our ancestors, however, he conceived, was better proved by their having said nothing upon it, but left such a question to be decided where it ought to be decided, whenever the occasion required it by the two Houses of Parliament. That the committee might assert the same, he meant, in the resolution he should offer, to quote that doctrine from the bill of rights, and assert that it rested with the Lords and Commons, as the rightful representatives of the people. If the contrary doctrine was so evident that it must be true; if the heir apparent, or heir presumptive, had a clear right to assume the royal prerogative, on the interruption of those powers, he desired to ask every gentleman in the committee, whether they would wish to adopt such a doctrine as a doctrine applicable to the safety of the crown, which had been long gloriously worn by His Majesty, and which it was the ardent, the sincere wish of his people that he might long continue to wear, until it should, in due time, and in a natural manner, descend to his legal and his illustrious successor? Mr. Pitt here strongly deprecated the idea of avoiding the discussion of what limitations might be necessary for insuring the safety of the crown on the head of its present

possessor, on account of the many virtuous qualifications of the Prince, or out of respect to any other motive whatsoever. It would not have been wisdom in our ancestors, had they said, that the care of the person of the sovereign ought to be vested in the heir apparent. He hoped, in this declaration, that he should not be misunderstood, for he was ready to acknowledge the greatest and best qualities in the present heir apparent; but he would rather, in what he had said, be misrepresented in any manner, and any where, than sacrifice the duty which he owed to the safety of his sovereign, and to the interests of the people.

The right honourable gentleman opposite to him had said, on a former day, that His Royal Highness had as clear a right to the exercise of the sovereign authority, as he would have had in case of the natural demise of the sovereign, and that he conceived the present to be a civil death. Could the committee so consider His Majesty's indisposition, which was not an uncommon case, and generally but temporary-could they conceive that His Majesty had undergone a civil death? He was sure they would not. If such a thing existed at the present moment as a civil death, His Royal Highness would immediately ascend the throne, with the full exercise of the royal prerogative, and not as a regent; for a civil death, like a natural death, was permanent. He stated from Mr. Justice Blackstone, that there were but two cases in which a man could undergo a civil death; the first was his being banished from the realm by process of common law; the second, his having entered into a religious order, and becoming a monk professed, thereby taking himself for ever from all secular concerns. The first was an act which cut off a criminal from society within the realm, and the other was the voWould any man pretend,

luntary act of retiring from the world. that either of those cases was analogous to the visitation of Heaven, to a stroke inflicted by the hand of Providence, which might, and probably would, prove temporary? Could it be pretended, that they ought to be adduced as acts to prevent His Majesty in future from exercising those powers which he had never forfeited, which he had never renounced?

After having advanced so much in contradiction to the claim of right, he believed no one would think of asserting it. The only question, then, was, and to which what had passed before was but preliminary, where did the right exist? If no provision in precedent, in history, or in law, was to be found, for the exercise of such authority, on the disability of the sovereign, where was it to be found? It was to be found in the voice, in the sense of the people. With them it rested; and though, in extraordinary cases, in most countries, such an event as the calamity which all deplored, would have gone near to dissolve the constitution itself; yet, in this more happily-tempered form of government, equally participating the advantages, and at the same time avoiding the evils of a democracy, an oligarchy, or an aristocracy, it would have no such effect; for, though the third estate of the legislature might be deficient, yet the organs of speech of the people remained entire in their representatives, by the Houses of Lords and Commons, through which the sense of the people might be taken. The Lords and the Commons represented the whole estates of the people, and with them it rested as a right, a constitutional and legal right, to provide for the deficiency of the third branch of the legislature, whenever a deficiency arose; they were, the legal organs of speech for the people; and such he conceived to be the true doctrine of the constitution. He would not merely state these as his own opinions, but he would state them to be the opinions of those who had framed the revolution, who had not, like the committee, to provide for the interruption of legal powers, while the throne was full, but to supply the deficiency of the third branch of the legislature, which was wholly vacant. Whenever the third branch, however, of the legislature was wholly gone, or but suffered a suspension, it was equally necessary to resort to the organs of the people's speech. Agreeably to the laws of the land, to the records of parliament, to precedent, and to the constitution, the political capacity of the King, except in cases of absolute forfeiture of the crown, was always considered as legally entire; and during that political capacity, according to

cause a suspension of the royal authority, it then rested with the remaining branches of the legislature to supply such defect. In every proceeding of the parliament, in the reign of Henry the Sixth, they had acted upon such a power, and declared in what manner, and by whom, the royal authority was to be exercised for, and in the name of, the King. In that reign, the Duke of Gloucester claimed the regency, and applied to parliament for the same as his right; but the answer of parliament to such claim was, that he neither had by birth, nor by the will of his brother, any right whatever to the exercise of the royal authority. They, however, appointed him regent, and intrusted him with the care of the young King. Here was an instance of the claim of right having been actually made, and an instance, likewise, that it had been fully decided upon by the then parliament, who declared, that no such right existed, either from the law of the land, or from precedent. The rights of parliament were congenial with the constitution.

Mr. Pitt referred the committee to every analogy that could be drawn from the principles of the constitution, and he contended, that the only right would be found to exist in parliament, describing it as a right capable of so effectually providing for the deficiency of the third branch of the legislature, as to enable them to appoint a power to give sanction to their proceedings, in the same manner as if the King was present. As the power of filling the throne rested with the people at the revolution, so, at the present moment, on the same principles of liberty, on the same rights of parliament, did the providing for the deficiency rest with the people. He declared, that he felt himself inadequate to the great task of stating the rights and privileges of the constitution, and of parliament; but he had made it appear, as plainly as he could, that no right existed any where to exercise the whole, or any part, of the royal prerogatives, during the indisposition of the sovereign. He had also proved, that, from the necessity of the case, it rested with that and the other House of Parliament, to provide for the deficiency in the legislature. He supposed that doubts might be stated as to the propriety of