Houses; and it became absolutely necessary for them to decide that doubt, and, by such decision, ascertain whether they had a power to deliberate, or whether they had only to adjudge, that such a right as had been mentioned was legally vested in His Royal Higness the Prince of Wales. The most embarrassing difficulties had, indeed, been thrown upon their proceedings by the assertion, that such a claim existed; and although he was free to confess, that the assertion had not been made from any authority, and that they had since heard, though not in that House, that it was not intended that the claim should be made, yet, having been once stated, by a very respectable member of that House, as his opinion, it was an opinion of too much importance to be passed by unnoticed. He would entreat the House to remember, however, that he had not stirred the question of right originally. If, therefore, any serious danger were actually to be dreaded, by its being discussed and decided, that danger and its consequences were solely imputable to the first agitator of the question, and not to him. Had the doubt never been raised, an express declaration on the subject had not been necessary; but, as the matter stood, such declaration must be made one way or the other. He begged, however, that it might not be imputed to him, that he was desirous of wasting time in bringing forward any abstract, or speculative, or theoretical question. An abstract question, in his conception of it, was a question wholly unneces sary, the discussion of which could answer no end, nor could its decision afford any light to guide and assist them in their proceedings. Of a very different nature was the question of right; it was a question that stood in the way of all subsequent proceeding, the resolving of which must necessarily decide the whole of their conduct, with regard to the present important business; they were not free to deliberate and determine, while the doubt of an existing right or claim hung over their heads; they could not speak intelligibly, or to any purpose, until they knew their proper characters, and whether they were exercising their own rights for the safety of the crown, and the interests of the people, or whether they were usurping that which had never belonged to

them. On that ground it was, that he had declared the question of right not to be an abstract question, a speculative question, or a theoretical question.

The first information which the papers that had been referred to the committee afforded, was that which he should make the first resolution. It was a resolution of fact, as the ground of those that were designed by him to follow it; a resolution, stating that of which the language of all His Majesty's physicians afforded sufficient proof, that His Majesty was incapable, from illness, of coming to his parliament, or attending to any public business, whence arose the interruption of the exercise of the royal authority. To that resolution of fact, he conceived there could not be any objection. His next resolution would be the resolution of right, couched in part in the words of the bill of rights, and stating, "That it was the right and duty of the lords spiritual and temporal, and of the House of Commons, as the rightful representatives of all the estates of the people of England, to provide for the deficiency in the legislature, by the interruption of the exercise of the royal authority, in consequence of His Majesty's incapacity through indisposition."

Here Mr. Pitt renewed his arguments in support of the claim of the two Houses of Parliament, declaring that under the present circumstances of the country, it was his firm and unalterable opinion, that it was the absolute and undeniable right of the two Houses, on the part of the people, to provide for the revival of the third estate. He declared, he would state the point at issue between him and the right honourable gentleman * opposite to him fairly. He wished not to take any advantage of any shades of difference between them, but to argue upon the solid and substantial difference of their opinions. If he had conceived the right honourable gentleman properly, he had asserted, that, in his opinion, the Prince of Wales, as heir apparent, upon the incapacity of the sovereign to exercise the sovereign authority being declared, had as clear, as perfect, and as indisputable a right to take upon himself the full exercise of all the authorities and prerogatives of his father, as if His Majesty had undergone

* Mr. Fox.

an actual demise. If it could be proved to exist by any precedents drawn from history, or founded in law, or by the analogy of the constitution, he wished to have been told what those precedents. were, because, in that case, the ground would be narrowed, and the proceedings of the committee rendered short and simple, as they would have no power nor occasion to deliberate; the only step they could take would be to recognise the claim of right. That claim of right, however, he flatly denied to have any existence capable of being sustained by such proof as he had mentioned. The right of providing for the deficiency of the royal authority, he contended, rested with the two remaining branches of the legislature. He professed himself exceedingly happy to hear that a declaration had been made in another place, from high authority, that the right stated by the right honourable gentleman in that House, to have existence, was not meant to be urged by a great personage. He came that day, confirmed in every opinion which he had before stated; and particularly confirmed in the opinion that no such right or claim in the Prince of Wales, as heir apparent, to exercise the royal authority during the incapacity of the sovereign, could be proved, either from precedents drawn from history, or from the law, or from the spirit of the constitution.

He begged leave to remind the committee, that when the right honourable gentleman first mentioned the right of the Prince of Wales in this particular, the right honourable gentleman had declared he was willing to wave the motion for a committee to search for precedents, because that he was persuaded, and the House must allow, that no precedent could be found that bore upon the particular case, of a Prince of Wales, the heir apparent to the crown, being of full age, and capable of taking on himself the exercise of the royal authority, under such circumstances as the present. There certainly was no case precisely in point; but, though the committee above stairs could not find a case precisely in point, they had furnished the House with many precedents, from which analogies might be drawn. He called upon

single case analogous to the infancy, infirmity, or illness of a sovereign, in which the full powers of sovereignty were exercised by any one person whatever. If the right attached to His Royal Highness, under the present circumstances, in the same manner as on the demise of his father, an heir presumptive would suc ceed as perfectly as an heir apparent, and, in pursuance of that doctrine, those precedents that would attach in the one case, would attach in the other. For precedents that were analogous, he would refer the committee to the report on the table; the precedents in which, though they might not throw all the light on the subject that could be wished, certainly tended to elucidate it considerably. He would refer to some of the precedents, and convince gentlemen, that their result formed the most undeniable proof, that no such a right existed as had been pretended.

The first precedent was taken from the reign of Edward the Third, when no heir apparent had claimed the exercise of the royal authority. The parliament of those days, whether wisely or not, was no question before the committee, provided a council about the King's person to act for him; a clear proof, that they conceived the power existed with them to provide for the exercise of the royal authority. The next precedent was in the reign of Richard the Second, when counsellors were also appointed to exercise the regal power. The third precedent occurred in the infancy of Henry the Sixth: at that time the parliament were called together by the young King's second uncle; the first being still living, but out of the kingdom; and that act was ratified by parliament, they not considering it sufficient that it was done by the authority of the Duke. In that instance, again, it was clear, that the regency was carried on by the parliament. These three instances were the principal of those stated in the report of the committee; subsequent precedents would prove, that no one instance could be found of any person's having exercised the royal authority, during the infancy of a King, but by the grant of the two Houses of Parliament, excepting only where a previous provision had been made. Having thus far mention

ed the power of parliament, during the infancy of a King, he observed, that he would next state their power during the King's absence; and if, in that case, it should be asserted, that the heir apparent had a right to exercise the royal authority, let the committee consider how the assertion would stand.

It had been advanced, that, in the majority of such cases, the power had been given to the Prince of Wales. If such cases could be adduced, they would, he owned, be cases in point; but, then, to prove what? To prove, that such heirs apparent possessed no inherent right. If a right existed to represent the King, it must be a perfect and an entire right, a right admitting of no modification whatever; because if any thing short of the whole power were given, it would be less than by right could be claimed, and consequently an acknowledgment that no such right existed. But, could any such cases be pointed out? By a reference to the ancient records, it would be found, that the custos regni, or lieutenant for the King, had never been invested with the whole rights of the King himself. The powers given to the custos regni had been different, under different circumstances; a plain and manifest inference then arose that the custodes regni did not hold their situation as a right but by appointment. The powers of bestowing benefices, and doing other acts of sovereignty, had been occasionally given to the custodes regni, which shewed that their powers had been always subject to some limitation or other. In modern times, lord-justices had been frequently appointed to the exercise of sovereign authority, during the residence of a prince of age in the country. Another instance that occurred to him was, where the exercise of royalty had been interrupted by severe illness, and which appeared to him to be more a case in point than any other to the present melancholy moment. The example to which he alluded was the precedent of Henry the Sixth, where the heir apparent was not of full age. It would, then, to supply the defect of that precedent, be necessary to have recourse to the principles of the constitution, and to the laws of the land; and, upon this ground, it would be