the part of the treaty where this committee of manufacturers had discovered these dangers. He conceived that they were empowered to preserve all the prohibitions which they might think it wise to continue. He knew not of any possibility of sending the wool, the fuller's earth, or the tools of the manufacturers out of the kingdom. He went through the whole report of the committee, commenting on each passage, and opposing the ideas of the whole. That a set of manufacturers should neglect to consider the application of the treaty to themselves, while they wandered into the paths of legislation and government, did not look like that apprehension for their real interests which their terrors betrayed at the time of the Irish propositions. They indeed expressed their fears, should the tools and manufacturers of this country be imported to France; but upon that subject they may be quite at their ease, for there was not a word in the treaty to favour such a construction.

Considering the treaty in its political view, he should not hesitate to contend against the too-frequently advanced doctrine, that France was, and must be, the unalterable enemy of Britain. His mind revolted from this position as monstruous and impossible. To suppose that any nation could be unalterably the enemy of another was weak and childish. It had neither its foundation in the experience of nations, nor in the history of man. It was a libel on the constitution of political societies, and supposed the existence of diabolical malice in the original frame of man. But these absurd tenents were taken up and propagated; nay, it was carried farther; it was said, that, by this treaty, the British nation was about blindly to throw itself into the arms of this constant and uniform foe. Men reasoned as if this treaty was not only to extinguish all jealousy from our bosoms, but also completely to annihilate our means of defence; as if by the treaty we gave up so much of our army, so much of our marine; as if our commerce was to be abridged, our navigation to be lessened, our colonies to be cut off or to be rendered defenceless, and as if all the functions of the state were to be sunk in apa

the treaty suppose that the interval of peace between the two countries would be so totally unemployed by us as to disable us from meeting France in the moment of war with our accustomed strength? Did it not much rather, by opening new sources of wealth, speak this forcible language that the interval of peace, as it would enrich the nation, would also prove the means of enabling her to combat her enemy with more effect when the day of hostility should come? It did more than this; by promoting habits of friendly intercourse, and of mutual benefit, while it invigorated the resources of Britain, it made it less likely that she should have occasion to call forth those resources. It certainly had at least the happy tendency to make the two nations enter into more intimate communion with one another, to enter into the same views even of taste and manners; and while they were mutually benefited by the connection, and endeared to one another by the result of the common benefits, it gave a better chance for the preservation of harmony between them, while, so far from weakening, it strengthened their sinews for war. That we should not be taken unprepared for war was a matter totally distinct from treaty. It depended in no degree on that circumstance, but simply and totally on the watchfulness and ability of the administration for the time being. He had heard of the invariable character of the French nation, and of the French cabinet; her restless ambition and her incessant enmity and designs against Britain; and he noticed the particular instance of her interference in our late disputes, and of the result of her attack at that time. That France had, in that instant of our distress, interfered to crush us, was a truth over which he did not desire to throw even the slightest veil. Having premised that the provisions of the treaty would neither delude us into security, nor accomplish our reduction; that, on the contrary, it would strengthen our hands, and, whilst it did not diminish our means, would throw the prospect, and the necessity of war, at a very great distance, friendly assurances, he added, were not always to be relied on; but, although he thought France the aggressor in most of our former wars, yet, her assur

ances and frankness during the present negociation, were such as, in his opinion, might be confided in. What might be the projects which wild ambition might one day dictate, was beyond his penetration; but, at present, the court of France was governed by maxims too prudent and political, not to consult its own safety and happiness beyond the ministerial aims of impracticable conquest. Oppressed as this nation was during the last war by the most formidable combination for its destruction, yet had France very little to boast at the end of the contest, which should induce her again to enter deliberately into hostilities against this country. In spite of our misfortunes, our resistance must be admired, and in our defeats we gave proofs of our greatness and almost inexhaustible resources; which, perhaps, success would never shew us

Duris ut ilex tonsa bipennibus,

Nigra feraci frondis in Algido;
Per damna, per cædes, ab ipso
Ducit opes animumque ferro.

Indeed, whilst he recollected the whole of that dreadful controversy, he could deduce arguments from it to reconcile the present conduct of France with more equitable and more candid principles of policy than gentlemen seemed willing to attribute to our rival. When France perceived that, in that dreadful contest, when with the enormous combination of power against us it might be truly said that we were struggling for our existence, we not only saved our honour, but manifested the solid, and, he might also be tempted to say, the inexhaustible resources of the land; reflecting that, though she had gained her object in dismembering our empire, she had done it at an expense which had sunk herself in extreme embarrassment; and reflecting also, that such a combination of hostile power against us, without a single friend in Europe on our side, can never be imagined again to exist; may I not (exclaimed Mr. Pitt) be led to cherish the idea, that, seeing the durable and steady character of our strength, and the inefficacy as well as the ruin of hostility, France

a

would eagerly wish to try the benefits of an amicable connection with us? It was a singular line of argument which he had heard, and which he saw was also propagated out of doors, that the treaty would prove objectionable, if it should be found that, though advantageous to ourselves, it would be equally so, to them. It was ridiculous to imagine that the French would consent to yield advantages without an idea of return: the treaty would be of benefit to them; but he did not hesitate to pronounce his firm opinion, even in the eyes of France, and pending the business, that though advantageous to her, it would be more so to us. The proof of this assertion was short and indubitable. She gained for her wines and other produce a great and opulent market; we did the same, and to a much greater degree. She procured a market of eight millions of people, we a market of twenty-four millions. France gained this market for her produce, which employed in preparation but few hands, gave little encouragement to its navigation, and produced but little to the state. We gained this market for our manufactures, which employed many hundreds of thousands, and which, in collecting the materials from every corner of the world, advanced our maritime strength, and which, in all its combinations, and in every article and stage of its progress, contributed largely to the state. France could not gain the accession of 100,000l. to her revenue by the treaty; but England must necessarily gain a million. This could easily be demonstrated. — The high price of labour in England arose chiefly from the excise, and three-fifths of the price of labour were said to come into the exchequer. The produce of France, on the contrary, was low in the staple, and less productive to the state in the process. Even the reduced duties were so proportionably high, that France could not send to us 500,000l. of brandies, but we must gain cent. per cent. by the article. In this view, then, though France might gain, we must be, comparatively, so much more benefited, that we ought not. to scruple to give her the advantages: and surely ought not to fear that this very disproportionate gain could be injurious to us in case of a future contest. It was in the nature and essence of

an agreement between a manufacturing country and a country blessed with peculiar productions, that the advantages must terminate in favour of the former; but it was particularly disposed and fitted for both the connections. Thus France was, by the peculiar dispensation of Providence, gifted, perhaps, more than any other country upon earth, with what made life desirable in point of soil, climate, and natural productions. It had the most fertile vineyards, and the richest harvests; the greatest luxuries of man were produced in it with little cost, and with moderate labour. Britain was not thus blest by nature; but, on the contrary, it possessed, through the happy freedom of its constitution, and the equal security of its laws, an energy in its enterprise, and a stability in its exertions, which had gradually raised it to a state of commercial grandeur; and not being so bountifully gifted by Heaven, it had recourse to labour and art, by which it had acquired the ability of supplying its neighbour with all the necessary embellishments of life in exchange for her natural luxuries. Thus standing with regard to each other, a friendly connection seemed to be pointed out between them, instead of the state of unalterable enmity, which was falsely said to be their true political feeling towards one another.

In conclusion, he remarked, that, with respect to political relation, this treaty at least, if it afforded us no benefits, brought us no disadvantages. It quieted no well-founded jealousy; it slackened no necessary exertion; it retarded no provident supply: but simply tended, while it increased our ability for war, to postpone the period of its approach. But on this day he had only to draw the attention of the House to objects merely commercial, and he must again say, that he by no means wished to bind them by any resolution this night, to any general approbation of the measure. He should sit down after voting his first resolution; yet he begged to be understood that he meant to move the others which he had mentioned.

Mr. Pitt now moved, "That in case either of the two high contracting parties shall think proper to establish prohibitions,