from the rest, his uneasiness was the less poignant, because the honourable general was on the spot to explain and support his own judgment; though even still he felt for the honourable general, who, he knew, would not think himself at liberty to enter so deeply into several of the more delicate parts of the question, as, perhaps, were his own justification alone concerned, he might wish to do. With respect to the other officer *, his feelings were more distressing, because he was obliged to canvass his opinion in his absence. Those two officers had joined with the rest of the board in their two first unanimous opinions, with respect to the necessity of fortifications towards the defence of the dock-yards; but they afterwards, by a subsequent proposition, declared, that notwithstanding such necessity, yet they were useless, because we were not masters of a sufficient military force to man them, He begged the House for a moment to consider the conclusion which would follow from such premises; because if nothing but certain fortifications could possibly afford protection to our dock yards, and if we were unable to garrison those fortifications when erected, what must prove the consequence? Deplorable in the extreme. It must be, that we were unable to protect them at all. The nation, however, need not despond at the prospect thus, unintentionally he was convinced, presented to them by the noble earl, for whose character he had the highest veneration, and whose noble disinterestedness, together with the brilliant example which he held out to the nobility of the age, in the active service of his country, and the uniform tenour of his conduct, were sufficient to add lustre even to the rank which the noble lord already filled. They need not despond at this uncomfortable prospect; for the papers laid upon the table, in consequence of the motions made by the enemies of the measure, clearly proved, that we should by no means stand in need of a greater force for the purpose of defending those fortifications, than we could easily afford to that service.

It would appear from one of those papers, that, in the year 1779, we had about fifty-three thousand men in South Britain,

* Earl Percy.

who were constantly and uniformly increasing, until the year 1782, to upwards of seventy-one thousand. There was also another paper on the table that had been demanded by the gentlemen on the other side, which gave an account of different cantonments in which those troops had been stationed during that period; a paper which he could not think in any way material for the government of the present question, unless the right honourable gentleman* opposite was ready to undertake to prove, that, like all the other arrangements made during the course of the American war, the disposition of the army through England was the very best and wisest which human ingenuity could devise. It appeared, however, from this paper, that the number of troops stationed in such cantonments, as might be considered within reach of Portsmouth and Plymouth, was, in 1779, above sixteen thousand men, and that it had, in the year 1782, amounted, by a progressive increase, to twenty-one thousand five hundred in each case, including that most invaluable resource of national defence, the militia. Let gentlemen judge from this state of our military force, whether it would, in case of an invasion, prove difficult to furnish a sufficient garrison for the proposed works. But when it was to be considered, that our forces in Great Britain bore scarcely any proportion to those which we were obliged to distribute through our then extensive dominions; and that, from our present situation, it was not likely that any such distraction of our military power would ever again take place, it might be looked upon as able to command a force fully adequate to the maintenance of the fortifications, without in any degree derogating from the respectable defence of all our other dominions. On this part of the subject, some gentlemen had thought proper to throw into derision and ridicule the whole inquiry of the board of officers, as if they had proceeded to investigate the question of fortifications, without having any state of the probable means of supplying those fortifications with troops for their defence laid before them. But he would only desire the

House to turn over the names of the land officers who sat at the board, and then to say, whether there was any foundation for such a reflection. Was the Duke of Richmond-Was Sir Guy Carleton-Was Sir William Howe-Was Lord George Lenox, who commanded at one of those places- Was Earl Cornwallis, his respect for whom he should extenuate, were he to attempt to express it-Was Sir David Lindsay, who commanded in another of those places-Was Sir Charles Grey, who commanded in a third, and who, besides, served in the course of the war with the greatest brilliancy, in the remotest parts of the globe-Was General Roy, who, at the time, was quarter-master-general to the whole-Were all those gentlemen to be supposed ignorant of the general military strength of the kingdom? Or, was it to be contended, that, to enable them to form an opinion on so broad and extended a question, it was necessary that the returns of every regiment should have been laid before them? Surely gentlemen would not persist in such weak and groundless arguments!

There was, besides, in the report, another instance of disagreement in opinion: that, however, he conceived, ought not, and could not carry any very great weight; not from the person from whom the dissent came being at all deficient in authority and consideration, but from a circumstance standing on the face of the report itself. The name of an honourable officer * appeared to a dissent to the answer given by the board to the third datum. It was to be observed that this datum, together with its answer, was omitted in the report, as containing matter not safe to be made public. This consideration rendered it impossible for him, consistently with his duty, to attempt to examine it in detail, and to combat the opinion of the honourable officer upon its own ground; but yet he had a stronger argument than any other he could be master of, and that was, the opinion of the honourable officer himself, who had, six weeks before, as appeared from the minutes of the board, given, together with all the other members of the board, his opinion directly in favour of the principle which

Captain Macbride.

that datum was calculated to establish. If he was mis-stating the honourable officer, he begged to be set right; but he believed it would be evident to any gentleman that would look at the report, that he was perfectly correct.

[Captain Macbride here interrupted Mr. Pitt. He admitted that the statements of the right honourable gentleman were`perfectly exact, but declared, that still he could not avoid embracing his former idea, that the opinion of the naval officers was fully in the teeth of the fortifications proposed at Plymouth; and for this assertion he had Admiral Barrington's authority, whom he had seen and talked with upon the subject during a part of the intermediately preceding days. The fact was, that the naval officers were not permitted to have an opinion of their own manifested.]

Mr. PITT, resuming his speech, remarked that as he had courted the corrections of others to fall upon the accidental, certainly not voluntary, errors in his statement, so it could not follow that he experienced the least concern, but rather pleasure, when he discovered the honourable gentlemen corroborating, instead of refuting his representation. The honourable officer, then, had formerly united with the rest of the board in an unanimous vote upon the subject of the third datum, and had afterwards, after an interval of six weeks, retracted that vote, and entered another on the minutes of the board, diametrically opposite to it. Thus, each opinion had the authority of the name of the honourable officer; and if any dilemma arose in forming a judgment between them both, it became easily solved by referring to the report itself, in which it would appear, that though each opinion was equally supported by the honourable officer, yet the casting voice between his first and second opinion was given by the whole board, by which he acted in favour of his former opinion, and of course there could be no room for the House to hesitate a moment which of the two they ought to adopt.

There was another circumstance which he thought it necessary to state under the head of the dissents from the general purport of the report, that he might answer it in order: although it did not arise out of the report itself, but had been taken up in that

that the fortifications proposed to be erected on the lands adjacent to Whitesand bay, were directly in the teeth of the opinion of all the sea-officers. He begged the House to attend particularly to the two distinct branches into which that part of the question was divided; one of a naval, the other of a military consideration. That which more immediately demanded the judgment of the naval service was the practicability of the enemy effecting a landing at all upon the coast, together with the various circumstances of tides, winds, soundings, currents, and anchorage, which might be necessary, and the probability there was of all those concurring, so as to enable an enemy to land at all, and to remain long enough off the coast to cover and complete their debarkation; the other subject was for the discussion of the land-officers singly, and had for its object the most effectual method of so fortifying the coast, as to prevent the enemy, should they effect a landing, from penetrating the country. The opinion of the sea-officers was, that, in certain circumstances, it was possible for an enemy to land; and he could only account for the objection of the honourable officer against fortifying a coast on which an enemy might (as it was admitted) land, by that gallant spirit and bravery which would at all times induce him to turn his thoughts more to the animating and brilliant prospect of attacking his enemy, than the less glorious, but still prudent, duty of providing for his own defence. In furnishing, however, the part of the country in question with forts, they ought not to confine themselves solely to the idea of an enemy's landing in Whitesand bay. They should consider whether it would be practicable for him to land in any place to the west of Plymouth; for if he could do so, then were these forts absolutely necessary for the defence of that town and its dock-yards; they were the very posts which an enemy would most eagerly endeavour to occupy, because from them they would be able to bombard the dock-yards. All persons who knew our coasts, and such as, to their own honour, and the glory of their country, were acquainted with the coasts of our enemies, knew also that it was absurd to think of fortifying every part of them which