hypothefis and opinion; and remember, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interefts, in a country fo extenfive as ours, a government of as much vigour as is confiftent with the perfect fecurity of liberty is indifpenfable. Liberty itfelf will find in fuch a government, with powers properly diftributed and adjufted, its fureft guardian. It is, indeed, little elfe than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprizes of faction, to confine each member of the fociety within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the fecure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of perfons and property. I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the ftate, with the particular reference to the founding of them on geographical difcriminations. Let me now take a more comprehenfive view, and warn you in the moft folemn manner against the baneful effects of the fpirit of party gene rally. This fpirit, unfortunately, is infeparable from our nature, having its roots in the ftrongeft paffions of the human mind. It exifts under different fhapes in all governments, more or lefs ftifled, controuled, or fuppreffed; but in thofe of the popular form, it is feen in its greateft ranknefs, and it is truly their worst enemy. The alternate dominion of one faction over another, fharpened by the fpirit of revenge natural to party diffenfion, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itfelf a moft horrid defpotifm. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent defpotifm. The diforders and miferies which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity and repofe in the abfolute power of an individual; and, fooner or later, the chief of fome prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty. Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight), the common and continued mifchiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the intereft and duty of a wife people to discourage and restrain it. It ferves always to diftra&t the public councils and enfeeble the public adminiftration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part against another, foments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated accefs to the government itself through the channels of party paffions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are fubjected to the policy and will of another. There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and ferve to keep alive the fpirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical caft, patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favour, upon the fpirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a fpirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that fpirit for every falutary purpose. And And there being conftant danger of excefs, the effect ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and affuage it. A fire not to be quenched it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its burfing into a flame, left, instead of warming, it fhould confume. It is important, likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country fhould infpire caution in thofe entrufted with its administration, to confine themfelves within their refpective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding, in the exercife of the powers of one department, to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments into one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotifm. A juft eftimate of that love of power, and pronenefs to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceffity of reciprocal checks in the exercife of political power, by dividing and diftributing it into different depofitories, and conftituting each the guardian of the public weal against invafions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; fome of them in our country, and under our own eyes. To preferve them rauft be as neceffary as to inftitute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the diftribution or modification of the conftitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the conftitution defignates. But let there be no change by ufurpation; for though this, in one inftance, may be the inftrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are deftroyed. The precedent muft always greatly over-balance in permanent evil any Of all the difpofitions and habits which lead to political profperity, religion and morality are indifpenfable fupports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotifm who fhould labour to fubvert thefe great pillars of human happinefs, thefe firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to refpect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connection with private and public felicity. Let it fimply be asked, where is the fecurity for property, for reputation, for life, if the fenfe of religious obligation defert the oaths, which are the inftruments of inveftigation in courts of juftice? And let us with caution indulge the fup. pofition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reafon and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can. prevail in exclufion of religious principle. It is fubftantially true, that virtue or morality is a neceffary fpring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force to every fpecies of free government. Who, that is a fincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to fhake the foundation of the fabric? Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, inftitutions for the general diffufion of knowledge. In proportion as the ftructure of government gives force to public opinion, it is effential that public opinion fhould be enlightened. (M 3) As As a very important fource of ftrength and fecurity, cherish pub. lic credit. One method of preferving it is to use it as fparingly as pothole; avoiding occafions of expence by cultivating peace, but remembering alfo that timely difbursements to prepare for danger, frequently preven: much greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding likewife the accumulation of debt, not only by fhunning occafions of expence, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to difcharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occafioned; not ungenerously throwing upon pofterity the burthen which we ourfelves ought to bear. The execution of thefe maxims belongs to your reprefentatives, but it is neceffary that public opinion fhould co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is effential that you houid practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be a revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be deviled which are not more or les inconvenient and unpleafant; that the intrinfic embarraffment infeparable from the felection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be á decifive motive for a candid conftruction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a fpirit of acquiefcence in the mea. fures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate. Obferve good faith and juftice towards all nations, cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct: and can it be that good policy does o equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no very diflunt period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted juftice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the courfe of time and things the fruits of fuch a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be loft by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtues? The experiment, at leaft, is recommended by every fentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impoflible by its vices? In the execution of fuch a plan, nothing is more effential than that permanent inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and paffionate attachments for others, fhould be excluded; and that, in place of them, juft and amicable feelings towards all fhould be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in fome degree a flavè. It is a flave to its animofity or to its affection, either of which is fufficient to lead it aftray from its duty and its intereft. Antipathy in one nation against another difpofes each more readily to offer infult and injury, to lay hold of flight caufes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occafions of dispute occur. Hence frequent collifions, obftinate, envenomed, and bloody con. tefts. The nation, prompted by ill-will and refentment, fometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government fometimes participates in the national propenfity, and adopts, through paffion, what reafon would reje&; at other times it makes the animofity of the nation fubfervient to projects projects of hoftility, inftigated by pride, ambition, and other finifter and pernicious motives. The peace often, fometimes, perhaps, the liberty of nations has been the victim. So, likewife, a paffionate attach- As the avenues to foreign in- mislead public opinion, to influ- Against the infidious wiles of The great rule of conduct for Europe has a fet of primary in- (M 4) ordinary ordinary combinations and collifions of her friendships or enmi ties. Our detached and diftant fituation invites and enables us to purfue a different courfe. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take fuch an attitude as will caufe the neutrality we may at any time refolve upon to be fcrupulously refpected; when belligerent nations, under the impoffibility of making acquifitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our intereft, guided by justice, shall counfel. Why forego the advantages of fo peculiar a fituation? Why quit our own to ftand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our deftiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and profperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, intereft, hunour, or caprice? 'Tis our true policy to fteer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; fo far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronifing infidelity to exifting engagements. I hold the maxim no lefs applicable to public than to private affairs, that honefty is always the beft policy. I repeat it, therefore, let thofe engagements be obferved in their genuine fenfe. But, in my opinion, it is unneceffary and would be unwife to extend them. Taking care always to keep ourselves, by fuitable eftablishments, on a refpectable defenfive pofture, we may fafely trust to temporary al liances for extraordinary emergencies. Harmony, liberal intercourfe with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy fhould hold an equal and impartial hand; neither feeking nor granting exclufive favours or preferences; confulting the natural courfe of things; diffufing and diverfifying by gentle means the ftreams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing, with powers fo dif pofed, in order to give trade a ftable courfe, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to fupport them, conventional rules of intercourfe, the beft that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit; but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumftances. fhall dictate; conftantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for difinterefted favours from another; that it must pay with a proportion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that, by fuch acceptance, it may place itfelf in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favours, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favours from nation to nation. It is an illufion which experience muft cure; which a juft pride ought to difcard. In offering to you, my countrymen, thefe counfels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lafting impreffion I could wish; that they will controul the ufual current of the paffions, or prevent our |