Stonewall Jackson's advance to and fight at Winchester, indicating further pugnacity in that quarter, were soon found to interfere with Gen. McClellan's order 48 to Gen. Banks to move his division down to Manassas, leaving only two regiments of cavalry to "occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley." Gen. McClellan, on embarking, calculated that he left behind, including Blenker's division, ordered to Fremont, and not including McDowell's corps, which he intended should follow him, no less than 75,000 men. But, as Blenker's division was known to be ordered to Fremont, in West Virginia, they are improperly included. Even excluding these, he computes the whole number available for the defense of Washington, including 35,467 under Banks in the Valley of the Shenandoah, at 67,428 men, with 85 pieces of light artillery. Yet he had barely departed when Gens. Hitchcock and L. Thomas, who had been instructed 49 imperfectly disciplined, several of the regiments in a very disorganized condition; 2 heavy artillery and 1 infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months for artillery service, had been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac; while he was at this time under orders from McClellan to detail 3 regiments to join divisions on their way to the Peninsula, and another for service at Budd's Ferry; while a further order directed him to send 4,000 men to Manassas and Warrenton to relieve Gen. Sumner, so as to enable him to embark for Yorktown. Upon the report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, the President gave orders" that either McDowell's or Sumner's corps should remain in front of Washington until otherwise directed. 51 Gen. McClellan, from his camp in front of Yorktown, remonstrated;"1 saying: I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the Rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers; but, whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you cannot leave me the whole of the 1st corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division." Two days later, he telegraphed to to investigate the matter, reported,1o "It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my handsprobably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps, my 48 March 16. force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position." In a dispatch of even date to the President, he says: "Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply, I have the honor to state that my 5o April 3. 61 April 5. THE PRESIDENT URGES MCCLELLAN TO ACT. entire force for duty amounts to only about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. Gen. Wool's command, as you will observe from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully cooperated with me. The only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time, only 53,000 men have joined me; but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation." The President responded by this letter: "WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862. "Maj.-Gen. MCCLELLAN: 131 just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? "As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away. "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you, is with you by this time; and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than you can by rëenforcements alone. And once more let me tell "MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, com- you, it is indispensable to you that you plaining that you are not properly sustained, strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. while they do not offend me, do pain me You will do me the justice to remember I very much. Blenker's division was with- always insisted that going down the Bay in drawn from you before you left here; and search of a field, instead of fighting at or you know the pressure under which I did near Manassas, was only shifting, and not it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it-cer- surmounting, a difficulty; that we would tainly, not without reluctance. After you find the same enemy, and the same or equal left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 un-intrenchments, at either place. The counorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this, even, was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted, and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. "I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but, when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself; and allow me to ask: Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manas sas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. "There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had try will not fail to note is now noting— that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. "I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. | But you must act. "Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN." The President's question as to the grave discrepancy between the 85,000 men, admitted to be with or on their way to him by Gen. M., and the 108,000 asserted by Secretary Stanton, was never answered, and probably could not be; since an official return of the number of his army April 30th, while it was still before Yorktown, makes its aggregate 130,378, whereof 112,392 were present and fit for duty; Franklin's division of 12,448 men having in the mean time been sent to him. But, on another point, military men are not likely to agree with the President. Gen. Wool's command may very probably have been doing just what an equal number of McClel- | days a strong position near Mount lan's troops must have done "if that command was away;" but it is by no means the same thing to a commander in the field to have 10,000 men holding an important post in his rear, but wholly independent of his authority, and having them subject implicitly to his orders. Gen. McClellan was therefore manifestly right in not regarding Gen. Wool's 10,000 as equivalent to a rëenforcement of his army by that number; and the order which detached this division from his command has not been justified. True, he had more men than he needed, had he possessed the ability and the nerve to use them. But a General, in such a position as his then was, should either be fully trusted or superseded. } 52 When he had fairly set down before Yorktown, he telegraphed to Washington as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "April 10. "Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War: "The reconnoissance to-day proves that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions, under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake it. If circumstances of which I am not aware make it impossible for you to send me two divisions to carry out this final plan of campaign, I will run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the result, if you will give me Franklin's division. If you still confide in my judgment, I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable to me. Gen. Barnard concurs in this view. I have determined on the point of attack, and am at this moment engaged in fixing the position of the batteries. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-General." The prompt response was as follows: 54 Jackson, crossed the South Fork of the Shenandoah and took position in Elk Run Valley; but he was soon startled by tidings that Gen. Milroy, with the advance of Gen. Schenck's division of Fremont's West Virginia force, was threatening Staunton from the direction of Monterey. As a junction of Fremont's and Banks's commands would have involved the fall of Staunton, and the complete possession of the Valley by our troops, Jackson resolved to prevent it by striking a swift and hard blow at Fremont's advance. Leaving Ewell, whose division had recently joined him from Gordonsville, to observe and check Banks, Jackson moved rapidly to Staunton, being rëenforced by the division of Gen. Edward Johnson, which he dispatched" in advance of his own, against Milroy; who, being decidedly overmatched, retreated westwardly across Shenandoah Mountain, concentrating his command at MCDOWELL, and sending "WAR DEPARTMENT, April 11, 1862. "Maj.-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding Army of Potomac, Fortress Monroe, Virginia: "By direction of the President, Franklin's division has been ordered to march back to Alexandria and immediately embark for Fort Monroe. "L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General." Which McClellan thus acknowledged: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Near Yorktown, April 12-12 M. "Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: "Your dispatch received. I thank you most sincerely for the rëenforcements sent to me. Franklin will attack on the other side. moment I hear from him, I will state point of rendezvous. I am confident as to results now. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-General." The THE FIGHT AT MCDOWELL. 133 to Schenck for assistance. Schenck | 3 missing. Our total loss in this well was at Franklin, 34 miles north, contested action was 256, including which distance he traversed, with his 145 slightly wounded. Gen. Jackbrigade, in 23 hours, joining Milroy son's report admits a loss on his part at 10 A. M. of the 8th; but he of 461-71 killed, including 3 Cobrought only three regiments, reduced lonels and 2 Majors, and 390 woundby details to less than 2,000 men; ed, among whom was Gen. Johnson. while Milroy's force was but very Our troops retreated to Franklin little stronger. Jackson's column during the night, carrying off their was considerably the larger, though wounded, but burning a part of their it is stated that but six regiments were stores. actually engaged in the fight. 58 56 Jackson pursued next day toward The Rebels advanced to and posted Franklin, but did not see fit to atthemselves on the top of a ridge in tack. Returning to McDowell, he the Bull Pasture Mountain, where it recrossed the Shenandoah Mountain is traversed by the Staunton turn to Lebanon White Sulphur Springs; pike, a mile or two west of McDow- where he gave his troops a brief rest, ell. Schenck saw that Milroy's posi- and then resumed" his march to tion was untenable, being command- Harrisonburg, having ascertained ed by hights in several directions; that Banks had fallen back to Strasbut he could not safely abandon it in burg. Being joined near Newmarket broad daylight, and so decided to re- by Ewell's division, he moved via main. Some desultory skirmishing Luray upon Front Royal, keeping and cannonading followed; until, at his advance carefully masked by 3 P. M., upon information that the Ashby's cavalry, so that he swooped Rebels were trying to plant a bat- down almost unannounced on our tery on the mountain, where it would small force holding that position, command our whole encampment, under Col. John R. Kenly, who Schenck directed Milroy, with the nevertheless made a spirited resist3d Virginia, 25th, 32d, and 82d ance, but was soon driven out with Ohio, numbering a little over 2,000 loss by the enemy's overwhelming men, to advance and feel of the ene- numbers. Kenly, after abandoning my. Led by Col. N. C. McLean, of the town, attempted to make a stand the 75th Ohio, they charged up the on a ridge scarcely a mile in its rear; mountain with great gallantry, defy- but, his force being hardly a tenth of ing the fire of a superior force, whose that assailing him, he was soon comheads only were visible, and were pelled to retreat across the river, after engaged at close range for an hour destroying his camp and stores. He and a half, during which an attempt tried to burn the bridge over the was made to turn the Rebel right, North Fork of the Shenandoah, but but repulsed. The fight did not the Rebels were upon him and extinwholly cease till 8 P. M., when our guished the flames. A few miles men were withdrawn by order, farther on, he was overtaken by the bringing in their dead and wounded, Rebel cavalry under Ashby and taking 4 prisoners and reporting but Flournoy, and a fight ensued, in which Col. K. was severely wounded, | town-a report soon confirmed by a his train captured, and his command disorderly rush of fugitives and nearly destroyed. Fully 700 prisoners, a section of rifled 10-pounders, and a large amount of stores, were among the trophies of this Rebel triumph. Our men fought nobly; but they were 900 against 8,000. Gen. Banks remained quiet and unsuspecting at Strasburg, with no enemy in his front, and no sign of danger, until the evening of the 23d, when he was astounded by tidings of Kenly's disaster, and assurances that the Rebels, 15,000 to 20,000 strong, were pressing forward to Winchester, directly in his rear. Shields's division having been sent, by order from Washington, to the Rappahannock, he had hardly 5,000 men at hand, with perhaps 2,000 or 3,000 more scattered through the Valley in his rear. Jackson's force must have exceeded 20,000 men." Banks had, on the first tidings of trouble at Front Royal, dispatched a small force to the aid of Kenly; but this was now recalled, and our trains sent forward on the road to Winchester, escorted by Gen. Hatch, with our cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery. At 9 A. M. our column was in motion, and had hardly proceeded three miles when it was apprised that the train had been attacked, and that the Rebels held the road at Middle 60 59 Lt.-Gen. Jackson, in his official report, says: "My command at this time embraced Ashby's cavalry; the 1st brigade, under Gen. Winder; the 2d brigade, Col. Campbell commanding; 3d brigade, Col. Fulkerson commanding; the troops recently under command of Brig.-Gen. Edward Johnson; and the division of Gen. Ewell, comprising the brigades of Gens. Elzey, Taylor, Trimble, and the Maryland Line, consisting of the 1st Maryland regiment and Brockenbrough's battery, under Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Stewart, and the 2d and 6th Virginia cavalry, under Col. Flournoy." wagons to the rear. The column was thereupon reorganized, with the train in the rear; and, on reaching Middletown, Col. D. Donnelly, commanding the vanguard, encountered a small force of Rebels, who were easily repulsed and driven back on the road to Front Royal. Col. Brodhead, 1st Michigan cavalry, now took the advance, and soon reported the road clear to Winchester. Before all our army had passed, the Rebels advanced on the Front Royal road in such force as to occupy Middletown, compelling our rear-guard to fall back to Strasburg, making a circuit thence to the north, whereby the 1st Vermont, Col. Tompkins, was enabled to rejoin Banks at Winchester in season for the fight of next morning; while the 5th New York, Col. De Forrest, made its way through the mountains to the Potomac, bringing in a train of 32 wagons and many stragglers. There was some fighting with our rear-guard at Strasburg, and again at Newtown, eight miles from Winchester; but our men retreated with moderate loss, and our infantry and artillery were again. concentrated at Winchester by midnight. Here they were allowed a rest of two or three hours, broken at brief intervals by the rattle of mus On our side, Brig.-Gen. Gordon, in his official report, says: "From the testimony of our signal officers, and from a fair estimate of the number in Rebel lines drawn up on the hights, from fugitives and deserters, the number of regiments in the Rebel army opposite Winchester was 28, being Ewell's division, Jackson's and Johnson's forces; the whole being commanded by Gen. Jackson. These regiments were full, and could not have numbered less than 22,000 men, with a corresponding proportion of artillery." 6o May 24. |