tion in the event of an actual irruption of barbarians or infidels, as when Frederic II. repulsed the Moguls, or Charles V. scared the Ottomans under the great Solyman; but for aggressive enterprise in distant regions they were no longer available. The writings of Eneas Sylvius-one of the earliest statesmen who surveyed the several Powers of Europe in connection with each other-give an intelligible picture of the condition of affairs at this period. The fall of Constantinople had excited some sympathies, but more selfishness. A certain commiseration, quickened by the refugees dispersed over the countries of the West, was felt for the exiled Greeks; but a far more lively sentiment was excited by the demonstrations of the triumphant Ottoman against the Italian peninsula. So reasonable were the apprehensions on this head made to appear, that within twelve months of the capture of the city, war was actually declared against the new Empire of the East in the Frankfort Diet; and, five years later, it was formally resolved at the Congress of Mantua, that 50,000 confederate soldiers should be equipped for the expulsion of the infidel, and the conclusive deliverance of Christendom. Neither of these designs, however, proceeded beyond the original menace; and the Turks were left in undisputed possession of their noble spoil. Between this turning point of Turkish destinies, and the new epoch to which we must now direct our attention, there intervened a period of great general interest, and of remarkable importance to the Ottoman Empire-but not inducing any material changes in the relations of this Power with Western Europe. The avowed designs of Mahomet II. upon the capital of Christendom, illustrated as they were by his attitude on the Danube and his actual lodgment at Otranto, were not indeed without their influence, as was shown by the multitude of volunteers who flocked to the standard of the intrepid Hunniades. But when the idea of Ottoman invincibility had been corrected by the victories of the Allies at Belgrade, by the successful defiance of Scanderbeg, and by the triumphant resistance of the Knights of Rhodes, this restlessness soon subsided, and the course of events became presently such as to substitute new objects of concern in European counsels for the power and progress of the Turks. Perhaps the wild and indefinite projects of Charles VIII., in that gigantic national foray upon Italy which disorganized the media val constitution of Europe, may be taken as a fair representation of the ideas prevailing respecting Constantinople, thirty years after the fall of the city. If the forces of France and Spain, instead of contending in deadly struggles for the possession of Italy, had been combined against a common enemy upon the Hellespont, it is certainly possible that something might have been achieved. The great Gonzalvo did, indeed, once appear upon the scene as an ally of the Venetians, and with an effect proportionate to his reputation. But in computing the chances of any such enterprise, it must be remembered that the Turks had hitherto achieved their conquests, not by mere force of numbers, like the Tartar hordes, but by superiority of discipline, tactics, equipments, and science. In this respect, at least, they were no barbarians. Their army was incomparably the strongest in Europe, and especially in those departments which indicate the highest military excellence. For many years afterward, their artillery and engineers surpassed those of the best appointed European troops. These advantages would have told with tenfold effect from such ramparts as those of Constantinople, while nothing, on the other hand, short of a recapture of the city, and a complete dislodgment of the intruders, could have effected the objects of the Christian Powers. Above all, it should be recollected, what was so clearly proved in the sequel, that these powers could not then be relied on for any steadiness of concert, or any integrity of purpose; and that the religious zeal of former days was certainly not now in sufficient strength to furnish an extraordinary bond of union. The Turks were no longer politically regarded as the common foes, either of the human race or the Christian name. Already had the ordinary transactions of bargains and contracts become familiar between them and the Venetians; dealings of a more degrading kind had compromised the Papal See, and the Ottoman arms had in various expeditions been repeatedly aided by small Christian succors. It is related, indeed, that high pay and liberal encouragement attracted recruits from all countries to the Turkish ranks; nor is there, we believe, much reason to doubt that many an European Dalgetty was serving under the standard of the Prophet. The number of renegade vizirs and pashas that have figured in the Turkish service is something extraordinary. To these considerations must be added the fact, that during the seventy years thus interposed between the capture of Constanti nople and the accession of the Great Solyman, the designs of Ottoman ambition had but others, of no inferior interest, remain yet to be noticed. been diverted from the North and West to | the East and South-from the shores of the Adriatic and the Danube to the defiles of In the month of February, 1536, the naArmenia and the plains of Cairo. Though tions of Europe were scandalized-we may the supremacy of the Turks was, it is true, still employ the expression-with the intellisteadily supported on the scene of its recent gence that a treaty of amity and concord had triumphs, and even unusually signalized on been struck, between the Grand Seignior of the waters of the Archipelago, yet the chief the Turks and the first king of the Christian efforts of the two immediate successors of world! At an earlier period, Francis I. of Mahomet were concentrated upon the terri- France had not hesitated to enter into one of tories of Persia and Egypt. It does not en- those nominal leagues against the Turk, ter into our present plan to discuss the inter- which decency was still thought occasionally esting results with which these efforts were to dictate, and of which it was the immediate attended. We need only remark, that while interest of Charles V. to perpetuate the the overthrow of the Mameluke dynasty and spirit. But the ease and readiness with the conquest (in 1516) of the kingdom of which these considerations were now subor Egypt, compensated for the less productive dinated to the very first suggestions of pracinvasions of the Persian provinces, the two tical policy, furnish edifying matter of obserobjects together combined to divert the at- vation. The political system of European tention of the Sultans from Europe, and to States-that is to say, the system in pursususpend, for an interval, the apprehensions ance of which a reciprocal relationship is of Christendom. Looking back, therefore, established between the several members of for a moment from the point which we have the community for the preservation of a gennow attained, we can see that the first rise eral equilibrium-was then in process of forof the Ottoman power occurred at such a mation; and a more curious example of its period and under such circumstances as to tendencies could hardly be given than this deprive the phenomenon of any great singu- which we are now attempting to represent, larity or terror; that even the passage of the in which the single idea contained in the Turks into Europe, their appearance on the term "balance of power" sufficed, first, to inDanube, and the permanent investment of troduce an infidel State into the company of Constantinople which virtually ensued, exer- Christian sovereigns; secondly, to bring aid cised no proportionate influence on the opin- and countenance to that State in its very ag ions of Western Europe, wearied as it wasgressions; and, lastly, when the course of with crusades, and detached as it had long practically been from any civil or religious intercourse with the Greeks of the Lower Empire; and that the Ottoman invaders thus finally stepped without material opposition into an imperial inheritance,--which supplied them opportunely and in full perfection with what they most needed for the consolidation of their conquests-a local habitation and a recognized name among the Powers of Europe. But for the occupation of Constantinople, the dominion of the Ottomans might possibly have been little more durable than the dominion of the Horde on the Don. Lastly, we may remark, that the power of resistance to further aggression developed at Belgrade, and exemplified by the evacuation of Otranto, contributed, in connection with the diversion of Turkish conquests to other quarters of the globe, to reassure the kingdoms of the West; and to prepare the way for the eventual admission of a Mahometan Power into the political community of Christian States. Some of the earlier causes conducive to this remarkable consummation we have already pointed out; events had hastened the premature hour of its decline, to protect its weakness, to assert its cause against even Christian adversaries, and to guarantee it, long, apparently, beyond the proper term, in a political and national existence. The system of which we have been speaking, took its rise, or, at least, assumed its first practical developments, from the rivalry be tween France and Spain. The aggrandizement and consolidation which each of these kingdoms, though in an unequal degree, had recently attained, constituted them "the two crowns of Christendom. The antagonism naturally ensuing between Powers thus situated, soon drew the other States of Europe into its sphere of action. This rivalry had been first exemplified in the Italian wars which followed upon the expedition of Charles VIII., and it was continued entirely in the spirit which that extraordinary enterprise had generated. The contested supremacy was for many years conceived to be represented by the possession of Italy; and the innumerable permutations of alliances which had been witnessed in the wars referred to, suggested all the requisite ideas of State-joyed by the Christian traffickers had been combinations. Whether it can be strictly judiciously confirmed and augmented. These said that, in these early transactions, regard antecedents were turned to account by Franwas really had to that equitable adjustment cis, who based upon them a proposal for a of power which became, subsequently, the general commercial treaty between France avowed object of similar struggles, may be and the Porte.* The instrument, it is true, reasonably doubted; but at all events, Euro- did not stipulate any alliance for offence or pean States now first began to group them- defence; but the assurances of amity now selves about two centres; and both parties ostentatiously interchanged, were sufficiently anxiously cast about for means of circum- indicative of the point to which matters were scribing the resources of their adversary or tending; and within a few months, the cor enlarging their own. It was no more than a sair subjects of the Porte were actually let natural result of such a condition of things, loose upon the Neapolitan possessions of the that the causes which had hitherto operated Catholic king! in promoting hostilities or friendship between States, should be superseded by more absorbing considerations of present policy; and it will be seen, accordingly, that though religious differences were still capable of originating wars, yet no material obstacle was found in diversity of creeds to the establishment of cordial and permanent alliances. In the Thirty Years' War, for instance, though the dispute lay ostensibly between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant constituencies of the Empire, yet the paramount object of the aggressive belligerents was the depression of the House of Austria; and in this good cause, the Popish troops of France, at the instigation of a cardinal minister, fought shoulder to shoulder with the parti-colored Protestants of Germany and Sweden. It was in such a state of affairs and opinion, that Francis I. turned his eyes toward the Porte. Solyman the Great, who in 1520 had ascended the Turkish throne, had again directed the Ottoman arms to European conquests and with a success surpassing the boldest achievements of his victorious predecessors. But these events, which a century before might have struck all Christian capitals with indignation and alarm, were now only looked upon as so many inducements to a political alliance. Francis saw in Solyman, not the conqueror of Rhodes and the wouldbe subjugator of Christendom, but the monarch of a mighty State availably situated for active diversion, and already at feud with his deadly enemy. That the Ottoman Sultan should have invested Vienna, and openly advanced pretensions to the supremacy claimed by Charles, were circumstances only additionally suggestive of the projected treaty. His resolution was taken accordingly. There had long been certain relations of trade and amity between French merchants and the Mameluke Soldans of Egypt; and when this country fell, as we have stated, under the dominion of the Turks, the privileges en Such was the first formal recognition of the Ottoman dynasty of Constantinople. Truces and treaties had, of course, been previously concluded between the Porte and its enemies; but this was the earliest instance of an amicable and gratuitous alliance; and it is worth observing, that so early did it occur, as to make the admission of a Mahometan Power into the community of Christian States contemporaneous with the very first and rudimentary combinations of these States among each other. That it was considered a step out of the common course of politics, and that it created, even in impartial quarters, some scandal, we can easily perceive; but not more, perhaps, than had been occasioned by the previous overtures of the same unscrupulous monarch to the Protestants of Smalcald. It is a significant indication, too, of the temper of the times, that the treaty was negotiated at Constantinople by a knight of St. John-and that it contained a special provision for the admission of the Pope to the league! Still, there was really, as we have said, some scandal; and it needed in fact a concurrence of conditions to bring about so strange an innovation as the political naturalization of the Turk among the States of Christendom. Some of these conditions are in the highest degree curious and interesting. In the first place, since the period when we left the Ottomans on their way toward Egypt and Persia, the Reformation of religion in Europe had been successfully carried out. This mighty event exercised a twofold influence upon the relationship between the Christian Powers and the Papal See. the one hand, by subtracting so many States On * What a benefit to History, if the National press of other countries was as usefully employed as that of France, in publications resembling the one, which we have placed at the head of our present Article. Is nobody engaged upon a translation of Von Hammer's Ottoman Empire?' which we have alluded, gave to its deportment the genuine impress of barbaric pride. The Emperor of the Ottomans carried himself as a sovereign immeasurably exalted above all the monarchs of the West-especially above those with whom he was brought into immediate contact. The view taken by Solyman of the overtures of Francis I. may be collected from his haughty boast, that in his shadow the kings of France, Poland, Venice, and Transylvania had been fain to seek refuge. The first Austrian ambassador de from the supremacy of the Pope, and weakening, in direct proportion, his authoritative power, it dislocated and neutralized the influence of that particular court, from which all combinations against the misbelievers had previously received their warrant and organization. No crusade could be maintained without the auspices of a Pope; and upon the good-will and services of this potentate more urgent and impressive claims were now preferred. But a few years before, indeed, the Pontiff had been besieged and imprisoned in his own city, not by the fierce Mahome-spatched to the Sublime Porte was sternly tans, who once threatened such an attack, and at the echo of whose arms on Italian territory a former Pope had actually prepared to retreat beyond the Alps, but by the sworn foes of these intruders-the troops, on whose protection against such contingencies the powerless Romans had been heretofore taught to rely. The time had past when the most deadly antagonist of the Pope was necessarily the Turk, and with it had gone all opportunity for the moral or material organization of an actual crusade. On the other hand, the support derivable for such purposes from popular opinion was diminished in a corresponding degree by the operation of the same events. A new object had been found for the combative propensities of fanaticism or zeal. In the religious wars of these times, "heretic " was substituted for "infidel," and the enthusiasm or animosity which in former days might have been directed against the encroachments of the Turk, were now furnished with sufficient occupation by the fatal divisions of Christendom itself. These causes, co-operating with a visible and settled repugnance to distant crusades, with the distractions arising from domestic vicissitudes, and with the indifference to alarming phenomena which familiarity ultimately brings on, may be taken perhaps as explanatory of that course of events which at length not only established the House of Othman upon the throne of the Cæsars, but gave it a title and place in the courts and councils of Europe. It was not, however, under any ordinary aspect that this diplomatic debut was solemnized. The Ottoman Porte made its entry into the European system with all the appliances of glory, grandeur, and triumph. Not only was it a first-rate Power, but, excepting the yet scarcely manageable resources of Imperial Germany, it was the strongest Power which could take the field. This consciousness of strength, combined with that orthodox insolence and heritage of pretensions :> rebuked for applying a majestic epithet to his own master, and was thrown contemptuously into prison. Indeed, for a long subsequent period, the Oriental arrogance of Turkish sultans withheld from the representatives of foreign Powers those honorable immunities which in the intercourse of civilized nations is ever attached to their office; and the personal liberties of the diplomatic body in the vicinity of the Seven Towers were proverbially insecure. Meanwhile, it is affirmed, by no less competent authority than that of Azuni, that on general international questions, Turkey has at all times set an example of moderation to the more civilized governments of Europe. Sketching, now, a broad outline of the position of Turkey between this time and a period which we may fix at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War, we might say that the idea of the " "Infidels had, from various causes, virtually disappeared; and that if the Porte was on other than acceptable terms with the courts of Christendom, the difference was not owing to its national faith. By the States engaged in hostilities with it, it was regarded as neither more nor less than an ordinary enemy; nor would we undertake to prove that Hungary* had much greater repugnance to a Turkish than to an Austrian master. The States removed from occasions of collision with the Porte were positively amicable-submitting to certain barbaric assumptions in consideration of commercial advantages. France had led the way from motives already explained; Venice, which in mercantile compacts had been already in the field, promptly followed; and England's first ambassador departed from the court of Elizabeth. His reception, curiously enough, was not unopposed. Previously, our few negoti ations with the Porte had been transacted through the representatives of the States already accredited there; and neither Venice * Ed. Rev. vol. 1. p. 454-5. dinand, thus strengthened, succeeded in incorporating the elective crown of Hungary with the already aggrandized inheritance of his family. From this consolidation of dominion flowed two results of signal impor nor France was disposed to forego the prerogative of mediation, or to welcome a new competitor on the scene. The objections, however, were overruled, and the Ottoman Porte was declared open to all. In 1606 the United States despatched also their en-tance to the subject we are now considering. voy to Constantinople. And thus, either the suggestions of policy, or the temptations of trade, had collected the representatives of Christendom about the Turkish Sultan, at as early a period as could be reasonably anticipated from the temper of the government, and the distance of the scene. The influence directly exerted at this period by Turkey upon Western Europe was not, indeed, remarkable; though there are two points connected with it which deserve to be recorded. The incessant attacks of the Ottomans along the Danube and the Theiss, created in Germany such a sense of insecurity as had not been felt since the irruptions of the Moguls; and it became indeed evident that the protection of the Empire under such new frontier relations could not be entrusted to a distant or non-resident sovereign. It was true that the front recently shown by Charles V. to Solyman proved that the armies of the East could be over-matched, on emergencies, by the forces of the West; but these forces could be mustered only by such desperate appeals, and after such difficulties, that they supplied but an uncertain resource against the perils constantly impending from the ambition or ferocity of the Sultan. Even on the occasion alluded to, the Mahometans were in the very heart of Styria, before the strength of the Empire could be collected for the deliverance of Germany. These obvious considerations, though they had less weight than might have been anticipated with the Imperial States, who apprehended more danger to their liberties from the House of Hapsburgh than from the House of Othman, did induce Charles so far to modify his own schemes as to partition the reversion of his possessions, and to bespeak the Imperial crown for his brother Ferdinand, instead of his son Philip. His exertions secured a settlement which he afterward vainly tried to cancel. Ferdinand was elected King of the Romans; and thus the substitution of the formidable Ottoman for the degenerate Greek in the halls of Constantinople, was the means of settling the crown of the Empire in a German instead of a Spanish House-and of laying the broad foundation of the great monarchy of Austria. The event, too, produced its reaction on the fortunes of Turkey; for Fer Not only was a State created of sufficient magnitude to resist the aggressions of the Turk, but this rival empire became actually conterminous with the Ottoman dominions. Prague, Buda, and Vienna were now capitals of the same kingdom; a blow struck at Zeuta was felt at Frankfort; and thus, instead of the uncertain resistance dictated by the fitful and erratic impulses of Hungarian cavaliers, a steady force was organized and arrayed against the Turk, and the majesty and strength of Imperial Christendom was brought bodily on his borders. It is with no wish to disparage the national character of Hungary that we here acknowledge our doubts whether this kingdom of itself either served or could have served as that "bulwark of Christendom which it has been often denominated. We think, indeed, that after an impartial review of the annals of this period, it will be difficult to escape the conclusion that, but for its practical identification with the Germanic Empire, it would probably have become, and perhaps have remained, a dependency of the misbelievers. Even as it was, it should be remembered that Buda was Turkish for almost as long a period as Gibraltar has been English; while, as regards any active or inveterate antagonism on the score of religion, we find little ground for concluding that the inhabitants of Hungary would have shown more tenacity than the population of Wallachia or Moldavia. The personal prowess and brilliant successes of Hunniades and Matthias Corvinus were mainly instrumental, no doubt, in stemming the first torrent of Ottoman conquest; but though the flower of the armies which encountered the Moslem on the Danube were usually supplied from the chivalry of Hungary, it is impossible not to trace the ultimate transfer of ascendency, to those events which established a mutual assurance among all the kingdoms between the Vistula and the Rhine. The second of the points to which we alluded as notably exemplifying the influence of Turkey upon Christendom was the establishment, on the coast of Barbary, of those anomalous piratical States which have only within our own generation become extinct. From the earliest development of their national strength, the Turks have always expe |