In acknowledging the receipt of Mr. Adams's note respecting the Hercules, Earl Russell wrote as follows: 1 Earl Russell to Mr. Adams. FOREIGN OFFICE, February 8, 1865. SIR: I have recived your letter dated the 7th instant, and delivered at the Foreign Office at a late hour yesterday evening after the close of business; but not being marked immediate, it did not come under the notice of the under-secretary of state until 1 p. m. to-day. The matter shall be immediately attended to, but, in the mean time, I wish to call your attention to the dates of the letters which you inclose. The first letter of the United States consul at Liverpool is dated the 2d instant, and affirms that a steamer named the Hercules is fitting out in the Clyde for the confederate service, and that this vessel is to be ready for sea in eight days. The second letter which you transmit to me is dated Glasgow, the 4th instant, and contains further information respecting this vessel, and states, moreover, that the trial trip is to take place to-day. In a former instance I was able by means of the lord advocate to prosecute the owners of a vessel building in the Clyde, and to get a verdict entered by consent, which defeated the purpose of the confederate agent. But these operations are very quick, and unless I have timely notice I can have but little hopes of stopping these nefarious transactions. I have, &c., RUSSELL. The attention of the government had been directed to the Amphion and Hawk, and inquiry made respecting them, before the receipt of any representation from Mr. Adams concerning those vessels. A vessel called the Ajax, as to which no representation had been made or information furnished, but which was suspected by some of her crew of being intended for the confederate service, was examined and searched by the officers of customs at Queenstown, and afterward, under instructions from the government, by the colonial authorities at Nassau.2 She was not, however, found to be adapted or intended for warlike use, and was never applied to such use. In sending information to Mr. Adams respecting the Virginia, Mr. Dudley, in a letter dated the 27th January, 1865, wrote as follows: 3 Like the Sea King, any steamer now destined for privateering fits away as a commercial vessel, and there is nothing about her movement before she leaves port, or until within a few hours of her leaving, when she may suddenly change owners, and her master be given authority to sell at a given sum out of British waters, to create any mistrust of the purpose of those who control her here. Under such a mode of operations it is next to impossible for us to get testimony in season, and sufficiently strong, to ask for their detention. The only course left me, therefore, is to call your attention to all cases offering any reasonable ground of suspicion, and leave them to be disposed of as you may deem most expedient. SUMMARY, The preceding statement of facts shows the general course of conduct pursued by Her Britannic Majesty's government, in relation to vessels alleged to be, or suspected of being, fitted out or prepared within British territory for belligerent use. It includes all the cases (except those of the Florida and Alabama, which will be presently stated) in which information that any vessel was being built, equipped, or prepared for sea in any British port, and intended, or supposed to be intended, for warlike use, was received by, or came to the knowledge of, Her Majesty's government before the departure of such vessel. It will have been seen 1. That in every case directions were given, without the least delay, for investigation and inquiry on the spot by the proper officers of gov 'Appendix,vol. ii, p. 582. 3 Ibid., p. 596. ernment; and these officers were ordered to keep a watchful eye on the suspected vessel; and the directions and orders so given were executed. 2. That in some cases the attention of the government had been [47] directed, before the receipt of any communication from Mr. Adams, to vessels as to which there appeared to be ground for suspicion. 3. That as soon as any evidence was obtained it was submitted, without delay, to the law-officers of the Crown; and they were called upon to advise as to the proper course of proceeding. 4. That in every case in which reasonable evidence could be obtained the vessel was seized by the officers of the government, and proceedings were instituted against her in the proper court of law. By reasonable evidence is understood testimony which, though not conclusive, offered nevertheless a reasonable prospect that the government might be able, when the time for trying the case should arrive, to sustain the seizure in a court of law. 5. That in several of the cases in which a seizure was made the government found itself unable, or uncertain whether it would be able, to sustain the seizure by sufficient evidence, and was under the necessity of either releasing the vessel and paying the costs of the trial and detention, or of purchasing her at the public expense. 6. That in every one of the cases enumerated either the information furnished to the government proved to be erroneous, and the supposed indicia of an unlawful intention to be absent or deceptive, or this intention was defeated or abandoned by reason of the measures taken and the vigilance exercised by Her Majesty's government. 7. That it is easy to infer special adaptation for war from peculiarities or supposed peculiarities of construction which are really equivocal; and such inferences are liable to be fallacious, especially in cases where the vessel is constructed with a view to some employment which, though commercial, is out of the ordinary course of commerce. CASE OF THE ANGLO-CHINESE FLOTILLA. The steady determination of Her Britannic Majesty's government to guard against any act or occurrence which might be supposed to cast a doubt on its neutrality, and its readiness even to go beyond, for this purpose, the strict measure of its international obligations, were exemplified in the case of the iron-clad rams, and were even more strikingly shown in that of the flotilla of gun-boats equipped for service in China. In March, 1862, the Chinese government gave authority to Mr. Lay, inspector general of Chinese customs, then on leave in England, to purchase and equip a steam-fleet for the Emperor's service;1 and a sum of money was placed at his disposal for the purpose. Mr. Lay accordingly entered into an agreement with Captain Sherard Osborn, an officer in Her Majesty's navy, according to which the latter was to take command-in-chief of the fleet, receiving orders from the Chinese government through Mr. Lay. Her Majesty's government, by orders in council, gave permission to enlist officers and men for this service. In September, 1863, Captain Sherard Osborn arrived in China with the flotilla, consisting of six vessels of war. These were the Pekin, China, and Keang-soo, of six guns each, the Kwangtung and Tien-tsin of four guns, and the Amoy of two, the Thule yacht, and the Ballarat store-ship. 'Appendix, vol. ii, p. 681. A difference, however, arose between the Chinese government on the one side, and Mr. Lay and Captain Osborn on the other, as to the conditions on which Captain Osborn was to hold his command; and, this difference not having been adjusted, Captain Osborn informed Sir F. Bruce, Her Majesty's minister at Pekin, that the force would be disbanded. He asked at the same time whether Sir F. Bruce saw any objection to his surrendering to the Chinese government the eight ships which he had brought out.1 Sir F. Bruce thereupon informed the Chinese government and Captain Osborn of his conviction that Her Majesty's government would not have consented to the organization of this powerful squadron, unless on the understanding that it was to be placed under the orders of an officer in whose prudence and high character they had full confidence, and that he could not consent to the ships and stores being handed over to the Chinese government without instructions to that effect from Her Majesty's government.1 Among other reasons for this course Sir F. Bruce reported to Her Majesty's government that the ships were not such as the Chinese could manage, and that it would not be safe to sell them on the coast, as they might fall into the hands of hostile daimios in Japan, or be bought for employment as confederate cruisers in those seas.2 The following letter from the United States minister at Pekin to Sir F. Bruce shows that he was equally alive to the latter danger : Mr. Burlingame to Sir F. Bruce.3 PEKIN, November 7, 1833. SIR: When the Chinese government refused the doings of its agent, Mr. Lay, and there was nothing left for Captain Osborn but to dissolve the force of the flotilla, the question was how it could be done with safety. I feared that the ships might fall into the hands of the confederates, who are supposed to have agents in China; and then there was the common apprehension from lawless men on the coast in the interest of the Taepings as well as from pirates, and the desire of the daimios in Japan to procure steamers at any price. It was clear that the Chinese could do nothing of themselves with the steamers, and that, unless something were done by you, they would certainly fall a prey to one of these several dangers. In my solicitude on account of the rebels in my own country, I made an earnest protest against the delivery of the ships to the Chinese. You responded, in that spirit of comity which has ever distinguished our relations, that the ships should be taken back to England, and that no effort on your part should be spared to prevent them from taking a direction against the interests of my country. Though subsequent events made it necessary for the ships to take the direction indicated by the desire of the Chinese themselves, still I should be wanting in appreciation of your conduct did I not mark it with my most heartfelt thanks, and at as early a period as possible bring it to the attention of my Government. I have, &c., A. BURLINGAME. It was eventually arranged that Captain Osborn should send part of the flotilla to England, take the other portion to Bombay, and sell them all on account of the Chinese government. Captain Osborn accordingly took three vessels, the Keangsoo, (6 guns,) Kwangtung, (4 guns,) and Amoy, (2 guns,) and the dispatchboat Thule, to Bombay, where he arrived in January, 1864. At his request the government of India took charge of the vessels and the military stores on board of them, and he then proceeded to England, where he arrived in February. The rest of the flotilla, consisting of the 1 Appendix, vol. ii, p. (82. 3 Ibid., p. 689. Pekin and China, (6 guns,) the Tien-tsin, (4 guns,) and the Ballarat store-ship, were sent to England, where they arrived in April.1 On the first intelligence of the arrangement made with the Chinese government for disposing of these vessels in India and England, a letter was addressed by the Foreign Office to the admiralty, India Office, and Colonial Office, stating that the "vessels are understood to be fully equipped for belligerent purposes, and Her Majesty's government are of opinion that it is incumbent upon them to take any precaution that may legally be within their power to prevent them from passing in their present state into the hands of any power or state engaged in hostility .. with another power or state in amity with Her Majesty." It was therefore desired "that the attention of the naval, colonial, or Indian authorities, both at home and on any station abroad within Her Majesty's dominions, where the vessels may be expected to be met with, should be called to the necessity of taking such measures as may be legally within their power in furtherance of the views of Her Majesty's government in this matter; and specifically as regards Captain Ösborn, who is an officer in Her Majesty's naval service, that he should be pointedly cautioned against disposing of any of the vessels to be used in the naval service of a belligerent power." Sir F. Bruce, at Pekin, and Sir H. Parkes, at Shanghai, were instructed to make a similar communication to Captain Osborn, in case that officer was still in China when the dispatch reached them. In anticipation of these instructions Commodore Montresor had warned Captain Osborn on his arrival at Bombay against selling the vessels, and had joined with the governor in remonstrating against any attempt to sell the Thule, which, as being an unarmed dispatch-boat, did not, in Captain Osborn's opinion, come within the same category as the armed vessels, but which the two former officers considered open to objection, as having been equipped for naval service, and capable of being adapted in some degree to belligerent purposes.3 The Thule was, notwithstanding, advertised for sale in Bombay on the 16th February, after Captain Osborn's departure; but the government of Bombay forbade the sale. Orders were sent from home in April to permit the sale of the Thule, but to retain the other vessels. Care was also to be taken that the Thule was not equipped as a vessel of war for either of the belligerent parties in America.* 49. The sale, however, did not take place. *The three armed vessels sent to England arrived in April, and were moored in Woolwich dock-yard. The Ballarat, being merely a store-ship, did not come under the custody of the government, and was sold. The admiralty refused to purchase the vessels for the government; and it was settled that they should be placed at moorings in the Med. way, and there retained until the objections to their sale might be removed, and that any expenses incurred by this course should be defrayed by Her Majesty's government.5 In the meanwhile Captain Osborn, learning that it was not the intention of the government to purchase the vessels left in charge of the Bombay authorities, wrote to ask permission to relieve himself of all responsibility, by substituting a mercantile firm at Bombay as the agents to carry out Sir Frederick Bruce's instructions for the sale of the vessels on account of the Chinese government.5 The matter was referred to the law-officers, who reported that the sale Appendix, vol. ii, p. 700. Ibid., p. 684. 3 Ibid., p. 695. 4 Ibid., p. 700, 704. 5 Ibid., p. 701. within Her Majesty's dominions, even to a belligerent power, of armed ships of war, already legally equipped with a view to a different object under Her Majesty's license, would not be illegal. The foreign enlistment act did not, in their opinion, prohibit such a sale. Her Majesty's government had therefore two alternatives. It might, on the one hand, inform Captain Osborn that it did not interpose any objection to his selling the vessels to any person or in any way that he might think fit; such sale (provided no addition were made to their equipments or furniture, before delivery to the purchaser, for the purposes of any belligerent power) being in no way contrary to law. If, on the other hand, the government were not prepared to take this course, it was morally bound to take upon itself the responsibility from which Captain Osborn desired to be freed. Captain Osborn, the admiralty, and India Office were thereupon apprised that Her Majesty's government could not at present sanction the sale of the vessels in India, but was prepared to take on itself the responsibility of detaining the vessels in question unsold until further orders. A similar communication was made to the Chinese government, through Sir F. Bruce, with the assurance that the Chinese government should not ultimately lose the value of the vessels.1 An offer was made in December, 1864, by Messrs. Ritherdon & Thompson, to purchase the three vessels in England on behalf of a foreign government. They were informed that a written guarantee would be required from the representative of the power for whom the vessels might be purchased, that they would not be used for warlike purposes against any power with whom the Queen was at peace, and that the government reserved to itself the right of refusing, without giving any reason, to sell the vessels when the name of the principal in the transaction should be disclosed. The negotiation was dropped. Overtures were also made in 1865 by Messrs. Bake & Co. to buy the vessels for the government of Mexico, but these also failed. A committee appointed to assess the value of the vessels at the time they left China valued them, with the concurrence of Captain Osborn, at £152,500, and Mr. Wade was instructed to inform the Chinese government that the admiralty would be intrusted with the sale of them, that the amount realized would be transmitted to the Chinese government, and any loss upon the original value of the ships would be made good by Her Majesty's government. The admiralty was at the same time again cautioned against the sale of the vessels either directly or indirectly to any state or body of persons at war with a State in amity with Her Majesty.3 In June, 1865, the civil war in America having come to an end, the restrictions on the sale of the vessels were withdrawn; but, from the delay and consequent deterioration, the price realized fell far short of the original estimate. The government of Egypt purchased the three vessels in England for £30,100. Of the four vessels left at Bombay, the government of India purchased two for £14,500, from which, however, a sum of £6,376 had to be deducted for dock-yard expenses. A sum of £11,250 was realized by the sale of the two remaining vessels; and the balance of £103,026 was provided by a parliamentary grant, and paid over to the Chinese government.* The guns and munitions of war on board the vessels had been procured from Her Majesty's government, and they were taken back by the Appendix, vol. ii, p. 704. 2 Ibid., p. 710. 3 Ibid., + Ibid., pp. |