7. Logic and dispute have

much contributed to this.

8. Calling it subtilty.

9. This learning very little

benefits society.

10. But destroys the instru

ments of knowledge and

communication.

11. As useful as to confound

the sound of the letters.

12. This art has perplexed re-

ligion and justice.

13. And ought not to pass

for learning.

14. Fourthly, taking them for

things.

15. Instance in matter.

16. Thismakeserrourslasting.

17. Fifthly, setting them for

what they cannot signify.

18. V.g. putting them for the

real essences ofsubstances.

19. Hence we think every

change of our idea in sub

stances, not to change the
species.

20. The cause of this abuse, a
supposition of nature's
workingalwaysregularly.
21. This abuse contains two
false suppositions.

22. Sixthly, a supposition that
words have a certain and
evident signification.
23. The ends of language:
first, to convey our ideas.
24. Secondly, to do it with
quickness.

25. Thirdly, therewith to

convey the knowledge of

things.

26-31. How men's words fail in

all these.

32. How in substances.

33. How in modes and rela

tions.

34-Seventhly, figurativespeech

also an abuse of language.

CHA P. XI.

Of the remedies of the foregoing

imperfections and abuses.

SECT.

1. They are worth seeking.

2. Are not easy.

3. But yet necessary to phi-

losophy.

4. Misuse of words, the cause

of great errours.

5. Obftinacy.

6. And wrangling.

7. Instance, bat and bird.

8. First remedy, to use no

word without an idea.

9. Secondly, to have distinct

ideas annexed to them in

modes.

10. And distinct and con-

formable in substances.

11. Thirdly, propriety.

12. Fourthly, to make known

their meaning.

13. And that three ways.

14. First,

Of knowledge in general.

SECT.

1. Our knowledge conver-

sant about our ideas.

2. Knowledge is the percep-

tion of the agreement,

or disagreement, of two

ideas.

3. This agreement fourfold.

4. First, of identity, or di-
verfity.

5. Secondly, relation.

6. Thirdly, of co-existence.

7. Fourthly,of realexistence.

8. Knowledge actual or ha-

bitual.

9. Habitualknowledge, two-

fold.

5. Not without precedent

doubt.

6. Not so clear.

7. Each step must have in-

tuitive evidence.

8. Hence the mistake ex præ-
cognitis & præconcessis.

9. Demonstration not limit

ed to quantity.

10-13. Whyit has been so thought

14. Sensitive knowledge of

particular existence.

15. Knowledge not always

clear, where the ideas are

So.

CHA P. III.

Of the extent of human knowledge.

SECT.

1. First, no farther than we

have ideas.

2. Secondly, no farther than

we can perceive their

agreement or disagree-

ment.

3. Thirdly, intuitive know

ledge extends itself not to

all the relations of all our

ideas,

4. Fourthly,

1. What truth is.

2. A right joining, or sepa-

rating of signs, i. e. ideas

or words.

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propositions.

4. Mental propositions are

very hard to be treated of.

5. Being nothing but join-

ing, or separating ideas,

without words.

6. When mental propositions

contain real truth, and

when verbal.

7. Objection against verbal

truth, that thus it may be

all chimerical.

8. Answered, real truth is

about ideas agreeing to

things.

9. Falshood is the joining of

names, otherwise than

their ideas agree.

10. General propositions to be

treated of more at large.

11. Moral and metaphysical

truth.

CHAP. VI.

Of universal propositions, their

truth and certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of words, neces-
sary to knowledge.

2. General truths hardly to
be understood, but in ver-
bal propositions.

3. Certainly two-fold, of

truth, and of knowledge.

4. No proposition can be

known to be true, where

the essence of each species

mentioned, is not known.

5. This more particularly

concerns substances.

6. The truth of few universal

propositions concerning

substances, is to be known.

7. Because, co-existence of

ideas in few cases is to be

known.

8, 9. Instance in gold.

10. As far as any such co-ex-

istence can be known, so

far universal propositions

may be certain. But this

will but a

go

little way,

because,

11, 12. The qualities, which make

our complex ideas of sub-

stances, depend mostly on

external, remote, and un-

perceived causes.

13. Judgment may reach far-

ther, but that is not

knowledge.

14. What is requisite for our
knowledge of substances.

15. Whilst our ideas of sub.

stances contain not their

real constitutions, we can

make but few general,

certain propositions con.-

cerning them.

16. Wherein lies the general

certainty of propositions.

4. First, as to identity and

diversity, all propositions

are equally self-evident.

5. Secondly, in co-existence,

we have few self-evident

propositions.

6. Thirdly, in other relations

we may have.

7. Fourthly, concerning real

existence, we have none.

8. These axioms do not much

influence our other know-

ledge.

9. Because they are not the

truths the first known.

10. Because on them the other

parts of our knowledge
do not depend.
31. What use these general
maxims have.

12. Maxims, if care be not

taken in the use of words,

may prove contradictions.

13. Instance in vacuum.

14. They prove not the exist

ence of things without us.

15. Their application danger-

ous about complex ideas.

16-18. Instance in man.

19. Little use of these maxims,

in proofs, where we have

clear and distinct ideas.

20. Their use dangerous, where

our ideas are confused.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propositions.

SECT.

1. Some propositions bring

no increase to our know.

ledge.

2, 3. As, first, identical propo-
sitions.

4. Secondly, when a part of
any complex idea is pre-
dicated of the whole.
5. As part of the definition
of the term defined.
6. Instance, man and palfry.
7.
For this teaches but the
signification of words.

8. But no real knowledge.

9. General propositions,con-

cerning substances, are

often trifling.

10. And why.

11. Thirdly, using words va-

riously, is trifling with

them.

12. Marks of verbal proposi-

tions. First, predication

in abstract.

13. Secondly, a part of the

definition, predicated of

any term.

CHAP. IX.

Of our knowledge of existence.
SECT.

1. General, certain proposi-

tions concern not exist-

ence.

2. A threefold knowledge of

existence.

3. Our knowledge of our own

existence, is intuitive.

СНАР. Х.

Of the existence of a God.

SECT.

1. We are capable of know-

ing certainly that there is

a God.

2. Man knows that he him.

self is.

3. He knows also, that no-

thing cannot produce a

being, therefore some.

thing eternal.

4. That eternal being must
be most powerful.
5. And most knowing.
6. And therefore God.
7. Our idea of a most perfect
being, not the sole proof
of a. God.

8. Something from eternity.
9. Two sorts of beings, co-
gitative and incogitative.