but this new tendency provides an abundant supply of complex multiples for the organization of a wide and diversified consciousness.

Once more, it is manifest that the power a sensation has of evoking ideas is not yet exhausted, for along with the ideas of sensations which have been grouped together simultaneously heretofore, come ideas of sensations which are external to the group but intimately related to it in the order of succession or following after; for example with the idea of weight in the first group comes the idea of compression which has followed in another, and with the idea of motion in the first comes that of a subsequent motion in the second. Reapplying the test we get the third law of association which stands thus: Whenever phenomena have been experienced or conceived in intimate contiguity one after another their ideas tend to present themselves in consciousness together. This law, the last in the order of statement, is perhaps the first in importance. It recognizes the fact that every sensation, and every group, however persistent, is subject to change, and that all changes are in the order of regular succession, so that those which go before are the conditions of those which come after.

It will be observed that these three laws are the expression of three several tendencies; tendencies of ideas not now actually in consciousness to present themselves there upon occasion of some sensation (or idea) which is. In these tendencies resides the accumulated wealth of consciousness and by them is determined the conduct of life. There is no act which is not a reliance upon some one or all of them; an expectation of the impending reappearance of associations which memory declares to have appeared before. The sensations which I have or can have at any given moment are few in number and life would be a poor affair if they were the whole capital upon which it traded, but each of them is a blank draft upon the funds of consciousness, or going back to the old figure, is the point at which associations effected in the past tend to present themselves anew, and life is the ample thing it is because it counts upon these tendencies and upon the permanence of the associations which they imply. The sensation of figure I have at this moment is nothing in itself but the ideas of the sensa

tions which have been grouped with it heretofore follow it into consciousness bringing with them the assurance that the old group is ready to reappear. Trusting the predictions of the ideas I have but to stretch out my hand, or otherwise provide the previous conditions, to realize the waiting sensa tions of hardness, heaviness, resonance, and x. Let me give the group a name or a nickname and the thing is done. Hereafter the paper-weight exists for me a group (not of actual but of) possible sensations. Wherever I am or whatever the actual contents of my consciousness this possibility will endure. I may admit into consciousnes the previous conditions of different sensations, for example as men say, I may go into the next room or out of doors; I have but to replace the previous conditions of the paper-weight, that is, I have but to come back again, and it reappears. It is not only a possibility but a permanent possibility of sensation. So of any other group to which I have given a name. I have only one of the constituent sensations; perhaps only an idea of one of them; yet I know that if the conditions recur the group will appear. Thus the table at which I write is a permanent possibility of sensation: so are the other contents of the room: so is the world out of doors; I have but to effect the necessary change of antecedents, that is, I have but to throw open my window to the evening air and there lies the sea murmuring in its sleep along the shore beneath the tranquil splendors of the stars. The material universe is the aggregate of permanent possibilities of sensation; or generalizing the statement, Matter is a Permanent Possibility of Sensation; and it is nothing more. I myself am a nucleus or cluster of a dozen sensations more or less bearing witness to permanent possibilities of sensation. nothing more.

And I am

Unfortunately, for the philosopher if not for mankind, for metaphysics if not for life, the laws of association which preside over ideas bring with them not only the organization of consciousness but the suggestion of being and organization beyond the ideas; and this suggestion is made so promptly and positively that it ends in looking like an intuition and in overpowering consciousness. The paper-weight is in fact nothing but the possibility of reinstating certain sensations which have

gone together heretofore, but the possibility has been trusted and verified so often that at last it has assumed the guise of a real being, an entity apart from and independent of me; and now the ideas of the group never rise without suggesting, instead of the sensations themselves, certain correspondent phenomena belonging to a reality of their own. I look upon the paper-weight as having existed before I knew it and as likely to exist when I am no more. So upon the natural organization brought by the association of ideas there is superposed an artificial and illusory one which has quite usurped the place of the other and appropriated all consciousness to itself. On the one hand, along with the entire aggregate of my sensations and my ideas of actual sensations in the past and possible sensations in the future I receive what seems to be the direct intuition of an enduring unchanging substance, or soul within, constituting my real self, from which they issue as its momentary manifestations, about which they gather as its apparelling and decoration. On the other, along with each particular group of these sensations and ideas I receive what seems to be the intuition of another substance which is not myself. One set of sensations and ideas, which tend to present themselves in advance of all others and which thus suggest possibilities of sensation which are the antecedents or conditions of all other possibilities, detaches itself to become the marvellous apparition known as the organism of the body. Around this illusory projection into unreal space are distributed the rarer and remoter possibilities which appear as the furniture and walls of the room in which I am sitting; farther away are the appearances of objects out of doors; encompassing all the illuminated atmosphere bounded by the blue dome of the sky. This whole environment of the material universe widening out forever into illimitable space is nothing but my sensations and ideas which the laws of association have thrown into magnificent but unreal perspectives; the play of its forces near and far, minute or mighty, from the hypothetical collisions of atoms up to the impressive flight of planets round their suns and systems round their centres, is but the orderly vicissitudes of my sensations, what I feel now and what I expect to feel by virtue of having felt before. There may be, as will appear

farther on, I have good reasons for believing that there are, other consciousnesses like my own, each lighted by the reflex splendors of its own projections; but their sensations, and consequently their permanent possibilities of sensation, however coincident with mine are not identical with them and so cannot guarantee an objective reality common to us all and which survives when we cease to be. No two of us ever trod the same soil or saw the same sun. The apocalypse which awaits me when I open my eyes, and which I know awaits me, collapses when I close them and passes away forever when I die.*

Such is the solitary essay of perhaps the greatest critic of our times in metaphysical construction. Whatever its defects it is a distinctly original contribution to philosophy and as such was surely entitled to introduction in some more ample and dignified form than could be given to any device for getting the better of Sir William Hamilton. We repeat that it is a lasting misfortune that Mr. Mill did not give more of the power spent in the exposure of other systems to the exposition of his own. Had he done so he might have left a work great enough to rank with the New Theory of Vision and the Recherche de la Verité; and frank enough to make criticism surperfluous.

* To complete the exposition it is to be remarked that the order of succession or antecedence and consequence expressed in the third law has provided the intuition of Time, and the constancy of the order the intuition of Force or Cause; as the order of co-existence expressed in the second law provides the intuition of Space and its constancy that of Substance. Having ascertained the general fact of succession we think events as occurring in time, and time we think as having an absolute existence independent of the whole series of events. Having ascertained the constant order of succession we think all antecedents as necessitating or causing their invariable consequents-the succession always having been can. not, we fancy, but be. Another important point to notice is that the constant succession is not often between single sensations, but almost always between groups or permanent possibilities of sensation, so that the conception of force or cause comes to be referred to the conception of substance which stands for the permanent possibility of sensation. In this way substance once admitted gains in apparent reality; we think it not only as holding together the phenomena grouped as in its own modifications but as causing the modifications which follow in other groups. Substances become the sources of all actions and changes in the universe.

ARTICLE IV.-THE SOURCE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION -POPULAR AND RELIGIOUS.

As long as the establishment of colleges by the State was regarded by their special promoters as but one of two or three American methods of sustaining the higher education—such colleges asking simply to be recognized by the side of established religious ones, denominational and undenominationalit was admitted that college education in this country was originally due to private benevolence. Our oldest colleges were prized and honored as the offspring of voluntary Christian enterprise. State universities were looked upon as a recent experiment. But along with the theory of higher education by the State exclusively has arisen the notion that this was the old Puritan theory of New England! and that her colleges were from the first State institutions! This new reading of the facts has its interest as a question of history simply: it has still greater interest as a blended question of history and public polity. The claim quietly made in the exclusive interest of State universities has attracted no attention; those best conversant with the facts have apparently deemed it of no consequence; it is quite likely to be quoted, not without additions, as if it had been proven, or possessed a firm historical foundation, -until from reiteration the truth of history is quite reversed.* It is proposed in this paper to examine the facts, and discover whether they warrant the new reading.

After the materials of this Article were collected, the Report of the U. S. Com. of Education for 1875 came to hand, containing, opposite p. cxliv, a "Synopsis of the proposed centennial history of American education-1776-1876," in which the century is divided into three periods, "the colonial period," "the homogeneous period-1776-1840," and "the heterogeneous period-1840-1876." Under the third period are placed "the rise of State universities, and of colleges of agriculture and the mechanic arts; rise of colleges for women," etc. Under the first period are placed "early colonial colleges, their foundation by colonial and individual action . . . . connection of religious denominations with the colleges, etc." A correct historical distinction is here recognized, without apparent complication with any late-born theories about the proper basis and management of college education. But on p. xxiii "the introduction of State colleges or universities" is