to recross was a very proper one. We recrossed on the night of the 15th, without the loss of a man, and with no trouble at all at our wing. By Mr. Gooch: Question. Had the pontoons been here at the time of the arrival of the army what would probably have been the result? Answer. The probable result would have been that the army-as much of it as General Burnside supposed necessary-would have immediately crossed the river, driving away the enemy here, perhaps 500 or 1,000 men; and they would have occupied those very heights which we have since been obliged to attack; and that crossing would have been permanent and successful. Question. Do you know on whom rests the responsibility of the delay in the arrival of the pontoons? Answer. I do not, officially. Question. What, in your opinion, is the number of your killed, wounded, and missing. Answer. I think it will amount to about ten thousand altogether. Answer. I have not, except what I saw incidentally in a Richmond paper. Question. Do I understand you to say that you concurred in the movement to cross the river? Answer. It was not my opinion that we could cross at any of the points indicated. Question. Will you state whether or not it is your opinion that if the movement of the army from Warrenton had been delayed until the time the pontoons arrived here the army could have then come here, and with those pontoons have made a crossing here and occupied the heights before the enemy could have reached here in sufficient force to have prevented it? Answer. Yes, sir; that is my opinion, Question. Then it is your opinion that if it had been ascertained that the pontoons could not possibly be here at the time General Burnside expected them to be here, he should have been notified of the time when they could be here, so that he might make the movements of his army correspond with the time when the pontoons could be here? Answer. That is my opinion. Question. What is the condition of the army now as to its efficiency? Is its efficiency impaired other than by the loss of so many men, or is it demoralized by the recent disasters? Answer. I think it is not demoralized at all-that is, so far as my own wing is concerned, I know it is not. Question. After the crossing had been made, was it possible, in your opinion, for our troops to have carried the heights, or to have held our posi tion upon the other side so as to have derived any advantage from it? Answer. It is my opinion that if, instead of making two real attacks, our whole force had been concentrated on our left-that is, our available forceand the real attack had been made there, and merely a feint made upon the right, we might have carried the heights. I think we could have carried them. Whether the army would have achieved a success by that I cannot say. I do not mean to say that the mere carrying of the heights would have secured our success. I do not know what was behind them, or how much of a force the enemy had there. I know that wherever we appeared we found a great many more men than we had. I would like to impress as firmly upon the committee as firmly as it is impressed upon my mind the fact that this whole disaster has resulted from the delay in the arrival of the pontoon bridges. Whoever is responsible for that delay is responsible for all the disasters which have followed. We were utterly astonished when we came down here to find that Sumner had been here for some days, and had not received the pontoon bridges. I think that is the main cause for this disaster. Question. Do you know what the expectation was as to the pontoons being here on the arrival of the first army corps that should get here? Was it expected that the pontoons would be here ? Answer. Certainly it was expected that they would be here. Question. What was that corps to have done if the pontoons had been here? Answer. That corps was to have crossed at once and taken possession of the heights. If the pontoons had been here there would have been very little difficulty in doing that. DECEMBER 19, 1862. Brigadier General D. P. WOODBURY sworn and examined. By Mr. Gooch: Question. What is your rank and position in the army? Answer. I am brigadier general, and have charge of the engineer brigade, consisting of the 15th and 50th regiments of New York volunteers. Question. Had you any connexion with the forwarding of the pontoons to be used in crossing the river from Falmouth to Fredericksburg? If so, state all the knowledge you have on that subject, what orders you received, what you did, and any conversations you had, if any, with General Halleck, Burnside, or any other officer your superior. Answer. On the morning of November 13 I received the following telegram from General Halleck: "WARRENTON, November 12-7.10 p. m. "Call upon the chief quartermaster, Colonel Rucker, to transport all your pontoons and bridge materials to Aquia creek. Colonel Belger has been ordered to charter and send one hundred barges to Alexandria. "H. W. HALLECK, "General-in-Chief. "Brigadier General WOODBURY, "Engineer Brigade, 19th and F streets, Washington." At that time there were only twelve serviceable pontoons in Washington, all the others being in bridges at Harper's Ferry and Berlin, about six miles below Harper's Ferry. I immediately ordered Major Spaulding, 50th New York, detached from my command, and in charge of the bridges above referred to, "to take up all the bridges and return all the pontoon property immediately to the Eastern Branch." Major Spaulding himself arrived in Washington on the night of the 13th, in pursuance of another order, as will appear below. On the 14th I received the two following telegrams from General Burnside, through Lieutenant Comstock, chief engineer: "WARRENTON, VA., November 14, 1862. "On November 6 Captain Spaulding was directed to move bridge material from Berlin to Washington, and mount at once one complete bridge train in Washington. Is that train ready to move, with horses and everything needed supplied? If not, how long before it will be ready? "C. B. COMSTOCK, "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "In addition to the bridge train which Captain Spaulding has been previously directed to fit out in Washington, General Burnside desires to have one more complete train mounted and horsed as soon as possible, and, with the other, sent with a company, at least, and Captain Spaulding in command, by land, to Fredericksburg, Va. * * * * * * * "Please advise me how long before they will be ready, and on starting advise me of that. "C. B. COMSTOCK, "Lieutenant of Engineers." To these telegrams I returned the following answer: "WASHINGTON, November 14, 1862. "I have received your two telegrams to-day : "Captain Spaulding has arrived, and 36 pontoons have arrived. Forty men are expected in the morning. Captain Spaulding received Captain Duane's order of the 6th on the afternoon of the 12th. One pontoon train can be got ready to start Sunday or Monday morning, (November 16 or 17,) depending somewhat upon the quartermaster's department. General Halleck is not inclined to send another train by land, but will allow it, probably, if General Burnside insists. A second train can be sent by water to Aquia creek, and from thence transported by the teams which carry the first. "D. P. WOODBURY, "Brigadier General." I received no further orders from General Burnside. To fit out this train Major Spaulding had to draw from the quartermaster's department 270 fresh untried horses, some of which had never been in harness; to put together 270 harnesses, taken in separate pieces from boxes; to fit these harnesses to the horses; to shoe the horses, and to look up teamsters, who could not be obtained in Washington, but were procured, with difficulty, in Alexandria. With four companies of men he worked day and night, but was not able to leave Washington before 2 o'clock on the morning of the 19th instant. Finding the roads almost impassable, he sent for a steam-tug and sent all his pontoons by water from the Occoquan. With his empty pontoon wagons he arrived at Belle Plain, 10 miles from Fredericksburg on the 24th. With his train, complete, he arrived at the headquarters of the army, 2 miles from Fredericksburg, on the 25th, one day after a train had come by water. The order from General Halleck given above, and his verbal orders to me on the 14th, all looked to the transport of bridge material to Aquia creek by water, that place being then in possession of the enemy. On the 15th I sent down three companies to build some temporary wharves. There were no pontoons to send with them, but some arrived towards night of that day. On the 16th eight companies started with forty-eight pontoons, which arrived at Belle Plain on the afternoon of the 18th, the transport having been aground twenty-four hours. On the 19th, fearing that the land train would not arrive in time, I had thirty pontoon wagons shipped for Belle Plain. These were delayed by rough weather, and did not arrive till the 22d. These wagons were loaded on the night of the 22d, and a pontoon train was taken to headquarters, as already stated, on the morning of the 24th, by means of teams which had come down with the army. The advance of the army arrived at Falmouth on the 17th. General Halleck's order to me of the 13th made it apparent that the army was preparing to march to Fredericksburg. As to the time when the movement would be made I never received any information. Fearing, however, that the movement would be precipitate, I went to General Halleck's office and urged him to delay the movement some five days, in order that the necessary preparations might be made to insure its success. To this he replied that he would do nothing to delay for an instant the advance of the army upon Richmond. I rejoined that my suggestion was not intended to cause delay, but rather to prevent it. In making this suggestion I had reference, not only to the pontoon train, but to the landings still to be created for the quartermaster and commissary departments. The quartermaster department was very scantily supplied with the means required for these landings-I may say almost totally destitute of means. With the very short notice given to me there was only one possible way of supplying the army with a pontoon train in time. Had the emergency been made known to me in any manner I could have disregarded the forms of service-seized teams, teamsters, and wagonmasters for instant service wherever I could find them. Then, with good roads and good weather, they might possibly have been in time. But I had no warrant for such a course, which, after all, could only have been carried out by the authority of the general-in-chief. I had a conversation with General Meigs on the 15th, in which much was said about the work to be done at Aquia creek-not a word, so far as I can remember, about the land pontoon train. The department of which General Meigs is chief cannot be justly blamed in this matter. My requisitions for horses and for transports were answered immediately. DECEMBER 20, 1862. Major General JOSEPH HOOKER Sworn and examined. By the chairman: Question. What position do you hold in the military service? Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, and command one of what is called the grand divisions of the army of the Potomac. Question. You have read the resolution of the Senate under which this committee is now acting. Will you please go on and state, in your own manner, what you consider necessary in order to give us a clear and concise history of the movements of the army of the Potomac since General Burnside assumed the command of it? Answer. I joined the army at Warrenton about the 10th of November. At that time General Burnside was in command. After I had been there a day or two, during which time there was some talk of transferring the line of operations from the line of the railroad at Warrenton to the line of railroad at Aquia creek, General Halleck and General Meigs visited General Burnside, as I was informed, to determine whether this transfer of the line of operations should be made. As near as I can recollect, that was about the 11th of November. That matter was discussed between those generals and General Burnside, and it was determined that that transfer should be made. Some one of the party remarked, either General Halleck or General Meigs, I do not recollect which, that they thought they could have everything ready on this line in three days. This was not a private consultation. I was present in the room at the time these things were discussed, and although my opinion in regard to them was not asked I heard the conversation. They said that they thought they could have the pontoons ready, the stores landed, and everything in readiness to advance in three days. I remember that I thought that was marvellous at the time; that it was not within the range of human possibility to do that. Soon after the movement to the Rappahannock commenced. I will say here that I brought up the rear of the army in marching from Warrenton to this point. I mention this matter because I think it has an important bearing upon some matters which are to come afterwards. The rear of this movement was considered the post of honor. After being upon the road for about three days, I stopped one day, with my command, at Hartwood. From that point I addressed a letter to General Burnside, requesting that he would permit me to cross the river with my grand division at one of the fords there, and come down on the south side of the Rappahannock. But, for reasons assigned in a communication from him, the request was denied me. I then marched to this place. In the meantime I had received orders to have my command furnished with twelve days' rations, forage for three days, and the requisite amount of ammunition. At Hartwood I had three days' provisions with me. On reaching this point I found that the divisions which had preceded me, I presume in obedience to orders, had provided themselves with the prescribed preparations, rations, forage, &c., for a forward movement, and nothing was left for my division. For three days after reaching here I was on less than half rations. After a few days, however, provisions began to accumulate here, and after a week or ten days I was enabled to prepare for the advance, so far as related to food. When I reached here, which was on the 221 November, all the pontoons had not arrived, and I was told that the reason for the limited amount of supplies was the difficulties of landing and forwarding; there were not cars enough; there were no facilities at Aquia creek or at Belle Plain for landing them. After the pontoons arrived, it became a matter of importance to determine where and in what way we should cross the Rappahannock. The officers commanding the grand divisions were called together to discuss and determine that matter. One of the first questions that were submitted to us was where we should cross the river. General Burnside proposed that a portion of the command should cross here, and a portion should cross about twelve miles below here. I objected, by my vote in the council, to crossing two columns so far apart, and stated my preference that the whole army should cross at what is called the United States or Richards's Ford, about twelve miles above here. But I was overruled, and it was determined that the crossing should be here and about twelve miles below here, and the road was corduroyed in the vicinity of the crossing about twelve miles below here, in order to facilitate the crossing. About this time General Burnside intimated that I should take the advance in crossing. I said to him that I should be most happy to do it; but if my division should hold the advance when it was the post of danger, and cover the retreat when that was the post of danger, I would like to have that place assigned me in line of battle; and if he would give me the right of this army I would vindicate my claim to it. It was then that General Burnside changed the plan of crossing, and he also changed the place of crossing. He had three bridges thrown across at Fredericksburg, and two bridges about three or four miles below here; and it was determined that Franklin should cross on the lower bridges, and Sumner should cross in advance of me on the upper bridges. My position, if they succeeded, was to be to hold my division in hand to spring upon the enemy in their retreat. |