Question. Would it have been better, in your judgment, to have crossed the river and engaged the enemy earlier than you did? And if so, why was it not done?

Answer. When General Burnside was ordered to take command of this army he told me what he proposed to do; that is, to march on Fredericksburg instead of on Culpeper. I thought that was the wisest plan for these reasons: If we had marched on Culpeper, according to the former plan, even if we had been successful, we would have had to fall back for supplies; whereas, by coming on this line, on reaching Fredericksburg I confidently expected to take the heights in rear of it before the army of the enemy could come from Culpeper, and I thought the chance of reaching Richmond was much better than by going the other way. Because if the pontoons had been here on my arrival, and in time for me to have crossed and occupied the heights in rear of Fredericksburg before the enemy could reach them, we should have kept pressing the enemy off from this line of railroad, keeping it in our own possession; and if we could not have preceded them into Richmond, we could have kept so close to them that they would have had no time to build fortifications. These were the reasons why I thought that it was a very judicious measure on the part of General Burnside to change the base of operations instead of advancing on Culpeper, which I believe General McClellan intended to have done.

On my arrival here, on the 17th of November, a battery of artillery on the other side of the river opened upon us the moment a portion of my troops appeared on the ridge back of Falmouth. I immediately put a battery into position, and, I think, in not to exceed fifteen minutes, they drove every man on the other side from the guns, and they ran off and left four guns on the field. My orders were to advance and hold Falmouth, not to cross. But the temptation was so strong to go over and take those guns the enemy had left that at one time I actually gave the order to cross the ford at all events and seize the guns and occupy the city. But on reflection I concluded I was rather too old a soldier to disobey a direct order; and there was another reason too: I had had little too much experience on the peninsula of the consequence of getting astride of a river to risk it here. For these two reasons I revoked my order that night.

That same night I sent a note to General Burnside, who was some eight or ten miles distant, asking him if I should take Fredericksburg in the morning should I be able to find a practicable ford, which, by the way, I knew when I wrote the note that I could find. The General replied, through his chief of staff, that he did not think it advisable to occupy Fredericksburg until his communications were established, and, on reflection, I myself thought that he was right; that it was prudent and proper to have the bridges ready before we occupied Fredericksburg. I think I could have taken that city and the heights on the other side of it any time within threedays after my arrival here if the pontoons had been here, for I do not think there was much force of the enemy here up to that time.

With regard to the delay in making the attack, I do not think that the movement could have been made sooner than it was made. It will be recollected that no preparations had been made at Aquia creek. When we came across here there were no means at Aquia creek for landing anything there. All those things had to be prepared afterwards. The railroad had to be completed before we could get up supplies for this great army. It takes an enormous amount of transportation to supply an army of 100,000 men, and I do not think the general could have made his preparations, done all that it was necessary to do, sooner than he did after the arrival here of the pontoons.

The first proposition ro cross the river was to cross at Skinker's Neck. Rep. Com. 108-42

It seemed to me that you could scarcely cross a river in the face of an enemy of equal or superior force, except by surprise. Therefore, after the preparations were made to cross at Skinker's Neck, after a large number of wagons had been sent by the general down there in order to deceive the enemy, I was decidedly in favor of throwing the bridges over here and carrying the town as we did carry it, which was by surprise, as the enemy were marching their troops down below expecting that we were going to cross down there.

I was in favor of crossing the Rappahannock, because I knew that neither our government nor our people would be satisfied to have our army retire from this position, or go into winter quarters, until we knew the force that was on the other side of the river; and the only way in which we could learn that was by going over there and feeling of them. I think it was necessary to have made the attack on that day, or Saturday, and it was necessary, therefore, to attack them in their strong works, and the repulse was what frequently happens in campaigns-the works were stronger than we believed them to be. I knew it was a very hazardous movement, but I did believe we could carry the enemy's works. The attack failed owing to the enemy's fortifications being much more formidable than we had supposed them to be.

Question. Will you describe those fortifications?

Answer. I cannot describe them any further than this: They were tier upon tier for two or three tiers. If we had carried the first tier, we could not have held it, because their next tier was a much more formidable row of fortifications, only a mile distant, and on a higher position still. And no doubt large masses of infantry were between the two crests: and having got on the top of one crest, we would have been compelled to contend with large masses of, fresh troops over whom their own batteries could fire. I was ordered by the general commanding to select the corps to make the attack. I selected the corps of General French and General Hancock, two of the most gallant officers in our army, and two corps that had neither of them ever turned their backs to the enemy. They made repeated assaults, but were driven back in spite of all the efforts that could be made by their officers. The principal obstacle that they found was a long stone wall, which was the outwork of the enemy. That wall was some 400 or 500 yards in length, as represented to me, and had been raised and strengthened. The enemy had artillery that enfiladed that wall on both sides; they held their fire until our troops arrived at a certain point, when they rose up and poured a perfect volley over this wall, their artillery enfilading our column at the same time. No troops could stand such a fire as that. I do not think it a reproach to those two divisions that they did not carry that position; they did all that men could do. I had General Howard's division in readiness to support those two, and one strong division of Wilcox's corps-the ninth corps, General Burnside's old corps-detached to keep open communication with General Franklin's right. That division was not under fire during the day. Some of the other divisions of the ninth corps were more or less engaged.

General Hooker had a part of his grand division in the town, and one of his corps, under General Humphries, was engaged. They made a gallant attack, but were driven back. The fight was continued on the left, but I was so remote from that that I cannot give any description of it at all.

The general commanding directed me to establish my headquarters at the Lacy House, so that I could superintend the operations of both my corps. I was there, while the general commanding was at the Phillips House during the action. During an action there is a constant running for orders, for re-enforcements, artillery, troops at different points, ammunition, &c.

I consider the crossing of the river, under the circumstances, a very

creditable thing; and I also consider the retreat, under the circumstances, as very creditable. There was not a gun or anything else lost. The entire army returned without an accident.

I would like to add here, because it was almost the only occasion where the general commanding and myself have differed in regard to any point, that I did not wish to relinquish Fredericksburg. I thought we could have held it with a single division by posting our batteries right. It would not have been giving up an expedition, but simply a change of tactics. That is the way in which I viewed it; that we would just be drawing back a little in order to try it again. I was therefore strongly in favor of holding Fredericksburg; others were not. Perhaps I was the only general officer of rank who was of that opinion. I thought it would present a better and a different appearance if we continued to hold the town. We could have commanded it at any time with our artillery, and we can do so now. I do not think there was any danger or difficulty in holding it. But I may have been mistaken.

Question. Do you know any reason why the pontoon bridges did not arrive earlier?

Answer. I do not.

Question. You know nothing upon that subject?

Answer. I do not. I expected, as a matter of course, to find them here when I came, or very soon afterwards.

Question. If you had found them here, as you expected, what would, in your opinion, have been the result?

Answer. I should have taken the crest in rear of the town on that night or the following day. Not considering Fredericksburg as being of any consequence, except as being on the road to Richmond. I should have passed through the town and taken possession of the crest.

Question. Are there any fords above here which might have been crossed? Answer. There are several fords on this river, and in the summer time two or three of them would be practicable, perhaps.

Question. I mean were there any practicable fords at the time you did cross; and if so, where were they?

Answer. There is a rough cavalry ford down by the upper bridge at Falmouth, where horsemen sometimes go over. But that ford depends upon the tide, which rises above this town. The tide was in when I arrived here, which was in the afternoon. The tide was then receding, and a citizen told me that it would not be possible to get anything over the ford until after dark. That ford is represented to me as being a deep ford, with deep holes in it. Men can skip from rock to rock-a few men at the time. But there are occasionally deep holes, from six to eight feet deep. Such a ford would never be considered practicable for marching troops over.

Question. What reasons do you assign for not crossing either above or below where the enemy have fortified?

Answer. The reason was this: we did not attempt to turn their left flank, because there is there a slack-water navigation taken out of the river some two miles above here, and brought into the basin at the upper end of the town. That runs along at a considerable distance from the Rappahannock. In making a movement to turn the enemy's left flank, if a force had been sent up between the river and the canal, the canal would have to be crossed, and to do so it would be necessary to bridge it. The only way to have made that movement would have been to have gone entirely on the left of that canal, and that would have exposed the troops all the way up to a fire upon their flank from the batteries, which had been erected all along up there, without ours being able to return the fire at all.

Question. In regard to the condition of the army since the battle, is it demoralized any more than by the loss of that number of men ?

Answer. I think it is.

Question. To what extent, and in what way?

Answer. It is difficult to describe it any other way than by saying there is a great deal too much croaking; there is not sufficient confidence. Question. What number of men, or about what number, do you suppose were engaged on our side on the day of battle?

The witness: Under fire, do you mean?

The chairman: Yes, sir.

Answer. Do you mean to include the reserves?

Question. I mean to include all who were really under fire.

Answer. I should think there were hardly 50,000 men under fire. When I say that 50,000 men were all that were under fire, I would say that I do not consider the reserves beyond musketry fire as being exactly troops under fire.

Question. What was the whole number of our forces over the river?

Answer. I should suppose there must have been about -men; and the difference between that number and the number actually under fire was held in reserve.

Question. From the best light that you have, what do you estimate to have been the force of the enemy?

Answer. I thought that our forces were about equal.

Question. At what do you estimate our loss to be, in killed, wounded, and missing?

Answer. I think 10,000 will cover our whole loss. It has been stated as over that number; but those things are always exaggerated.

Question. At what do you estimate the loss of the enemy?

Answer. A great deal less than our own, from the fact that they were covered by their works.

Question. In your judgment, as a military man, were there any faults or mistakes in bringing on or conducting that attack?

Answer. I think not. The general commanding conferred a great deal with me about it. If he made a mistake, I made one too; for I certainly approved the steps, one by one, that he took. As regards the responsibility for ordering the attack, I do not know what orders the general commanding may have received from Washington. He, however, told me that he had received a telegram from the President that he did not wish the army sacrificed. I think myself I would have made but a single attack. Instead of making two attacks I would have made but one, massing everything upon that. But that is a point upon which military men may differ.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did the commanders of the grand division concur, all of them, so far as you know, in the movement that was made?

Answer. I do not know; but I presume they did.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your opinion of the general condition and efficiency of the army since the battle?

Answer. I consider that within a few days, with sufficient exertion, this army will be in excellent order again.

DECEMBER 19, 1862.

Major General WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. You have seen the resolution of the Senate under which this committee are now acting. Will you go on and state, in your own way, what you deem it necessary to state?

Answer. I do not recollect the precise time, but it was just before we moved from Warrenton, General Halleck and General Meigs came down there and had a conference with General Burnside. The result of that conference, as I understood it, was that General Burnside was to move this army from Warrenton and that vicinity to Fredericksburg, and so across the river here. As an important part of that movement, I understood from General Burnside that when the advance of his army arrived in front of Fredericksburg, a pontoon train, enough to build two bridges, was to meet him there. I know the advance of the army did arrive at Fredericksburg at the proper time, but there was no pontoon train to meet it there, and in consequence of that the army could not cross at the time we expected to cross. We were therefore delayed several days in consequence of the delay in the arrival of the pontoon train.

After arriving here we accumulated provisions for twelve days; then General Burnside called a council, in which it was the unanimous opinion, I think, of all the generals present, that if this river could be crossed it ought to be crossed, no matter what might happen afterwards. The point of crossing was not then definitely determined upon; but I thought at the time that we were to cross several miles further down.

Afterwards General Burnside called us together again, and informed us that he had determined to cross at the two points at which we finally did cross. I had no objection to that, but thought they were as good as the point further down. I knew nothing at all, in fact, about the defences on the other side; it was not my business to know anything about them. I think the arrangements for the crossing were all well made. At the same time, I always doubted our power to cross; and I do not believe we could have crossed had the enemy chosen to prevent it. And I know, from what I have seen since and what I before suspected, that they could have prevented our crossing at those two points if they had chosen.

However, as the committee know, the crossing was successfully made under cover of a fog, and, as far as my wing was concerned, we got into position safely, with the loss of a very few men. Still we were in such a position that if the enemy had at any moment opened upon us with the guns they had bearing upon us, I think that in the course of an hour our men would have been so scattered that it would have been impossible to rally them. For some unaccountable reason they did not open their batteries.

On the morning of the 13th instant I made the attack, according to the order of General Burnside. I put in all the troops that I thought it proper and prudent to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command as far as I could, and at the same time keep my connexion with the river open. The reason that we failed was, that we had not troops enough to carry the points where the attack was made under the orders that were given. After we were pressed back, I directed that a position should be held as far in advance as it was possible to hold it, and I brought up all the troops I had in reserve to hold that position. I held that position until I was ordered to recross the river. And from what I knew of our want of success on the right, and the demoralized condition of the troops on the right and centre, as represented to me by their commanders, I confess that I believe the order