General Rodman's death. But I saw that brigade the next morning, and considered it in fighting condition. The rest of my troops held all their ground the next day, keeping up a continual skirmishing. Question. What was your own opinion at that time in relation to renewing the attack? Answer. I was of the impression, the night after the battle, that the attack ought to be renewed the next morning; but having positive knowledge in relation only to my own command, my opinion was only valuable as that of the commander of that part of our line. Question. Did you express any opinion to General McClellan, or to any of his staff, in relation to renewing the battle the next day; if so, what was that opinion? Answer. I did express an opinion to General McClellan on the subject. After my command was all in position-say 8 o'clock at night-I went over to General McClellan's headquarters at Čadysville, and expressed the opinion to General Marcy, his chief of staff, that the attack ought to be renewed the next morning at 5 o'clock. I also expressed the same opinion to some of the other members of General McClellan's staff. General Marcy told me that I ought to see General McClellan, and tell him what I thought of the matter. I went to General McClellan's tent, and in the course of conversation I expressed the same opinion to him; and told him that if I could have 5,000 fresh troops to pass in advance of my line, I would be willing to commence the attack on the next morning. He said that he had been thinking the matter over, and would make up his mind during the night, and if I would send a staff officer to his headquarters to remain there over night, he would send me orders early in the morning; and if he concluded to renew the attack, he would send me the necessary men. I did send the staff officer over, but General McClellan concluded not to renew the attack the next day. Question. Would there have been any difficulty in furnishing the 5,000 fresh troops which you desired, as the corps of Fitz-John Porter, some 15,000 or 20,000 men, had not been engaged? Answer. There would have been no difficulty in furnishing 5,000 fresh troops. In fact, General McClellan did send Morell's division, of quite that strength, to report to me, but not with orders to me to renew the attack. Question. Was there anything in the condition of the army which made necessary the long delay after the battle of Antietam? Answer. So far as my own command was concerned, there was not. It was ready to march within a few days after the battle. But I heard other corps commanders report to General McClellan, after he received an important order from the President of the United States, that their corps were not ready to move? Question. Who were those corps commanders? Answer. General Fitz-John Porter, General Franklin, and General Reynolds. Question. Do you know whether or not an order was given from the Presi dent to General McClellan to put the army in motion? Answer. General McClellan showed me a telegraphic despatch, either from the President or from General Halleck, just previous to this consultation of which I have spoken, ordering him to cross the river and attack the enemy. Question. Was it not of the utmost importance that the time should be improved if we were to accomplish anything during the fall? Answer. There is no doubt that it was of the greatest military importance that the army should do all the work possible before winter set in. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, On motion by Mr. Wilkinson, Resolved, That the committee on the conduct of the war be, and they are hereby, directed to inquire into the facts relating to the recent battle at Fredericksburg, Virginia, and particularly as to what officer or officers are responsible for the assault which was made upon the enemy's works; and also the delay which occurred in preparing to meet the enemy; and to report the facts to the Senate. Attest: J. W. FORNEY, Secretary, By W. HICKEY, Chief Clerk. DOCUMENTS. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, GENERAL: In accordance with the orders of the general-in-chief of the 5th instant, I have the honor to make the following report of the movements proposed for this army: To concentrate all the forces near this place, and impress upon the enemy a belief that we are to attack Culpeper or Gordonsville, and, at the same time, accumulate a four or five days' supply for the men and animals; then make a rapid move of the whole force to Fredericksburg, with a view to a movement upon Richmond from that point. The following are my reasons for deciding upon this plan: If we move upon Culpeper and Gordonsville, with a fight there or a general engagement, even with results in our favor, the enemy will have many lines of retreat for his defeated army, and will, in all likelihood, be able to reach Richmond with enough of his force to render it necessary to fight another battle at that place; and should he leave even one corps, with cavalry, on our right flank, it would render the pursuit very precarious, owing to the great lack of supplies in this country, and the liability to an interruption of our communication with Washington. Should the enemy retreat in the direction of Richmond upon our approach to Culpeper and Gordonsville, we would simply follow a retreating army well supplied with provisions, (at least in depots in his rear,) whilst this army would have to rely upon a long line of communications for its supplies; and, as in the other case, a small portion of the enemy's force on our flank might tend to interrupt our communications. It may be well to add here, while on the subject of interrupted communications, that the enemy's sources for gaining information are far superior to our own. The general-in-chief will readily understand the reason; the difference is more than usual in their favor at present, from the fact that nearly all the negroes are being run south and kept under strict guard. Should the enemy retreat before us in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg the same difficulty would follow, with the certainty that he would also have a small portion of his force on our left flank. In moving by way of Fredericksburg there is no point up to the time when we should reach that place at which we will not be nearer to Washington than the enemy, and we will all that time be on the shortest road to Richmond, the taking of which, I think, should be the great object of the campaign, as the fall of that place would tend more to cripple the rebel cause than almost any other military event, except the absolute breaking up their army. The presence of a large army on the Fredericksburg line would render it almost impossible for the enemy to make a successful move upon Washington by any road on this side of the Potomac connected with the fortifications about Washington to repulse any movement of the enemy on the capital by way of the Upper Potomac, and it is hardly probable that he would attempt any serious invasion of Pennsylvania at this season of the year; and even should he make a lodgement in that State of any force that he can spare, the destruction of that force would be the result very soon after winter set in, and the destruction of property by him would be small in comparison with the other expenses of the war. Could the army before Richmond be beaten and their capital taken, the loss of half a dozen of our towns and cities in the interior of Pennsylvania could well be afforded. A movement of the enemy upon Baltimore I consider altogether improbable, as an attack upon that place would render the destruction of the city certain. In connexion with this movement in the direction of Fredericksburg, I would suggest that at least thirty canal boats and barges be at once loaded with commissary stores and forage and be towed to the neighborhood of Aquia creek, from which place they can be brought into Belle Plain. After the arrival of our force in that vicinity, these should be followed at once by enough stores and forage to subsist the army for thirty days. A great por tion of this, I think, could be towed up the Rappahannock under convoy of light-draught gunboats; but that is a matter for after consideration. It will be also necessary to start at once from Washington or Alexandria, by way of Dumfries, a quantity of beef-cattle, and all the wagon trains that can be spared, filled with small rations, such as bread, salt, coffee, sugar, soap, and candles. This train should be preceded by pontoon trains enough to span the Rappahannock with two tracks. But a small escort of cavalry for this train would be necessary, as we would be all the time between the enemy and the train. I will, however, if notified of its departure by telegraph, see that it is protected by my cavalry. During these movements it would be well for General Sigel to remain with his force at Centreville and its neighborhood, holding Manassas Junction, Thoroughfare Gap, Aldie, and Leesburg, with forces sufficient to protect them against any light attack, any one of which can fall back on the main body if attacked by too large a force. The main portion of his cavalry can be kept in Loudon county, where there is an abundance of subsistence and forage. Below Fredericksburg, between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, there must be quite an amount of forage, which could be raised for our broken-down animals after we reach Freder icksburg. We will need some fresh horses and mules on our arrival, which can be driven direct from Washington on this side of the Potomac, or direct from Baltimore to Smith's Point, opposite Aquia creek, from which place they can be brought over in ferry-boats, several of which it would be advisable to send us. An abundance of horses can be brought also by lightdraught vessels from New York and Philadelphia to a point near Belle Plain, where they can be thrown overboard and swim ashore. I cannot impress too strongly on the general-in-chief the necessity of furnishing by all these means an abundant supply of horses, mules, and beef-cattle; these should be sent to Fredericksburg, even at the risk of arriving after we leave. After reaching Fredericksburg our wagon train can be organized, and filled with at least twelve days' provisions, when a rapid movement can be made upon Richmond direct by way of such roads as are open to us, and as soon as the army arrives in front of the place an attack should be made at once, and with a strong hope of success. The details of the movement from Fredericksburg I will give you hereafter. I hope the general-in-chief will impress upon the Secretary of War the necessity of sanctioning the changes which I now propose to make in this army. First. To divide it into three parts: right wing, left wing, and centre, under commands of the three ranking generals present. Second. To do away with the very massive and elaborate adjutant general's office at these headquarters, and require the different commanders of these wings and corps to correspond directly with Washington in reference to all such things as resignations, leaves of absence, discharges, recruiting service, &c., &c., about which they necessarily know more than I do. I would have to be governed by their suggestion at any rate; and the attention to these matters in detail would surround me with a large number of staff officials, and embarrass me with a responsibility which I cannot as sume. Third. To make General Seth Williams an inspector of the different staff departments of the command, by which means I will ascertain if these duties are properly performed by the persons to whom they are delegated. Fourth. To keep my own adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel L. Richmond, at my headquarters, and to use, as far as possible, my own staff-officers with promotions necessary to their positions. I shall make as few changes as possible, but I am very anxious to keep my staff as small as possible, and to throw the labor and detail upon the officers immediately in command of the troops. With an approval of these suggestions, I will endeavor, with all my ability; to bring this campaign to a successful issue. If they are not approved, I hope specific instructions will be given, and the general-in-chief may rely upon a cheerful and implicit obedience. The general-in-chief will readily comprehend the embarrassments which surround me in taking command of this army, at this place, and at this season of the year. Had I been asked to take it, I should have declined; but being ordered, I cheerfully obey. A telegraph from you approving of my plans will put us to work at once. Captain E. M. Neill, of my staff, will bear this despatch to you. I have the honor to be your very obedient servant, General G. W. CULLUM, A. E. BURNSIDE, Major General, Commanding Army of Potomac. Chief of Staff, Washington. UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH. [Received November 14, 1862-From Washington.] The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks that it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not. See General Wright's telegraph in relation to the movements of Jackson on Romney and Cumberland. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major General A. E. BURNSIDE, Commanding Army of Potomac. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, November 22, 1862. GENERAL: By reference to my plan of operations, submitted by order of the commander-in-chief, it will be found that one of the necessary parts of that plan was to have started from Washington, at once, pontoon trains suffi cient to span the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg twice; and I was as sured that at least one train would leave as soon as the general-in-chief and General Meigs returned; and I proposed that if an escort was required, and I was informed of the departure of the train by telegraph, I would furnish it from my cavalry. Receiving no information of its departure, I ordered Lieutenant Comstock to telegraph in reference to it. It is very clear that my object was to make the move to Fredericksburg very rapidly, and to throw a heavy force across the river before the enemy could concentrate a force to oppose the crossing, and supposed the pontoon train would arrive at this place nearly simultaneously with the head of the column. Had that been the case, the whole of General Sumner's column of 33,000 strong would have crossed into Fredericksburg, at once, over a pontoon bridge, in front of a city filled with families of rebel officers and sympathizers with the rebel cause, and garrisoned by a small squadron of cavalry and a battery of artillery, which General Sumner silenced within an hour after his arrival. Had the pontoon bridge arrived even on the 19th or 20th the army could have crossed with trifling opposition; but now the opposite side of the river is occupied by a large rebel force under General Longstreet, with batteries to be placed in position, to operate against the working parties building the bridge and the troops in crossing. The pontoon train has not yet arrived, and the river is too high for the troops to cross at any of the fords. You can readily see that much delay may occur in the general movement; and I deem it my duty to lay these facts before you, and to say that I cannot make the promise of probable success with the faith that I did when I supposed that all parts of the plan would be carried out. Another very material part of the proposition which, I understood to be, appeared as a whole, was, that all the surplus wagons that were in Washington were to be loaded with bread and small commissary stores, and sent to this place at once, which would probably have supplid our army with from five to ten days' provisions. These trains could have moved with perfect safety, as they would have been protected by the movement of this army. I do not recall these facts in any captious spirit, but simply to impress upon the general-in-chief that he cannot expect me to do as much as if all the parts of the plan had been carried out. In fact, a force can be arrayed against us at this place that would very materially retard us. The work of the quartermaster and commissary departments at Aquia creek and Belle Plain has been most completely accomplished, and I am not prepared to say that every effort has not been made to carry out the other parts of the plan; but I must in honesty and candor say that I cannot feel that the move indicated in my plan of operations will be successful after two very important parts of the plan have not been carried out, no matter for what reason. The President said that the movement, in order to be successful, must be made quickly, and I thought the same. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, General G. W. CULLUM, Major General Commanding. Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C. |