Question. They must have the actual discipline of service?

Answer. I mean that although they would increase in military habits, still they would not be the veteran troops you desire to have, until you harden them in service; and if you instruct them for six months, there would still be a doubt whether they would behave well.

Question. As military men, so far as you yourself are concerned, and others who have looked at this question, do not they consider that a good policy requires immediate active operations-active operations forthwith on the part of this government, or our army?

Answer. I find a general impression that there should be no winter quarters. The general impression is that the snakes are torpid now, and now is the time to strike them.

Question. They consider that time is always in favor of a rebellion? Answer. I do not think there is any decided impression about that. There is a variety of opinions among men that the rebellion is eating itself up. I have had a great many reasons for believing that time alone is working fearfully against them. I have had the opinion from May, when I came to Washington, up to this time; and I have always said that, lacking, as we did, a regular army of twenty-five thousand men, which might have put down this rebellion in the beginning just as well as not, and probably would have done so if it had been well in hand and directed to proper points-not having this regular army, then time was in our favor.

Question. Do you think so now?

Answer. I have thought, from that time to this, that time was in our favor. Question. You think delays have been in our favor?

Answer. I do, for the simple reason that the rebellion has not gained military organization and military strength thereby; and for the reason that at any time since it started the advantages have been against us. We have never had a force enough. Look at Bull Run, and other places where we have not had strength enough to whip them. We had not the men to meet them. I have no doubt that the more time you give them the more military organization they make. But we had no organization. They were whipped at Bull Run, and ought to have been whipped; still, our men were stampeded, and the result was against us. It was one of the natural results of the kind of force we have. We had nothing to crush this rebellion out with. We are correcting these things now. I said in May, Pile up the battalions, tighten the cords around the foe, and make certainty of it. Now, as to the reasons I speak of, they are not theoretical reasons; they are these: I catch prisoners, and they tell me of the increased price of clothing there. This gray cloth, that they used to buy for ninety cents a yard, is now selling in Richmond at ten dollars a yard. All the country stores are shut up, and all their remnants are carried in town to be sold, to create the impression of plenty. Liverpool salt is worth twenty-five dollars a bag over in Hardy county and over in the Valley, and Kanawha salt is worth thirteen dollars a bag there. The great effort of the rebellion (and their leaders have a great deal more method than we have) has been to satisfy the people that none of these troubles would come on them, to convince them that they need not be afraid; and all the resources of the country have been brought into play to create the appearance of sufficiency. And the fact is that the people will find out very soon that it is only in appearance, and then they will probably have something like the feeling that the Logan county people have had. After their wants become real and pressing, then they will begin to think they were mistaken. I have watched the growth of these things, and they have furnished me reasons to know that they will suffer greatly sooner or later by this delay. I think our mistake in the beginning was in underestimating this rebellion .Most men seemed to think it was nothing. If it had

been dealt with in the beginning as we now see we have to deal with it, we probably might have saved Virginia and the border States. We could have quenched it during the first three months as easily as a man can put out a little fire with a bucket of water. There were not many troops at Manassas, and only a little marauding band at Harper's Ferry. We should have occupied Harper's Ferry, and could have done it easily.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. How are your troops armed?
Answer. With all kinds of arms.

Question. Are they generally well armed?

Answer. No, sir; only tolerably well. My whole army are troops that have been hurried into the field before they were properly armed, with the exception of a few regiments; and when you come to remember a few facts that will all be plain, first of all, General McClellan marched upon a sudden to meet Garnett and Porterfield, taking troops from Camp Dennison that were about half equipped, and armed with whatever they could get. The muskets they had were smooth-bores, and when given to them the intention was to have them use them to learn the manual by, and then they were to be turned over to be rifled, and good muskets given in their stead, and the old ones when rifled to be delivered to subsequent regiments. When the three months' service men went out after the battle of Bull Run, and left this frontier exposed to any enterprise that might take place, there was a call for three years' men who came without any equipments. There are some of the regiments who have four different kinds of muskets, and, of course, must have four different kinds of ammunition. I have two regiments that have all rifled muskets now. Most of the regiments have two companies armed with rifled muskets, and the remainder of the companies have smooth-bóres. It has been agreed at the Ordnance department to furnish me a thousand rifled muskets which I applied for to be used in this way. They will be delivered to a regiment, and the smooth-bore muskets of that regiment will be taken and rifled, and then delivered to the next regiment, and their smooth-bore muskets taken and rifled and delivered to the next, and so on until they get done.

Question. So that you are now in process of getting the whole of your armament rifled?

Answer. Yes, sir. Now, as to the efficiency of the rifled muskets, I will give you an instance of the difference between the rifled musket and the smooth-bore. On the New river Floyd's skirmishers commenced firing across a place where the road runs down near the bank; and they kept up the fire for two days. Although combatted by a hundred smooth-bore muskets from the 2d Kentucky, I did not see that they produced any effect upon them at all. The fire of the other side was just as hot the second day as at any other time. I sent for twenty-five rifled muskets, and took away the one hundred smooth-bores entirely, because they were merely wasting ammunition; and in three hours from the time the twenty-five rifled muskets commenced firing, the rebel fire ceased and never began again.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Have any of your force been removed to Kentucky?

Answer. Yes, sir. I have been ordered to send eight regiments there. I have been ordered to send four more, but the order has been suspended through my representations that I did not think it proper.

Question. When were they moved?

Answer. The last of them about the 10th of December.

Question. When you estimated your number now there, did you take into account those you have sent away?

Answer. No, sir.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Have you any artillery?

Answer. There is only one battery of artillery. They have ordered three batteries out of the department into Kentucky.

Question. What is the character of your men as regards sobriety?

Answer. There is very little drunkenness among them. We have been in a place where we could get no liquor. As a general thing, I think the sobriety of the troops there is creditable and good. In short, I have seen very few drunken men; and the tendency to dissipation and disorder does not appear to be very manifest among them. I should think, from appearances, that the men were rather prudent.

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1862.

Major ABNER DOUBLEDAY sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. I will ask you a few questions, such as we have asked of other witnesses, as your answers may very possibly be useful. I will first ask you whether you are acquainted with the condition of the fortifications on the south side of the Potomac ?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And in view of those fortifications, how many men would it take to render this city perfectly secure, provided we were content to act on the defensive?

Answer. I should suppose about 60,000, manning the fortifications on both sides of the river.

Question. I mean to make the city secure from attacks in crossing either above or below. I want to know all you think would be necessary to make the city secure, so as to be able to spare the residue of the army for other expeditions, and for other purposes.

Answer. I should estimate it would require about 60,000 men to make all points secure.

Question. Then, if we act only on the defensive here, we could spare all the troops over 60,000 for other expeditions?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think so.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Are the forts properly manned?

Answer. They are not.

Question. In what respect are they not properly manned?

Answer. I mean the garrisons have not been assigned them, or but a very small portion of them. They are very inadequately garrisoned. Question. How are they off for ammunition?

Answer. I have given them all one hundred rounds of ammunition to a gun, except to Fort Lyon, which is not quite ready yet. The magazine of that fort caved in the other day, and they are now repairing it. The others are well appointed.

Rep. Com. 108-14

By the chairman :

Question. If these fortifications were placed around the city for its defence, and they are inadequately garrisoned, should an attack be made upon the city, would they not be a source of danger rather than of protection to us, in that the enemy might take possession of them, and turn their guns against us?

Answer. I mean they are inadequately garrisoned with artillerists. They might order regiments into them, but they would be green and unprepared to serve the guns.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Why are they not properly manned?

Answer. I cannot tell you. I have myself made representations repeatedly, and tried to get that done. If they had been manned in the beginning, as soon as one or two guns of each were placed in position, the troops at this time would have been thorough artillerists; would have known the range of every tree and everything around, and would be vastly more efficient than they would be likely to be now when freshly placed at work in them.

By Mr. Julian:

Question. How long has that state of things existed?

Answer. All the way through. I understand there are no garrisons in the upon this side of the river.

forts

By the chairman:

Question. More attention has been paid to training the infantry than the artillerists in those fortifications?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. Do you know of any intention on the part of the authorities to sufficiently garrison those forts?

Answer. They are raising heavy artillery very slowly; but the thing is to detail regiments as heavy artillery, and you would have the force at once. A great many of the regiments would like to go in the forts as heavy artillery. There seems to be a competition for that purpose.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. How many regiments would it take now to properly garrison all the forts around Washington?

Answer. I should suppose there ought to be from fourteen to sixteen regiments. The forts extend away down opposite Alexandria.

Question. I mean to garrison all the forts. You think sixteen regiments would be enough?

Answer. Yes, sir; I think so. There is a great zeal among those who are in the forts, and they are doing very well in the way of drill, &c., as a general thing; but the forts are very inadequately garrisoned-some of the garrisons. At Fort Lyon they keep the men all the time digging there, and, of course, they have hardly any time for their artillery duties.

By Mr. Odell:

Question. As a military man, familiar with this service, should not those forts, in your judgment, be garrisoned at once?

Answer. Oh! at once; they ought to have been long ago.

Question. What length of time does it take to make men efficient as artillerists?

Answer. I should think they ought to have a couple of months' drill. They can go through the routine sooner; but they do not get the proper elevations, &c.

Question. I mean, by my question, fit for war purposes.

Answer. They can load and fire a gun in a few days; but it would be without any accuracy. They ought to have two or three months' careful drill and practice.

By the chairman:

Question. Have these defects in the garrisoning of those fortifications and the practicing the men been brought to the notice of General McClellan? Answer. I have mentioned it to his adjutant general, and to General Barry, who is the chief of the artillery; I have mentioned it repeatedly. General Barry feels it; he knows that it is badly needed. But I do not see anything being done to remedy it.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. You have a pretty accurate knowledge of the condition of the forces here and the number of them. Have you an idea, approximating accuracy, in relation to the number, condition, and morale of the army?

Answer. I do not know now exactly what number there is, with a view to guess at it, they are scattered over so wide a space. We do not see the

statistics.

Question. Having in view the condition of the army as it stands here, would you consider it advisable to move upon the enemy-not upon any particular point, perhaps, but to make a forward movement now-or should it be postponed until next spring, and let the army go into winter quarters? Answer. I do not think there ought to be any postponement. If it is to be made, I think it ought to be made now.

Question. You think they are in a better condition now to make the movement than they would be next spring?

Answer. I think so; because if we stand still they may occupy fresh points, and fortify them.

Question. Have you laid down in your mind any plan by which you would make this forward movement?

Answer. They seem to be very well provided against a flank movement on the Potomac; at least they claim they are. I should suppose one could be made by Leesburg and Gum Spring, and the rear of them to the Manassas Gap road, and a movement afterwards upon the position of the enemy's forces. But unless I knew precisely how they were stationed, or could form an approximate idea of how they were placed, their numbers, &c., it would be. difficult to decide on a plan of operations.

Question. Suppose that we were to proceed upon the hypothesis that the number of the enemy before us is 100,000, and that we had here, sick and all, 195,000-160,000 effective men we will say, with our advantages here, and that we had determined that an advance movement should be made: how would you make it?

Answer. It would depend a great deal upon the position in which the enemy has placed his advanced force. I think we should go up to Centreville and feel the place; send up a balloon, and count every gun in it; see the exact form of their fortifications, and if the place is too strong, not attack it. If we could take Leesburg and Gum Spring, we could get down behind the enemy on the Manassas Gap railroad, I should think; I think if we did that we should have an intrenched bridge at Leesburg, or near there, over which to retire in case of disaster, and also one half-way between the Chain Bridge and Leesburg.