Instead, General Scott proposed his celebrated “anaconda plan,” which, in turn, was predicated upon a more limited strategy designed to strangle the Confederacy into submission by forcing the South to exhaust its war-making resources. General Scott felt that, as the South's war-making potential progressively declined, pro-Union sentiment throughout the South would become increasingly powerful and ultimately force the secessionists to abandon their struggle for independence and rejoin the Union. To accomplish this, the aged warrior recommended "the complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports' " of the states in rebellion, thereby sealing the South off from all access to maritime commerce and possible overseas support. This, in turn, would force the South to rely exclusively upon its own domestically derived war-making resources. In addition, he proposed the limited territorial dismemberment of the Confederacy and the severance of the South's internal communications by isolating the three trans-Mississippi states in rebellion from those east of the great river, thereby accelerating the exhaustion of Confederate war-making resources. Along these lines, he proposed 'a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points ... the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communications in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent states and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan.'" Discussing the move to permanently occupy the Mississippi Valley in more detail, General Scott stated, 66 I propose to organize an army of regulars and volunteers on the Ohio River, of say, 80,000 men, to be divided into two unequal columns, the smaller to proceed by water on the first autumnal swell in the river, headed and flanked by gunboats (propellers of great speed and strength), and the other column to proceed as nearly abreast as practicable by land-of course without the benefit of rail transportation-and receiving at certain points on the river its heavier articles of consumption from the freight boats of the first column.13 The General also recommended a cordon of posts along the Confederacy's northern border. Finally, the General-in-Chief recognized the need for a Federal force to occupy the Confederate forces in the eastern theater, but he did not seem to feel that this force should be anything more than an army of observation. Even after this limited strategy produced the collapse of the Confederacy, however, General Scott predicted that it would still be necessary for the Federal government ""to restrain the fury of the noncombatants.'" Yet, on balance, the General-inChief felt that, in view of the available and mobilizable resources at the disposal of the Lincoln Administration, this limited military/naval strategy, predicated upon the assumption that proUnion elements in the South would eventually be able to assert themselves, displace the secessionists, and bring the Southern states back into the Union, was the only appropriate course of action open to the Federal authorities. 14 General Scott, however, recognized that "the greatest obstacle in the way of the plan'" was " "the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear of consequences. . . ." Indeed, the General-in-Chief's strategy for strangling the Confederacy into exhausted submission by forcing the South to deplete its warmaking resources through the Federal naval enforcement of Southern maritime isolation, combined with the severance of internal Confederate communications by Federal occupation of the Mississippi Valley, was open to criticism for being too slow to take effect against a relatively self-sufficient South populated by a people resolved to secure their independence from the United States. First, time consuming preparations would have to be made to establish a naval blockade and to occupy the Mississippi Valley. Second, additional time would be required to effectively isolate the South from access to overseas trade and possible support via the naval blockade. In addition, time would be required to successfully sever the Confederacy's internal communications by occupying the Mississippi Valley. Third, even after the Confederacy had been externally isolated and the Deep South severed from the trans-Mississippi portion of the Confederate States, it would require even more time for the Confederate government to exhaust the South's wealth of warmaking resources, for centrally organized resistance to collapse, and for pro-Unionist elements to assert themselves and make peace. In addition to these considerations, General Scott's plan did not adequately take into account the activities of the Confederate field armies, particularly if these forces assumed the offensive. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, however, the aged General-in-Chief's strategy possessed a number of strengths. First, it stressed the importance of economic considerations in sustaining a war effort. Second, the General, at least implicitly recognized that, even after the Confederate government had ceased to be capable of sustaining the war effort and pro-Union moderates had displaced the secessionists and driven them "underground" or abroad, effective Southern resistance could continue as long as the people of the South remained committed to their goal of independence. Consequently, for a period of time following the war, the Federal authorities would have to be prepared to garrison an extensive hostile area. Beyond this, however, General Scott recognized that eventually the Southern people would have to voluntarily abandon their goal of independence and commit themselves to full participation within the restored Union. 15 Finally, the Mississippi component of General Scott's plan had the great political merit of coinciding with the perceptions and interests of the people residing in the Ohio, upper Mississippi, and Missouri River Valleys. As Bruce Catton wrote, The Mississippi was basic in Western thinking. What happened in the East might or might not matter, but this river was the road to the world and the future, the inescapable geographic symbol of the fact that if the West would live and grow it must lie at the heart of a single undivided nation. The railway network was already replacing the river as a traffic artery, but that did not destroy the symbol. The river could be seen and felt, traditions had been built around it, men would fight for it and weave legends about their fighting, and they would make any sacrifice to keep this valley open.16 William Tecumseh Sherman, an officer who was to emerge as one of the principal architects of the eventual Union victory, articulately reflected the perspective of many Westerners. General Sherman almost mystically viewed the Mississippi Valley as 'the spinal column of America,' " a “heartland binding together the Union in an indivisible whole,... (the) great center that made America unique and great and worth preserving." Hence, noting that "the valley of the Mississippi is America,'" the 66 General observed, “the inhabitants of the country on the Monongahela, the Illinois, the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage, are as directly concerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as are those who dwell on its very banks in Louisiana...." In 1861, as the Republic teetered on the edge of political disintegration, General Sherman maintained that, ""were it not for the physical geography of the country it might be that people would consent to divide and separate in peace. But the Mississippi is too grand an element to be divided and all its extent must of necessity be under one government." " Hence, for Sherman, peace between two political entities, "one which owned the source and the other the mouth of the Mississippi River," was unthinkable. Moving from the mystical to the practical, the General argued, How could it be otherwise with the agricultural South insisting upon Thus, Sherman felt that, if Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas followed their sister states from the Deep South and mid-Atlantic region out of the Union, the states of the Ohio, upper Mississippi, and Missouri Valleys would be compelled to resist with force. Moreover, Sherman predicted that if Missouri left the Union, Kentucky, southern Illinois, and southern Indiana would possibly follow. Indeed, he would later write, "to secure the safety of navigation of the Mississippi, I would slay millions.' "18 In addition to emphasizing the geopolitical and economic importance of the Mississippi Valley, General Sherman argued that, while victory would not be quick or cheap, control of the Mississippi was "the key to ultimate victory." Just as he held that he would "regard the loss of St. Louis as more fatal to our future success than the capture . . . of Harrisburg and Philadelphia,' or even Washington, the Federal seizure of the lower Mississippi was more important to ultimate success than the capture of any Eastern city, including the Confederate capital. Simply put, he stressed "whatever nation gets control of the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri Rivers will control the continent,'" because the "Atlantic slope and the Pacific shores will follow" the destiny of the Mississippi Valley “‘as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk.' ”’19 Initially, the entire cabinet, except the more aggressive Montgomery Blair, agreed with General Scott's hypothesis that by tightening pressure around the perimeter of the South, proUnion moderates in the South would eventually displace the secessionists and return the Southern states to the Union. In supporting Scott's strategy, however, Mr. Seward continued to maintain that it was still not too late to resolve the dispute by compromise. In any case, with the support of his advisors, Mr. Lincoln took the first steps toward gradually pressuring the South to abandon the rebellion. On April 15, 1861, in an attempt to separate what the members of the Administration still felt was a strong pro-Union sentiment throughout the Southern states from the secessionists, the President stated that Federal forces would be used to "... repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in any event, the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with, property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country.'" Thus, the President attempted to tell the Southern people, especially the pro-Union elements in the South, that he intended to "wage a limited war, engaging in no unnecessary punishment and destruction" and, thus, "suppress the insurrection with the least possible annoyance to well-disposed people everywhere."20 Four days later, on April 19, 1861, President Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade of the Confederate States. Thus, from the outset of the war, the mission of the Federal Navy became, 1. The closing of all the insurgent ports along a coast of nearly three thousand miles, in the form and under the exacting regulations of an international blockade, including the naval occupation and defense of the Potomac river.... 2. The organization of combined naval and military expeditions to operate in force against various points on the southern coast, rendering efficient naval cooperations with the position and movements of such |