APPENDIX

To understand the war policy of the United States government during the American Civil War or, for that matter, national security policy during any period, one must first adopt a series of working definitions. Throughout this study, the term "national objectives" refers to "those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation—as opposed to the means for seeking these endstoward which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.”1 “National policy” springs directly from national objectives, since the former represents “a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives." "Grand strategy" is "the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and lessen the chances of defeat."3 "National military strategy" is one component of grand strategy. National military strategy is "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure (national) objectives by the application or threat of force."4 As such, national military strategy performs a variety of functions. First, it establishes the goals of military operations nationally and within the theater or various theaters of war. Second, it delineates the methods to be employed in accomplishing these military-strategic goals. Third, it imposes the conditions governing the application of military force. Fourth, it prioritizes the allocation of military resources between the various theaters, as necessary. Fifth, it determines the general timing and tempo of theater operations." "Theater operational planning" takes place within the framework of the national military strategy. Theater operational planning involves the actual "employment of military forces" along the general lines delineated by the national military strategy to attain the military-strategic goals assigned to that theater of war "through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major

operations." Finally, through "tactics," unit commanders apply the combat power of their units against the enemy forces in battles or engagements."

According to Carl von Clausewitz, the celebrated nineteenth century military theoretician, since war "is an act of violence meant to force the enemy to do our will," its theoretical aim would be "to overcome the enemy and disarm him." Clausewitz distinguished between "three broad objectives: the armed forces, the country, and the enemy's will."8

The fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight. Whenever we use the phrase "destruction of the enemy's forces" this alone is what we mean. The country must be occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces. Yet both these things may be done and the war, that is the animosity and the reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit.9

Theoretically, "since of the three objectives named, it is the fighting forces that assure the safety of the country, the natural sequence would be to destroy them first and then subdue the country."10

As a rule, destroying the enemy's forces tends to be a gradual process, as does the ensuing subjugation of the country. Normally the one reacts on the other, in that loss of territory weakens the fighting forces; but that particular sequence of events is not essential and therefore does not always take place. Before they suffer seriously, the enemy's forces may retire to remote areas, or even withdraw to other countries. In that event, of course, most or all of the country will be occupied."

Moving from the theoretical to the practical, however, Clausewitz noted that:

But the aim of disarming the enemy (the object of war in the abstract, the ultimate means of accomplishing the war's political purpose, which should incorporate all the rest) is in fact not always encountered in reality, and need not be fully achieved as a condition of peace. On no account should theory raise it to the level of a law. Many treaties have been concluded before one of the antagonists could be called powerless-even before the balance of power had been seriously altered. What is more, a review of actual cases shows a whole category of wars in

which the very idea of defeating the enemy is unreal: those in which the enemy is substantially the stronger power . . . . Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost .... Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. If from the very start the other side feels that this is probable, it will obviously concentrate on bringing about this probability rather than take the long way round and totally defeat the enemy. Of even greater influence on the decision to make peace is the consciousness of all the effort that has already been made and of the efforts yet to come. Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. We see then that if one side cannot completely disarm the other, the desire for peace on either side will rise and fall with the probability of further successes and the amount of effort these would require.12

Hence, Clausewitz suggested that the choice of national military strategies by the various belligerents and their level of resolve in pursuing these national military strategies would be determined, in part, by the perceived value of the national objectives being sought. Unlimited national objectives demand nothing less than total victory and, "if we wish to gain total victory, then the destruction of his armed forces is the most appropriate action and the occupation of his territory only a consequence. To occupy land before his armies are defeated should be considered at best a necessary evil."13 If less than total national objectives are sought, then less demanding national military strategies may be pursued. For example,

If on the other hand we do not aim at destroying the opposing army, and if we are convinced that the enemy does not seek a brutal decision, but rather fears it, then the seizure of a lightly held or undefended province is an advantage in itself; and should this advantage be enough to make the enemy fear for the final outcome, it can be considered as a short cut on the road to peace. But there is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly

improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to

the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.14

From this point, Clausewitz addressed a related question, "how to influence the enemy's expenditure of effort; in other words, how to make the war more costly to him."

The enemy's expenditure of effort consists in the wastage of his forcesour destruction of them; and in his loss of territory-our conquest. Closer study will make it obvious that both of these factors can vary in their significance with the variation in objectives. As a rule the differences will be slight, but that should not mislead us, for in practice, when strong motives are not present, the slightest nuances often decide between the different uses of force. For the moment all that matters is to show that, given certain conditions, different ways of reaching the objective are possible and that they are neither inconsistent, absurd, nor even mistaken. In addition, there are three other methods directly aimed at increasing the enemy's expenditure of effort. The first of these is invasion, that is the seizure of enemy territory; not with the object of retaining it but in order to exact financial contributions, or even to lay it waste. The immediate object here is neither to conquer the enemy country nor to destroy its army, but simply to cause general damage. The second method is to give priority to operations that will increase the enemy's suffering. It is easy to imagine two alternatives: one operation is far more advantageous if the purpose is to defeat the enemy; the other is more profitable if that cannot be done. The first tends to be described as the more military, the second the more political alternative. From the highest point of view, however, one is as military as the other, and neither is appropriate unless it suits the particular conditions. The third, and far the most important method, judging from the frequency of its use, is to wear down the enemy. That expression is more than a label; it describes the process precisely, and is not so metaphorical as it may seem at first. Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.

15

In short, in wars for limited objectives, the attacker might seize the enemy's capital, his other cities, fortresses, depots, logistical centers, politically dissident areas, agricultural regions, etc. While pursuing such a national military strategy, the attacker might find it necessary to engage the enemy field forces in battle for political reasons of prestige or to raise or sustain military and popular morale. The goal of such a national military strategy would be the capture of a sufficient number of politically, strategically, economically, logistically, and/or psychologically/sym

bolically significant places, possibly combined with the visible defeat of the enemy's field forces, to induce the enemy to cease resistance despite the continued cohesion of his armies in the field. Indeed, given the impact of public opinion, often if a particular geographic region or battlefield victory is popularly perceived as being important to the success of the struggle, it, in fact, becomes important, irrespective of its intrinsic military value. Finally, Clausewitz noted that the enemy field armies derive strength from the territory which they defend. Thus, “giving up part of a country's land and resources during a withdrawal into the interior would ultimately weaken the defender because it would involve the forfeiture of magazines and depots as well as the production of the country." Conversely, the attacker would derive strength from the resources of the captured territory. As a result," "if the conquered areas are important enough, and if there are places in them vital to the areas still in enemy hands, the rot will spread, like a cancer, by itself; and if only that and nothing else happens, the conqueror may well enjoy a net advantage.'" Eventually, the enemy forces may weaken to a point where they become unable to effectively take the field.16 Thus, Clausewitz maintained that, "in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent's outright defeat. Any one of these may be used to overcome the enemy's will: the choice depends on circumstances." But, while national military strategies in pursuit of national objectives may vary, Clausewitz maintained that “fighting is the only possible means. Everything is governed by a supreme law, the decision by force of arms." .. the violent resolution of the crisis, the wish to annihilate the enemy's forces, is the first-born son of war. If the political aims are small, the motives slight and tensions low, a prudent general may look for any way to avoid major crises and decisive actions, exploit any weaknesses in the opponent's military and political strategy, and finally reach a peaceful settlement. If his assumptions are sound and promise success we are not entitled to criticize him. But he must never forget that he is moving on devious paths where the god of war may catch him unaware. He must keep his eye on the enemy in order to be adequately prepared should he suddenly be attacked with massive force.18

9917

Clausewitz recognized that the annihilation of the enemy's field army in battle was extremely difficult to accomplish and