CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

Throughout the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln attempted to establish and maintain a broad coalition of support toward the Federal war effort. Consequently, in defining the Federal war objectives, in formulating grand strategy, and, within the framework of that grand strategy, delineating the national military strategy, the President had to take into consideration the opinions of a number of articulate members of his own Administration, the Congress, the Union Army, the various state governments, and other influential citizens, including newspapermen, business leaders, and the clergy. Indirectly, the President had to take into consideration the amorphous body of public opinion which stood behind these influential leaders and popular representatives. Regionally, he had to remain sensitive to the pulse of the Northeast, the Great Lakes region, and the Ohio, Missouri, and upper Mississippi Valleys. Moreover, especially at the outset of the war, but perhaps with somewhat reduced emphasis throughout the entire conflict, Mr. Lincoln had to weigh the views of the peoples residing in the border areas of Maryland, western Virginia, eastern Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri. Furthermore, during the four years of the conflict, the President attempted to shape his response to the Southern rebellion in such a way as to have a positive impact upon Southern opinion. Finally, Mr. Lincoln had to take into consideration the attitudes of the European powers, particularly the British, in formulating Federal war policy.

Unfortunately for the President, none of these institutional bodies or geographic areas represented a cohesive opinion block toward the Federal war effort. For analytical purposes, at least four opinion groups cross-cut the institutional bodies and geographic regions noted above: the Radical Republicans, the Moderate Republicans, the War Democrats, and the Peace

Democrats. It should be emphasized, however, that, with respect to specific aspects of Federal war policy, these four general opinion groups often reconfigured in support or opposition to a particular course of action. Moreover, further complicating an already very clouded political environment, throughout the terrible four year war, the attitudes of many key leaders, as well as those of the public at large, evolved, often drastically. For example, within the Union Army, as the war lengthened with no end in sight, the attitudes of both the military leadership and the common soldiers evolved regarding the definition of the Federal war objectives, as well as the goals, methods, and conditions governing military operations nationally and within the various theaters of war. Finally, in formulating the Federal response to the Southern rebellion, the President had to weigh not only the attitudes of the various elements cited above, he also had to weigh his own evolving convictions. He would have to do so within an often volatile, emotionally charged political, military, social, and even personal context which, in turn, further complicated the environment in which Presidential leadership decisions were made. Perhaps the greatest asset of the Union cause during these four traumatic years was the tower of strength provided by Abraham Lincoln. More than any other single individual, he was responsible for saving the Union.

From the outset of the war, the national objectives of the United States government were total, although the scope of those objectives escalated. The conflict began as a war for total political objectives-the restoration of the Union and the total extinction of the movement supporting Southern independence. In the autumn of the second year of the war, however, under very heavy pressure from the radical wing of the Republican Party, the Administration reluctantly opted to escalate the definition of the Federal war objectives, transforming the conflict into a war for total socio-economic, as well as total political objectives. From the President's perspective, emancipation of the slaves became essential politically, militarily, internationally, and morally. This escalation in the scope of Washington's national objectives, however, did not alter the total nature of Federal war objectives. Hence, from the outset of the conflict, nothing less

than total victory over the forces supporting the cause of Southern political independence was required. Compromise between the antagonists predicated upon the perpetuation of the Southern Confederacy was impossible, since a compromise along these lines would have been tantamount to a Federal defeat.

In framing Federal strategy, President Lincoln consistently recognized that it was imperative that the people of the Northern states retain their commitment to continue to make the inevitable sacrifices necessary to successfully suppress the Southern rebellion. Indeed, the Confederacy's best hope for victory was to wear the North down until it finally would acquiesce to Southern independence. From another perspective, however, Mr. Lincoln recognized that, if the struggle to restore the Union was to be ultimately successful, not only would the Southerners have to cease resistance at all levels, they would have to abandon their ambitions to achieve independence and voluntarily resume their roles as full participatory citizens within the American political system. Finally, President Lincoln, as well as others, including Generals Scott and McClellan, were, from the outset of the conflict, aware that the definition of the national objectives and the goals, methods, and conditions governing theater operations were symbiotically interconnected. They recognized that, not only would the definition of the national objectives influence the delineation of the national military strategy, the reverse was also true. The definition of the national objectives would itself be influenced by the level of wartime suffering, which, in turn, would be determined by the level of violence resulting, in part, from the implementation of the national military strategy. Indeed, the longer the war lasted, the more severe might become the level of violence. A long, harsh war would increase the probability that the definition of the national objectives would escalate. These considerations, in turn, would increase the likelihood of draconian peace terms and mutual post-war bitterness. All of this would make a post-war settlement and voluntary popular submission by the defeated side proportionately difficult. As noted earlier, in the case of the American Civil War, if the Federal government was to be truly victorious, the defeated Southerners would eventually have to willingly resume

their rightful places as co-equal citizens in the Republic and be willingly accepted as co-equals by the victorious Northerners. As such, President Lincoln felt that it was imperative to suppress the Southern rebellion as quickly as possible before extremism acquired a momentum of its own which would be difficult or impossible for the President, or anyone, to control. Conversely, especially during the first year and a half of the war, the Radical Republicans wanted the war to last sufficiently long for them to pressure the Administration to escalate the national objectives to include the immediate, compulsory, uncompensated emancipation of the slaves and the destruction of the socio-economicpolitical power of the Southern agrarian establishment. Similarly, from the outset of the war, some military officers felt that the goals, methods, and conditions governing theater operations inherent in the national military strategy should be made more

severe.

Based upon these considerations, the President argued consistently that, in formulating the national military strategy and in planning and conducting theater operations, the Union forces would have to demonstrate activity and forward progress in extinguishing the flames of the Southern rebellion. Only by demonstrating tangible progress toward that goal could the Administration retain Northern popular support for the war effort and demonstrate strength and determination to the European powers. Moreover, initially, immediate forward progress was considered to be imperative in order to strengthen proUnion forces and undermine the secessionists throughout the Southern states. But even after the secessionists had become entrenched and the political significance of the Southern Unionists had virtually ceased to be an immediate factor in Washington's war planning, steady forward progress by the Union armies was still deemed to be essential in order to impress upon the Southerners the belief that the North was willing to make whatever sacrifices were necessary, for as long as necessary, in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Hence, the Federal high command repeatedly attempted to instill in the minds of such theater commanders as Generals McClellan, Buell, Rosecrans, and Thomas, among others, the political urgency to engage

the enemy. Of course, some commanders, such as Generals Grant and Sherman consistently demonstrated sensitivity to the linkage between societal attitudes, foreign perceptions, and military operations. Indeed, although Mr. Lincoln seemed at times to have felt that any forward movement by the Union armies, yielding any result, was preferable to no movement at all, he was, of course, sensitive to the psychological and symbolic, as well as military, political, and economic significance of field successes, such as Antietam, Stones River, and Atlanta, and field reversals, such as the Seven Days Battles, Fredericksburg, and Chickamauga. In the final analysis, however, the President was quite aware that victory in the field was the key to final victory in war. Hence, when the Southern rebellion was young, the President felt that an early, highly visible success, whether in battle or in terms of the capture of specifically targeted locations, would abruptly terminate the insurrection. Even by mid-1863, after the forces of Southern secession had secured virtually complete control within the Southern states and had effectively displaced the Southern Unionists, after the Federal war objectives had been amended to combine total socio-economic objectives with the total political objectives originally sought, Mr. Lincoln, perhaps somewhat overoptimistically, appears to have believed that, had the extremely significant Federal victory at Vicksburg been combined with a successful exploitation of the opportunity provided by the Army of the Potomac's victory at Gettysburg to decisively destroy General Lee's army, the rebellion would have abruptly collapsed.

Early in the war, Mr. Lincoln concluded that, by applying the principle of simultaneous advances nationally and within the various theaters, the advantage of interior lines, often enjoyed by the Confederates, could be partially overcome. Consequently, throughout the war, the President urged the various theater commanders to be mutually supportive by synchronizing the timing of their operations. In advocating this, however, the President remained sensitive to the need to prioritize among the various theaters of war in allocating resources. Consequently, after the disappointing campaigns of the first eighteen months of the war in the Virginia theater, as opposed to the comparative Federal