which stated, “After four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities..." Thus, notwithstanding General McClellan's expressed commitment to continue the war, the Democrats clearly emerged as the party of peace in the 1864 campaign.40

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By August, within this political context and against what appeared to be a rising tide of Northern discontent caused by the high level of battlefield casualties, accompanied by the lack of any dramatic successes against the Confederate armies, Mr. Lincoln entertained "grave doubts" concerning his reelection chances. Furthermore, he, as well as many others, felt that his failure to secure reelection would probably lead to the final defeat of the efforts to restore the Union. President Lincoln believed that, if General McClellan were to win the election, his victory would have been secured “ ‘on such grounds that he cannot possibly save it (the Union)" " after taking office. Hence, in the event of defeat in the November election, the President resolved to try to "cooperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration,'" since, in his opinion, that would be the old Union's last chance. In doing so, irrespective of the final result, President Lincoln told the members of his cabinet, "At least, I should have done my duty, and have stood clear before my own conscience." "41 If the Confederates could hold out a bit longer without suffering any really significant, highly visible reversals in the field, it was still quite possible for them to emerge victorious from America's terrible ordeal.

CHAPTER VII

Summer 1864-Winter 1865

The mid-summer and early autumn of 1864 was one of the most momentous times in the history of the United States; indeed, the fate of the republic hung in the balance. But then, dramatically, the tide of war began to shift clearly in favor of the Union. First, the port of Mobile was finally closed by the Federal naval forces. Earlier, immediately following the capture of New Orleans in the spring of 1862, Admiral Farragut had wanted to move against Mobile and, as noted earlier, General Grant had long advocated the capture of Mobile Bay as the prelude to his proposed Alabama River expedition. Finally, on August 5, 1864, Admiral Farragut took control of Mobile Bay. On August 23, Fort Morgan, at the entrance to the Bay, was overcome, although, for the next three quarters of a year, the city of Mobile itself remained in Confederate hands. Between January and April, 1865, a coordinated Union army-navy force operated against the city, resulting in its eventual capture on April 12, 1865, long after it had ceased to have strategic significance in the Union war effort.'

Meanwhile, on August 25, following a lengthy artillery bombardment of Atlanta, during which "the ground shook night and day from the roar of 223 cannon,' General Sherman quickly moved his forces south of the city and severed the rail lines which were vital for continued Confederate possession of the city. Without communications, the Southerners had no viable choice but to abandon the city. Hence, on September 1, 1864, the Confederate army evacuated Atlanta and regrouped south of the city. The following day, General Sherman informed Washington that Atlanta was in Union hands. The fall of Atlanta was, of course, of enormous importance, since, with its fall, the Confederacy lost one of its major cities, an important rail hub, and a key supply center. As B. H. Liddell Hart wrote,

For Atlanta, . . . had a three-fold strategic value—apart from its moral value, which grew with the effort to hold it. First, as one of the few manufacturing centres for munitions—a term wider than “ammunition"—in the agrarian Confederacy; its foundries and machine-shops furnishing a high proportion of the material without which the war could not be maintained. Second, as the greatest rail centre of the South; thither converged and thence radiated outward the main lines connecting the Atlantic seaboard with the western parts of the Confederacy. If these were already curtailed, the value of Alabama's resources had increased thereby, and not least that of the newly created ordinance works at Selma. Third, because Atlanta was the inner back gate, as Chattanooga was the outer, to the Atlantic states of old foundation, which were the foundation of the hostile power and will. And the last line of nature's battlements was that which covered Atlanta. Once the Atlanta gate could be opened the heart of the Confederacy would lie open to a mortal thrust.2

Professors Hattaway and Jones pointed out, however,

The existence elsewhere of another east-west railway link did, however, limit Atlanta's importance. This still unbroken line ran through Macon, some 100 miles south of Atlanta. Although Union forces had closed the port of Mobile, the major manufacturing centers of Selma and Augusta remained untouched and still enjoyed uninterrupted rail connections. The fall of Atlanta hurt the Confederate logistics badly but not fatally.3 Finally, notwithstanding the capture of Atlanta, the Confederate army which had been defending the city was not destroyed. Rather, it had escaped intact to fight again. On balance, perhaps the greatest impact of Atlanta's fall was symbolic; its capture by Sherman's army group had enormous psychological significance to the people of both the North and the South. This, in turn, had tremendous political and military ramifications for both antagonists. In the North, General Sherman's capture of Atlanta provided the Northern people with a highly visible field victory and, thus, significantly lifted their morale. Moreover, Sherman's victory gave the Lincoln Administration tangible evidence to place before the Northern electorate that General Grant's strategy was, indeed, working and that real progress was being made.4 Conversely, as Professors Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still observed, throughout the South,

... the fall of Atlanta produced exactly the opposite effect. Desertion rates, already serious, now multiplied as the needs of destitute families at home were reinforced by a soldier's presumption of the inevitable

outcome of the war to persuade him that there was no more point in risking his life for a lost cause. It was no longer possible to augment military power by the strength of national will, nor was it possible to stiffen civilian determination by exciting victories on the field. The basic purposes of government are to protect lives and property, but as casualty lists lengthened, the letters from home grew more urgent, and the Union armies seemed more aggressive, it became clear that Confederate armies were doing neither. Why, then, a Confederacy? Thousands of soldiers and civilians asked themselves that question and concluded that "their interests could best be protected by rejoining the Union:” accordingly, they waged war with less enthusiasm than heretofore. After Atlanta, the bottom was about to drop out of the Confederate tub.❜

Finally, in the Virginia theater, although the stalemate in the Petersburg area continued, Union forces made significant progress in the Shenandoah Valley. As T. Harry Williams noted, following the Southern raid on Pennsylvania, General Grant,

realized that he would have to unify the command system in the Washington area by putting the troops in the capital and the adjacent departments under the control of one general. Early (the Confederate Commander of the Shenandoah Valley army) was still in the Valley and was sure to strike again. Only a central command of all the forces around the city could prevent a recurrence of the confusion prevailing in the recent raid. If Early could make periodic sweeps at Washington and escape each time because of the divisions in the Federal command system, Grant would always have to be detaching troops from Petersburg to chase after the Confederates. He would never be able to corner Lee. Furthermore, Grant knew that if Early got close to Washington again Lincoln would become dissatisfied with the defense setup for the capital."

Consequently, in early August, 1864, the General-in-Chief unified the confused command structure in northern Virginia. Grant placed Major General Philip H. Sheridan in command of the troops in Washington, northern Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. General Sheridan's mission was to destroy the Confederate field forces in the Shenandoah Valley, destroy the rail lines and the James River canal which connected Richmond and the Confederate army with the Shenandoah Valley, and destroy the crops in the area so as to prevent them from being utilized by the increasingly hard pressed Southerners. General Grant summed up his instructions to General Sheridan by stating, "Give the enemy no rest, and if it is possible to follow

to the Virginia Central road, follow that far. Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste.'" Meanwhile, the Army of the Potomac remained active in the Petersburg area in an effort, not only to break the defenses and/or sever the rail lines of communications which extended southward from the town, but also to prevent General Lee from reinforcing the Confederate forces in the Valley and, optimally, to force Lee to recall the Valley force to assist in the defense of Petersburg. If the latter occurred, General Grant instructed General Sheridan to aggressively pursue the retiring Southerners. Throughout September, culminating in mid-October, fighting continued in the Shenandoah Valley and, ultimately, the Confederates were compelled to suspend operations in the area. Following in the wake of the closure of Mobile Bay and the fall of Atlanta, Sheridan's victory in the Shenandoah Valley further depressed Southern morale, elevated Northern morale, and significantly helped secure Mr. Lincoln's reelection. On September 22, 1864, the Radical favorite, John C. Fremont, withdrew from the Presidential race. As Allen Nevins noted,

Fremont, a lifelong Abolitionist at heart, had withdrawn primarily because he thought that McClellan's candidacy on a platform which offered longer life to slavery must at all cost be defeated. "The Chicago platform is simply separation," he wrote. "General McClellan's letter of acceptance is re-establishment with slavery." Both were intolerable. "The Republican candidate, on the contrary, is pledged to the re-establishment of the Union without slavery . . ." Fremont would do what he could to prevent a Democratic victory, and he realized that Republican unity was a paramount necessity.'

Notwithstanding Fremont's withdrawal, however, while Mr. Lincoln obtained an overwhelming 212 electoral votes, compared to General McClellan's 21, only 400,000 popular votes separated the two candidates. Hence, even a relatively small shift in the voting patterns in the larger states could have altered the results of the election. Clearly, Mr. Lincoln owed his reelection to Admiral Farragut, General Sherman, General Sherdian, and the architect of the overall operational plan for the 1864 campaign, General Grant. Conversely, "for many Southerners, Lincoln's