ineffective naval blockade of the Southern coast. These measures were clearly insufficient to decisively strengthen pro-Union Southern moderates and enable them to displace the secessionists, thereby causing the collapse of the Southern Confederacy. In the larger sense, however, the South was too self-sufficient for the strategy of enforced isolation to cause the Confederacy to exhaust its domestically produced war-making resources in a reasonable amount of time. Moreover, there were no specific geographic targets which were so imperative to the survival of the Confederacy that their loss would cause the Richmond government to collapse. Finally, in the largest sense, the South's commitment to the goal of political independence from the United States appeared in the autumn of 1862 to be too strong for any limited military strategy to yield decisive results. 32

As the war continued with no end in sight, the attitudes of the Northern people, as well as their political and military leaders regarding the style with which the war was being fought and the national objectives which ought to be sought began to slowly undergo a transformation. After a year and a half of costly fighting, many Northerners began to have second thoughts about the moderate prosecution of the war with its emphasis upon shielding non-combatants and sparing their property (including slaves) from confiscation or destruction. Discussing this trend, Bruce Catton observed,

The longer the war went on and the more it cost, the less willing were patriots on either side to recede from this position. The heroic dead, who were so tragically numerous and who had died for such diametrically opposite causes, must not have died in vain, and only total victory would justify what had been done. And because total victory was the only thinkable outcome, men came to feel that it was right to do anything at all that might bring victory nearer. It was right to destroy railroads, to burn factories and confiscate supplies of food or other raw materials, to seize or ruin any kind of property which was helpful to the enemy.

33

Officers, such as General Grant, who had initially felt that the Confederate government would collapse after a few early defeats, now concluded that nothing but "complete conquest" would yield victory and that the war should be "pursued to the limit." Hence, by the summer and early autumn of 1862, Grant had concluded,

I regard it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. Protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within reach of the Confederate armies I regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war . . . This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end. 34

Similarly, even General Halleck was increasingly adopting a harder attitude, instructing General Grant that,

It is very desirable that you should clear out West Tennessee and North Mississippi of all organized enemies. If necessary, take up all active sympathizers, and either hold them as prisoners or put them beyond our lines. Handle that class without gloves, and take their property for public use. As soon as the corn gets fit for forage get all the supplies you can from the rebels in Mississippi. It is time that they should begin to feel the presence of war on our side.35

Similarly, Major General William T. Sherman, an officer who began the war with extremely orthodox and scrupulous views regarding the definition and enforcement of foraging activities, began to liberalize and adopt a less restrictive policy. It should be noted, however, that in liberalizing their attitudes toward foraging, none of the Union leaders, including General Grant, had yet concluded that an army could cut loose from its line of communications and live off the enemy countryside.36

Finally, according to the future President, but then Brigadier General James A. Garfield, there "grew the conviction in the mind of every soldier that 'behind the Rebel army of soldiers, the black army of laborers was feeding and sustained the rebellion and there could be no victory until its main support was taken away." " Hence, above and beyond the Congressional pressures which were being brought to bear upon the President regarding immediate emancipation, many Northern soldiers increasingly concluded that the emancipation of the slaves would be necessary in order to undercut the strength of the Confederacy. This, however, was not usually accompanied by the corollary conviction that the blacks should be made equal citizens. These Northerners merely wanted to free the slaves because their

"bondage propped up the power of the Confederacy." In addition, the slavery question demanded attention since, "no matter where the Union armies went and no matter what they did, they met the Negro slave, and they had to do something about him simply because he was there. He represented a problem that could not possibly be postponed, and the inner sympathies of the men on whom the problem was being thrust made no difference at all." In short, for a host of reasons, by mid to late 1862, the Lincoln Administration concluded that the time had come, not only to replace the army's eastern and one of its western field commanders, the time had also come to fundamentally reconsider the definition of the national objectives and the national military strategy adopted to attain these objectives.37

CHAPTER IV

Autumn 1862-Summer 1863

Throughout the summer and the early autumn, President Lincoln began to reevaluate the Administration's position concerning the abolition of slavery and its relationship to the Federal government's national war objectives. As already traced, the first year and a quarter of the war witnessed the gradual growth of Radical influences within the Republican Party and Congress. Indeed, by the middle of the summer, 1862, the President feared "that if he did not adopt emancipation, the Congressional leaders would cut off appropriations for sustaining the war." Moreover, Mr. Lincoln concluded that, if he was to retain the leadership of his party, he would have to modify his position regarding gradual, compensated emancipation. Hence, during the summer of 1862, the President decided to seize the leadership of the abolitionist movement within the government. On July 13, the President privately and informally raised the topic with two members of his cabinet. Describing the conversation, Allen Nevins wrote that, in Mr. Lincoln's view, "the government had reached a crisis... it must make new military arrangements to meet the astonishing strength of the Confederacy, find a fresh inspiration to stimulate volunteering, and tap the reservoir of slave power." Hence, the President announced that he had ""about come to the conclusion'" that the Administration would have to emancipate the slaves or lose the war. He felt that "it had become essential as a political measure, to keep the Republican Party behind him; a war measure, to cripple the South; a foreign policy measure, to align the humanitarian sentiment of the world, and especially Great Britain, with the North; and a measure to lift national morale." During the next several days, the Chief Executive drafted the historic Emancipation Proclamation. Finally, on July 22, President Lincoln announced to the cabinet that he had completed the draft. During the discussion