augment the savings of the family.76 A person may be wholly dependent on an employee, although the support received is not wholly from the wages of the employment," or although the contributions are not paid directly to him.78 [52] D. Persons Partially Dependent. Partial dependency may exist, although the alleged dependent could have subsisted without the contributions of the employee,79 or is not without the neces timony of the petitioner that the son lived at home with his father and mother and that all three of them worked in the mill, the father earning about $11.50, and the mother and son each about $8.00 per week; that the father owned the house in which they lived, which had a rental value of $10.00 a month; and that the father and mother owned two other houses, each of which rented for $7.00 a month. These houses were mortgaged for $500.00, the interest being $30.00 per year. The son gave his pay to his parents every week, in return for which they gave him about $1.00 in money, in addition to supplying him with board, lodging and clothing. From this arrangement the father received a net profit of some $5.00 a week from his son's wages, and at the time of the injury to the son the united savings of the family were from $10.00 to $12.00 per week. Since the death of the son the mother has ceased to work in the mill, but the father has continued to work there and has been able to support himself and wife out of his wages and income and save $3.00 or $4.00 per week. Upon these essential facts the Superior Court found that the father was not wholly or partly dependent for support upon the earnings of his son at the time of the injury and, therefore, was not entitled to receive compensation under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Superior Court, however, ordered the respondent to pay to the petitioner the sum of $200.00 for the expenses of the last sickness and burial of the son. We think that the decision of the Superior Court was correct." Dazy V. Apponaug Co., 36 R. I. 81, 84, 89 A 160. 76. Dazy v. Apponaug Co., 36 R. I. 81, 85, 89 A 160. "The petitioner is not bound to deprive himself of the ordinary necessaries of life to which he has been accustomed in order to absolve the respondent from the payment of damages nor can he on the other hand demand money from the employer for the purpose of adding to his savings or investments. The expression dependent' must be held to mean dependent for the ordinary necessaries of life for a person of his class and position, and does not cover the reception of benefits which might be devoted to the establishment or increase of some fund which he might desire to lay aside." Dazy v. Apponaug Co., supra. 77. State v. Beltrami County Dist. Ct., 131 Minn. 27, 154 NW 509. [a] Illustration.-A widowed mother, without means, who is supported by her son, partly by the wages of his employment and partly by the yield of his land, is wholly dependent on her son for support. within the meaning of the Minnesota Compensation Act (Gen. St. [1913] § 8208 par 2). State V. Beltrami County Dist. Ct., 131 Minn. 27, 154 NW 509. 78. Walz v. Holbrook, etc., Corp., 170 App. Div. 6, 155 NYS 703. [a] Sister living with parents."The appellant contends, however, that the sister was not a dependent within the meaning of the statute, for the reasons that the moneys for her support were not paid directly to her individually by the deceased, and that her parents were legally chargeable with such support. If dependent upon the moneys contrib uted to her support by the deceased, I had, during his father's illness, sent such dependency was not affected by his mother ten dollars a week from the fact that the moneys were SO his weekly wages of fifteen dollars, applied by a person to whom they and after the father's death he sent had been paid by the deceased for her from twenty dollars to twentythat purpose." Walz v. Holbrook, five dollars a month to be applied on etc., Corp., 170 App. Div. 6, 9, 155 his father's funeral expenses, and, NYS 703. when such expenses were paid, it was arranged that he and his mother were to live together and that he would support her, and where the mother was temporarily living with another son, but, except as stated, none of the other children contributed to her support, no error was apparent in a conclusion that the mother was totally dependent .on such employee. Kennerson Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A 372, LRA1916A 436. 79. Hotel Bond Co.'s App., 89 Conn. 143, 152, 93 A 245; Smith v. Cope, 6 BWCC 569; Howells V. Vivian, 4 WCC 106, 85 L. T. Rep. N. S. 529. "In this case there was evidence that the deceased contributed to the support of his mother, and that she, while not immediately dependent for sustenance upon such contributions, was, because of advancing years, condition of mind, lack of regular employment and of property, liable to become dependent. We cannot hold, as matter of law, that this evidence did not tend to prove that the mother had been receiving support from her deceased son and was not partially dependent upon him. Nor can we hold, as matter of law, that evidence such as this did not tend to prove a condition of partial dependency." Hotel Bond Co.'s App., supra. [a] Earnings establishing independence.-A woman stenographer capable of earning, when at work, five hundred and twenty dollars or more per year cannot be said as a matter of law to be independent. Miller v. Riverside Storage, etc., Co., (Mich.) 155 NW 462. 80. Havey v. Erie R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 444, 95 A 124 [rev on other grounds 88 N. J. L. 684, 96 A 995]. 81. Mahoney v. Gamble-Desmond Co., (Conn.) 96 A 1025; Hotel Bond Co.'s App., 89 Conn. 143, 93 A 245; Main Colliery Co. v. Davies, [1900] A. C. 358, 2 WCC 108 [aff 1 WCC 92]; Simmons v. White, [1899] 1 Q. B. 1005, 1 WCC 89; Turner v. Miller, 3 BWCC 305; Arrol v. Kelly, 7 F. (Ct. Sess.) 906; French v. Underwood, 5 WCC 119; Varesick v. British Columbia Copper Co., 12 B. C. 286. "The test of dependency is not whether the petitioner, by reducing his expenses below a standard suitable to his condition in life, could secure a subsistence for his family without the contributions of the deceased son, but whether such contributions were needed to provide the family with the ordinary necessaries of life suitable for persons in their class and position." Dazy v. Apponaug Co., 36 R. I. 81, 85, 89 A 160. [a] Illustrations.-(1) "We are only to determine whether at the time of the injury the father was dependent upon the boy's earnings within the meaning of the act. As to this we think there can be no doubt. It was the father's duty to support the boy, and it was his right to receive the boy's wages. The boy did not, as the respondent argues, give to his father his pay envelope in exchange for maintenance. Nor did the father maintain the boy in exchange for his wages. The boy's wages belonged to the father. Whatever earnings the boy turned over to his father were used by the father in discharging his legal obligation to support his family; and as the father had no other income at the time of the injury, he was plainly dependent on the boy's earnings for his means of living." Mahoney v. Gamble-Desmond Co., (Conn.) 96 A 1025, 1026. (2) Where a deceased employee, who left surviving him two brothers, a sister, and a mother, V. 82. Kenney's Case, 222 Mass. 401, 111 NE 47; Conners v. Public Service Electric Co., (N. J.) 97 A 792; Hammill v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 388, 94 A 313; Krauss v. Fritz, 87 N. J. L. 321, 93 A 578; Walz v. Holbrook, etc., Corp., 170 App. Div. 6, 155 NYS 703; Tirre v. Bush Terminal Co., 158 NYS 883. "Dependent" means dependent for the ordinary necessaries of life; one who looks to another for support or help. Jackson v. Erie R. Co., 86 N. J. L. 550. 91 A 1035. [a] Illustrations.—(1) "In the case at bar the earnings of the employee were the chief source to which the claimant looked for her maintenance and support. Apparently his regular and substantial payments were given by him and received by her, not as a gratuity, but in recognition of a moral if not a legal obligation to support her, in accordance with the promise made when he induced her to become a non-producer. This is enough to create a relation of dependence, as a basis for compensation." Kenney's Case, 222 Mass. 401, 404, 111 NE 47. (2) "It is denied that petitioner [a sister] is an actual dependent, and it is practically conceded that no one else could claim to be such. The evidence shows that deceased made his home at her house, so far as he had a home, and that his brother did likewise. Both worked on their boats and were away from Monday until Saturday, but always spent their spare time, from Saturday until Monday, at her house, and each paid her $5 a week. The court found, and its finding is justified, that these payments were materially greater than the mere value of the board and lodging for thirty-six hours and the care of their extra clothing, &c., for the rest of the week so that they were really contributing to her support." Hammill v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 388, 389, 94 A 313. (3) "Proof that prior to and up to the time of his death the decedent gave his earnings to his father and that the father had no other income or means of support, justifies a finding that the father was an actual dependent of the decedent." Reardon v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 90, 88 A 970. [b] Contributions to support.-A son living with his parents and paying the price for his board and lodging that is ordinarily paid at boarding houses may be said to be contributing to their support. Erickson v. American Well Works, 196 Ill. A. 346. 83. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A 372, LRA 1916A 436; Hotel Bond Co.'s 84 family fund, and the contributions may be at irregular intervals and in irregular amounts,85 and need not approximate at least the minimum amounts of compensation fixed by the act.8 87 86 Financial injury as test.8 Under the English act the amount recoverable in cases of partial dependency must be reasonable and proportionate to the 90 injury to the dependent. As a result of this, under XI. INJURIES FOR WHICH COMPENSATION MAY BE HAD of a liberal construction.9 98 The fact that a com- Incapacity. To constitute incapacity as a basis. [§ 53] A. In General. Under the terms of the English act, which have been quite generally followed in the United States,"1 to give rise to a claim for compensation the employee must have sustained personal injury-92 by accident 93 arising out of, and in the course of, the employment.94 Some statutes in the United States, however, omit the words "by accident" as a qualification of the words "personal injury.''95 Others provide that the injury shall be in the course of the employment without in terms requiring that it shall arise out of the employment.96 The Washington statute is apparently sui generis, and totally omits any part of the phrase "personal injury by accident arising out of, and in the course of, employment."97 In the application of these provisions of the statutes the courts favor the adoption App., 89 Conn. 143, 93 A 245; Smith | B. 521, 2 BWCC 282; Tamworth Col- | (2) It has been held to insure workv. National Sash, etc., Co., 96 Kan. liery Co. v. Hall, 4 BWCC 313. 816, 153 P 533; Walz v. Holbrook, etc., Corp., 170 App. Div. 6, 155 NYS 703. [a] Illustration.-Where plaintiff's illegitimate son, eighteen years old, living with her and her husband, turned over to her his wages, paying nothing for his board, room, or laundry, but obtaining from her money for his expenditures, she was partly dependent on him, although she was supported by her husband, where she had required certain medical and surgical attention, the expenses of which were paid in part by the deceased, and his wages were always available by her for such attention, all of which extra expense could be met only by using a portion of his earnings. Smith V. National Sash, etc., Co., 96 Kan. 816, 153 P 533. 84. McLean v. Moss Bay Hæmatite Iron, etc., Co., 3 BWCC 402 [rev [1909] 2 K. B. 521, 2 BWCC 282]; Hodgson V. West Stanley Colliery, BWCC 260. Contra Senior Fountains, [1907] 2 K. B. 563, 9 WCC 116. 3 V. 85. Hotel Bond Co.'s App., 89 Conn. 143, 93 A 245; Taylor v. Seabrook, 87 N. J. L. 407, 94 A 399; Robertson v. Hall Bros. SS. Co., 3 BWCC 368; Follis v. Schaake Mach. Works, 13 B. C. 471, 1 BWCC 442. [a] Illustration.-"The next point is that the widow and daughter, for whose benefit the petition was filed. are not dependents in the sense intended by the act. This point we deem to be without substance. It is true that the deceased did not work steadily, that he was inclined to dissipation, that he did not live at home all of the time, and that his wife's position was not very satisfactory. But there was evidence that when he did work he contributed a substantial part of his earnings towards the support of his wife and daughter, and that he and his wife were not living in a state of legal separation in any sense of the word. Consequently, the presumption of dependency was not rebutted. See Pamph. L. 1913, p. 305." Taylor v. Seabrook, 87 N. J. L. 407, 408, 94 A 399. 86. Hotel Bond Co.'s App., 89 Conn. 143, 93 A 245. 87. As fixing amount of compensation see infra § 96. 88. Mahoney v. Gamble-Desmond Co.. (Conn.) 96 A 1025; McLean v. Moss Bay Iron, etc., Co., [1909] 2 K. Hazardous employments. Where the statute provides that compensation shall be paid for injuries to employees engaged in enumerated hazardous employments, it is not sufficient that the employment is within the statute, but the employee at the time of the injury must be engaged therein;2 although 89. Mahoney v. Gamble-Desmond Co., (Conn.) 96 A 1025, 1026. "We are not, therefore, required in this case to strike a balance between the boy's earnings and the cost of his maintenance, with a view to ascertaining whether his death was a financial injury to the father." Mahoney V. Gamble-Desmond Co., supra. 90. St. 60 & 61 Vict. c 37 § 1 (1); 6 Edw. VII c 58 § 1 (1). 91. See statutory provisions; and 92. See infra §§ 54-62. men absolutely against injury re- Commn., supra. 98. In re Keaney, 217 Mass. 5, 104 NE 438; State v. St. Louis County Dist. Ct., 129 Minn. 176, 151 NW 912; Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Commn., 91 Wash. 588, 158 P 256; Zappala v. Industrial Ins. Commn., 82 Wash. 314, 144 P 54, LRA1916A 295; Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 NW 640, LRA1916A 273. 99. Wagner v. American Bridge Co., 158 NYS 1043 (holding that under the New York act the intention was to provide compensation for all personal injuries involving permanent or temporary disability, whether total or partial). 1. 144 P 244. Incapacity as measure of compen- 2. Newman v. Newman, 218 N. Y. See infra § 63. Stertz V. Industrial Ins. "We decline to read into our act [a] Construction of statute.-(1) [a] Illustrations.-(1) Where decedent, a motorman, finished his work for the day, signed his name to the register as evidence thereof, started to take one of the company's cars to go to have his watch tested, a fortnightly requirement of the company which designated and paid the person making the test, and was killed by an automobile running near the curb, he was not engaged in the operation of a street railway, included as a hazardous employment, since the testing of his watch was merely a condition of employment. 1 the injury need not result from the particular risk which induced the legislature to include the employment within the operation of the act.3 Right of action against third person. Unless the statute provides to the contrary, the fact that the employee or his representative may have a cause of action for the injury against a third person will not prevent an award of compensation.* De Voe v. New York State R. Cos., a 3. Boody v. K. & C. Mfg. Co., 77 N. H. 208, 90 A 859, LRA1916A 10, AnnCas1914D 1280. 4. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 79, 86 A 458; Mercer v. Ott, (W. Va.) 89 SE 952. "The fact, if it be a fact, that the representative of the decedent has also a right of action against a third party, in nowise militates against the present action. The act under which this suit is brought, and which at best provides only for partial compensation, nowhere provides specifically or by implication that an employe shall be deprived of his right to compensation thereunder merely because the accident gives rise to a right of recovery against a third party." Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72. 79, 86 A 458. Effect of compensation acts on rights of action against third person see infra §§ 167-172. 5. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 111 NE 379, LRA1916D 1000; In re Johnson, 217 Mass. 388, 390, 104 NE 735. "It is clear that 'personal injury' under our act includes any injury or disease which arises out of and in the course of the employment, which causes incapacity for work and thereby impairs the ability of the employee for earning wages." In re Johnson, supra. [a] "In common speech the word injury,' as applied to a personal injury to a human being, includes whatever lesion or change in any part of the system produces harm or pain or a lessened facility of any natural use of any bodily activity or capability." Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8. 12, 105 NE 601, AnnCas 1916A 787. "It is not necessary to 'personal injury' that there be a physical impact.' Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 492, 111 NE 379, LRA1916D 1000. same effect Coyle v. Watson, [1915] A. C. 1. To [§ 54] B. Necessity and Character of Physical Harm-1. Injury; Injury by Accident; Accident. The term "personal injury" when employed by itself and without qualification is broad enough to include any bodily injury. It is not limited to injuries caused by external violence or physical force" and is more inclusive than the phrase "personal injury by accident" which is more often employed.' 6. Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8, 105 | Commission on Compensation for InNE 601, AnnCas1916A 787; In re dustrial Accidents, 1912, page 46. Johnson, 217 Mass. 388, 104 NE 735; This difference must be treated as In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 NE the result of deliberate design by 336, AnnCasi915C 919, LRA1916A 279. the General Court after intelligent understanding of the limitation expressed by the words of the English act. The freer and more comprehensive words in our act must be given their natural construction with whatever added force may come from the intentional contrast in phraseology with the Englist act. The 'personal injury by accident,' which by the English act is made the prerequisite for the award of financial relief, is narrower in its scope than the simple 'personal injury' of our Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 489, 111 NE 379, LRA1916D 1000. (2) "It is true that in interpreting a statute words should be construed in their ordinary sense. Injury, however, is usually employed as an inclusive word. The fact remains that the word 'injury' and not 'accident' was employed by the Legislature throughout this act. It would not be accurate but lax to treat the act as if it referred merely to accidents." In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 227, 101 NE 336, AnnCas1915C 919, LRA1916 279. [a] Impact of poisonous gases. There appears to be no sound dis- act. [b] Effect of words "by accident." -As was said in Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443, 448: "The words "by accident" are intro duced Original Gas Engine Co., (Mich.) 157 a which "Personal injury' is materially Mad were as it parenthetically to qualify the word "injury," confining it to a certain class of injuries, and excluding other classes, as, for instance, injuries by disease or inTo juries self inflicted by design.' the element of 'personal injury' the further condition is added, that it must have been received as 'an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed,' and to this have been appended the words 'by the workman himself' in Trim Joint Dist. School v. Kelly, [1914] A. C. 667, whereby inother juries designed' by persons than the workmen are included within that act. An illustration of the difference between 'personal injury' and 'personal injury by accident' put by Lord Reading, the present Chief Justice of England, in the case last cited, at page 720, is apposite in this connection: 'For example, if a workman became blind in consequence of an explosion at the factory, that would constitute an injury by 'accident; but if in consequence of the nature of his employment his sight was gradually impaired and eventually he became blind, that would be an injury, but not an injury by accident.' Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 490, 111 NE 379, LRA1916D 1000. [c] The federal act of 1908.-(1) Since the operation of the act is not expressly limited to accidental injuries or injuries of an accidental nature, it is not necessary to show in every case a definite accident in the strict sense. Re Clark, 27 Op. Atty.-Gen. 346; In re Edmonds, Op. [a] Materiality of difference.-(1) "The standard established by our workmen's compensation act as the ground for compensation is simply the receiving of personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. This standard is materially different from that of the English act and of the acts of some of the states of this nation. That standard is 'personal injury by accident,' both in the act of 1897 and 1906. See Sts. 60 & 61 Vict. c 37, § 1 (1); 6 Edw. VII, c 58, § 1 (1). The difference between the phrase-Sol. Dept. Labor 259; In re Irving, ology of our act and the English act in this respect cannot be regarded as immaterial or casual. The English act in its present form was passed several years before ours. It was known to the Legislature which enacted our statute and was followed as to its general frame and in many important particulars. In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 NE 697, LRA1916A 306; In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 NE 693, AnnCas1914D 372. Indeed. The language of the English act of 1897 was followed whenever possible.' See Report of Massachusetts Op. Sol. Dept. Labor 249; In re Clark, Op. Sol. Dept. Labor 188. (2) To constitute an injury, it will suffice if an element of accident clearly appears or if the injury is of a type which in the interpretation of statutes of similar scope and purpose has been accepted as properly included in the class comprehensively known as accidental injuries. In re Irving, supra. (3) The injury must be referable to some particular event capable of being fixed in point_of time. In re Clark, supra. (4) But it may be caused by continuous When the injury is occasioned by physical force, the force need not have been applied directly to that part of the body which it is contended has been harmed.8 Accident. The word "accident," as used in a compensation act requiring the injury compensated strain due to the nature of the work, Disease from accident $ 55. § 56. see infra Occupational diseases see infra Previously weakened or diseased condition accentuated see infra § 58. 8. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 111 NE 379, LRA1916D 1000. [a] Illustration.-"If one by external violence had his optic nerve severed close to the brain, or its function destroyed so as to result in blindness, although nothing whatever had been done to the eyes themselves or to the structures immediately surrounding them, it yet would be said in common speech that his eyes had been injured to the point of uselessness. Whatever part of the human body thus has been made incapable of its normal use, so that practically it has ceased to be available for the purpose for which it was adapted, is certainly injured,' according to the common understanding of men. would be difficult to say that one whose legs had been paralyzed [by a fracture of the spine] like those of this employee, if entitled to maintain an action therefor, could not properly describe the injury as having been done to his legs. It seems to us to come within the meaning of the statute. It is a harm done to the legs, a loss or detriment caused to them, something which impairs their soundness, and diminishes their value." Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8, 12, 105 NE 601, AnnCas1916A 787. It 9. Cal.-Western Indemn. Co. V. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 P 398. Mich. Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Works, 157 NW 437. N. H.-Boody v. K. & C. Mfg. Co., 77 N. H. 208, 90 A 859, LRA1916A 10, AnnCas1914D 1280. N. Y.-De Filippis v. Falkenberg, 155 NYS 761. Wis.-Bystrom V. Jacobson. 162 Wis. 180, 155 NW 919, LRA1916D 966. Eng.-Fenton V. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443, 5 WCC 1; Hensey v. White, [1900] 1 Q. B. 481. B. C.-Neville v. Kelly, 13 B. C. 125. for to be by "accident," is held to be employed in its ordinary sense as meaning an unlooked-for and untoward event which is not expected or designed;10 and the term "accidental" means something unusual, unexpected, and undesigned." It would seem that an injury cannot be held to be an injury by out any design on the part of the [b] Statutory definitions.-In Nebraska, under Rev. St. (1913) § 3693b, the word "accident," unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, is to be construed as meaning an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. See Johansen V. Union Stockyards Co., 99 Nebr. 328, 156 NW 511. "Etymologically, the word means | denly and unexpectedly, and withsomething which happens-a rendering which is not very helpful. We are to construe it in the popular sense, as plain people would understand it, but we are also to construe it in its setting, in the context, and in the light of the purpose which appears from the Act itself. Now, there is no single rigid meaning in the common use of the word. Mankind have taken the liberty of using it, as they use so many other words, not in any exact sense but in a somewhat confused way, or rather in a variety of ways. We say that some one met a friend in the street quite by accident, as opposed to appointment, or omitted to mention something by accident, as opposed to intention, or that he is disabled by an accident, as opposed to disease, or made a discovery by accident, as opposed to research or reasoned experiment. When people use this word they are usually thinking of some definite event which is unexpected, but it is not so always, for you might say of a person that he is foolish as a rule and wise only by accident. Again, the same thing, when occurring to a man in one kind of employment, would not be called accident, but would be so described if it occurred to another not similarly employed. A soldier shot in battle is not killed by accident, in common parlance. An inhabitant trying to escape from the field might be shot by accident. It makes all the difference that the occupation of the two was different. In short, the common meaning of this word is ruled neither by logic nor by etymology, but by custom, and no formula will precisely express its usage for all cases.' Earl Loreburn, in Trim Joint Dist. School V. Kelly, [1914] A. C. 667, 680, 7 BWCC 274 [dism app 6 BWCC 921]. 10. Cal-Southwestern Surety Ins. Mich. Adams V. Acme White N. H.-Boody v. K. & C. Mfg. Co., N. J. Bryant v. Fissell, 84. N. J. N. Y.-De Filippis v. Falkenberg, W. Va.-Archibald v. Ott, 87 SE 791. Wis. Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 NW 640, LRA1916A 273. Eng. Fenton V. Thorley, [1903] A. C. 443. Compare Hensey V. White, [1900] 1 Q. B. 481, 2 WCC 1 (an early case emphasizing the fortuitous and unexpected element of accident). B. C.-Neville v. Kelly, 13 B. C. "Accident includes [a] Other definitions.-(1) “An [c] Rule obtaining as to accident insurance distinguished.—The doctrine of some cases involving accident insurance policies is as follows: "It is not sufficient that there be an unusual and unanticipated result; the means must be accidentalinvoluntary and unintended. There must, too, be some proximate connection between accidental means and the injurious result. It is doubtful, however, if in applying our statute, its general purpose being considered, the court should exactly follow the rules suggested and applied in the cases referred to. The statute seems to contemplate that an accidental injury may result by mere mischance; that accidental injuries may be due to carelessness, not willful, to fatigue, and to miscalculation of the effects of voluntary action." Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., (Mich.) 157 NW 437, 439. [d] Illustrations.—(1) Fall of bar of metal from upper story of building under construction. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 A 458. (2) Person in a toilet room, caused by something striking her on the shoulder to look through an aperture into the next room, when another employee thrust scissors through the aperture and into her eye destroying the sight. De Filippis V. Falkenberg, 155 NYS 761. (3) Fall from roof. Von Ette's Case, 223 Mass. 56, 111 NE 696, LRA1916D 641. (4) Drinking polluted water. Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 NW 640. LRA1916A 273. (5) Drinking poisonous fluid in mistake for water. Archibald v. Ott, (W. Va.) 87 SE 791. (6) Abrasion of eye by foreign matter. Adams v. Thompson, BWCC 19. (7) Chip of steel flying into eye of workman using cold chisel. Neville v. Kelly, 13 B. C. 125, 1 BWCC 432. (8) Fragment of coal working into knee of miner. Thompson v. Ashington Coal Co., 84 L. T. Rep. N. S. 412, 3 WCC 21. (9) Scraping of foot by tight boot, however, is not an accident. White V. Sheepwash, 3 BWCC 382. (10) Nor is the gradual formation of an abscess by friction. Marshall v. East Holywell Coal Co., 21 T. L. R. 494, 7 WCC 19. 5 11. Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 374, 154 NW 640, LRA1916A 273. "The nature of it implies that there was an external act or occurrence which caused the personal in 14 accident unless a specific time or occasion can be 17 has been held that the term "fortuitous event" is not to be distinguished from "accident," 21 although it has been said that it is the strongest term which may be employed.22 [55] 2. Disease-a. In General. An idiopathic as distinguished from a traumatic disease cannot be regarded as an injury by accident;23 but. on the other hand the fact that an injury may be classed as a disease does not take it out of the operation of a compensation act.24 Even under the restricted use of the term "personal injury" as referring merely to accidental injuries it includes all of the consequences of the accident, whether a development of the injury from a derangement of the physical structure of the body, or of a disease from the accident.2 Hence a disease occasioned by an accident is held to be a personal injury26 and the acciW. Va.-Archibald v. Ott, 87 SE | Steamship Swansea Vale v. Rice, 4 791. BWCC 298; Clover V. Hughes, 3 Wis.-Vennen v. New Dells Lum- BWCC 275. ber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 373, 154 NW 640, LRA1916A 273. as Fortuitous event. Where the word "injury," employed in a statute, is limited to the meaning of an injury resulting from some fortuitous event, it jury or death of the employee. It contemplates an event not within one's foresight and expectation, resulting in a mishap causing injury to the employee. Such an Occurrence may be due to purely accidental causes or it may be due to oversight and negligence." Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., supra. [a] Other definitions.—(1) “Happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected." Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., (Mich.) 157 NW 437. 438. (2) "Happening by chance, or unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of events; casual; fortuitous." Naud v. King Sewing Mach. Co., 159 NYS 910, 912 [quot North American L., etc., Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 8 AmR 212]. (3) "An event happening without human agency, or, if happening through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual, and not expected to the person to whom it happens." Naud v. King Sewing Mach. Co., supra. 12. Liondale Bleach, etc., Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. L. 426, 89 A 929; Steel V. Cammell, [1905] 2 K. B. 232, 2 AnnCas 142; Petschett V. Preis, 8 BWCC 44; Evans v. Dodd, 5 BWCC 305; Martin v. Manchester Corp., 5 BWCC 259; Eke v. Dyke, 3 BWCC 482. [a] Illustration.-Petitioner cannot be said to have been injured by accident where after ten days' service in defendant's bleachery he was affected with a rash which was pronounced to be a condition of eczema capable of being caused by acids and found by the trial judge to have caused by contact been with the Liondale Bleach, dampened goods. Works etc.. v. Riker, 85 N. J. L. 426, 89 A 929. Application of rule to disease see infra § 55. 13. La Veck v. Parke, (Mich.) 157 NW 72; Bystrom v. Jacobson, 162 Wis. 180, 155 NW 919, LRA1916D 966. [a] Inhalation of poisonous gases and fumes (1) may cause "disability resulting from an accidental injury." Naud V. King Sewing Mach. Co., 159 NYS 910, 912. (2) [b] Nervous shock may be accident. Yates v. South Kirby, etc., Collieries, 3 BWCC 418. Muscular strain and overexertion see infra § 57. 25 "It is plain enough from the terms of the act that, when an injury arising from a risk of the business is suffered while the employé is doing the thing which his employment fairly requires him to do, he will be entitled to compensation (except when the injury is caused by the willful and serious misconduct of the injured employé, or by his intoxication), although he was doing the work in a negligent or unusual way.' Mann v. Glastonbury Knitting Co., (Conn.) 96 A 368, 369. [a] Illustration.-An employee was injured by accident where during the course of his employment he was seized with an epileptic fit and caused to fall from a stage on which he stood. Wilks V. Dowell, [1905] 2 K. B. 225, 7 WCC 14, 2 AnnCas 732. 19. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 A 458. 20. Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 A 458. 21. Zappala V. Industrial Ins. Commn., 82 Wash. 314, 144 P 54, LRA1916A 295. Wash. 314, 316, 144 P 54, LRA1916A 295 [quot Standard D.]. Ins. [a] "Fortuitous is defined as: "The intention of the legislature 'Occurring by chance as opposed to to include accidental injuries result- design; coming or taking place withing from negligence within the lanout any cause; accidental; casual;' guage of the Compensation Act is so and a fortuitous cause is said to be, manifest that there is no room to in- 'A contingent or accidental cause.' dulge in construction of the lan- | Zappála v. Industrial Ins. Commn., 82 guage employed. In the popular sense the words as used in the Compensation Act, referring to a personal injury accidentally sustained by an employee while performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment, include all accidental injuries, whether happening through negligence or otherwise except those intentionally self-inflicted." Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 373, 154 NW 642, LRA1916A 273. 15. Mercer v. Ott, (W. Va.) 89 SE 952; Manson v. Forth, etc., SS. Co., [1913] S. C. 921, 50 Sc. L. Rep. 687, 6 BWCC 830. V. 16. Western "An injury caused by the attack [a] Illustrations of injuries held accidental.-(1) Willful or criminal assault_generally. Western Indemn. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 P 398. (2) Shooting. Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, (Cal.), 156 P 491. (3) Assault on night watchman for purpose of robbing him. Walther v. American Paper Co., (N. J.) 98 A 264. (4) Murder of night watchman. Western Grain, etc., Co. v. Pillsbury, (Cal.) 159 P 423. 17. Risdale v. Steamship Kilmarnock, [1915] 1 K. B. 503, 8 BWCC 7 (engineer on steam trawler struck by mine). 18. Carroll v. What Cheer Stables Co.. (R. I.) 96 A 208; Wicks V. Dowell, [1905] 2 K. B. 225, 7 WCC 14, 2 AnnCas 732; Fennah v. Midland, etc., R. Co., BWCC 440; 22. Stertz V. Industrial Commn., 91 Wash. 588, 593, 158 P 256 (where the court said that the term is not a "popular expression but one used by lawyers for positive strength, a term in truth that is selected when one wishes all of 'accident' and more"). [a] The word "accident" as employed in the administrative portions of the Washington act is used for brevity as a convenient substitute for fortuitous event. Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Commn., 91 Wash. 588, 158 P 256. 23. In re Murray, Op. Sol. Dept. Labor 239; Pencis v. Girard, 47 Que. Super. 406. 24. In re Withy, Op. Sol. Dept. Labor 273; In re Ellmore, Op. Sol. Dept. Labor 245; In re Murray, Op. Sol. Dept. Labor 239; Glasgow Coal Co. v. Welsh, 8 BWCC 635. 25. Larke v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., (Conn.) 97 A 320. 26. Cal. Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 69, 151 P 1136, LRA1916A 281. Ill-Frey V. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co., 271 Ill. 121, 110 NE 824. Mass. In re McPhee, 222 Mass. 1, 109 NE 633; Hunnewell's Case, 220 Mass. 351, 107 NE 934; In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 NE 336, AnnCas 1915C 919, LRA1916A 279. Mich. -Cline v. Studebaker Corp., 155 NW 519. N. J.-Newcomb v. Albertson, 85 N. J. L. 435, 89 A 928. N. Y.-Rist v. Larkin, 171 App. Div. 71, 156 NYS 875; Kohler v. Frohmann, 167 App. Div. 533, 153 NYS 559; Plass v. Central New England R. Co., 155 NYS 854. Wis.-Milwaukee First Nat. Bank v. Industrial Commn., 161 Wis. 526, 154 NW 847; Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 NW 640, LRA1916A 273; Heileman Brewing Co. v. Industrial Commn., 161 Wis. 46, 152 NW 446. Eng-Ystradowen Colliery Co. v. Griffiths, [1909] 2 K. B. 533, 2 BWCC 357; Beare v. Garrod, 8 BWCC 474; |