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gest success. You've probably overlooked it entirely.

P. S. C.-I confess I have.

P. C.-You are not to be blamed. Most people easily overlook invisible things. P. S. C.-That's natural.

P. C.-I suppose so; but it oughtn't to be. And a press correspondent does not do his job well unless he enables people to see the invisible and to understand that it is only the invisible that is really important. Mr. Mark Sullivan is one of the ablest press correspondents in Washington. In some respects he is without an equal. I have known him to make some invisible things quite plain. But at the Washington Conference he seems to have failed to see the most important thing it was aiming at, perhaps because it was invisible. In his book "The Great Adventure at Washington," which records in most interesting fashion the doings of the Conference as he saw them, he writes: "Our minds were intent" (he means his mind was) "upon what we regarded" (that is, what he regarded) "as the great adventure of the Conference, the immense historic effort to agree upon self-imposed limitations on naval armament;" which perhaps is not surprising; but near the end of his book he adds: "The questions of the Far East were not an essential part of that great adventure. They, to a large extent, were a subject apart." That's where Mr. Sullivan missed the invisible.

If every big naval Power understood the rest of the world and was itself understood, had no suspicion of other Powers and was itself unsuspected, regarded its naval power as a means not of aggression but of police protection solely, and entertained no idea of selfaggrandizement at the expense of others, there would be no need of a campaign for limiting naval armaments. What makes big navies dangerous is suspicion, misunderstanding, selfish and shortsighted ambition. The big navies are visible; but the danger lies in what is invisible behind them. And that is where the Far East comes in. That is what made the Far East not "a subject apart" from the Conference, but the

The Great Adventure at Washington: The Story of the Conference. By Mark Sullivan. Illustrated by Joseph Cummings Chase. Doubleday, Page, & Co., New York. $2.50.

No other book that I know of gives so coherent and vivid a picture of the Washington Conference as this. Its emphasis on the naval features of the Conference, which renders it defective as an interpretation of the Conference, is one of its virtues as a picture of it. Mr. Sullivan's book is peculiarly free from signs of prejudice. His frankness is never clever or cynical, and therefore his honest judgment is such that even those participants in whom he finds defects may read his comments with interest and profit. He has succeeded admirably, not

only in recording his own observations, but in selecting for quotation the comments of other observers. This book is rot merely of contemporary interest, but is valuable as a source book for the historian. It is not often that a useful istorical document is as readable as this. E. H. A.

most important and fundamental subject of all.

China and the Pacific Ocean have long been a storm center of international rivalry, a swirl of national ambitions. Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France, Japan, and even some of the smaller countries like Holland and Belgium, have contributed force to the storms in that vast region. In all these storms the chief victim, herself feeble and inert under the control of corrupt military chieftains, has been China. With such storms America at first had very little to do; but it happened that America be came increasingly involved in them at the very time when the storms began blowing from the direction of Japan. Without knowing much about Far Eastern affairs, most Americans for several years were growing more and more suspicious of Japanese militarism and aggression; and at the same time the Japanese were becoming more and more unfriendly toward their old friend, America. This situation was not helped at all by the alliance between Japan and Great Britain; it was made very much worse by Japan's seizure of the German leasehold in the Chinese province of Shantung, by her imperious Twenty-one Demands upon China, and by her military occupation of Siberia when she was supposed to be acting as a partner of America in helping, and not subduing, the Russians. Under these circumstances, the talk about limiting naval armaments without removing the cause would have been frivolous. Now what has happened? Japan is out of Siberia. Did you see that in any scare heads in the newspapers?

P. 8. C.-No, I missed that.

P. C.-For a very good reason. There weren't any scare heads. But Japan is out, just the same. Did you know that Japan was practically out of Shantungnot merely the port, but even out of the railway zone that runs all the way up into the interior of the province? And did you know that there has been a great internal change in Japanese government by which the old military control of Japan's foreign policies has been weakened and appears to be on the way toward removal altogether?

P. S. C.-To tell the truth, I haven't taken much interest in the internal politics in Japan.

P. C.-This isn't politics merely; it's a change in the spirit and tone of Japan in her relation to other countries. And you must have noticed the change in the feeling of Americans toward Japan. There is no such suspicion as there was a year ago last summer. And it's not Japan only. All the nations that were represented at the Washington Conference are in an entirely different relation

to China and the Far East from that of a year ago. Don't misunderstand me. There is no golden age suddenly come on the world. There is no new world order; but there is all the difference between a condition in which war was threatening and a condition in which war is, to say the least, improbable. It's not merely the treaties that were adopted at the Washington Conference so much as the invisible spirit behind them that has changed the situation.

If the things that have occurred as a result of the Washington Conference had happened as a result of a war, the papers would have been full of them.

P. S. C.-You seem to think it is still a going concern?

P. C.-Yes, sir; with its stock way above par.






a former Turkish Ambassador and for ten years a resident of the United States, returned to Constantinople after the armistice, taking with him his American bride. As he professes, he "was anxious to show her his country, and in "Speaking of the Turks," just published by Duffield & Co., he seeks to do as much for us all.

Are Christians persecuted there? According to Zia Bey, "at the time of the conquest of Constantinople, Mchemet IV not only recognized the entire freedom of religion of the non-Turkish races, but even exempted them from all duties to the state. When it is realized that these privileges have survived nearly five long centuries, the stories of persecution will be considered as greatly exaggerated as the news of the death of Mark Twain." They are fabricated by missionaries and the Near East Relief, as "a wellmanaged campaign following an energetic propaganda by which Turks are represented as committing wholesale massacres and atrocities is always sure to bring substantial financial assistance for Armenians and Greeks, and incidentally to secure a longer lease of life to the jobs of all those employed in reliet and missionary work."

However, the flow of money is "carefully canalized into Greek and Armenian channels alone. What difference does it make if hundreds of thousands of Turks are dying? We do not ask help. Why do not the foreigners take in their own homes their pet children, their crybabies, and leave us alone to heal our wounds? Are they afraid that public opinion in their countries will-through direct contact-realize too soon the

hypocrisy of their pets? . . . An old saying states that it takes one Jew to fool two Christians, one Armenian to fool two Jews, and one Greek to fool two Armenians." In business the Turk claims to have found this true. "As commerce, finance, and industry developed, the non-Turkish.elements of the country obtained a solid economic grip and used it in their endeavors to choke the Turks."

Is there polygamy in Turkey? slavery? Zia Bey finds neither. he:

Or Says

This is a true narrative of Turkey and the Turks as they really are, so I have to speak the truth even at the risk of shattering many legends. I am bound, therefore, not to fall in line with the traditions established by other writers who never fail to refer to a servant in a Turkish household as being a "slave," and to the ladies of a Turkish family as being "wives." The truth is that slavery was not generally practised in Turkey even before the Civil War in America, and the "wives" referred to by most of the foreign writers either exist only in their imagination or else are the sisters, sisters-in-law, daughters, or cousins of the head of the family which foreign writers innocently or purposely represent as his wives. Of course there might be several wives in the same household-but not the wives of the same man.

Indeed, the status of women in Turkey is now all that any rational feminist could demand, for "the daily contact of Turkish women with the public during the war years resulted of course in tearing down the social walls which had so far secluded them. . . . The emancipation of Turkish women became complete."

Apparently Zia Bey has read "Haremlik," by Demetra Vaka (Mrs. Kenneth Brown), for, after paying his compliments to "the higher-class Greeks," who, though "not Venizelist enough to don a Greek uniform," maintain "a cunning and insidious propaganda," he remarks:

To obtain the sympathy and the moral support of certain nations which, like America, are imbued with the spirit of fair play, some of their women write sweet articles where the keynote is the lovableness of the Turks individually, their innocence, their dearness, and their romanticism, cunningly interwoven with stories— supposed to be personal experienceswhich emphasize in descriptions, if not in words, the ignorance of the Turks, their administrative or business incapacity, how they still practice slavery and polygamy, and how they commit political murder and atrocities. The broad-minded but misinformed public believes in these camouflaged false accusations because of the hypocritical profession of love interwoven with them.

The "broad-minded but misinformed public" should instead read Pierre Loti,

he contends, and "if there is any one whose talent is equal to that of Pierre Loti and has the courage to publish his opinion, he can thoroughly count on all the help, assistance, and gratitude of the whole Turkish race, much maligned in American literature."

Confusedly broad-minded is Zia Bey himself. In his chapter on Robert College he deplores its sectarianism and tells us, "Recognizing the one Almighty God and all his prophets, I never hesitated to go into any church of any denomination and raise my thoughts in prayer."

Coming from a "terrible" Turk, this may seem a bit odd, but are Turks in reality at all terrible? Says Zia Bey:

An American lady-it being her first day in Constantinople and her imagination being full of all the horrid things she had heard about the Turks in America-was rather nervous until she met my wife, who breezed in to greet her in a perfectly American way. Needless to say that a short while after she was laughing with us at the reputation of being "terrible" which the Turks have abroad.

Queer logic this-as queer, almost, as that by which massacres become inventions of the Near East Relief, polygamy and slavery a "legend," the emancipation of Turkish women "complete," and Loti's romances a contribution to knowledge. Throughout "Speaking of the Turks" he proves too much, leaving the impression that he is aware of having his hands full and rather more. One cannot help wondering what was his sensation on again beholding Turkey after ten years' residence in America. Perhaps shame!




HE story I have to tell is not of any particular importance except in showing how history is made by the daily newspaper. Hundreds of thousands of modern readers get their sole impressions of political events and political characters from the daily press. They have no means of referring to original documents or state papers. There is a moral here for editors, which, however, I do not propose to draw. I merely wish to relate an incident of editorial misinformation which has come under my own observation. It is as significant, perhaps, as it is amusing.

On September 30 the New York "Times," a responsible and careful newspaper of the first class, published an editorial commenting on the surrender of the notorious Moroccan bandit, Rai

suli. In the course of its editorial it made this positive statement, which on its face bears all the earmarks of being based on accurate and official knowledge. I have italicized the most important assertion:

President Roosevelt may be said to have introduced the humorous knave [Raisuli] to the American people. Who can fail to remember that droll gesture of Mr. Roosevelt to the Republican party in convention at Chicago, "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead"?-a telegram prepared for transmission to the Sultan at Tangier, but never sent. It fixed attention upon the Republican Convention, it roused the country. "Just like Teddy!" was the admiring comment.

If the statement were true that President Roosevelt deliberately wrote a telegram, never intending to send it, for the purpose of bamboozling the American people in a Convention which he hoped would nominate him, the fact would automatically assign him to the most contemptible class of pot-house politicians. A friend of mine, holding a responsible official position in one of the most important financial institutions in this country, called my attention to this editorial statement of the "Times" with considerable anxiety. He is an admirer of Roosevelt's achievements and character, but if the statement by the "Times" were a historical fact he felt that it would shake his faith in a great American. I told him that I knew nothing more about the incident than was current in 1904, but that I would see what I could discover.

My first step was to go to George B. Cortelyou, now President of the Consolidated Gas Company of New York, and Secretary of Commerce, PostmasterGeneral, and Secretary of the Treasury under President Roosevelt. As a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet I thought he might remember the circumstances under which the Raisuli telegram was written. He did remember, of course, the Raisuli episode, but could not, naturally, speak definitely of dates or details after a lapse of eighteen years. He suggested seeing William Loeb, Jr. Mr. Loeb was Secretary to President Roosevelt from 1903 to 1909; was later Collector of the Port of New York; and is now an executive of the American Smelting and Refining Company. Somewhat later, at a Committee meeting of the Roosevelt National Memorial Association, of which Mr. Loeb and I are both members, I told him of my quest. He recollected the incident very well, and remembered Roosevelt's asking Mr. Hay in his presence to cable to the American Consul at Tangier, "We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." Mr. Loeb added that he always supposed the

cablegram was sent, but it might be conceivable that before it was coded and despatched Perdicaris was surrendered. Mr. Loeb further suggested that Mr. Adee, who has been Assistant Secretary of State since 1886, and who is probably as familiar with the historical records of the State Department as any living man, might be able to furnish exact information. In the meantime, at this Committee meeting of the Roosevelt Memorial Association, its Executive Secretary, Mr. Hermann Hagedorn, suggested that the "Life and Letters of John Hay," by William Roscoe Thayer, would undoubtedly refer to the Perdicaris affair. We got a copy of the "Life of Hay" from the Association's library, and found in Volume II, on page 383, the following:

One example of Secretary Hay's success in securing immediate attention to an ultimatum occurred in June, 1904, when an American citizen, Ion H. Perdicaris, was seized by Raizuli, a Moroccan bandit, and held for a ransom. After much shillyshallying, and threats by Raizuli that he would kill his prisoner unless the money was speedily paid, Hay cabled to Gummeré, the American Consul at Tangier, June 22: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead:" adding that "he [Gummeré] was not to commit us about landing marines or seizing custom house."

"June 23. My telegram to Gummeré had an uncalled-for success. It is curious how a concise impropriety hits the public.

"June 24. Gummeré telegraphs that he expects Perdicaris to-night. "June 27. Perdicaris wires his thanks."

So speedily did even a brigand, apparently safe in the depths of Morocco, recognize the note of command in the voice from overseas.

What Mr. Hay meant by a "concise impropriety" is probably an allusion to

the very undiplomatic but very delightful and effective language of the phrase, "We want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead."

The proof now seemed pretty complete that the telegram, which the "Times" asserts was never sent, was actually sent. But I wanted to clinch the matter. I therefore wrote to Mr. Adee on November 23, inclosing the "Times" editorial, and saying:

At Mr. Loeb's suggestion, I am writing to you to know whether there are any records to show whether the cablegram was actually despatched or not. Mr. Loeb thinks there is a very remote possibility that before the message was coded and despatched, word may have come in of the return of Perdicaris, which made the actual telegraphing of the message unnecessary. I hesitate to add to your burdens, but as a matter of historical accuracy I think these facts may be of some interest.

Apparently the question was considered by Mr. Adee of sufficient importance to refer to the Secretary of State, for on November 29 Mr. Hughes himself replied as follows:

"My dear Mr. Abbott:

"I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 23, 1922, enclosing a copy of an editorial article in the New York Times' of September 30, in which it is stated that the telegram containing the expression 'Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead' was prepared but never sent by the Department. You wish to know whether the telegram was actually despatched.

"On June 22, 1904, the following telegram was sent to the American Minister at Tangier, Morocco:

We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead. Further than this we desire least possible complications with

Morocco or other powers. You will not arrange for landing marines or seizing custom house without specific directions from this Department.

(signed) HAY.

"A paraphrase of this telegram is printed in the 1904 volume of 'Foreign Relations,' page 503.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) CHARLES E. HUGHES." Perhaps it may seem that a good deal of unnecessary detail is given in the foregoing relation, but each link of the procedure is purposely presented as an indication that even newspapers, when they try to make history, can by a little painstaking get the exact facts. It may be added that the distinguished statesman who presided at the Republican Convention of 1904, when Roosevelt was practically nominated by acclamation, said to me that the "Times" implication that the Perdicaris cablegram was written for the purpose of arousing enthusiasm at the Convention is grotesque. He added that not only was it unnecessary for Mr. Roosevelt to write a telegram to arouse enthusiasm in his behalf, but that no telegram from him could possibly have stopped the enthusiasm or hindered his nomination.

Since this article is written in behalf of accuracy, it should be said that if the name of the Moroccan bandit is spelled with an "s" in one place and with a "z" in another, it is not the proof-reader's fault. The State Department and the New International Encyclopædia prefer the former spelling, while Mr. Thayer prefers the latter. The "Times" version of the incident, however, is just as dead as Raisuli would have been if he had not heeded President Roosevelt's "droll gesture" in behalf of American rights.

L. F. A.




OUR or five years ago it is probable

that the entire Northwest would have regarded the appointment of Pierce Butler, of St. Paul, to the Supreme Court of the United States with the kind of satisfaction that ordinarily accompanies gratified local pride. It would have felt that in thus recognizing the Northwest's foremost lawyer the President had shown both wisdom in his choice of an able man and good judgment in acknowledging the claims of a part of the country not previously represented in the Nation's highest Tribunal.

Even as little as six or eight weeks ago, it seems unlikely that the appointment would have created much active protest. November 7, however, exercised a profound influence in the Northwest, less on the thoughts of men and women than on their readiness to translate these thoughts into action. The victory of La Follette in Wisconsin, the triumph of the once-repudiated Frazier in North Dakota, and, above all, the defeat of Kellogg by Shipstead in Minnesotathese things have sharply intensified the zeal of all the elements in the Northwest opposed to conservatism.

Thus it has come about that the appointment of Pierce Butler was the signal for a double outcry in his own State an outcry of enthusiastic applause on the part of Republican and Democratic leaders alike and on the part of the State bar and bench generally; an outery of bitter indignation on the part of those whose votes had just elected Henrik Shipstead to the Senate.

A general Northwestern estimate of Mr. Butler would unquestionably place him in the same category with Senator Kellogg. Both are prominent corporation lawyers in St. Paul, and the agri

cultural population of the Northwest has little love for corporations, lawyers, or the cities. Minnesota having just voted to unseat Senator Kellogg in favor of a dentist representing the Farmer-Labor party, the feeling in certain quarters regarding Mr. Butler's appointment is only a little less violent than it would have been if President Harding had appointed Senator Kellogg himself to the vacancy.

The opposition has taken specific form in many editorials in the labor press, in protests to Senators, and, above all, in a long letter to Senators Ladd and La Follette from an anonymous professor in the University of Minnesota. This letter charges Mr. Butler with unfitness for a high judicial position on the grounds of violent prejudices, high-handed and domineering methods, and what the critic regards as an excess of devotion to the cause of his clients, sometimes leading him to disregard the ethical if not the legal principles of justice.

Sifted down, these charges amount to this: that Mr. Butler has always been a man of vigorous action, absolutely fearless, and at times relentless in doing what he believed to be right, and that he is an extraordinarily able lawyer. For fifteen years he has been one of the regents of the University of Minnesota, and because he has steadfastly resisted shilly-shallying sentimentality on the one hand and political wire-pulling on the other he has won many enemies through his distinguished service to the State.

Once Mr. Butler has clearly made up his mind as to what ought to be done, he has repeatedly shown an indomitable will in bringing it to pass, and this has naturally created among his enemies a tradition as to his violent prejudices. But his whole career as a regent of the University bears testimony to his in



variable willingness to hear all sides of every controversy and his zeal in studying it from every possible angle before making up his mind.

As a lawyer Mr. Butler has done his work well-too well, his opponents argue. He has been a shrewd and zealous advocate; does that fact unfit him for being an impartial and wise judge? Those who make such a claim challenge the whole theory of appointing lawyers to the bench. Mr. Butler's integrity has never been seriously questioned; the objection made by his enemies is simply that he has served his clients too well.

In answer to this, it may be pointed out that some of his most important clients have been the people themselves. Shortly after his admission to the bar he became assistant county attorney for

Ramsey County, in which St. Paul is situated, and two years later, in 1893, he was elected county attorney. In 1909 he was appointed Special Attorney-General for the Government by Attorney-General Wickersham in the prosecution of the bleached flour cases, and again in 1911 in connection with the criminal prosecution of the Chicago meat packers for violation of the Sherman Act. Two years ago he was retained by the Canadian Government as counsel in its proceedings to determine the price to be paid to the Grand Trunk Railroad when its properties were taken over.

On the other side, he was for some years general attorney for the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railroad, and from 1913 to 1918 he was counsel for the conference committee of the railways in connection with their physical valuation. Most of his work for the past twenty-four years has been in the general practice of law.

In his own State Republicans and Democrats have united, almost without exception, in commending the appointment. They feel that he has amply proved his ability as a lawyer, and, far more than that, his sound wisdom, his courage, and his high ideals of public service. Nearly every one who knows him personally believes that he can serve the country, as for fifteen years he has served the State University, impartially, fearlessly, and wisely. A great many people throughout the Northwest, however, regard his appointment as a direct blow to those who have just succeeded in electing Frazier and Shipstead to the Senate. They object to him, not for the reasons alleged in most of the published protests, but because, as a St. Paul corporation lawyer, they link his name with that of his fellow-citizen and friend, Frank B. Kellogg.

Minneapolis, Minnesota, December 1, 1922




T is a decidedly new departure for Germany to have Mr. Cuno form his


Cabinet of non-partisan Ministers. Perhaps it is also a departure from the classical forms of parliamentarism. The Cabinet of Wirth was still composed on the old lines; the parties of the majority selected their representatives to make up the Government, and, as so often happens with parliamentary coalitions, they were able to keep the power in their hands for only a short period. The position of Wirth was made a trifle stronger than he really deserved only on account of Germany's international plight. The break-up, however deferred, had finally to come. Neither Wirth nor his colleagues could hold the parties together any more.

The reason is easy to find. Germany is living through a severe internal

crisis. Her social structure, put out of joint by the war, is being readjusted and reshaped, and mostly at the expense of the middle classes. The war, the painful peace that followed, recent profiteering, the fabulous drop of the mark, all that tended to produce new social elements, and this in turn increased the social struggle, intensifying the claims of the two extremes; the monarchists assiduously work for restoration and possibly vengeance, the Socialists had to revise their own programme accórding to the new conditions and digest the disappointment of the Russian experiment. In this last respect one can notice great progress made by the Socialist leaders of Germany, which brought about the remarkable reunion of the Socialist factions; the extreme radical elements have realized their

mistaken position, built exclusively on the hopes of being able some day to follow the example of Lenine; they have come back into the fold of their former companions-in-arms, the majority Socialists. This in turn increased enormously the power of the latter, and a clash with the bourgeois parties became inevitable, upsetting the weak Cabinet of Wirth.

Under these circumstances, nothing was left for President Ebert but to call in an outsider, some person who would be free from party allegiance and who would be able to form and run a government on non-partisan lines, a so-called "business" Cabinet. This promised a little more stability and it promised a better chance for tiding Germany over the crisis.

Cuno's position will be nevertheless an

extremely difficult one; he won't have many friends anywhere; he will be harassed by enemies and opponents from all sides, and probably deluged by all sorts of foolish criticism. Yet he has a good chance. He is himself a moderate business man, sufficiently experienced and cool-headed to attend to the business side of the Government work; the administration of the country will probably run smoothly, conducted on strictly non-partisan lines. This in itself is a great advantage, leaving more time for the Government to concentrate its attention on the main political problems that are now distracting Germany.

There is no doubt, however, that in this last respect Cuno is confronted with a formidable array of difficulties. First, there is the pressing French claim for reparation payments; will Cuno be able to press out of the people the necessary money? Secondly, there comes the problem of the falling mark; will the new Government be able to find means to stop it and, in particular, to curb those

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elements that endeavor to create artificial causes for the further decline of the mark? Thirdly, Germany needs badly to revise her international relations; in this respect Cuno has an easier task; he will have to concentrate his attention on the relations to England and Russia, and a certain co-operation in both cases seems inevitable. And, fourthly, the greatest problem of the day constitutes the internal social struggle and the necessity of finding means to avoid a monarchical restoration, to restrain obstreperous Bavaria, and save the German federal union. Will Cuno succeed in this, his most difficult task? Only the future can tell; the difficulties, no doubt, are in some ways overwhelming and the present outlook rather discouraging, but certainly not hopeless. A satisfactory solution, on which, by the way, the peace of Europe depends very much, will be found only on condition that Cuno proves strong enough and sufficiently tactful. His first steps are quite promising in both respects. Washington, D. C.





OME months ago, during the Cannes

Conference, in this excellent Hôtel Suisse, lived one Benito Mussolini. He is now Prime Minister of Italy.

The hotel proprietor, M. Keller, has been telling me about him, as follows: "He has ambition and pride. He will go far. Those who think they see in him only a passing phase will find themselves mistaken. He knows his Italy too well for that. . . . I see that he has come out for loyal support for the King. That is good. But he did not impress me as very strong on that side. Perhaps you could hardly expect it from an exExtreme Socialist."

Benito Mussolini, the son of a blacksmith and Socialist of the Italian Romagna, was born at Doria, in the province of Forli, about forty years ago, and so from his earliest years he knew that Fiume lay across the Adriatic. He began his work-days as apprentice to a stonemason. In addition to being a stonemason himself, he has been a gardener, a weaver, a railway porter, a violinist, a fencer, a Socialist agitator, an editor, a soldier in the Alpini ranks, and, finally, the founder of the Fascisti.

This party takes its name from the fasces, or bundle of rods bound together, borne by or in front of officials of the old Roman Republic and Empire, as symbols of their power in imposing law and order. Mussolini's early course had been rather in agitation for resistance to law and order. His professions of extreme Socialism, not to say Communism, his publication at Lugano, Switzerland, of an incendiary sheet, "L'Avvenire del Lavoratore" (the Future of the Working nan), and his alleged extra-legal course

earned for him a decree of expulsion. This was the more significant as the Swiss Government has been the most tolerant of any in affording a refuge to extremists of all sorts. From Switzerland Mussolini went to Germany and Austria, and, returning to Italy (1910). founded a weekly paper, "La Lotta di Classe" (Class Conflict).

From these vagabond years it is a relief to turn to Mussolini's more inspiring war record.

That record really began long before Italy entered the war. It dates from Mussolini's meeting in Austria with Cesare Battisti, the Italian patriot and martyr of the Trentino, then under Austrian sovereignty. Mussolini's fiery revolutionary soul now began to be awakened by a new cause-that of Nationalism, pure and simple. He even published a book (1908) about it and the Trentino.

His curiously mingled ideas of Socialism and Nationalism were seen four years later when, in Italy, he fulminated against the Tripolitan war and was imprisoned for it, while in 1914 we find him at the head of the Red Week Revolution in the Romagna, which apparently endangered the throne itself.

Later in the year the World War began. Italy was out of it, but Mussolini did not propose that she should remain out of it. He now founded his third journal, the "Popolo d'Italia," so that he might have a militant organ for combating the propaganda of the powerful Socialist "Avanti," which favored continued Italian neutrality, thus playing into Germany's hands. Mussolini, on the contrary, advocated Italian intervention on the Entente side.

In the war itself he was wounded at Cividale (1916). And when the war ended it found him as violently Nationalist as he had been Socialist before. He had not to wait long for an opportunity to show the fervor of the change which animated him.

The occasion arose in this wise. After the war the extreme Socialists rose to unprecedented power. It finally became so great that in Turin and other industrial centers they actually seized factories and workshops from their lawful proprietors and managers and themselves tried to run those factories and workshops. There could be but one end to this. It almost seemed as if Russia's tragic experiences were going to be reproduced in Italy. A long period of unrest now occurred, and it took the clever Giolitti ultimately to bring the extremists to economic reason.

But, though at the time the world did not realize it, more than economic reason was involved. Despite the brilliant Italian army triumphs at the end of the war, the social revolutionaries, not content with their ghastly disintegrating influence at the time of the Caporetto disaster, now began openly to show, not only indifference to the army, but often contempt and even hostility. If such an attitude could once have been accepted by the Communist Mussolini, it could no longer be accepted by the Nationalist Mussolini. What! was this the attitude that for one moment could be shown towards an army that by its victory at Vittorio Veneto, by the armistice it compelled Austria to sign (four years ago this very day!), had utterly vanquished its foe of centuries, had redeemed what

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