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S no tariff bill of which the writer has cognizance-not even the "Tariff of Abominations" of preCivil War days-ever provoked the widespread excoriation for alleged excesses that has been lavished on the FordneyMcCumber Bill, even by professed protectionists, it is not easy for one who differs from the protectionist school of economics to treat it with entire judicial fairness. It must be said, however, that its departures from the Underwood rates are less glaring than has been asserted, and if the principle of excluding imports for the protection of home industries be sound, it has been but inadequately embodied in the new law. If the principle be unsound, its opponents have been derelict in not having discarded it in toto.

The bill, widely heralded as a "scientific tariff law," is of magnificent proportions. As reported to the Senate it made a book of 438 pages. As signed by President Harding it filled, with small type, nearly eight newspaper pages. Small wonder, then, that Congress struggled with it from the House hearings beginning January 7, 1921, to its final passage by the Senate, September 19, 1922, and its signature by the President two days later. Obviously, a bill of this magnitude cannot be adequately treated in a magazine article.

Among the favorable features of this supposedly scientific tariff law may be mentioned its administrative provisions, which, according to S. G. Van Hoesen, Chairman of the Customs Committee of the New York Merchants' Association, will simplify procedure and afford relief to importers in case of errors, which they did not have before. There will be those who differ from President Harding's judgment that the elastic provision of the bill will prove "the greatest contribution toward progress in tariffmaking in a century," but that it may afford relief from rates which prove too burdensome is not to be denied. Under this provision manufacturers, importers, and other interested persons may apply to either the President or the Tariff Commission for changes in rates or valuation bases, and the President may, with the approval of the Commission, which is to be enlarged, make changes within a range of fifty per cent of the tax imposed under the law. It is to be doubted if the President realized at the time the bombardment of applications for changes that will descend upon his head.

Opponents of the bill and some legal authorities predict an unprecedented amount of litigation growing out of this "elastic" provision by which the Presient instead of Congress will make iff rates, which is said to be uncon

The dye embargo is dead for this session. Congress could understand an embargo, though it may be doubted if any other than an expert chemist can understand all of the polysyllabic labyrinth of words and figures comprising the chemical schedule. There are lapses from the protective principle in the bill. Leather coverings for the feet are free, leather coverings for the hands are taxed up to 70 per cent. Wood shingles are free, metal roofing is highly taxed. The printer's linotype is free, the housewife's sewing machine is dutiable. The contest over rates and the methods by which agreement was reached have strengthened the sentiment for taking tariff making out of Congress and placing it in the hands of qualified experts, if such can be found.

How will the new tariff affect the fortunes of our people? There are too many factors of uncertain trend to make detailed prophecies of any value. Already Chicago reports an upward revision in dry goods prices, but this may be credited to increased wages and higher prices of raw materials as well as the tariff. Also, Ivy L. Lee returns from Europe and tells Philadelphia bankers that cotton would be selling for 40 to 50 cents a pound if Europe could buy. But Europe has no dollars wherewith to buy, and under the provisions of the new law is unlikely to get any undue number of them. The European food situation is bad, too, but Europe

Germany in particular is badly off for food, but with a quarter trillion of marks already circulating and more issuing at the rate of twenty billion a week, she has broken her financial emergency brake and is slipping down hill for an upset. And German finances affect all Europe.

Tariffs and tariff making in their international aspects have been insufficiently discussed. The British have been startled at the passage of the new law, for they expected radical changes in it. They feel that it will not entirely exclude British goods, however, since shipments of these afford the only means by which the British war debt or interest thereon can be paid. But Lancashire is discouraged. French papers are bitter, contrasting our expressed solicitude for European recovery with this blow at European trade and industry. They also assert that we have cut off means of paying the debts owed us. Mr. Huntington Adams in an article in a New York newspaper sets forth that all the monetary gold outside the United States amounts to but $4,680,000,000, of which our debtors have only $1,720,000,000, and asks how the debts can be paid unless they can create here the credits necessary for their payment. Sir Robert Horne, British Chancellor, is coming here in October to fund the British debt, and perhaps the Government officials will be able to explain this to him.

That the whole question of international trade and exchange is in a critical condition is apparent from Lord Robert Cecil's assertion at Geneva that the economic situation is linked up with disarmament and that disarmament depends on a solution of the international debts. Of course the League knew this before, but it is disconcerting to have the fact advertised just now, while it is still trying to gather the nations together as a hen gathers her chickens.

The consensus of foreign opinion is that we will find we have hurt our own trade quite as much as we have injured that of others. Yet the Department of Commerce is engaged in a world-wide campaign to extol the merits of American products in order to expand our foreign trade, and the proposal to extend foreign credits to facilitate foreign buying is renewed.

We are told that the passage of this new tariff law was necessary because of the debased currencies and lower costs of manufacture in Europe. In the years since the war began our exports have exceeded our imports by 22 billions of dollars, and the balance still runs heavily the same way. In the debate on the tariff 74 exhibits of cheap German

gests that future defense is to be inspired by compensation rather than consciousness of duty to flag and country.

Mr. Harding apparently believes that the passage of the Adjusted Compensation Act would not obviate the need, real or political, of a later passage of pension legislation similar to that which has followed all our wars in the past:

It is to be remembered that the United States played no self-seeking part in the World War and pursued an unselfish policy after the cause was won. We demanded no reparation for the cost involved, no payments out of which obligations to our soldiers could be met. I have not magnified the willing outlay in behalf of those to whom we have a sacred obligation. It is essential to remember that a more than $4,000,000,000 pledge to the able-bodied ex-service men now will not diminish the later obligations which will have to be met when the younger veterans of to-day shall contribute to the rolls of the aged, indigent, and dependent.

It is as inevitable as that the years will pass that pension provision for World War veterans will be made, as it had been made for those who served in previous wars. It will cost more billions than I venture to suggest. There will be justification when the need is apparent, and a rational financial policy to-day is necessary to make the nation ready for the expenditure which is certain to be required in the coming years. The contemplation of such a policy is in accord with the established practice of the nation, and puts the service men of the World War on the same plane as the millions of men who fought the previous battles of the Republic.

We trust that, with or without an adjusted compensation act, the country will never again witness such a pension scandal as followed the Civil War. Probably the President is right in saying that some form of pension system is

inevitable, but there have been abuses of our pension system in the past which should never be permitted to recur again. Indeed, the War Risk insurance plan, which the Government had the foresight to adopt, was supposed to obviate the need of an alms-like pension system.

THE VETO SUSTAINED

As readers of The Outlook know, the House voted to overrule the President's veto by a vote of 258 to 54. The Senate voted to sustain the veto by a margin of four votes. Among the Republican Sena

tors who voted to override the veto were Senators Capper, Cummins, Kellogg, La Follette, Lenroot, Lodge, and McCumber. Seventeen Democrats joined their Republican colleagues in an attempt to overrule the President. Among them were Senators Culberson, Heflin, Hitchcock, and Reed.

There were twenty-one Republicans who voted to sustain the veto, and they included Senators Borah, Calder, Moses, Newberry, Pepper, Smoot, and Wadsworth. Senators Williams, Glass, Owen, and Underwood were among the seven Democrats to vote to sustain the veto.

PEAKING before his organization a month or so ago, the President of the Bankers' Association of the State which has the highest per capita wealth in the Union said, "To say that our country cannot afford to adjust in some small measure the difference in compensation between the man who went to war and the man who stayed at home is to indict us for incompetence and to impeach us for ingratitude." The offering of a man's life and his services with the colors at least should receive equal consideration with the services of contractors, manufacturers, railways, and shipping interests. These obligations have been or are being paid, and they are undoubtedly proper debts, but the obligation to the veteran still remains and will remain until some adjustment is made. The Nation stands behind us when we say that the economic handicap of the veteran is not the Nation's intention or wish. Its representatives in Congress time and again have expressed this feeling by the passage of this legislation by large majori

ties. President Harding has prevented its enactment into law. Heretofore he has stated that he believed some such legislation should be passed. He asked that a revenue feature be part of the measure. He now suggests that a pension system in the future would be the proper solution.

The American Legion feels and always has felt that if benefit to the veterans concerned were provided now, no great pension system, except for the disabled, would be necessary during the coming years to meet their handicap. Not only would immediate adjustment save the Nation billions of dollars, but it would restore the faith of men sorely tried by what they feel to be National ingratitude and injustice.

The battle for adjusted compensation has only just begun. The President has made the task doubly hard, but no one can stand between the wish of the people and fulfillment of what they believe to be a just obligation. The first bills introduced in the next session of Congress will be for adjusted compensation. Postponement for a few months will only strengthen the measure, and we shall win this fight. We are right, and right always prevails in America. HANFORD MACNIDER.

T

"OUR BUSINESS "

HE seeds of the present trouble in the Middle East were sown be fore the Great War. The naval and military aspects of a possible war with Germany were carefully studied in Great Britain in pre-war days by the Committee of Imperial Defense, but no special attention was devoted to conditions likely to arise out of a war against Turkey in alliance with Germany. The result was that, when Turkey came into the war, the Mesopotamian and Dardanelles campaigns were launched by inde pendent authorities without considering the war situation as a whole, the mili

tary resources available, or the probable aftermath of our war strategy. Our failures in the Dardanelles and in the early stages of the Mesopotamian campaign landed us in a difficult situation, which was retrieved, partly by General Maude in Mesopotamia, and finally by Allenby's brilliant campaign in Palestine and Syria. Turkey was knocked out, and ready to agree to any terms if they could be enforced without delay. The delays have been interminable, and we are still technically at war with Turkey. The situation is now serious.

The trouble began with the extension

of Greek territory over a large portion of Asia Minor under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, which has never been ratified. It was chiefly on this account that the Nationalist Turks under Mustapha Kemal defied the Constantinople Government and started their campaign in Anatolia. This brings us to our own part in the matter. We accepted the military responsibility for keeping the Dardanelles and Bosphorus open to the sea-traffic of the whole world. There were heavy drains at the time upon our military resources to provide for contingencies in India, in Mesopotamia, in

Palestine, in Egypt, in the Rhinelands, and in Ireland, in addition to the nor mal demands upon our army to provide the usual oversea garrisons. The security of the Straits, as we were told by Mr. Lloyd George when the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres were published, was "our business." America was unwilling to accept the responsibility. Neither France nor Italy could spare the troops, so we undertook to provide them. We are still doing so.

Unfortunately, soon after we undertook the responsibility, we found that we could not, out of our own resources, provide a sufficiently strong force to secure both the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus against attacks by Kemalist National troops from the Asiatic side, and we were obliged to call in the aid of the Greeks, who responded with enthusiasm. Unfortunately, the British public at the time was much occupied with home affairs and heartily sick of everything to do with warfare. The press and Parliament devoted scarcely any attention to a situation pregnant with possibilities. In pre-war days press correspondents of the first rank would have swooped down upon the spot, and we should have had constant and reliable information. As matters were we only received information tainted at the source by Greek, Turkish, and Bolshevik propagandists. We gathered that the Greek troops had helped to drive back the Kemalists and insure the security of the Bosphorus. The next thing we heard was that Greek troops were landing at various places in the Sea of Marmora under the guns of British war vessels. Then that the Greek army was undertaking a campaign on a large scale in Asia Minor, far beyond the limits of the territory assigned to Greece by the Sèvres Treaty. We heard of friction with Italian troops on their southern flank, and, later on, of the withdrawal of the Italians from Asia Minor. A definite statement was published, said to emanate from the Greek General Staff, that the Greek army was embarking on the campaign at the request of the British Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople. That statement I do not believe. Then came Greek successes, and a refusal to make peace. Then the French treaty with the Kemalists, affecting most seriously our military position in Mesopotamia by surrendering to the Turks territory forming a corridor to its frontiers. Then came the understanding between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks, the betrayal of Armenia, and now the débâcle of the Greek armies in Asia Minor and the occupation of Smyrna by the Turks. Such, in brief terms, is the history of the policy which has led up to the present situation in the Asiatic side of the Straits, the defense of which has been proclaimed to be "our busi

ness."

From our point of view the situation is as it was before we called in the aid of the Greeks. The security of the

Straits may be threatened from the Asiatic side by Kemalist forces. What could they do to interfere with the free passage of merchant shipping through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus? The war, if there is to be one, will be an amphibious war if ever there was one: and this time let us hope that we shall not forget that war vessels cannot climb mountains. The land on both sides abounds in cover, in hills, underfeatures, and woody scrub. Communications, essential to the maintenance of armies of any appreciable size, are deficient on the Asiatic side. The railway from Ismid to Scutari, opposite to Constantinople, is the most important. It is exposed throughout its length to bombardment from the sea. There is also the short line from Brusa to Mudania on the coast, and the line from Smyrna to Panderma. Sea transport is easy, land transport is difficult. This fact, if intelligently applied, puts us on interior lines and enables us to make effective use of such troops as may be available. They can move faster by sea than by land. Responsibility for maintaining order in Constantinople is a handicap that must be accepted. The conditions of the problem are that we have sufficient naval forces on the spot to contro! the sea communications, but troops will be needed if there should be any attempts by hostile forces to approach the shores of the Straits to snipe at passing steamers, or to harass them with mobile gun or howitzer fire. Former experience of gunfire from the sea against such pieces, if well concealed, is not en couraging, but, with aircraft available. air observation should greatly increase its effectiveness. Such are the conditions of the problem if (this seems inconceivable) we are to be left to guard the Straits without the aid of other countries in whose interests they are guarded.

So far allusion has been made only to

the Asiatic side. The Nationalist Turks are also credited with a determination to regain Turkish dominion in Thrace, especially over Adrianople, and to do away with foreign control over Constantinople and the belt of territory now administered by the Allies on each side of the Straits. Thrace is in occupation of a Greek army which only a few weeks ago was knocking at the gates of the Chataldja Lines covering Constantinople. There is at present no reason to suppose that the Greeks will be unable to deal with any situation that may arise. As regards ourselves, we have been given a peep into the enemy's brain. The policy both of the Kemalists and of their allies the Bolsheviks has been, and will be, to try to create trouble in other regions, in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, and in India, with a view to forcing us to use there the military resources needed to maintain "our business," the security of the Straits for the flags of all nations.

If the world is to have the longed-for peace, the essential condition is to secure united action between the countries most concerned, France, Italy, ourselves, and, let us hope, America. If this combination can once more be restored, then the abandonment, in the face of military defeat, of Greek ambitions for territorial expansion in Asia Minor may, after all, come to be a blessing in disguise. That statement is made solely from the point of view of naval and military (commonly called amphibious) strategy. I have not touched the urgent question of protecting the Christians in Asia Minor We have neither the financial nor the fighting resources to save them from what, judging from precedents, may mean wholesale massacre. We cannot, without the whole-hearted support of other nations, make their protection "our business."

Court House, Lower Woodford, Salisbury, England, September 13, 1922.