to be themselves independent forces, capable of exercising a reflex action upon facts. But as they contemplate the contradictory states of peace and war, and have no inherent reference to any third relation in which countries can stand to one another, international facts of recent growth are obliged to pay a divided allegiance, and to accommodate themselves to principles which cannot be brought into harmonious working with each other. Not only, therefore, is the usage which governs the conduct of neutrals and belligerents often inconsistent with itself, but there are even two broadly divided tendencies of opinion as to its right basis, of which one prefers the interests of the neutral and the other those of the belligerent.' However unfortunate the existence of these divergent tendencies may be, they are equally defensible theoretically on the fundamental principles with which the law of neutrality is bound to conform; and as it is beyond the province of the international lawyer to settle precedence between the interests of neutrals and belligerents, he must leave to moralists and to statesmen the task of deciding which of the two are the more worthy of encouragement, and therefore which theoretic tendency is to be preferred. The antecedent principles of which I speak may be stated in the following propositions: 1. Sovereignty is the status of a society which has the exclusive power of making and enforcing law within the territory occupied by it, and which is subject to no control in its relations with other societies. 2. All states are sovereign; and so far as neutrals are concerned, sovereignty is an attribute of communities in the enjoyment of belligerent privileges. 3. The sea, with the exception of certain portions conventionally attached to the countries bordering upon it, is not under the sovereignty of any nation; upon it, therefore, the rights of all nations are equal. 4. A belligerent may put such stress upon his enemy as the customs of war permit in his own, or in his enemy's country, and in all other places not under the sovereignty of any third power. These propositions are perfectly consistent with one another so long as the entire civilised world is in a state of peace or war; but so soon as some countries only are at war while others remain in a state of amity with the belligerents, the right of maritime hostility is found to clash with that which makes the sea a common field for the use of all nations. It has been thought impossible to force an enemy possessed of a seaboard into submission without interfering with the access of the neutral to his friend, and with the trade which is carried on between them. Belligerents, therefore, on the ground of their right to injure an enemy, have arrogated to themselves a series of privileges which amount to an exercise of qualified dominion at sea. At the same time, the highest attribute of a state, that of sovereignty itself, has become a root of neutral duty, and in the interests of belligerents imposes obligations not altogether consistent with full liberty of choice as to the degree in which a people may exercise it. It is obviously an incident of sovereignty that every people possessing it has the right of determining what kind and amount of intercourse it will maintain with foreign nations, and that it may choose to mark out one as an object for greater friendship than another. In time of peace it is easy to accord such preference and to remain, nevertheless, on terms of perfect amity with less favoured countries. But during war privileges tend ing to strengthen the hands of one of two belligerents help him towards the destruction of his enemy. To grant them is not merely to show less friendship to one than to the other; it is to refuse friendship altogether to one and to assume an attitude with respect to him of at least passive hostility. If therefore a people desires not to be the enemy of either belligerent, its amity must be colourless in the eyes of both; in its corporate capacity as a state it must abstain altogether from mixing itself up in the quarrel. And in the older and more rudimentary theory neutrality was confined within this limit. But at this point sovereignty is now introduced to affect neutrals with more stringent obligations. tion of duties of states. § 4. As to a sovereign state belongs the sole right The relato decide what acts shall or shall not be openly done sovereignwithin its limits, all countries are supposed on the ty to the one hand to be jealous of any infringement of that neutral right; and on the other, as no stranger can look behind the fact of sovereignty, to be able to secure that it shall be respected. It would neither be likely nor is it found to be the fact that nations, in matters connected principally with their own interests, regard with patience any exercise of authority or of force within their territories independently of their own sanction. If therefore a people is found to acquiesce in conduct injurious to its friends; if it permits a belligerent to use its lands or its harbours as the scene of hostile action, or the basis of hostile preparation, a violent presumption is raised that its neutrality is unreal, and that it deliberately intends under the mask of equal friendship to help the belligerent who has committed an unpunished offence. The reasoning which applies to strangers applies also to subjects. As the presumption that a sovereign has control over avowed acts done within his do C V The rights of bellige. rents in neutral trade. minions is still stronger in the case of subjects than of foreigners, if any acts are done by them which are in opposition to his declared policy, it is easier to believe the declaration to be false than the power to be inadequate. On the other hand, no government can exercise an inquisitorial surveillance over all the doings of persons living within its jurisdiction, and it therefore becomes a question at what point the responsibility of a state ceases in respect of concealed acts. As sovereignty brings with it duties, so also it supplies their measure. No state can be asked to take cognizance of what occurs outside its own borders; in another country it cannot, and on the sea it need not act; there it washes its hands of responsibility. It is not expected to follow its subjects beyond its jurisdiction to protect a belligerent; of whatever hostile conduct its subjects may be guilty, his remedy is upon them personally, and not upon the nation to which they belong. § 5. Although the privilege of interference with neutral commerce which belligerents have been allowed to appropriate does not spring from the cessation of state control at the frontier of state territory, it is to a large extent connected with it. There are only two ways in which trade injurious to the operations of a belligerent can be restrained. Either the neutral sovereign may be responsible for the conduct of his subjects or the belligerent may himself be entrusted with the necessary power. The grave and obvious inconveniences inseparable from the former method1 would have secured its rejection 1 No power can exercise such an effective control over the actions of each of its subjects as to prevent them from yielding to the temptations of gain, at a dis No tance from its territory. if the impatience of belligerents had not denied it the opportunity of trial; but the actual practice in fact arose because it was easy for the belligerent to protect himself by summary action, while it was not easy for the neutral sovereign to give him an equal security. The origin of the privilege was lawless, but existing custom fortunately gives effect to a real distinction which separates non-neutral acts, with which the state is identified, from commercial acts done by individuals from which a belligerent suffers. between mercial acts of the individual. An act of the state which is prejudicial to the Distinction belligerent is necessarily done with the intent to state act injure; but the commercial act of the individual and comonly affects the belligerent accidentally. It is not directed against him; it is done in the way of business, with the object of getting a business profit, and however injurious in its consequences, it is not instigated by that wish to do harm to a particular person which is the essence of hostility. It is prevented because it is inconvenient, not because it is a wrong; and to allow the performance by a subject of an act not in itself improper cannot constitute a crime on the part of the state to which he belongs. Trade between a neutral individual and a belligerent, which is prejudicial to the operations of a country at war, not being in itself wrong, even in the qualified sense in which non-neutral national acts can be said to be venient to intrust the party injured by such aggressions with the power of checking them. This arrangement seems beneficial to all parties; for it answers the chief end of the law of nations, checking injustice without the necessity of war. Endless hostilities would result from any other arrangement. If a government were to be made responsible for each act of its |